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Foreign Relations of the United States

The Conference
at Quebec
1944



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PREFACE

This volume of documents on the Second Quebec Conference (1944) completes the special series of *Foreign Relations* volumes on the World War II conferences attended by President Roosevelt or President Truman, along with Prime Minister Churchill or Marshal Stalin, or both of the latter. Volumes previously published in this series were entitled *The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943; The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943; The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943; The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945; and The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945.*

Richardson Dougall, Deputy Director of the Historical Office, was the principal editor of the present volume. Substantial preliminary work was done by Arthur G. Kogan, Richard S. Patterson, and Irving L. Thomson. The volume was reviewed by the undersigned.

The technical editing of the volume was the responsibility of the Publishing and Reproduction Services Division, Jerome H. Perlmutter, Chief.

In order to make this volume as complete and accurate as possible, the editor supplemented the documentation and data available in the Department of State by obtaining source material and information from a number of agencies outside the Department. The Historical Office would like to express its sincere appreciation for their assistance. Particular acknowledgment is made of the extensive help received from the Historical Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York, and from the Treasury Department. Material from the manuscript collections listed in the Introduction to the volume has been included with the kind permission of the respective owners and archival authorities, and quotations from published works have been reproduced with the generous permission of the copyright owners. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office graciously made available a number of Quebec papers which were referred to in United States documentation but which could not be located in American files. The photographs were supplied through the courtesy of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and the United States Army Audio-Visual Agency.

WILLIAM M. FRANKLIN
Director, Historical Office
Bureau of Public Affairs

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INTRODUCTION

SCOPE OF COVERAGE

This volume presents documentation relating to the ninth conference participated in by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill after the United States became a belligerent in World War II—the Second Quebec Conference of September 11–16, 1944, also known by its code name, OCTAGON—together with papers on the Roosevelt–Churchill conversations which took place at Hyde Park, New York, immediately following the Quebec Conference.

Advisers, both civilian and military, assisted Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec. The conferees were concerned with planning for the final stages of the war both in Europe and in the Far East, so that documentation on military subjects bulks large. But Prime Minister Mackenzie King, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Lord Cherwell, and Sir Alexander Cadogan participated in the top-level political discussions at Quebec, in preparation for which the State, War, and Treasury Departments prepared a considerable amount of background documentation. Additional and extensive background information on the subjects discussed at Quebec has previously been published in the annual volumes of *Foreign Relations of the United States* and in the series *United States Army in World War II*, published by the Department of the Army.

ORGANIZATION OF THE VOLUME

The volume opens with a chapter on agenda and arrangements for the Second Quebec Conference, followed by a chapter containing substantive preparatory papers, divided among eight subjects. This chapter includes pre-conference papers later circulated or discussed at Quebec as well as official background memoranda and recommendations prepared specifically for possible use at Quebec. These background chapters are followed in turn by a log of the President's visit to Canada.

The chapter on proceedings of the OCTAGON Conference is organized chronologically by meetings. Every meeting known to have been attended by a senior American official is accounted for. All minutes and memoranda of conversation at the international level

are included; where none was found, the editor has supplied an editorial note embodying what information was available on that particular meeting. There were no general meetings of the United States delegation, but information on President Roosevelt's consultations with his advisers has been included. The chapter on proceedings is followed by the conference documents and related papers, arranged by subject, concluding with the final documents of the OCTAGON Conference.

At the end of the Second Quebec Conference, Prime Minister Churchill visited the President at the latter's home at Hyde Park on September 18-19, 1944. The final chapter of the present volume includes all the documentation that has been found relating to their conversations there.

UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

Since the Second Quebec Conference dealt to a very large extent with questions outside the jurisdiction of the Department of State, the editor sought and obtained the assistance of several other Government departments and agencies in gathering much of the source material for this publication. Of particular importance were the Presidential papers in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park; the papers of Presidential Assistant Harry L. Hopkins and of Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., also located in the Roosevelt Library; military papers in the files of the Department of Defense (principally in the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff); papers on financial questions and on the postwar treatment of Germany in the files of the Treasury Department; and documents on cooperation with the United Kingdom in the field of atomic energy research in the files of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. The Roosevelt Library provided photocopies of all Roosevelt, Hopkins, and Morgenthau papers that could be found relating to the Quebec Conference. The Department of Defense provided all papers that could be found documenting the official position or advice of the War Department on politico-military subjects discussed at the international level, as presented by the civilian leaders of that department and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as well as excerpts from the minutes of a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Quebec which were needed for an understanding of the international discussions.

The papers printed in this volume which are in the Central Files of the Department of State are indicated by means of a file number in the headnote, in the usual style of *Foreign Relations*. The provenance of papers obtained from other sources is also shown in headnotes, as indicated on the following list:

A. INSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. *Lot 55 D 375*.—An unindexed collection of files of the United States Delegation to the European Advisory Commission.
2. *Notter File*.—A collection of materials assembled in the office of the late Harley A. Notter containing information on wartime planning for an international security organization to be formed at the end of the war. This collection has been used for memoranda by Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., on the Dumbarton Oaks conversations as they related to preparations for the Second Quebec Conference.

B. OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. *A.E.C. Files*.—The files of the United States Atomic Energy Commission.
2. *Cherwell Papers*.—The papers of Lord Cherwell, deposited in the Library of Nuffield College, Oxford.
3. *Department of the Army Files*.—Files for 1944 of the War Department, now under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Army.
4. *Habsburg Papers*.—The papers of Dr. Otto von Habsburg.
5. *Hopkins Papers*.—The papers of Harry L. Hopkins, deposited in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park.
6. *J.C.S. Files*.—The files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These files provided documentation of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the American-British Combined Chiefs of Staff. The approval of the British Chiefs of Staff, along with that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was obtained for declassification of the Combined Chiefs of Staff documentation published in this volume.
7. *Leahy Papers*.—The diary of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, deposited in the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress.
8. *Morgenthau Papers*.—The papers of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., deposited in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park. The phrases "Morgenthau Diary" and "Morgenthau Presidential Diary" have been used to identify more closely the location of some of the materials used from the Morgenthau Papers.
9. *Roosevelt Papers*.—The papers of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, deposited in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park.
10. *Stimson Papers*.—The papers of Henry L. Stimson, deposited in the Yale University Library.
11. *Treasury Files*.—The files of the Treasury Department.

PUBLISHED SOURCES

A. OFFICIAL

In addition to *Foreign Relations of the United States*, the Department of State *Bulletin*, and the various series of international treaties

and agreements published by the Department of State, the official publications listed below were found to be of particular value in the preparation of this volume. Other official publications consulted by the editor are identified in editorial notes and footnotes.

SOURCES PUBLISHED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

- Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy, 1943-1945* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), in the series *United States Army in World War II: The War Department*.
- Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, editors, *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, prepared by the U.S. Air Force Historical Division, volume III, *Europe: Argument to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). Hereafter cited as "Craven and Cate".
- Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), in the series *United States Army in World War II: The War Department*. Hereafter cited as "Matloff".
- Morgenthau Diary (Germany)*, prepared by the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session, committee print (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), 2 volumes. Hereafter cited as *Morgenthau Diary (Germany)*.
- Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), in the series *United States Army in World War II: China-Burma-India Theater*. Hereafter cited as "Romanus and Sunderland".

SOURCES PUBLISHED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

- John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, volume V, *August 1943-September 1944* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), in the series *History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Military Series*. Hereafter cited as "Ehrman".
- H. Duncan Hall, *North American Supply* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office and Longmans, Green and Co., 1955), in the series *History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Civil Series*. Hereafter cited as "Hall".
- W. K. Hancock and M. M. Gowing, *British War Economy* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949), in the series *History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Civil Series*. Hereafter cited as "Hancock and Gowing".
- Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945*, volume III, *Victory* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961), in the series *History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Military Series*. Hereafter cited as "Webster and Frankland".
- Sir Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962), in the series *History of the Second World War*. Hereafter cited as "Woodward".

SOURCE PUBLISHED BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commission for the Publication of Diplomatic Documents, *Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R. and the Presidents of the U. S. A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945* (Moscow,

Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957). This two-volume work has been republished in the United States, with the original title pages and the original pagination but bound in one volume with a new preliminary title page bearing the title *Stalin's Correspondence With Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941-45* (New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1958). Hereafter cited as *Stalin's Correspondence*. For the Russian-language edition of the same work, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Commission for the Publication of Diplomatic Documents, Переписка Председателя Совета Министров СССР с Президентами США и Премьер-Министрами Великобритании во Время Великой Отечественной Войны, 1941-1945 гг. (Moscow, State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1957).

B. UNOFFICIAL

Much authoritative information is to be found in unofficial publications written by those who participated in the Second Quebec Conference or by authors who have used the papers of conference participants. In view of the incompleteness of the official record in many respects, the editor has cited such unofficial publications frequently for factual information not found in official files. The Department of State assumes no responsibility for the accuracy of fact or interpretation in these unofficial publications. The principal publications of this type which have been consulted in the preparation of this volume are listed below. Other works consulted on particular points are identified in editorial notes and footnotes at the appropriate places.

- H. H. Arnold, *Global Mission* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949). Hereafter cited as "Arnold".
- John Morton Blum, *From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of War, 1941-1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967). Hereafter cited as "Blum".
- Arthur Bryant, *Triumph in the West: A History of the War Years Based on the Diaries of Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1959). Hereafter cited as "Alanbrooke".
- Alexander Cadogan, *The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, O.M., 1938-1945*, ed. by David Dilks (London: Cassell and Company, 1971). Hereafter cited as "Cadogan".
- Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948-1953), 6 volumes.
 Volume V, *Closing the Ring*. Hereafter cited as "Churchill, *Closing the Ring*".
 Volume VI, *Triumph and Tragedy*. Hereafter cited as "Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*".
- Viscount Cunningham, *A Sailor's Odyssey: The Autobiography of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope* (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1951). Hereafter cited as "Cunningham".
- John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Co-operation With Russia* (New York: The Viking Press, 1947). Hereafter cited as "Deane".
- Anthony Eden, *The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon: The Reckoning* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965). Hereafter cited as "Eden".
- William D. Hassett, *Off the Record With F.D.R., 1942-1945* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1958). Hereafter cited as "Hassett".

- Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, volume II (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948). Hereafter cited as "Hull".
- Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1952). Hereafter cited as "King".
- William D. Leahy, *I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time* (New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1950). Hereafter cited as "Leahy".
- Lord Moran, *Churchill, Taken From the Diaries of Lord Moran: The Struggle for Survival, 1940-1965* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966). Hereafter cited as "Moran".
- Henry Morgenthau, Jr., *Germany Is Our Problem* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945).
- Gerald Pawle, *The War and Colonel Warden: Based on the Recollections of Commander C. R. Thompson, Personal Assistant to the Prime Minister, 1940-1945* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963). Hereafter cited as "Pawle".
- J. W. Pickersgill and D. F. Forster, *The Mackenzie King Record*, volume 2, 1944-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968). Hereafter cited as "Pickersgill and Forster".
- Franklin D. Roosevelt, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1944-45* volume, *Victory and the Threshold of Peace*, compiled by Samuel I. Rosenman (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950). Hereafter cited as "Rosenman".
- Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History*, revised edition (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950). Hereafter cited as "Sherwood".
- General Sikorski Historical Institute, *Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations*, volume II, 1943-1945 (London: Heinemann, 1967). Hereafter cited as *Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations*.
- Joseph W. Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers* (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948). Hereafter cited as "Stilwell".
- Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947). Hereafter cited as "Stimson and Bundy".

EDITORIAL TREATMENT

In the preparation of this volume the editor has been guided by the regulations of the Department applicable to the *Foreign Relations* series, viz.:

1350 DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

1351 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

1352 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States* shall be edited by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State. The editing of the record shall be guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There shall be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing shall be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternatives presented to the Department before the decision was made.

1353 *Clearance*

To obtain appropriate clearance of material to be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, the Historical Office:

- a. Refers to the appropriate policy offices of the Department and of other agencies of the Government such papers as appear to require policy clearance.
- b. Refers to the appropriate foreign governments requests for permission to print as part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States those previously unpublished documents which were originated by the foreign governments.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, SYMBOLS, AND CODE NAMES

EDITOR'S NOTE.—This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage or unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified in footnotes to the text.

- AAF, Army Air Forces
 AEF, Allied Expeditionary Force
 AFHQ, Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta
 AGWar, Adjutant General, War Department
 ALUSNA, Office of the Naval Attaché
 AMCO, the President's telephone exchange at the Citadel, Quebec
 ANVIL, early plan for the invasion of southern France (final code name for which was DRAGOON)
 APA, transport, attack
 Avenger, naval torpedo bomber aircraft (United States)
- B-17, four-engine heavy bomber aircraft (Flying Fortress) (United States)
 B-24, four-engine heavy bomber aircraft (Liberator) (United States)
 B-29, four-engine very heavy bomber aircraft (Superfortress) (United States)
 Barracuda, naval torpedo bomber aircraft (British)
 BLACK, communications indicator used on messages sent to the White House Map Room by President Roosevelt and his party when the President was away from Washington
 BLUE, communications indicator used on messages sent to the White House Map Room by President Roosevelt when the latter was away from Washington
 BMA, British Military Authority
 BONIFACE, applied to certain information sent by Churchill to Roosevelt (British)
- C-54, four-engine transport aircraft (Skymaster) (United States)
 CAC, document symbol used by the Country Area Committees, Department of State
 CAL, communications indicator
 CAPITAL, attack across the Chindwin River to Mandalay
 CAPITAL I, first phase of CAPITAL
 CAPITAL II, second phase of CAPITAL
 CCC, Civilian Conservation Corps
 CCS, Combined Chiefs of Staff (United States-British); document symbol used by the Combined Chiefs of Staff
 CFB, military communications indicator
 CHAMPION, late 1943 plan for general offensive in Burma
 CIC, Combined Intelligence Committee (United States-British)
 COSSAC, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate)
 COSMED, communications indicator used on messages from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater
 CROSSBOW, the German pilotless aircraft offensive against England
 CVE, aircraft carrier, escort
- D + 14, etc., fourteen, etc., days after D Day
 D Day, the date of a planned military operation, used with special reference to the launching of Operation OVERLORD
 DRACULA, plan for an attack on Rangoon

- DRAGOON**, the invasion of southern France
- EAC**, European Advisory Commission
- ECEFP**, document symbol used by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy
- ESCOM**, Eastern Command (United States Army Air Forces in the Soviet Union)
- ETO**, European Theater of Operations
- ETOUSA**, European Theater of Operations, United States Army
- EUR**, Office of European Affairs, Department of State
- EUREKA II**, the forthcoming Roosevelt-Churchill conference
- EW**, European War
- EWI**, Eastern War Time
- FACS**, communications indicator used on messages from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force
- FAN**, communications indicator used on messages from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Allied Force Headquarters at Caserta
- FCNL**, French Committee of National Liberation
- FE**, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
- FEA**, Foreign Economic Administration
- FHCOS**, reference symbol used by the Chief of Staff, Allied Force Headquarters
- FIC**, French Indochina
- Former Naval Person**, Prime Minister Churchill
- FRANTIC**, shuttle bombing by United States Army Air Forces of Axis-controlled Europe from bases in the United Kingdom, Italy, and the Soviet Union
- FW**, file with
- Fwd**, forward
- FX**, military communications indicator
- GAF**, German Air Force
- Gestapo**, Secret State Police (German)
- GUNFIRE**, communications indicator used on telegrams to the British Government in London from the British Delegation to the Second Quebec Conference
- Halifax**, four-engine heavy bomber aircraft (British)
- HIGHBALL**, carriers employing Mosquito aircraft (British)
- HMCS**, His Majesty's Canadian Ship
- ILO**, International Labor Organization
- Ind**, Indian
- JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff (United States); document symbol used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- LAC**, communications indicator
- Lancaster**, four-engine heavy bomber aircraft (British)
- LSI**, landing ship, infantry
- LST**, landing ship, tank
- MEDCOS**, communications indicator used on messages from the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
- MIL**, military communications indicator (British)
- Mosquito**, two-engine light bomber aircraft (British)
- MR-IN**, communications indicator used on messages received by the White House Map Room
- MR-OUT**, communications indicator used on messages sent by the White House Map Room
- MS**, Milestone
- MULBERRY**, artificial harbor
- MX**, military communications indicator
- NAF**, communications indicator used on messages from Allied Force Headquarters at Caserta to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
- NEA**, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State
- NEI**, Netherlands East Indies

- NETER**, communications indicator used on messages relating to the Netherlands sent to the Department of State by the Embassy to the Governments in exile established at London
- NIACT**, night action (communications indicator requiring immediate attention on receipt)
- OCTAGON**, the forthcoming Roosevelt-Churchill conference; the Second Quebec Conference, September 11-16, 1944; Quebec; short form for **OCTAGON-OUT**
- OCTAGON-IN**, communications indicator used on messages received by the United States military communications center at the Second Quebec Conference
- OCTAGON-OUT**, communications indicator used on messages sent by the United States military communications center at the Second Quebec Conference
- OSS**, Office of Strategic Services
- OVERLORD**, the cross-channel invasion of northwestern Europe, June 1944
- OZ**, military communications indicator (British)
- P-40**, single-engine fighter aircraft (Warhawk) (United States)
- Phase II**, the period between the defeat of Germany and the surrender of Japan
- PLOUGH Force**, project for training United States and Canadian volunteers for snow operations in northern Norway
- PM**, Prime Minister
- POINTBLANK**, the combined bomber offensive against Germany from the United Kingdom
- POLES**, communications indicator used on messages relating to Poland sent to the Department of State by the Embassy to the Governments in exile established at London
- PR**, photo reconnaissance
- PRIME**, Prime Minister Churchill
- Prof**, Lord Cherwell
- PW**, Pacific War
- PWA**, Public Works Administration
- PWC**, document symbol used by the Committee on Post-War Programs, Department of State
- QUADRANT**, the First Quebec Conference, August 11-24, 1943; Quebec
- RAAF**, Royal Australian Air Force
- RAF**, Royal Air Force (British)
- RANKIN**, plans for an Allied return to the Continent in the event of a deterioration of the German position
- RANKIN B**, plan for Allied action in the event of an organized German withdrawal from Norway
- RANKIN C**, plan for Allied action in the event of German unconditional surrender and the cessation of organized German resistance in northwestern Europe
- RATWEEK**, operations of the Balkan Air Force, coordinated with those of Marshal Tito, against German communications in the Balkans
- RCNVR**, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve
- RED**, communications indicator used on messages sent by the White House Map Room to President Roosevelt when the latter was away from Washington
- REMAC**, communications indicator (British)
- RNVR**, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (British)
- S**, Office of the Secretary of State
- SA**, National Socialist Storm Troops (German)
- SAC**, Supreme Allied Commander
- SACMed**, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater
- SACSEA**, Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia
- SCAEF**, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force
- SCAF**, communications indicator used on messages from the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff

SEAC, Southeast Asia Command
SEXTANT, the Cairo Conferences,
November 22-26 and December 2-7,
1943

SHAEF, Supreme Headquarters,
Allied Expeditionary Force

SOE, Special Operations Executive
(British)

SS, National Socialist Elite Guard
(German); Special Service (Com-
mando) (British)

Stage II, period from the defeat of
Germany to the surrender of Japan

Stat, United States *Statutes at Large*

TA, *see* **TUBE ALLOYS**

TALISMAN, post-hostilities plans for
Germany

TOO, time of origin

TopSec, top secret

TUBE ALLOYS, atomic energy research
and development

U-boat, submarine

UJ, Uncle Joe, i.e., Stalin

UK, United Kingdom

Uncle Joe, Stalin

UNRRA, United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration

USSTAF, United States Strategic
Air Force

VANGUARD, plan for capture of Ran-
goon

VICTOR, United States Army telephone
exchange at the Château Frontenac,
Quebec

VLR, very long range

W, military communications indicator
WA, West African

Waffen SS, combat units of the Nation-
al Socialist Elite Guard (German)

WARX, military communications in-
dicator

WH, communications indicator used
on White House messages

WHITE, communications indicator used
on messages sent by the White
House Map Room to President
Roosevelt and his party when the
President was away from Washing-
ton

WM, document symbol used by the
War Cabinet (British)

WP, document symbol used by the
War Cabinet (British)

WPA, Works Progress Administration

WS, document symbol used by the
interdepartmental Working Security
Committee

WX, military communications indi-
cator

X craft, midget submarines (British)

Y Force, American-sponsored Chinese
division in Yunnan

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THE SECOND QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED
CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK

5. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

J. FINAL DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE—continued

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6. POST-CONFERENCE CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK

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THE SECOND QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED
CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK

6. POST-CONFERENCE CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK—Continued

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THE SECOND QUEBEC CONFERENCE
(September 11-16, 1944)

AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK
(September 18-19, 1944)

1. AGENDA AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt ¹

MOST SECRET

LONDON, March 18, 1944.

No. 624. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt most secret and personal.

1. Winant gave me your letter ² this morning. As you are so keen for the company of İnönü, I wonder whether you would care to spend Easter ³ with me at Bermuda. I can arrive there on the 5th and we could separate on the 11th or earlier if you are pressed. I would not suggest bringing the great staffs but only the principals on the scale with which we went to Teheran.⁴ It is not so much that there are new departures in policy to be taken but there is a need after more than 90 days of separation for checking up and shaking together.

2. I am hardening for OVERLORD as the time gets nearer. Perhaps Marshall will show you a telegram I sent him.⁵

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² i.e., a copy of a proposed letter from Roosevelt to President İnönü of Turkey. For information on the decision that this letter should not be delivered to İnönü, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, p. 821, fn. 15.

³ Easter in 1944 fell on April 9.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.

⁵ Not printed.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill ¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 20 March 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 506. Personal and secret. From the President for the Former Naval Person.

I am very angry with myself. The old attack of grippe having hung on and on, leaving me with an intermittent temperature, Ross ² decided about a week ago that it is necessary for me to take a complete rest

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² Vice Admiral Ross T. McIntire, Roosevelt's physician.

of about two or three weeks in a suitable climate which I am definitely planning to do beginning at the end of this month. I see no way out and I am furious.

It will therefore be impossible for me to get to a staff meeting in early April. I believe that such a meeting on the Teheran scale in early April would be most useful and if you agree I will send my Chiefs of Staff to Bermuda for that purpose at any time that suits your convenience.

I am glad you feel hardened about OVERLORD. Its accomplishment may synchronize with a real Russian break-through.

ROOSEVELT

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 21 March 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Number 629 most secret and personal. Your 506.²

1. I am indeed grieved and trust rest will do you good.
2. I do not think the staff meeting worthwhile without our being there.
3. I hope you are still planning your visit here for the great event³ after you are fully recovered.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² *Supra.*

³ The Allied invasion of Normandy (OVERLORD).

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 22 March 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 507. Personal and secret. From the President for the Former Naval Person.

Your 629² received and my Chiefs of Staff have been told.

I join you in hoping that we may arrange to have a meeting before the great event is launched.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² *Supra.*

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, May 25, 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt top secret and personal no. 680.

All this brings me to my great hope, which is that you will yourself be able to come over. It could not now I suppose be till after D Day as your movement would be taken as heralding it. But if you could start as soon as the signal has been given, the very greatest advantages might be derived from our close talks about all matters including any address to the Germans by you. This meeting is also becoming a practical necessity in respect of the Chiefs of Staff. We have the whole Far Eastern Campaign to discuss and our execution of our promise to help in it to the very utmost of our strength. We need you here so much as the great battle will be of a profound and heart-shaking character, not by any means only in its opening phase. The King will of course send you a formal invitation at any moment that you let me know. There is a very good place in London which would give you perfect safety and comfort. I greatly desire to see you again. It is six months since we met.²

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² The text of this paragraph, as printed, incorporates two corrections contained in Churchill's telegram No. 683 of May 27, 1944, to Roosevelt (Roosevelt Papers).

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 27 May 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 543. Personal and top secret. From the President for the Former Naval Person.

Your 680²

Conditions here will not permit of my visiting the U.K. shortly after D-day, and after consultation with my Joint Chiefs of Staff I do not believe that a full staff meeting at that time is necessary.

Small staff conversations can and will be conducted immediately after the attack is launched.

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² *Supra*.

At a later date after our forces are established on the Continent it does appear necessary to have a full Staff meeting to decide upon our future moves, and I hope and expect that it will then be possible for me to be present.

I join you in a hope that the present magnificent performance of our Forces in Italy will continue and inflict a major disaster upon the enemy. Things look well at this moment.

ROOSEVELT

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, May 28, 1944.

685. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt top secret and personal.

1. Cabinet and I are most grateful to you for your number 543² about my 680.³

2. I still think that a short visit is, above all things, desirable for the Staffs and above all for you, but any time after D+14 might be convenient to you, and would be received with rejoicing by us. I am delighted at what you say and that you are keeping this in view. Doctor Churchill informs you that a sea voyage in one of your great new battleships would do you no end of good.

¹ Channel of transmission to Washington not indicated; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Shangri La (a mountain camp in Maryland), as telegram No. RED 40.

² *Supra.*

³ *Ante*, p. 5.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 31 May 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 546. Personal and top secret. From the President for the Former Naval Person.

I should like very much to accept Dr. Churchill's advice to make a sea voyage in your direction and I hope to do so at a later date. Conditions here will not permit it shortly after D plus 14 as suggested by you.

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Developments of the OVERLORD campaign should point with some accuracy to the time when a meeting of the Combined Staff is necessary. I think we had best await developments of OVERLORD before making a decision as to the next full Staff meeting.

ROOSEVELT

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 1 June 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and top secret. Number 688. Your 546.²

5. I am indeed sorry to hear the long time that must elapse before we meet on your programme. When the immediate situation in OVERLORD clarifies I would make an effort to meet you at Quebec or Bermuda. The former seems easier if this were agreeable to you. It would probably be better for me not to come in to the United States as you approach the election crisis or our enemies might try to make mischief.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² *Supra*.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 4 June 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and top secret number 692.

10 I am deeply grieved that you cannot come before that very distant date.² Let me know if I can help matters by a journey.

PRIME

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Charlottesville, Virginia, in telegram No. RED 51. For the full text of this message, see Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 626.

² In a letter to Churchill dated May 20, 1944 (not printed), to which this telegram was a reply, Roosevelt had said: "I do not believe I can get away for over a month." (Roosevelt Papers)

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 20 June 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt personal and top secret number 707 your 564.²

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2. Your operations in the Pacific assume every day a more vehement and compulsive course. Admiral King gave me a full account in the several good talks I had with him. Everything went well at the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff.³

3. However, it is most desirable we have a meeting before October.⁴ How about August 20 at the Citadel Quebec? A week in those surroundings and cool air would do you no end of good.

4. Your troops are fighting magnificently and I should not think that Cherbourg would hold out long. Anyhow, the synthetic harbours, which are a miracle of rapid construction, would each of them handle more traffic than Cherbourg, and I hope you will honour one of them with your arrival.

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Hyde Park, New York, as telegram No. RED 77.

² Not printed.

³ The Combined Chiefs of Staff had held their 162d-166th meetings in England in the period June 10-15, 1944. With reference to these meetings and related activities and conversations, see Matloff, pp. 467-469; Alanbrooke, pp. 156-162; Arnold, pp. 504-512; Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 60-61; and King, pp. 547-553.

⁴ No message from Roosevelt to Churchill has been found which mentions the possibility of a meeting in October.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 28 June 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and Top Secret. Number 719.

.

2. I earnestly hope you will take all these² into consideration and then let me know what you think. A meeting will have to be arranged unless agreement can be reached by correspondence. I agree with you that a deadlock on fundamental questions of strategy would be a cruel injury to our soldiers, who are now fighting so vehemently side by side.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² Churchill, by "all these", meant a series of messages about the mounting of Operation ANVIL and possible alternative uses for the forces available in the Mediterranean. For the fullest expression of Churchill's views as contained in these messages, see Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 716-721.

For this reason a careful and patient discussion is indispensable and not an over-riding decision by either side.³

³ Roosevelt's reply to this message, dated June 29, 1944, does not allude to the desirability of a meeting with Churchill. For text, see Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 721-723.

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 14 July 1944.

C.C.S. 618

MACHINERY FOR COORDINATION OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET-BRITISH MILITARY EFFORT

1. The text of messages which have been exchanged between the Head of the British Military Mission in Moscow and the British Chiefs of Staff is contained in the Enclosure to this paper. The British Chiefs of Staff have asked us to pass these messages to the United States Chiefs of Staff and to explain that it is their firm opinion that the coordination of matters of military importance must rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and cannot be delegated to any theatre commander.

2. The British Chiefs of Staff agree that some machinery is necessary to coordinate the efforts of the Anglo-American forces on the one side and the Russians on the other, but feel that this is a matter which must be settled by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and that this can best be done at the next meeting of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff.

Enclosure

TOP SECRET

I. Following is the text of MIL 1582 (T.O.O. 121630¹) from General Burrows, Head of British Military Mission in Moscow, to British Chiefs of Staff.

"1. After conference yesterday with both ambassadors² and Deane letter in following sense was addressed to General Slavin over signatures of Deane and myself.

2. *Begins:* Stalin recently indicated to Harriman that it might be desirable to create some machinery through which the efforts of our respective forces could be co-ordinated.³

3. In view of the firm establishment of a bridgehead in France and the rapid advance of the Red Army we suggest that the moment to create this machinery has arrived.

¹ i.e., dated at 4:30 p.m., July 12, 1944.

² The British and American Ambassadors to the Soviet Union were Sir Archibald Clark Kerr and W. Averell Harriman, respectively.

³ According to Deane, pp. 152-153, Stalin made this proposal to Harriman on June 28, 1944.

4. General Eisenhower and General Marshall discussed this subject with Ambassador Harriman and agreed that the exchange of operational information will become increasingly important as the armies of our three countries converge and General Eisenhower is ready for us to come to England and discuss the establishment of an effective system.

5. We plan to leave for England about Monday, 17th July, and suggest that prior to our departure we should be given an opportunity to discuss this matter with Marshal Vassilevsky or General Antonov in order to be able to give General Eisenhower an indication of the Soviet views on this subject. *Ends.*[""]

.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 16 July 1944.

Prime Minister to President Personal and Top Secret No. 732.

When are we going to meet and where? That we must meet soon is certain. It would be better that U.J. came too. I am entirely in your hands. I would brave the reporters at Washington or the mosquitos of Alaska! Surely we ought now to fix a date and then begin negotiating with U.J. His Majesty's Government would wish to propose "EUREKA II" for the last ten days of August. For details see my immediately following telegram. Failing this, Casablanca, Rome or even Teheran present themselves and many other places too. But we two must meet and if possible three. Please let me have your ideas on all this.

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was en route from Washington to California, as telegram No. RED 134. Roosevelt had left the capital by train aboard the Presidential Special on July 13, 1944. He arrived at San Diego, California, on July 19; sailed for Hawaii on July 21; arrived at Pearl Harbor on July 26; sailed for Alaska on July 29; arrived at the Aleutian base of Adak on August 3; visited Kodiak and other points in Alaska; arrived at Puget Sound Navy Yard at Bremerton, Washington, on August 12 and delivered a radio address there on that date; boarded the Presidential Special again at Seattle, Washington, during the evening of August 12; and arrived back in Washington, D.C., on August 17.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 16 July 1944.

Prime Minister to President Personal and Top Secret No. 733.

We suggest that the first attempt should be to arrange a meeting between us three at Invergordon, where each could have his battleship

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was en route from Washington to California, as telegram No. RED 135.

as headquarters besides a suitable house on land. The King would entertain us before, after or during the meeting either at Langwell, which he could borrow from the Duke of Portland, or at Balmoral if a night journey is acceptable.² The weather might well be agreeable in Scotland at that time. Secrecy, if desired, and security in any case, can be provided. U.J. might be able to fly or could certainly come by sea in the *Royal Sovereign* which has now become a part of his fleet. Anyhow please let me know what you think. Remember you have my standing offer and Mackenzie King's for Quebec if that is easiest for you.

² Langwell and Balmoral are located in Caithness and Aberdeenshire, respectively. Of the two, Langwell is the more accessible from Invergordon.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET [ABOARD THE PRESIDENTIAL SPECIAL,] 17 July 1944.
PRIORITY

Number 585, personal and top secret, from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Your 732² and 733.³

I am half way across the continent and think this is the best opportunity to go through with this trip. This means I will not get back until between the fifteenth and twentieth of August. I ought to be a fortnight in Washington. I wholly agree that we three should meet but it would be a lot easier for me if we could make it the tenth or fifteenth of September. This is just before the Equinox. I am rather keen about the idea of Invergordon or a spot on the west coast of Scotland. I like the idea of the battleship. This would get me back in plenty of time for the election, although that is in the lap of the Gods. I am sending a telegram, as per my next, to Uncle Joe purely as a feeler.⁴ If he feels he cannot come you and I should meet anyway.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the White House Map Room; forwarded to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² *Ante*, p. 10.

³ *Supra*.

⁴ For Roosevelt's exchange of messages with Stalin on the possibility of a tripartite meeting, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 3-5. Roosevelt repeated to Churchill, in his telegram No. 586 (not printed), the text of the message sent to Stalin on July 17, 1944.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 26, 1944.

Personal and secret to the President from Harry L. Hopkins.

I have been thinking a good deal about the forthcoming conference. It seems to me it would have been to your advantage to have gone most anywhere to meet Uncle Joe and Churchill together but, in the light of Uncle Joe's message,² it seems to me that you have nothing to gain by going to see Churchill. The world will, I believe, construe a conference in England or Europe between you and Churchill alone as a political meeting with Russia out in the cold.

I assume that there are important matters which you might well want to take up with Churchill soon but I think it would be far better to have Churchill come to you rather than have you go to him at this particular time and I am inclined to believe that the sooner the conference could be held the better.

Obviously Uncle Joe wants the next meeting with you after Germany has collapsed.

HARRY

¹ Sent to Roosevelt in Hawaii. See *ante*, p. 10, fn. 1.

² The reference is to Stalin's negative reply of July 22, 1944, to Roosevelt's message of July 17 concerning a possible tripartite meeting. See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 4.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 4 August 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret.
Number 741.

As U.J. cannot come to OCTAGON,² would it not be well to invite Molotov?³

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then in Alaska, as telegram No. RED 234.

² No messages between Churchill and Roosevelt have been found explaining the appearance of the code word OCTAGON in their correspondence at this time.

³ The Map Room files indicate that Roosevelt did not reply to this message.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, August 5, 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret number 744.

Thank you so much for your 593.² Things are everywhere approaching a climax, and almost always a climax in our favour.

Please try to give me a firm date for OCTAGON as I have a lot to arrange.

I am sure your journey to the Pacific must have strengthened the already buoyant situation there. One of the most important things we have to settle when we meet is what you want us to do in the Japanese finale and how we can do it, and also, please, what we would like to do ourselves.

Am off to Normandy tomorrow morning, returning evening, and on Wednesday night³ I leave for 10 days or a fortnight for [with?] Wilson, Devers, and Alexander.⁴ I shall be in full touch all the time and will communicate as usual, which is saying a lot. Every good wish.

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then in Alaska, as telegram No. RED 245.

² Not printed.

³ August 9, 1944; but Churchill's departure was delayed.

⁴ Concerning Churchill's visit to Italy, August 11-28, 1944, see Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 86-127.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[U.S.S. "BALTIMORE",²] 8 August 1944.

PRIORITY

Personal and top secret for the Former Naval Person from the President. Number 595.

Thanks for your number 744.³ I am still in the Aleutians but will be back in Washington in ten days.

I hope you are right about the climax but I can not feel quite as optimistic in view of the distances involved both in France and on the Russian Front.

Can you give me one week more to consider all the implications of OCTAGON? My present thought is that, for many reasons you will

¹ Sent to the White House Map Room; forwarded to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² Roosevelt was en route from Kodiak Island to Auk Bay, Alaska. Concerning his whereabouts in the period July 13-August 17, 1944, see *ante*, p. 10, fn. 1.

³ *Supra*.

understand, it would be a mistake for me to go to Scotland especially in view of Uncle Joe's failure to come. My present inclination is to give greater consideration to Bermuda especially if we can make it a small meeting of Staffs and not a full Staff meeting as it was in Quebec.⁴ We could both live on our ships. As you know, domestic problems are unfortunately difficult for three months to come.

I hope you will have a grand trip and wish I could be with you.

Tell Clemmie⁵ I am hereby ordering you not to take unnecessary risks.

ROOSEVELT

⁴ i.e., at the First Quebec Conference. See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943.

⁵ Mrs. Churchill.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 8 August 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and top secret. Number 746.

1. I will certainly come to Bermuda at any time. We could make you very comfortable at Government House. I had preparations made some months ago for your personal convenience in every way. Whatever you wish in these matters will be agreeable to us.

2. By "climax" I did not mean "end".

3. Thank you for your very kind personal thoughts.

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then in Alaska, as telegram No. RED 265.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 8 August 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and top secret. Number 748.

My telegram number 746.²

I am sending you an amended version of my reply about OCTAGON on account of later information. Please therefore regard my telegram as cancelled.

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then in Alaska, as telegram No. RED 274.

² *Supra*.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 10 August 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and top secret number 750.

See my numbers 746² and 748.³

1. I have a very bad report on the climatic conditions in Bermuda in the first or second week of September. It is said to be extremely hot and steamy whether ashore or afloat. There is also a persistent southerly wind reported very sticky and unpleasant. I most deeply regret your inability to visit Scotland. The King seemed very much disappointed when I told him. However, I quite see that, with Stalin not coming, you may wish to defer this promised visit. I, therefore, recommend the QUADRANT area.⁴ Mackenzie King assured me he would be enchanted. I have no doubt all could be arranged to your comfort and convenience.

2. I agree about reduced staff on the Teheran scale,⁵ but I hope that the meeting will not be delayed beyond the early part of September. There are several serious matters in the military sphere which must be adjusted between our staffs. I, too, would greatly welcome a few frank talks with you on matters it is difficult to put on paper. We have to settle the part the British Empire should take in the war against Japan after Germany's unconditional surrender. The situation in Burma causes me much anxiety. We have suffered very heavy losses through disease and the prospect of the whole forces of the British Indian Army being tied down indefinitely in the worst part of the country is unattractive. Other tangled questions arise about the position of Alexander's army in Italy including whether it is to be bled white for DRAGOON and thus stripped of all initiative. It is impossible to resolve these thorny matters by correspondence and I am sure that, if we and the staffs were together, good working agreements could be reached.

3. It will be a very great pleasure for me to see you again. I do hope your tour has done you good. Let me know your wishes as soon as possible.

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then en route from Auk Bay, Alaska, to Bremerton, Washington, as telegram No. RED 290.

² *Ante*, p. 14.

³ *Supra*.

⁴ Quebec.

⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant
(Hopkins)*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 10 August 1944.

Prime Minister to Mr. Hopkins Top Secret and Personal.

1. I was on the point of telegraphing to the President about stage II² when I heard of your conversations with Campbell and Brand.³

2. I agree with you about the necessity of obtaining a directive from the President about stage II, which is a war period.

3. Much now turns on our meeting. The President has asked for a week more before giving a date and a rendezvous.⁴ He seems to be cooling off Scotland and talks of Bermuda. I am trying to persuade him to come to QUADRANT. The worst accounts are given of the Bermuda climate in September. Let us know what you advise at earliest. I was counting of course on your coming with him.⁵

4. It was my idea to discuss the question of a directive with him at this meeting.

5. Meanwhile I hope that he will be able to issue directions to all concerned so as to prevent decisions being taken regarding American programmes for munitions and other supplies.

6. Perhaps you will let me know in your reply whether in the light of the above you still think that you should have at once a detailed statement of our case. If so it will of course be furnished, but we are inclined to think, subject to your views, that it may be better to discuss it with you at the meeting.⁶

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² The phrases "stage II" and "phase II" refer to the furnishing of lend-lease aid in the period between the surrender of Germany and the surrender of Japan. For background on Anglo-American discussions on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, pp. 31 ff.; Hancock and Gowing, pp. 515 ff.; Hall, pp. 434-447.

³ No memoranda have been found of Hopkins-Campbell-Brand conversations on this subject.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 13.

⁵ In a telegram of July 20, 1944 (not printed), Hopkins had told Churchill that he hoped to be present at the proposed conference between Roosevelt and Churchill (Hopkins Papers).

⁶ Although Hopkins' reply to Churchill (*post*, p. 17) did not request the detailed statement referred to, Brand prepared a memorandum on the British position on August 14, 1944, and gave it to Hopkins. See *post*, p. 159.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[U.S.S. "CUMMINGS";²] 11 August 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 597 personal and top secret from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Your 750³ is received at sea. I also deeply regret my inability to come to Scotland for this meeting.

It appears now that I should be able to arrive in Quebec on the 10th or 11th of September for a meeting of the Combined Staff on the Teheran scale.

My consultations with the military and naval commanders in the Pacific area have been most interesting and valuable.⁴

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the White House Map Room as telegram No. BLUE 106; forwarded to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² Roosevelt was en route from Auk Bay, Alaska, to Bremerton, Washington. See *ante*, p. 10, fn. 1.

³ *Ante*, p. 15.

⁴ Concerning Roosevelt's conferences with MacArthur and Nimitz, July 27-28, 1944, see Matloff, p. 482; Leahy, pp. 250-251.

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 19, 1944.

Personal and secret to the Prime Minister from Harry L. Hopkins.

The President wishes to discuss military requirements for Phase II with you at your next meeting. This means that this matter is in *status quo* here for the present.

I am looking forward to seeing you and hope you are well.

HARRY

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated. This message was sent in reply to Churchill's telegram of August 10, 1944, *ante*, p. 16.

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON,² 23 August 1944.

Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins, personal, private, and top secret.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² The message originated in Rome but was sent via London.

For Stage 2 I should require to have with me Chancellor of Exchequer Anderson, Oliver Lyttelton and Lord Cherwell. These complicated discussions could take place side by side with military topics. It might also be well for Anderson and Cherwell to contact your people on TA.

For President's most secret personal information Alexander is going to make a considerable push in the near future, with what he has got left. You know, Harry, that I have here the Army of British Empire, British, Canadian, Australian, South African, and Indian. The airborne army is so [*also?*] representative of whole Empire. They are in grand fettle in spite of unsettlements caused to all ranks by pulling out of key elements, which has gone on for three months, but I hope their action will remind you they cannot possibly be left on side line during later phase of war. I could never consent to this.

I shall now probably come by Boeing,³ which gives me four or five days more in London and France, to which I must pay a visit.

Foresee enemy present policy of holding on to all ports to utmost while withdrawing under strong rearguard to Swiss frontier-Dijon-Paris line or farther make it most necessary we shall obtain port facilities and not be jammed up against autumn and winter gales, as is evidently the desire of Schickelgruber.⁴

Looking forward so much to seeing you and our great friend in near future.

³ i.e., by air.

⁴ Hitler.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 23 August 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 602, personal and top secret, from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Referring to our agreement that the OCTAGON Conference should be on the Teheran scale I find by consultation with my Chiefs of Staff with which I am in agreement that the Teheran scale on the American Staff included the four Chiefs of Staff with their eleven military assistants, a total of fifteen officers.²

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² In a letter of August 26, 1944, to Prime Minister Mackenzie King, Roosevelt stated: "... I am pleading with Winston not to bring a large staff with him. The meeting is supposed to be on the Teheran side where I had a staff of fifteen Americans and Winston had the same. This did not include our two or three personal aides." For the full text of this letter, see *F. D. R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945*, edited by Elliott Roosevelt assisted by Joseph P. Lash (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), vol. II, p. 1536.

I am therefore limiting those officers who will go to Quebec with me to fifteen, not counting Leahy, Watson, Brown and McIntire.

ROOSEVELT

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 23, 1944.

Personal and secret to the Prime Minister from Harry L. Hopkins.

I am quite sure that the President does not want to discuss supply problems relative to Stage II on such a formal basis as you indicate ¹ and that he would much prefer to have the initial discussion with you, to be followed later by appropriate conferences between representatives of our side and the group that would represent your government.

As you know the President is very anxious that the whole conference be limited to as few people as possible.

The news of the fall of Paris is very exciting to everyone in this country and we are looking forward to smashing the German Army this side of the Seine and giving it no rest until they can get to some strong point much further east.

I think everyone agrees with you about the importance of getting the ports soon and from what I hear today that is going to be done.

HARRY ²

¹ See Churchill's telegram to Hopkins of August 23, 1944, *ante*, p. 17.

² The source text also has the holograph signature "Harry L Hopkins", but only the given name "Harry" was to be transmitted at the end of the message.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON,² 26 August 1944.

To Mr. Harry Hopkins from Prime Minister. Personal and top secret.

I cannot pretend to be an authority on the supply and financial questions relative to stage II having been so much immersed in the war. But, of course, I would hear what the President had in mind and then report it to my colleagues. I must have someone to keep me right on the facts and figures. I am, therefore, bringing Lord Cherwell for this part of our work which would not be till some days after the military side had started.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² The message originated at Eighth Army Headquarters in Italy but was sent via London.

2. With regard to the President's wish to limit the conference to the smallest possible numbers, the British Chiefs of Staff inform me they can manage with only about fifteen officers who need actually take part in the conference. However, it is indispensable for me and the Chiefs of Staff to take with us sufficient staff for the day to day conduct of the war and for carrying on the government of Great Britain. Observing that our absence from Headquarters may be anything up to three weeks, I shall have to have my full cypher staff, map room, etc. I cannot conceive how this will, in any way, get in your way or trouble you. You must remember that the United States Chiefs of Staff will not be away from Washington much more than a week and a few hours in an aeroplane can bring them any assistance they wish. I hope, therefore, that this will be agreed to.

3. Brendan ³ has raised the point that our meetings at Quebec and Cairo were marked by certain troubles with the press who came from far and wide and then found that there was nothing for them until the official communiqué for the press conference at the end of the meetings. In the case of OCTAGON, I suggest we should let it be known in advance that no information about the subject under discussion will be given apart from any communiqué that will be issued at the conclusion of our talks. If this is agreeable to you, I could give definite instructions to our public relations and press people to this effect at this end. Counting on you to do the same at yours.

PRIME

³ Bracken.

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 28, 1944.

51. Personal and secret to the Prime Minister from Harry L. Hopkins.

DEAR WINSTON: I am feeling ever so much better but am still taking things pretty easy and I am inclined to think that I will not risk the dangers of a setback by fighting the Battle of Quebec. Better men than I have been killed there.¹

HARRY ²

¹ For Churchill's interpretation of Hopkins' absence from the Second Quebec Conference, see Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 149, 161. Cf. Sherwood, p. 814.

² The source text also has the holograph signature "Harry L Hopkins", but only the given name "Harry" was to be transmitted at the end of the message.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 28, 1944.

52. Personal and secret to the Prime Minister from Harry L. Hopkins.

The President is delighted that the Prof¹ is coming. He, however, has not changed his original belief that the conference should be on the Teheran scale. He thinks it would be a great mistake to take over a hotel like the Frontenac during the tourist season and, under any circumstances, is anxious to have a small, intimate staff conference along with his meeting with you. He understands, of course, that you must have a cypher staff and he, naturally, will have his own. I do hope you can agree on a conference of this size. It is necessary for us to have your final decision as to the number and composition of your party at the earliest possible date in order that we may complete our plans.

The President feels that it would be a great mistake to have newspaper men all over the place. They will inevitably, no matter what they are told relative to a communiqué after the conference is over, be demanding press releases every day. The President hopes that no newspaper men will be imported into Quebec from anywhere and that the news of the conference will rest on a communiqué to be issued at the conclusion of your talks.

I think it is very important that this be fully understood in Canada.

HARRY

¹ Lord Cherwell.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to Prime Minister Churchill

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 28, 1944.

53. Personal and secret to the Prime Minister from Harry L. Hopkins.

A story has been passed by the London censorship written by Frederick Kuh which states that a conference with you and the President is going to take place in the immediate future and, in all probability, this conference will be in Canada. It states further that there will be no Soviet representation.

The President, at his press conference tomorrow, when asked about this, intends to say that he has no further comment other than his previous statement that he intended to see you some time soon. He will

stand on this statement and does not intend to be drawn out about the place or the time and hopes that you will do the same.¹

Will you be sure that your censorship deals with this matter accordingly.

Furthermore, on this particular point I think you should make certain that Mackenzie King sings the same tune.

As I wired you this morning,² the President is particularly anxious that Mackenzie King give no invitation to newspapermen as he did before,³ either in Canada or the United States, to come to Quebec. The President would appreciate it if you would make this clear to Mackenzie King.

HARRY ⁴

¹ Roosevelt stated at his press conference of August 29, 1944, that he would see Churchill soon, but he declined to elaborate on the details of his plans. See *New York Times*, August 30, 1944, p. 32.

² *Supra*.

³ The reference is to the arrangements for the press made in 1943 in connection with the First Quebec Conference. Cf. Mackenzie King's message to Hopkins on this subject transmitted in a letter to Hopkins from the Canadian Ambassador (Pearson) on September 3, 1944, *post*, p. 33.

⁴ The source text also has the holograph signature "Harry L Hopkins", but only the given name "Harry" was to be transmitted at the end of the message.

Notter File, Box 168 : Stettinius Diary

*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)*¹

RESTRICTED

SIXTH DAY, MONDAY,
August 28, 1944.

(5) General. (Mr. Hopkins joined the meeting² at this point.) I inquired if his³ plans of meeting the Prime Minister were sufficiently definite for him to indicate whether he wished us to prepare any special notes for him covering the security conversations⁴ to take with him. He said he would like to have such a memo prepared⁵ but that he would not take the initiative in discussing the international organization with the Prime Minister but that he should be briefed in case the Prime Minister brought it up. He intimated he expected his conversation with the Prime Minister to relate chiefly to military matters.

¹ In the form of a daily record, based on personal conversations, correspondence, telegrams, minutes, and other documents pertaining to Stettinius' activities during the conversations on the creation of a world organization held at the Dumbarton Oaks estate in Washington, D.C.

² Roosevelt and Stettinius had been having a private conversation until Hopkins joined them. For other extracts from Stettinius' record for August 28, 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 743-746.

³ i.e., Roosevelt's.

⁴ i.e., the Dumbarton Oaks conversations.

⁵ Cf. *post*, pp. 36-37.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 29 August 1944.

771. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret.

To take part in the conference I shall only bring 14 or 15 persons but I must explain to you that as I and the Chiefs of Staff have to conduct a very great number of import[ant] affairs from day to day it will be necessary to have considerable numbers of persons for that purpose. For instance. My own party and private secretaries 7. Secretariat and Administration 6. Clerical 42. Cipher staff 30. Royal Marine Guard 36. There will also be a small contingent from our element in Washington. These however are only the machinery with which I carry on my work and without which I could not leave the country. You have all your great departments immediately under your hand a few hours away by air.

2. The glorious events in France and in the Balkans have completely altered the whole outlook of the war and with people like the Germans anything might happen. Last time Bulgaria proved the lynchpin which when pulled brought everything crashing down.²

3. I must express my admiration to you not only for the valour but for the astonishing mobility and manoeuvring power of the great armies trained in the United States. I am looking forward immensely to seeing you again and trying to clear up with you in the light of our friendship some of the difficulties which beset even the path of dazzling victory. Thank you very much for your telegram about Greece.³

PRIME

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² In World War I Bulgaria was the first of the Central Powers to conclude an armistice.

³ For the text of Roosevelt's telegram No. 608 to Churchill, dated August 26, 1944, with reference to Greece, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. v, pp. 133-134; Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 112.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*The Minister in the United Kingdom (Reed) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 29 August 1944.

(Top Secret and personal for Harry Hopkins from Philip Reed)

Fred Leathers tells me he will attend forthcoming top level conference accompanied by three associates from his Ministry. He is most anxious that Jerry Land attend the conference and bring with him assistants in operating and programming fields. As you know Lew

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Douglas attended earlier conferences in Land's behalf. I am sure it would be useful if Land and Leathers had an opportunity to work together at this conference.

I hope time will be found at the conference to consider Phase II requirements, the manner in which the reduced munitions production load will be divided between U.K. and U.S., and the extent of lend lease aid to Britain during Phase II.

Also hope consideration will be given to creating high level Combined Export Problems Committee which would assemble full information on past, present and prospective exports, and to which problems in this field, including lend lease white paper,² could be referred for study and recommendation.

² The reference is presumably to the British white paper of September 10, 1941, regarding distribution of lend-lease material. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. v, September 13, 1941, pp. 204-206.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 30 August 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 610, personal and top secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.

Your 771.² I am pleased that our final arrangements for OCTAGON will keep the number who will participate in the conference to the Teheran level insofar as practicable.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² *Ante*, p. 23.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 30 August 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 611, personal and top secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.²

We can renew our Teheran talk about Trieste and Istria³ at OCTAGON.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² For the paragraphs of this message omitted here, see *post*, pp. 222-223.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 493, 503.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 31 August 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and top secret. Number 774.²

3. As to the future: continuous employment against the enemy will have to be found for the Eighth and Fifth Armies once the German armies in Italy have been destroyed or unluckily made their escape. This employment can only take the form of a movement first to Istria and Trieste and ultimately upon Vienna. Should the war come to an end in a few months, as may well be possible, none of these questions will arise. Anyhow, we can talk this over fully at OCTAGON.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² For the portions of this message omitted here, see *post*, pp. 223-224.

Roosevelt Papers

The President's Naval Aide (Brown) to the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McFarland)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL A. J. McFARLAND, U.S.A.,
SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: The President's Party at OCTAGON

1. Admiral Leahy asked me to inform you that the following will accompany the President to the OCTAGON conference:

Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S.N.
Vice Admiral Ross T. McIntire, (MC), U.S.N.
Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U.S.N.
Major General Edwin M. Watson, U.S.A.
Colonel Richard Park, Jr., U.S.A.
Lt-Comdr. Howard G. Bruenn, MC-V(S), U.S.N.R.
Lt-Comdr. George A. Fox, (HC), U.S.N.
Captain Boyce P. Price, A.U.S.
Lieutenant Ogden S. Collins, U.S.N.R.
Lieut (jg) William M. Rigdon, U.S.N.
Chief Yeoman Edwin L. Hoying, U.S.N.R.
Miss Grace Tully.
Mrs. D. J. Brady.
Mr. Charles W. Fredericks.
Irineo Esperancilla, CSt., U.S.N.

2. A Secret Service detail in addition to the above will be present but arrangements for their quarters will be made by the head of the detail.

3. It is possible that the above list may be changed slightly, either with some additions or some eliminations.

WILSON BROWN

Rear Admiral, U.S.N.

Naval Aide to the President

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 31 August 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret No. 773.

I had a sudden attack of my former malady with a temperature of between 103 and 104 degrees two hours before my plane reached home. However with vigilance, care and M and B,² I am now normal again and have every hope and intention of coming in the *Queen Mary* on the fifth instant, thus reaching OCTAGON on the 10th. The voyage at sea will be better for me than a journey by air.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² A drug which had also been prescribed when Churchill had had pneumonia in February 1943. Concerning the Prime Minister's health immediately before the Second Quebec Conference, see Moran, p. 189.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 31 August 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 612, personal and top secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.

Your 773.² I am distressed at the news of your illness. Please guard your health first and above all other considerations.

We can postpone OCTAGON to some later date if it appears advisable to do so.

Where is landing spot? If New York you and I could go to OCTAGON together on my train.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² *Supra*.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to Prime Minister Mackenzie King*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1944.

56. Personal and secret to Prime Minister Mackenzie King from Harry L. Hopkins.

The President's Secretary, Stephen Early, has today conferred at length with your Mr David Dunton. Also attending the conference, were representatives of our Office of War Information.

Early told Dunton of the President's wishes in regard to press, radio and photography.

I think you should know at once that the President has wired Churchill telling him he thinks it would be a great mistake to take over the whole of the Hotel Frontenac at such a time as this² and that he is sure security can be properly maintained if two or three floors are taken over.

Furthermore, the President feels that it would be a great mistake to have newspapermen all over the place and that the newspapermen should know that only a communiqué, after the conference, will be issued. The President is afraid they will be demanding press releases every day. He, therefore, hopes that no newspapermen will be specially invited into Quebec from anywhere and that the news of the conference will rest on a communiqué to be issued at the conclusion of the talks.³

You will, no doubt, hear directly from Churchill of this but I wanted to acquaint you with the President's position.

HARRY HOPKINS

¹ Sent to the United States Military Attaché, Ottawa, via Army channels.

² See *ante*, p. 21.

³ Cf. *ante*, p. 21.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 1st September 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. No. 775 Personal and Top Secret.

My temperature is normal and I am much better though still eating masses of M and B. The doctors seem quite confident that I can get away on night of fifth.² The ship goes to Halifax direct and I will arrive Citadel on the tenth.

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was spending the Labor Day weekend at Hyde Park, as telegram No. REP 346.

² For Winant's comments on Churchill's health, sent to Hopkins on September 1, 1944, see *post*, p. 254.

I look forward so much to seeing you again and to making good plans with you for the future in these days of glory.

PRIME

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[HYDE PARK,] 1 September 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 614, personal and top secret, from the President to the Prime Minister.

So happy your temperature is normal but this is the time to go slow. Remember I am entirely free and can go to OCTAGON literally any time if the doctors suggest a postponement for a week or several weeks. I suggest you make Clemmie² the arbiter. The armies keep rolling along and a few weeks of delay on our part will not slow them up.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the White House Map Room; forwarded to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² Mrs. Churchill.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 1 September 1944.

Number 777. Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and top secret.

I hope you will pardon a further transgression of the Teheran scale. I am going to bring Mrs. Churchill with me.

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was at Hyde Park, as telegram No. RED 348.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[HYDE PARK,] 1 September 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 615. Personal and Top Secret. From the President for the Prime Minister.

¹ Sent to the White House Map Room; forwarded to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Perfectly delighted that Clemmie will be with you. Eleanor ² will go with me to OCTAGON.

ROOSEVELT

² Mrs. Roosevelt.

Roosevelt Papers

The War Shipping Administrator (Land) to the President

PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, September 1, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attention: General Watson

Press reports indicate a conference between you and the Prime Minister to be held in Quebec in the near future.

A Montreal paper stated that Lord Leathers (my opposite number) will be present.

If at all practicable, will you please have me advised as to whether or not you desire that I accompany you at this conference and the probable time thereof in order that I may make proper arrangements accordingly.

This is in accordance with our discussion on shipping at our conference on July 10th.

JERRY

Roosevelt Papers

The President to the War Shipping Administrator (Land)

SECRET

[HYDE PARK,] September 2, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LAND

I have not heard anything about the proposed personnel if the Prime Minister comes over but if he brings Lord Leathers you must, of course, come to Quebec. I will let you know shortly. Meantime, will you keep yourself in readiness to come to Quebec, leaving the ninth or tenth?

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 2 September 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and top secret. Number 778.

I am delighted that Eleanor will come.

The doctors are resolute that I can go bar a setback. I cannot reach OCTAGON till noon 11th.

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was at Hyde Park, as telegram No. RED 355.

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 2 September 1944.

C.C.S. 654/2

AGENDA FOR THE NEXT UNITED STATES-BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE

References: C.C.S. 654 Series¹

C.C.S. 643²

C.C.S. 660³

1. The broad headings of the agenda for the next United States-British Staff Conference have already been agreed. A copy is attached, for ease of reference, at Enclosure "A".

2. The British Chiefs of Staff now propose that these broad headings should be elaborated as follows, observing that these suggestions are of course liable to modification or addition as a result of developments between now and the start of the Conference:—

(A) *War Against Germany.*

(i) Progress Reports by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force and Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.

(ii) Estimate of the Enemy Situation.

(iii) Development of the Italian Campaign.

(iv) Control of Strategic Bomber Force.

(v) Allocation of Zones of Occupation and Provision of Forces.

(In this connection the British Chiefs of Staff are anxious to know what forces the United States Chiefs of Staff are prepared to provide in Europe. They are also anxious to settle the question of the control of German naval bases

¹ For C.C.S. 654 and C.C.S. 654/1, see *post*, pp. 218, 219.

² "Estimate of the Enemy Situation, Pacific-Far East", August 5, 1944; not printed.

³ "Prospects of a German Collapse or Surrender", August 27, 1944; not printed.

and the part that air forces will play in the control of Europe.)

(vi) Machinery for inter-Allied coordination in Moscow.

(B) *War Against Japan.*

(i) Progress Report by Supreme Allied Commander, South-east Asia.

(ii) Progress Report of Operations in the Pacific.

(iii) Estimate of Enemy Situation.

(iv) Strategy for the Defeat of Japan.

(In this connection the British Chiefs of Staff would also wish to discuss Russian participation in the war against Japan and the possibility of making an approach to the Russians on this subject.)

(v) British Participation in the War Against Japan.

(In this connection the British Chiefs of Staff are anxious to carry the discussion to the point where definite operations are approved, in order that preparations can be made. They feel moreover, in the light of such decisions as may be reached, that questions of the system of command and the boundaries between commands may also arise.)

(C) *Redeployment of Forces Reoriented From Europe to the War Against Japan.*

3. The British Chiefs of Staff suggest that the detailed papers on the relation of resources to plans and the calculations for redeployment after Germany's defeat should be completed after the Conference ends.

4. With reference to (A) (i) and (B) (i) above, the British Chiefs of Staff suggest that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should inform Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, and Supreme Allied Commander, South-east Asia of the forthcoming Conference and request brief telegraphic reports by the 9th September of the progress of their operations and of their intentions in the near future. We recommend the despatch of the telegram attached as Enclosure "B" to Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, and Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia.

5. With reference to (A) (ii) and (B) (iii), the estimates of the enemy situation contained in C.C.S. 643 and C.C.S. 660 have been brought up to date by the Combined Intelligence Committee.⁴

6. With reference to (B) (iv), the British Chiefs of Staff assume that the United States Chiefs of Staff will open the discussion on strategy for the defeat of Japan and give a report on operations in the Pacific.

⁴ See the enclosures to C.C.S. 643/1 and C.C.S. 660/1, *post*, pp. 267 and 237, respectively.

Enclosure "A"

TOP SECRET

AGREED BROAD HEADINGS FOR THE AGENDA FOR THE NEXT UNITED STATES-BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE

(A) *The War Against Germany*

- (1) Operations for the defeat of Axis Powers in Europe.
- (2) Occupation of Germany, its satellites, and Axis-occupied countries.*

(B) *The War Against Japan*

- (1) Operations for the Defeat of Japan.
- (2) British Participation in the War Against Japan.

(C) *Redeployment of Forces Reoriented From Europe to the War Against Japan.*

Enclosure "B"

TOP SECRET

DRAFT TELEGRAM TO SHAEF, SACMED AND SACSEA ⁵

Following from Combined Chiefs of Staff for General Eisenhower, General Wilson and Admiral Mountbatten. Eyes Only.

1. The next United States-British Staff Conference will take place in the near future. Code-word for Conference in our immediately following signal.

2. Request brief telegraphic report by 9th September giving progress of operations in your theatre and your intentions in the near future.

*Exact wording of heading still under consideration. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁵ Following approval by the United States Chiefs of Staff on September 7, 1944 (see C.C.S. 654/3, *post*, p. 39), messages closely following this draft were dispatched to Eisenhower as telegram No. FACS 69, to Wilson as telegram No. FAN 406, and to Mountbatten. The message to Eisenhower instructed him specifically to include Operation POINTBLANK in his report. The texts of the messages as sent were circulated by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on September 8, 1944, as enclosures A and B to C.C.S. 654/4, not printed.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[HYDE PARK,] 3 September 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 616. Personal and top secret. From the President for the Prime Minister.²

As to the exact employment of our forces in Italy in the future, this is a matter we can discuss at OCTAGON. . . .

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the White House Map Room; forwarded to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² For the portions of this message omitted here, see *post*, p. 229.

Hopkins Papers

The Canadian Ambassador (Pearson) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 3, 1944.

AND PERSONAL

DEAR MR. HOPKINS, I have just received from our Prime Minister a reply to the message delivered to him by the Military Attaché of the United States Embassy in Ottawa, on your behalf.¹ Mr. King's message to you is as follows:

"I fully share the President's view that it would be undesirable at this time to take over the whole of the Château Frontenac though I am told that the physical layout of the hotel would make it difficult to shut off a particular section or floors of the building. However I have instructed Mr. Coleman who is in charge of local arrangements to go into the matter very carefully with the management on Monday.

"As regards representation of the press, I may say that I have already assured Mr. Churchill that the Canadian authorities will do everything they can to carry out his own and the President's wishes in this matter. I have suggested to Mr. Churchill (and a copy of my message² has been communicated to Mr. Early) that if no special arrangements are to be made for newspaper men who may insist on being present at Quebec while the meetings are taking place, it will be necessary to inform the Canadian newspapers in confidence and in advance of the meetings that it is the express wish of the President and Mr. Churchill that the news of the conference should rest on the communiqué to be issued at its conclusion. I assume that similar advice will be given in Washington and London to United States and United

¹ See *ante*, p. 27.

² Not printed.

Kingdom newspapers and news services which may expect to have representatives at Quebec during the meetings. I feel that I should perhaps make it clear that no newspaper men were invited to Quebec at the time of the last meeting by any Canadian authority. In fact my recollection is that they were all explicitly warned that no hard news could be expected during the meeting and that speculative reports could only be harmful. I shall gladly see that such warnings are given again and more strongly, but I should not like to leave you or the President under any possible misapprehension that Canadian newspaper men had been invited to be present at Quebec during last year's meetings.

"Would you please assure the President of my great desire to have his wishes met in every particular and please do not hesitate yourself to let me know of any way in which I can be helpful.

"Kindest remembrances to the President and yourself.

"W. L. Mackenzie King."

If there is any point arising out of this message which you wish to discuss with me I will be glad to see you at any time.

Sincerely,

L B PEARSON

Roosevelt Papers

The Assistant to the President's Military Aide (Park) to the President's Naval Aide (Brown)

WASHINGTON, 5 September 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN

There is given below a résumé of arrangements and plans with respect to the President's Map Room for OCTAGON:

In general, the arrangements for the President's Map Room for OCTAGON are the same as for QUADRANT. The President's Map Room will operate entirely independently of the Prime Minister's Map Room.

The principal map on which we will show air and ground operations will be at the scale of 1 to 500,000, the same as the map on the north wall of the White House Map Room on which we are posting German troop dispositions. We are having this map made up especially for us to include the Western, Southern, and Eastern Fronts. For our fleet postings, a chart of the world has been procured, the same as on the east wall of the White House Map Room, which will be posted exactly as it is now. The remaining wall space at OCTAGON will contain the Asia map for coverage of Burma, China and Pacific Ocean theaters. We will, of course, bring with us complete information on fleet locations, Allied and enemy order of battle, and other pertinent information.

Captain Price departed Washington for QUADRANT on Saturday, 2 September. As our advance man, he will see to the setting up of the room so that when the rest of the Map Room party arrive, they can go to work immediately. Lieutenant Collins and I will leave Washington

on 6 September, taking with us all maps and material. Chief Yeoman Hoying will leave with the Presidential party.

The White House Map Room will operate as usual, under the command of Lt. Commander Tyree. Captain Kniffin will be in charge of the Army interests in my absence, and will go to the War Department twice daily for pick-up of dispatches.

RICHARD PARK, JR.
Colonel, General Staff

Hopkins Papers

The Canadian Ambassador (Pearson) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 6th, 1944.

DEAR MR. HOPKINS: I have just received from Mr. Mackenzie King the following message, by telegram, which he has asked me to deliver to you:

"Dear Mr. Hopkins: Please let the President know that his personal letter dated August 26th,¹ in which he speaks of meetings at Quebec as being on Teheran scale, with 15 or 20 people in his party and as many in Churchill's, was received at Ottawa only today.

"I am informed by our officials who are at the moment in Quebec concerting accommodation arrangements with representatives of your Government and the United Kingdom Government, that accommodation will be required for 260 members of the United States Chiefs of Staff party, and perhaps 40 in the White House party, and I understand that the United Kingdom party, which is already en route, is about 225. These numbers are on almost exactly the scale of last year's meeting, and will require the same accommodation, i.e., practically the whole Château Frontenac. I might also say that, according to our information, press enquiries about accommodation at Quebec indicate that the number of newspapermen intent on being present, despite all discouragements, is likely to be at least as great as last year.

"As you know, I have been very anxious to see that the Canadian end of the arrangements for the meeting should follow exactly what the President and Mr. Churchill had in mind. I take it that any misunderstandings there may have been about the size of staffs and the accommodation required for them have already been cleared up. I should, however, be glad to hear from you that the arrangements now in hand have been explained to the President and are agreeable to him.

"Yours very sincerely,

W. L. Mackenzie King."

I shall be glad to telegraph to Mr. King any reply to the above message which you may wish to send to him.²

Yours sincerely,

L B PEARSON

¹ See *ante*, p. 18, fn. 2.

² Filed with this letter in the Hopkins Papers is the following typewritten note, dated September 6, 1944: "I talked to Pearson and told him to tell Mackenzie King not to worry about this—that everything is all right. H[ARRY] L. H[OPKINS]."

Notter File, Box 168: Stettinius Diary

*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)*¹

RESTRICTED

FIFTEENTH DAY, WEDNESDAY,
September 6, 1944.

Conversation With Cadogan

I asked Cadogan if he had received any further word on the possibility of his being called to Quebec. He said his instructions were to report to the Prime Minister on his arrival. I told him that we would be very disappointed if that occurred as we thought it would be misunderstood everywhere and that if it did turn out that it was necessary for him to go that we hoped Lord Halifax would take over his chair.² (Dunn takes a very serious view of Cadogan deserting the meeting to go to Quebec. He believes the press reaction worldwide would be very unfavorable. Pasvolsky does not think he will leave.)

Meeting With the President and the Secretary

I first presented to the President maps and analyses of the climatic conditions and harbor facilities of the [islands of] Flores in the Azores and Niihau in the Hawaiian group.³ The President said he still thought the Azores would be the place. I said, "Well, your island of Flores is fine but has no harbor". He said, "Ed, you don't know your poetry".⁴ The President said he would take these memos and maps to Quebec and discuss them with the Prime Minister.⁵

I then informed the President that we felt that inasmuch as Vice Admiral Willson would be in Quebec and was completely informed on the proposals and the activity thus far at Dumbarton Oaks⁶ that it would be better for him to rely on the Admiral for information if he became involved in discussions on this subject rather than to burden

¹ In the form of a daily record pertaining to Stettinius' activities during the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. See *ante*, p. 22, fn. 1.

² At the Dumbarton Oaks conversations.

³ In a discussion with Roosevelt on August 28, 1944, with respect to the location of the headquarters of the various organs of the proposed international organization, Stettinius had promised to give Roosevelt maps and information on points in the Azores and the Hawaiian Islands. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 745-746.

⁴ Roosevelt's reference was presumably to Tennyson's poem, *The "Revenge"*.

⁵ No indication has been found that this material (not printed) was discussed by Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec.

⁶ Willson was a member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a member of the United States delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, at which he chaired the meetings of the Special Informal Military Group.

him with memoranda and other documents. He agreed with the proviso that Admiral Willson be supplied with complete papers in case it was necessary for him to refer to them.⁷

I next took up with the President the question of an international air force.⁸ We had some little difficulty in explaining this so that the President completely understood it. But after we had stressed that he had already gone on record against an international police force and [*we?*] recommended to him that we stick to our guns on this question. He finally agreed. I confirmed our previous discussion about the possibility of a change in the Prime Minister's position and he said that he would be ready to discuss this with him at Quebec if we found it was necessary for him to do so.⁹ I then asked the President whom we would work through in Quebec, and he said, "I don't want you to work through anybody; you should call me direct." I said this was not always practicable; and he said that in such an event to call Admiral Leahy if Hopkins was not going. (He did not go.) I then told him that if the international air force question remained open until after the Churchill arrival in Quebec that this might hold up our proceedings with the Russians . . .¹⁰

I then told the President of the possibility of Cadogan being called to Quebec. Mr. Hull thought this would be bad and the President felt so strongly about it that he said that if Churchill spoke of having a diplomat come that he would suggest Eden . . . During this conversation, Mr. Hull got the incorrect impression that the President was talking about Eden taking Cadogan's place in Washington while Cadogan was in Quebec and objected violently to such a procedure. We of course straightened this out. I suggested that I be authorized to press for Halifax taking Cadogan's chair if the latter should be called away. Both gave complete approval to this but wished me to make every effort to persuade Cadogan not to leave the meeting. . . .

I then raised with the President the importance of his having political advisers with him at meetings such as the forthcoming one at Quebec, in the event that political questions would be discussed. The President agreed that this was sound and important but said the forth-

⁷ As it turned out, Roosevelt did not consult at Quebec the papers which Willson took there with relation to the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. See Harley A. Notter, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949; Department of State publication No. 3580), p. 323, fn. 25.

⁸ See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. 1, pp. 716, 748-749, 769-770.

⁹ No indication has been found that this subject was discussed by Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec.

¹⁰ For the passage omitted here and for other portions not printed here of Stettinius' record covering September 6, 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. 1, pp. 773 ff.

coming meeting would be of a military nature. He did, however, promise to send for Mr. Hull if the discussions took a political turn. I later asked Mr. Hull if he thought I had spoken out of turn and he said no, that it was wonderful.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, [September 6, 1944.]

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret number 782.

We are just off. I cannot make Quebec before evening 11th. It might be convenient for you to put off your arrival till 12th as I should wish to have the pleasure of welcoming you and Eleanor at the Citadel but everything will be in readiness anyhow. Every good wish.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 6 September 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 620, personal and top secret, from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Your 782.² We will arrive OCTAGON afternoon of September 11th. This time I want to have the privilege and great pleasure of meeting you and Clemmie when you arrive.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² *Supra*.

740.0011 EW/9-644

*The Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)
to the Ambassador in Canada (Atherton)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 6, 1944.

DEAR RAY: As you know, I pointed out to Admiral Leahy the importance we attach, with a view to your position in Canada, to your presence for at least a part of the forthcoming talks at Quebec. The Admiral fully understood and telephoned me this afternoon to say that he had discussed the matter with the President, and that the Presi-

dent wishes you to come to see him at Quebec on the 11th or 12th of September. When you arrive, I suggest that you get in touch again with Admiral Leahy.

Hastily,
As ever,

H F[REEMAN] M[ATTHEWS]

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 7 September 1944.

C.C.S. 654/3

AGENDA FOR THE NEXT UNITED STATES-BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE

Reference: C.C.S. 654/2¹

The United States Chiefs of Staff concur in the views expressed by the British Chiefs of Staff as set forth in C.C.S. 654/2 and to the dispatch of message to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, and Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, contained in Enclosure "B", C.C.S. 654/2.²

¹ *Ante*, p. 30.

² See *ante*, p. 32, fn. 4.

Roosevelt Papers

The Chinese Minister of Finance (Kung) to President Roosevelt

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am in Washington for a few days, and would have availed myself of another visit with you if not because I realise how crowded your schedule must have been at this time.

I understand you are leaving shortly for Canada to confer with Mr. Churchill. If in the course of your discussions with the Prime Minister you wish me to transmit any message to the Generalissimo¹ or have a personal consultation with me in connection with any problem concerning China, I venture to assure you that I shall be at your service at all times.

With high esteem and best regards,

I am, Mr. President,

Yours sincerely,

H. H. KUNG

¹ Chiang Kai-shek.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 10 September 1944.

C.C.S. 654/6 (OCTAGON)

PROGRAMME FOR THE OCTAGON CONFERENCE

Reference: C.C.S. 654/2² and 654/4³

1. The British Chiefs of Staff suggest that it would save time if a tentative programme and time-table were agreed before the Conference commences.

2. They suggest that every effort should be made to complete our business by Saturday, 16th September, leaving Sunday, 17th September, as a possible spare day.

3. They suggest the following tentative programmes:—

I. *Tuesday, 12th September.*

War against Germany.

- (a) Situation report from SHAEF and SACMed.
- (b) C.I.C. report on the enemy situation in Europe.
- (c) General Eisenhower's future plan of campaign.
- (d) General Wilson's plan of campaign.

II. *Wednesday, 13th September.*

(e) Prospect of re-deployment of forces from European theatre for war against Japan.

- (f) Situation report on the Pacific and from SACSEA.
- (g) C.I.C. report on enemy situation in the Pacific.
- (h) Strategy for the defeat of Japan.

III. *Thursday, 14th September.*

(i) British participation in the Pacific in the war against Japan.

- (j) Future operations in South East Asia.

IV. *Friday, 15th September.*

(k) Continuation of discussion of items listed in III above.

(l) Further consideration of the re-deployment of forces from the European theatre for the war against Japan.

- (m) Possible Russian participation in the war against Japan.

V. *Saturday, 16th September.*

(n) Control of Strategic Bomber Force.

(o) Zones of occupation—provision of forces.

(p) Machinery for Inter-Allied coordination in Moscow.

¹ Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 172d meeting, September 12, 1944. See *post*, p. 301.

² *Ante*, p. 30.

³ See *ante*, p. 32, fn. 4.

J.C.S. Files

Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 12 September 1944.

C.C.S. 654/7

PROGRAM FOR THE "OCTAGON" CONFERENCE

Reference: CCS 172d Meeting, Item 3¹

In their 172d Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the following program for the OCTAGON Conference:

I. *Tuesday, 12th September*

- a. Control of Strategic Bomber Force.
- b. Zones of occupation—provision of forces.
- c. Machinery for Inter-Allied coordination in Moscow.
- d. Situation report from SHAEF and SACMed.
- e. C.I.C. report on the enemy situation in Europe.
- f. General Eisenhower's future plan of campaign.
- g. General Wilson's plan of campaign.

II. *Wednesday, 13th September*

- h. Prospect of redeployment of forces from European Theater for war against Japan.
- i. C.I.C. report on enemy situation in the Pacific.
- j. Situation report on the Pacific and from SACSEA.
- k. Strategy for the defeat of Japan.

III. *Thursday, 14th September*

- l. British participation in the Pacific in the war against Japan.
- m. Future operations in Southeast Asia.

IV. *Friday, 15th September*

- n. Continuation of discussion of items listed in III above.
- o. Further consideration of the redeployment of forces from the European Theater for the war against Japan.
- p. Possible Russian participation [in] the war against Japan.

A. J. McFARLAND

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES

Combined Secretariat

¹ See *post*, p. 301.

Roosevelt Papers

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

QUEBEC, September 12, 1944.

MY DEAR FRIEND, 1. Would it be agreeable to you to discuss with me sometime today our Italian policy? ¹ I must fill up the Chairmanship of the Allied Control Commission, and I feel the great need of a competent politician and Minister there, like Macmillan, rather than a General. I was distressed and disquieted by the tales I heard of serious food shortages in some parts of Rome and other great towns. Unemployment looms big in Italy. We may also soon have the populous North flowing on to our hands. I was hoping we might together make up an agreeable programme for Italy, which could be announced, comprising resumption of their export trade, interchange of diplomatic representatives *à la Russe*,² and bringing them into the area of U.N.R.R.A. as co-belligerents if that can be managed. If not, some other scheme of effective relief. You spoke of La Guardia having a Mission. This also I should like to discuss with you.

2. The Staffs are forming their contacts this morning and browsing over the Agenda on general lines. But would it not be well to have a plenary session tomorrow where you and I can put forward the fundamentals of our future war policy. This will enable them to go ahead much more rapidly and easily.

3. A small point. Leathers is longing for Admiral Land. You said you were keeping him handy; but if he could come up soon, these two would be together working out their complicated affairs, while we are busy with other things, and have results ready for us at each stage.

4. Some of the BONIFACE I sent you this morning appeared to me to be of profound significance. Alexander's battle is a hard one, but now that Clark has crashed into the centre I am hopeful of speedy results.

Yours always,

W[INSTON S. CHURCHILL]

¹ No record has been found of a Roosevelt-Churchill discussion of Italy on September 12. The appointment to the Allied Control Commission was not settled on that date, as Churchill wrote to Roosevelt again on September 14 definitely proposing Macmillan. See *post*, p. 417.

² The Soviet Union had established relations with Italy on March 13, 1944, without prior notice to the United States and British Governments.

Roosevelt Papers

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

QUEBEC, September 12, 1944.

MY DEAR FRIEND, Would you let me have your views on the following suggested time-table:

Wednesday, 13th—Plenary Meeting with Chiefs of Staff.

Thursday, 14th, and Friday, 15th—their further discussions.

They should report to us the evening of Friday, 15th, enabling a final Plenary to take place on Saturday, 16th.

It would probably be in conformity with your wishes to return to Hyde Park on Saturday. If agreeable to you I would follow by Air with Clemmie early on Monday, 18th, and stay with you Monday and Tuesday. We could then have anyone necessary to wind up outstanding points. I must depart on Wednesday, 20th.

I have asked Eden to come over if possible tomorrow, so he should be here on Thursday or Friday. There are several important things to discuss with him including recognition of the French Provisional Government, as to which I am by no means convinced. I do not know whether you would require to have Hull or Stettinius for Friday, 15th.

One of the most important things I have to discuss with you is Stage II. Would Thursday, 14th, do for that?—in which case I hope you could have Morgenthau present. This matter is considered of extreme and vital importance by the British Government, for reasons which are only too painfully apparent.

Yours always,

W[INSTON S. CHURCHILL]

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The President to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau)*¹

[QUEBEC,] 12 September 1944.

Please be in Quebec by Thursday, 14 September, Noon.

¹ Sent to the White House Map Room at Washington. The message was delivered to Morgenthau at his farm at Fishkill, New York, by a Secret Service agent on the evening of September 12.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The President to the War Shipping Administrator (Land)*¹

[QUEBEC,] 12 September 1944.

Please come to Quebec without delay.

¹ Sent to the White House Map Room at Washington. The message was delivered to Land by Major Henry W. Putnam of the Map Room staff on the evening of September 12.

Notter File, Box 168 : Stettinius Diary

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) ¹

RESTRICTED

TWENTIETH DAY, TUESDAY,
September 12, 1944.

I then told the group ² in the strictest confidence that Cadogan had received a cable from Churchill asking him to come to Quebec and that he had asked my advice and opinion on the matter, and whether, if he went, we would be offended. I reported that I had told him we would have no objection to his flying up and spending the evening there if he could come back the next day. There was considerable discussion as to whether we should suggest that the President ask Churchill not to call him up, but this was entirely inconclusive. The point of view was also expressed that this changed the entire character of the Quebec conference from one of a military nature to one of a political nature and it was very serious to be having a political conference without Stalin present. Incidentally I informed the group that the President had assured me that if the British called any political men to Quebec he would do likewise.³ (This was not done, Morgenthau being the only person called up although through special arrangements we did have Ambassador Atherton at Quebec, although he did not participate in any direct way at the meeting.)

Talks During the Day With the Secretary

Early in the day I had a discussion with the Secretary on the voting procedure and also on the question of Cadogan's being ordered to Quebec. I also told him of the possibility that Eden was coming to Quebec. Mr. Hull made the same point which was made at the American meeting by Mr. Long, that changing the character of the meeting in a political direction, and probably discussing the future of Europe without Stalin being present was quite a serious matter. . . .

The Secretary thinks that it would be most unfortunate if Cadogan goes to Quebec, not only from the point of view of our Conversations at

¹ In the form of a daily record pertaining to Stettinius' activities in Washington during the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. See *ante*, p. 22, fn. 1. Cf. Cadogan, p. 664.

² i.e., the United States delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks conversations.

³ See *ante*, p. 38.

Dumbarton but that it would throw that conference into a discussion of general diplomatic and political affairs. He asked me to do everything in my power to keep him from going.

Discussion During the Day With Cadogan

I talked privately with Cadogan and Jebb in the early afternoon . . . [Cadogan] inquired if Mr. Hull had heard from the President about going to Quebec and I told him he had not. . . .

Later in the afternoon I had another private talk with him on the question of his going to Quebec. He immediately prepared a cable to his Prime Minister saying that Mr. Hull felt it would be a mistake for him to go as it would arouse all types of speculation in the press in this country. He said in the cable that if the Prime Minister felt keenly about it he hoped he would discuss it with the President. Cadogan handed me the wire and I suggested that he take out the word "terrific". He had originally used the expression that Hull thought it would be a terrific mistake.

Roosevelt Papers

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

QUEBEC, September 14, 1944.

MY DEAR FRIEND, I understand that we are meeting at 11.30¹ about Stage 2. Dick Law arrived here late last night, and I wonder whether I might bring him at 11 o'clock with or without Anthony,² to discuss the application of U.N.R.R.A. to Italy. He tells me that a compromise proposal would get through whereby 50 million dollars of U.N.R.R.A. would be available for Italy. I consider this should be an essential part of our friendly gesture to Italy.

If agreeable then, I will turn up at 11.³

Yours always,

W[INSTON S. CHURCHILL]

¹ See *post*, p. 342.

² Eden.

³ No record of the discussion at the 11 o'clock meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill on September 14 has been found.

740.0011 EW/9-1444 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, September 14, 1944.

US URGENT NIACT

7558. Personal for the Secretary.

Eden left last night for Quebec Conference by air. I understand he is going more in his capacity as unofficial Deputy Defense Minister than as Foreign Secretary.

WINANT

Notter File, Box 168 : Stettinius Diary

*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)*¹

RESTRICTED

TWENTY-SECOND DAY, THURSDAY,
September 14, 1944.

Conversations With Sir Alexander Cadogan

Cadogan called me right after midnight to say that while the Prime Minister had given him twenty-four hours of grace yesterday, in view of Eden's arrival he now felt obligated to go to Quebec immediately and assumed that under the circumstances Mr. Hull could now have no objections. I told him that I felt that any decision he made now should be entirely his own. He said he did not think it would interfere too much with the Conversations inasmuch as little could probably be done in the next day or so in any event pending an evaluation by our respective Governments on the informal compromise formula on voting.²

Cadogan called me again at 10 o'clock in the morning saying he had just received a further telegram asking him to go there, and he was planning to leave later in the morning by special plane and that he would return tomorrow. . . .³

Conversation With Mr. Hull

I called Mr. Hull early in the morning and told him of Cadogan's midnight call about going to Quebec. Mr. Hull again said that he thought it was a mistake for Cadogan to go and for that conference to get into political matters but that he agreed that we would not make a further point of the matter.

¹ In the form of a daily record pertaining to Stettinius' activities in Washington during the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. See *ante*, p. 22, fn. 1.

² See *post*, pp. 425, 426.

³ Portions of the Stettinius record for September 14 not pertinent to this volume are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 809-812.

. . . [Mr. Hull] said he had not heard from the President about going to Quebec and did not feel in any event that he should go. This comment was made after I had reminded him of the President's promise to send for him or someone else in the Department if the conference went into political matters.⁴

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Conversation With Harry Hopkins

Harry Hopkins called me just before 11:00 in the morning and I reported to him the recent development, particularly on the voting question. I also told him that Cadogan was going to Quebec this morning and that Eden was arriving there late this afternoon. I told him about our proposed press statement.⁵

He then told me it was expected that the Quebec conference would break up Monday [*Friday?*] night and that probably the Prime Minister and the President would go to Hyde Park Sunday night and that if Eden went probably Hull would be invited up.⁶ He told me he was not going to Quebec but would go to Hyde Park. . . .⁷

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⁴ See *ante*, p. 38.

⁵ On September 14 Stettinius released a statement to the press indicating that Cadogan had been called to Quebec to see Churchill "on important matters not in any way connected with the talks at Dumbarton Oaks". See Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. xi, September 17, 1944, p. 292. The British press spokesman at Quebec told correspondents there that Cadogan had come to discuss the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. See Notter File, Box 168, Stettinius Diary for September 16, 1944.

⁶ Eden, however, declined Roosevelt's invitation to go to Hyde Park (see Eden, p. 554), and Hull did not go either. On September 16 Stettinius discussed with Halifax and Cadogan in Washington the possibility that Stettinius and Cadogan might go to Hyde Park to discuss with Roosevelt and Churchill the question of voting in the Council of the proposed world organization, but when Stettinius telephoned Roosevelt on September 17 about the possibility of coming to Hyde Park for this purpose, the President discouraged him. See Notter File, Box 168, Stettinius Diary; Hull, p. 1702. For information as to which British and American officials were at Hyde Park during the Roosevelt-Churchill conversations there following the Second Quebec Conference, see *post*, p. 481.

⁷ Stettinius informed Hull later in the day of the tentative arrangements mentioned in this paragraph. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. i, p. 811.

2. SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY PAPERS

A. OCCUPATION AND POSTWAR TREATMENT OF GERMANY

Editorial Note

The documents printed and cited in this section are considerably illuminated by contemporary diary notes and other materials written by a number of the ranking participants in the discussions of this subject within the United States Government. See particularly Hull, pp. 1602 ff.; Stimson and Bundy, pp. 568 ff.; and Morgenthau materials printed in Blum, pp. 339 ff., and *Morgenthau Diary (Germany)*, vol. I, pp. 415 ff. See also *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 276 ff.

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*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

[WASHINGTON,] August 28, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am attaching a summary of recommendations prepared after careful study in the Department with regard to the treatment of Germany.² I am also attaching for your consideration a longer paper giving the reasoning behind the recommendations and a memorandum on the present status of negotiations and discussions with regard to Germany.

This problem is, of course, of great importance and considerable urgency, for until an American policy has been decided upon with regard to the future treatment of Germany, we are not in a position to discuss the matter with the British or Russians. I hope, therefore, that you will be able to study the attached documents and let me have your comments thereon at an early date. The two former documents were

¹ Printed from an uncertified carbon copy which, however, bears the following manuscript endorsement by the Secretary of State's Assistant: "Left with the President by the Secretary. J[AMES] E B[ROWN] JR."

² The first two attachments to this memorandum are not filed with the source text. They have been supplied from Lot 55 D 375 and the Notter File, Box 18, respectively.

transmitted to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff about a month ago with a request for their views.³

[Attachment 1]

*Memorandum by the Committee on Post-War Programs*⁴

TOP SECRET
PWC-149c

[WASHINGTON,] May 31, 1944.

THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

I. LONG-TERM INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

A. *Frontiers*

1. The Danish-German frontier should remain unchanged. (Recommended)

2. The water-boundary between the Netherlands and Germany should be moved from the western shore of the Ems Estuary to the main channel. The land-boundary should remain unchanged. (Recommended with request for further study of possible territorial compensation for the Netherlands for areas ruined by flooding.)

3. The Belgian-German frontier should be returned to the 1920-1940 line. (Recommended)

4. Alsace-Lorraine should be returned to France. (Recommended)

5. The transfer of the Sonthofen district from Austria to Germany should be recognized unless there is convincing evidence that the inhabitants wish to return to Austrian rule. (Recommended)

6. The pre-Munich frontiers of Czechoslovakia should in principle be restored, subject to any minor rectifications which the Czechoslovakian Government might wish to propose as part of a broader settlement of the issues in dispute between Czechoslovakia and Germany. (Recommended)

7. This Government should not oppose the annexation by Poland of East Prussia, Danzig, and in German Upper Silesia the industrial district and a rural hinterland to be determined primarily by ethnic considerations. The United States, however, would not be disposed to encourage the acquisition by Poland of additional German-populated territory in the trans-Oder region. (Recommended)

³ For the memorandum of transmittal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated July 22, 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, p. 251. For the reply of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated September 29, 1944 (after the conclusion of the Second Quebec Conference), see *ibid.*, p. 343.

⁴ The source text indicates that the original draft of this memorandum (CAC-181b) had been prepared and reviewed by the Interdivisional Committee on Germany, and that the paper had been reviewed and revised by the Committee on Post-War Programs at meetings held on May 11, 12, 18, 19, 25, and 31, 1944.

8. This Government should oppose the mass transfer to the Reich of Germanic people from neighboring countries immediately after the cessation of hostilities but should approve the removal of individuals and groups who constitute an especially difficult problem; the transfer should be made, so far as may be feasible, under humane conditions and without undue strain on Germany's absorptive capacity. (Tentatively recommended; Inter-Divisional Committee on Germany to study further the question of (a) criteria for selecting populations for transfer, (b) an inter-allied occupation of East Prussia, and (c) establishment of an inter-allied commission to supervise transfers of population.)

B. Political and Economic Conditions

9. This Government should advocate (a) the prohibition for an indefinite period of a German military establishment, (b) the prohibition for an indefinite period of the manufacture and import of arms (except the importation of small arms for police purposes), ammunition and implements of war, together with the prohibition of the manufacture of aircraft and the prohibition of the importation of military aircraft, and (c) a system of international audit, inspection, and enforcement, extending over the whole of Germany, for insuring the observance of disarmament stipulations and for preventing the accumulation of war matériel. (Tentatively recommended subject to further study.)

10. The United States should encourage democratic self-government both at the local and national level as soon as security precautions make it feasible. (Recommended)

11. The German people should be assured that a democratic Germany can, by demonstrating its ability and intention to act as a peace-loving nation, earn an honorable place in the society of peace-loving nations. (Recommended)

12. A "war-guilt" clause should not be written into the surrender instrument or into the peace terms. (Recommended)

13. Partition should not be imposed upon Germany. (Referred to the Secretary for possible consideration with the President.)

14. The victors should make every feasible effort to promote a return to a federal system of government and a division of Prussia into a number of medium-sized states. The imposition of a degree of political decentralization more extensive than that which moderate Germans would be willing to support might defeat its purpose by creating internal confusion and by arousing a lasting antagonism even among liberal and democratic German groups.

15. It should be an ultimate objective of this Government to assimilate Germany into world economy without discrimination other than that necessary for security controls. (Recommended)

16. The large German landed estates should be broken up. (Recommended, with a request to the Inter-Divisional Committee on Germany to continue its study of means of implementation.)

17. The great concentration of power exercised by German industrial and financial concerns should be destroyed. (Referred to the Inter-Divisional Committee on Germany for further study.)

18. Free labor organizations possessing the power of collective bargaining should be revived. (Recommended)

19. The German people should be permitted, subject to security requirements, and to such international obligations as Germany may be required to assume, eventually to determine the nature of their economic system without foreign pressure or intervention. (Recommended)

C. German Foreign Relations

20. Germany should be admitted, as soon as its good faith is demonstrated, to participation without discrimination, other than for security objectives, in general political and economic arrangements. (Recommended)

21. Germany should not be permitted to use trade policy as an instrument of aggression. (Recommended)

II. TRANSITIONAL PROCEDURES AND ARRANGEMENTS

A. Surrender Terms

22. The victor powers should secure through a single surrender instrument an unequivocal delivery of unrestricted rights and powers over Germany rather than rely on the rights of occupation and conquest or on undefined unconditional surrender. (Recommended)

23. The surrender instrument should be authorized and ratified by whatever German Government is in existence at the time. It should be signed by properly authorized military plenipotentiaries and, if a Nazi or quasi-Nazi Government is in power, by authorized civilian agents. (Recommended)

24. The rights and powers surrendered by Germany should be acquired by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on behalf of the United Nations and should be exercised jointly by their three Governments acting in the interests of the United Nations. (Recommended)

B. Occupation

25. The three principal United Nations should set up a military government which, while making extensive use of German administrative machinery and personnel, should supplant any existing central political authority. (Recommended)

26. While the military occupation of Germany should be effected on a zonal basis, the principal instrumentality of military government should be a tripartite agency in Berlin possessing the power, under instructions from the three Governments, to direct a uniform administration over the whole of Germany and to maintain the unity of those essential administrative functions and economic processes now operated on a nation-wide basis. (Recommended)

27. As soon as military considerations cease to be paramount, the control of Germany should be transferred to an inter-allied civilian agency under whose authority military occupation would be continued. (Recommended)

28. This Government should favor the participation of the other United Nations in so far as would be compatible with the responsibility of the three major powers in planning and executing the measures for the treatment of Germany. (Recommended)

29. The German armed forces should be demobilized and disbanded as rapidly as considerations of internal order and the absorptive capacity of German economy will allow. (Recommended)

30. This Government is in principle opposed to the use in labor service for an indefinite period of large numbers of Army units, but should not oppose the employment of Waffen SS and other Nazi Party military formations in reconstruction work outside Germany. (Referred to the Inter-Divisional Committee on Germany with request for a separate study of this problem.)

31. German arms, ammunition and implements of war should be scrapped except as they are wanted for use in the war against Japan or are adaptable to peaceful uses. (Further study requested of the disposition of German armaments.)

32. All German military and para-military organizations, the General Staff, military training centers, supply services and all directly related groups should be promptly dissolved and permanently prohibited. (Recommended)

33. The manufacture and import of all arms, ammunition and implements of war should be forbidden, necessary security controls established over German economy, and those industrial plants dismantled which are not convertible to peace-time production or which otherwise present insuperable security problems. (Recommended)

34. The National Socialist Party and dependent organizations should be abolished and their records and assets seized. (Recommended)

35. The chief categories of Party "leaders", both local and national, and other active Nazis, should be removed from governmental service and posts in cultural and economic enterprises. (Recommended)

36. All parties and groups reflecting National Socialist views should be rigorously suppressed, but non-Nazi parties based on democratic principles should be encouraged to organize and appeal for support in so far as their activities do not jeopardize public order. (Recommended)

37. In order to prevent an economic collapse the existing German administrative machinery of economic control should be utilized, with necessary adaptations. (Recommended)

38. The mark should not be deliberately undervalued on the foreign exchanges. (Recommended)

39. Reparation exacted from Germany should be directed mainly to furthering reconstruction. Even though it will not be large enough to meet the total cost, the payments should be confined to early years after the close of hostilities. The transfer of capital equipment should not be large enough seriously to cripple German economy. (Deferred for the consideration of the report of the Committee on Reparation.)

C. *Establishment of Permanent Government*

40. The direct inter-allied administration of Germany should terminate as soon as the prospects of order and the emergence of an acceptable German Government make it desirable. (Recommended)

41. The process of political reconstruction should begin with the establishment of democratic self-government in local communities and should be extended to larger units as the success of each step becomes apparent. (Recommended)

[Attachment 2]

*Memorandum by the Committee on Post-War Programs*⁵

TOP SECRET
PWC-141b

[WASHINGTON,] August 5, 1944.

THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY

I. INTRODUCTORY

The following discussion of the treatment of Germany makes a distinction between (1) long-range interests and objectives of the United States and (2) the problems of the occupation period.

The latter category embraces those immediate concerns of the victor powers from the moment of Germany's surrender or collapse until

⁵ The source text indicates that the original draft of this memorandum (CAC-143b) had been prepared and reviewed by the Interdivisional Committee on Germany and that the paper had been reviewed and revised by the Committee on Post-War Programs at meetings held on May 11, 12, 18, 19, 25, and 31, 1944.

a time when it will be safe to establish a permanent system of controls and to permit the organization of a constitutional German Government. The major tasks of this period will be (1) to secure through the surrender instrument and to exercise an unqualified authority over Germany, (2) to establish the machinery of an effective military government, (3) to destroy the National Socialist Party and uproot its influence from German life, (4) to disarm and demobilize the German military machine and establish controls over Germany's war potential, (5) to institute a program of restitution and reparation, (6) to prevent an economic breakdown and to begin an economic reorganization which will destroy autarky and eliminate, in so far as possible, the economic and social bases of ultra-nationalism and militarism, and (7) to make a start towards the creation of an acceptable and durable political structure in Germany.

If this program is to provide more than temporary security and is to prepare the way for continuing European stability and peace, it must be worked out and applied in the light of long-range objectives with respect to Germany and to Germany's place in the projected world order.

II. LONG-TERM INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

Axiomatically the basic long-term interest of the United States is peace, and so far as Germany is concerned, consequently, the basic objective is to see to it that that country does not disturb the peace.

Security against a renewal of German aggression must be guaranteed during the foreseeable future—not only during but beyond the occupation period—through a rigorously enforced prohibition of a German military establishment and through vigilant control of German war potential.

An indefinitely continued coercion of more than sixty million technically advanced people, however, would at best be an expensive undertaking that would afford the world little sense of real security and, more important still, there exists no convincing reason to anticipate that the victor powers would be willing and able indefinitely to apply coercion. In the long run, therefore, the best guarantee of security, and the least expensive, would be the German people's repudiation of militaristic ambitions and their assimilation, as an equal partner, into a cooperative world society.

These considerations dictate the search for a policy which will prevent a renewal of German aggression and, at the same time, pave the way for the German people in the course of time to join willingly in the common enterprises of peace.

The long-range objectives which might best protect the interests of the United States include (1) the settlement of disturbing frontier

problems, (2) the achievement of political and economic reform within Germany, and (3) a constructive role for Germany, both political and economic, in international relations.

A. *Frontiers*

In order to strengthen the forces of peace throughout the world, it is a continuing interest of the United States that the significance of frontiers be reduced through the development of international organization and of freer international economic relations. In the establishment of post-war boundaries, the objectives of the United States can be best served by territorial settlements which, by doing least injustice to the peoples of all the states concerned, offer the most reasonable prospect of general acceptance and stability. In the case of Germany the principles of minimum change and minimum grievance apply fairly well to her northern, western and southern boundaries.

1. *With Denmark*.—The existing Danish-German boundary has not been challenged by the Danes, and there is no apparent reason to propose a change.

2. *With the Netherlands*.—No adjustment of the Netherlands land boundary seems desirable since it has heretofore been no source of disturbance. The Netherlands Government, however, has a justified claim for the relocation of the boundary in the Ems Estuary in the main channel rather than along the western shore as has been maintained by Germany in contravention of an established principle of international law. Unofficial Netherlands spokesmen have recently threatened to claim compensation in adjacent German territory if the German army should destroy the dikes and flood the reclaimed lands of their country.

Further study is being given to the question of possible territorial compensation in such an event.

3. *With Belgium*.—There appears to be no convincing reason why the 1920 line should not be restored. The justice of the Belgian frontier as established in 1920 was attacked by the Germans, and the pre-1914 line was restored in 1940. Despite Belgian abuse of the open plebiscite, the inhabitants of the disputed region had generally become reconciled to Belgian authority.

4. *With France*.—The United States Government is committed to the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France. Since there are no strong forces, either political or economic, working toward the creation of a separate state, or federation, composed of French, German, Luxembourg, Belgian and other territories within the watershed of the Rhine River, it would be undesirable for this Government to support such a proposal.

5. *With Austria*.—It is recommended that the present administrative boundary be maintained as the international frontier. After the

absorption of Austria, the German Government made a slight rectification of the old frontier—now an administrative boundary—for reasons of convenience rather than for political motives. There is no cause to restore the pre-1938 boundary unless that should be desired by the 2000 inhabitants of the small Sonthofen area, which is shut off by mountains from close contact with Austria.

6. *With Czechoslovakia.*—It is recommended that the pre-Munich frontier be restored without prejudice to any rectifications which the Czechoslovak Government might wish to propose as part of a broader settlement of the issues in dispute between Czechoslovakia and Germany.

Since a viable Czechoslovakia, to whose restoration this Government is committed, must include a substantial German population, it is believed that the pre-Munich frontier with Germany should in principle be restored on grounds of historic, legal and strategic considerations. Such a conclusion is without prejudice to any cessions in the six northern salients (area, 772 square miles; population, 320,000, about 96 percent German) which the Czechoslovak Government might wish to negotiate with Germany or to slight rectifications in favor of Czechoslovakia. If such rectifications should be arranged by the two Governments concerned, this settlement could be approved by this Government, which is not committed to support any specific boundaries.

7. *With Poland.*—The principle of minimum grievance will be fairly well attained by the dispositions indicated above. In the case of the Polish-German frontier that principle may have to be overridden. To strengthen Poland strategically and economically and to compensate it for prospective losses of territories in the East, the Polish Government urges, with Soviet and British support, that East Prussia, Danzig, and a portion of German Upper Silesia should be ceded to Poland, and will probably insist that the approximately 3.4 million German inhabitants of the ceded areas should be transferred to Germany. The Soviet Government with apparently some British support, has suggested the cession of additional German territory up to the Oder River.

A basic question which has arisen in acute form is whether this Government should enter into active negotiations with the British and Soviet Governments with a view to determining a new Polish-German boundary or whether it should disclaim interest in this question and refrain from expressing approval or disapproval of a settlement agreed upon by its two major allies and Poland. If it is determined that this Government should play an active role, two questions arise. The first is whether a settlement of the future Polish boundaries should be negotiated now or be treated as part of the final peace settlement.

The second is whether this Government should admit the principle of the acquisition by Poland of territories containing large blocs of ethnically German population as compensation for the loss of only partially Polish-inhabited territories to the Soviet Union or for strategic and economic reasons.

Regardless of whether the United States takes an active or passive role with respect to the disposition of East Prussia, Danzig and Upper Silesia, it is recommended that the United States not encourage the cession of German territory in the lower trans-Oder region. The strategic considerations advanced in support of such an annexation are difficult to justify since no frontier arrangement between the two states could of itself suffice to maintain Poland's security against German aggression.

8. *Transfer of Germanic Populations.*—A problem closely related to that of establishment of equitable frontiers is presented by the presence of considerable German minorities in the various states of Eastern Europe. In particular, the Czechoslovak Government has indicated a desire to transfer a substantial number of the 3,200,000 Germans from that state; Poland will wish likewise to remove the Germans from Poznań, as well as from newly acquired territories; Yugoslavia may desire to take similar action.

These German minorities became the advance guard of National Socialist penetration, and the states which they helped to deliver to Hitler have a well-founded grievance against them. Their transfer to Germany would probably contribute to the tranquility of the countries concerned. Hitler himself has set an example by numerous forced migrations of the peoples of this region of Europe.

The problem, however, is one of enormous proportions. Serious economic injury would be done if these people should be summarily uprooted from their homes and thrown into Germany without compensation for their possessions and without provision for livelihood. By land reform in Germany it would be possible to absorb perhaps one million of the immigrants into agriculture. The great majority would have to enter urban life and would cause considerable strains unless there were an expanding German economy accompanied by an increase in foreign trade.

It is recommended, because of the above consideration, that this Government oppose the mass transfer of these peoples immediately upon the cessation of hostilities. It will perhaps be desirable, however, to sanction the relocation of individuals and groups who have constituted a special problem.

Further study is to be undertaken on the questions of (a) criteria for selecting populations to be transferred, (b) the establishment of an inter-allied commission to supervise transfers of populations, and (c) an inter-allied occupation of East Prussia.

B. Political and Economic Conditions

1. *Disarmament*.—This Government should advocate (a) the prohibition for an indefinite period of a German military establishment, (b) the prohibition for an indefinite period of the manufacture and import of arms (except the importation of small arms for police purposes), ammunition and implements of war, together with the prohibition of the manufacture of aircraft and the prohibition of the importation of military aircraft, and (c) a system of international audit, inspection, and enforcement, extending over the whole of Germany, for insuring the observance of disarmament stipulations and for preventing the accumulation of war material.

The details of this problem will be the subject of further study.

2. *Democracy*.—Since a peace maintained only by the continuous coercion of Germany would be a precarious and expensive one at best, it must be an objective of the United States to promote in Germany the largest degree possible of internal stability based on free institutions, on the psychological disarmament of the German people, and on tolerable economic conditions.

The most plausible hope for lasting political reconstruction and orderly development lies in the establishment of a democratic government, despite serious difficulties facing such an attempt. It is therefore recommended that the aim of American policy should be to prepare the German people for self-government as early as that may be compatible with the operation of security controls over Germany and with the functioning of a general system of international security.

The survival of a new democratic regime will depend in considerable measure on the psychological disarmament of the German people as well as on a tolerable standard of living. Although a democracy will labor under a heavy burden because of its necessary submission to the will of the victors, it must be able to offer some claim on German pride and patriotism purged of its aggressive content. In order to encourage a constructive fresh start in German political life, the United States should favor holding out the prospect that a democratic Germany, by demonstrating its ability and intention to act as a peace-loving nation, can earn an honorable place in the society of nations. In order to avoid raising an issue similar to that which, after 1919, was exploited by the nationalists to discredit and destroy all attempts to promote liberalism and international cooperation, this Government should oppose writing into the surrender terms or the peace settlement a verdict of moral guilt against the German people as a whole.

3. *Partition*.—It is recommended that this Government oppose the forcible partition of Germany. (Referred to the Secretary for possible consideration with the President.)

An imposed dismemberment of Germany into two or more separate states has been advocated as a practicable means of forestalling any renewal of German aggression. Such a measure, however drastic in itself, would not obviate the necessity of imposing and enforcing far-reaching security controls upon Germany for an indeterminate future, whether Germany is left united or is divided. Moreover, because of the high degree of economic, political and cultural integration in Germany, it must be anticipated that partition would not only have to be imposed but also maintained by force. Such a drastic interference in German life would evoke a vastly increased resentment over and above the inevitable discontent with defeat and its consequences. The victor powers, by imposing partition, would take on themselves a burdensome and never-ending task of preventing surreptitious collaboration between the partite states and of restraining the nationalistic determination to reunite, which would, in all probability, be the response of the German people. Finally, the disruption of German economic unity would carry with it grave dangers for the economic stability of Europe as a whole, and not merely to Germany.

4. *Political Decentralization.*—It is recommended that every feasible effort should be made to promote a return to a federal system of government and a division of Prussia into a number of medium-sized states.

In reaction to National Socialist over-centralization, the Germans will probably return, of their own accord, to a considerable degree of federal decentralization, including the breakup of Prussia, which in 1938 included 62 percent of the area and two-thirds of the population of Germany, into several states of moderate size.

Two risks may, however, be incurred by going beyond encouragement of decentralization. The first is that an imposed weakening of the governmental structure more sweeping than that favored by the moderate and liberal parties in Germany would, like an imposed dismemberment, provide a ready-made program for the nationalistic groups. The second risk is that a weak central authority would be unable to cope with the social and economic problems of post-war adjustment. In addition, a return to wide provincial autonomy might again offer to undesirable elements an advantageous means of penetrating the various state governments, as happened prior to 1933, when the National Socialists captured control of several of the smaller states. Finally, even the cumbersome federalism of the Bismarckian empire was no protection against the growth of German power and militarism. Too much importance should not be attached to movements for decentralization, in any case, for the democratic forces have generally favored greater unification of the Reich.

5. *Economic Arrangements.*—It is to the long-range interest of the United States that Germany be prosperous but that, at the same time,

German economy should not again be directed to war-like purposes. A prime concern of this Government, therefore, is that Germany for the indefinite future be forbidden the manufacture and import of arms, ammunition and implements of war and be denied the right to develop an economically unsound productive capacity convertible to war purposes. This interest points to the termination of an autarkic policy and to the assimilation of Germany, without discrimination other than that necessary for security controls, into world economy, the maximum reduction of the economic significance of frontiers and the development of responsible international agencies for transportation, power, and other functions. It is equally to the interest of this Government that Germany eventually should participate fully in such international economic organizations and agencies, but should not be permitted to use foreign trade or commercial relations as an instrument of nationalistic policy.

In the interest of eliminating the social and economic bases of recurrent militarism, it is recommended that this Government approve a program for destroying the privileged positions of the Junker estate owners and of the great financial and industrial monopolies. The problem of the Junkers can be solved by breaking up the large landed estates; the problem of financial and industrial monopoly could be met in part through disestablishing the top financial structures of the great industrial combines and redistributing the ownership of constituent operating companies, and in part through some effective form of public control exercised through a democratic regime. It is also possible that nationalization of certain industries would contribute to the elimination of militarism and of political and economic abuses arising from the excessive concentration of economic power in private hands. Moreover, this Government should oppose the development of new forms of industrial combinations, whether on a German or international basis, which could contribute to renewed German economic and political aggression in Europe.

Further study is to be undertaken of ways and means of implementing these recommendations with respect to landed estates and industrial concentration.

It is recommended that this Government propose allowing the German people, subject to such requirements as those outlined above, to determine the nature of their economic system. It is to the interest of the United States to see in Germany the revival of free labor organizations enjoying ultimately the rights of association and of collective bargaining. (See also PWC-71a, "General Objectives of United States Economic Policy With Respect to Germany".⁶)

⁶ For the text of this paper, as revised during its consideration by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, see ECEFP D-36/44, August 14, 1944, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, p. 278.

C. *German Foreign Relations*

The position of post-war Germany in world affairs will be conditioned largely by the success or failure of international cooperation for security and prosperity and by the degree to which Germany demonstrates its abandonment of aggressive and totalitarian ambitions. Although deprived for an undefined future of all military power, Germany will remain the most populous and productive country in Europe to the west of Russia. Germany would present a danger to peace only if the victors should fall out among themselves and if either Russia or Great Britain should try to bring Germany into its orbit. The best guarantee against such a development would therefore lie in the continued cooperation of the three principal victors in their treatment of Germany and in the solution of other problems, and in the early establishment of a general international organization within which the security of Germany, like that of other nations, would be assured.

In the post-war period Germany will presumably be debarred by its own weakness and by the continuing resentment of its smaller neighbors from pursuing independently any regional policy in Europe. If, however, European economic interests can be served by promoting, on a non-discriminatory basis, commercial exchanges between Germany and its neighbors to their mutual benefit and without undue advantage to Germany, this Government should be prepared to view such a development with equanimity. It is probable, however, that Germany's overseas trade will play a much larger part than before in an economy reoriented away from war and the pursuit of autarky. Germany should not be permitted to use trade policy as an instrument of aggression.

It is recommended that the United States encourage the earliest possible integration of Germany into the community of peace-loving nations and into world commerce through holding out to a reconstructed Germany the prospect of early admission to the general international organization and of participation without discrimination in world trade.

III. TRANSITIONAL PROCEDURES AND ARRANGEMENTS

A. *Surrender Terms*

This Government, by public commitment, demands the unconditional surrender of Germany.

1. *The Psychological Result.*—The exaction of an admission of total defeat might prevent the invention of new legends about the alleged invincibility of German arms. Against this future advantage is to be weighed the immediate disadvantage of the fact that German propaganda, by misinterpreting the intentions of the United Nations

to mean subjugation and destruction, is encouraging the resistance of the German people and is to that extent prolonging the war.

2. *The Legal Basis for the Authority and the Acts of the Victor Powers.*—The basic problem of the surrender is the establishment of a firm legal basis for the authority and acts of the victor powers. The traditional rights of military occupation do not give all the authority that is necessary for dealing with unforeseen contingencies and for effecting the reforms prescribed by long-term objectives. It is open to question whether an assertion of rights of conquest would provide a more satisfactory legal basis. In any case, unconditional surrender of a state is an innovation which requires exact definition before unusual rights can be derived incontestably from it.

It would seem essential, therefore, that the terms written into the surrender instrument, rather than conventional rights of occupation or the rights of conquest, be the source of the authority of the victors, provided there is a German Government capable of signing, and that the instrument contain a clear and comprehensive statement of that authority.

3. *The Extent of the Rights To Be Surrendered.*—A further problem is the definition of unconditional surrender in terms of the extent of the rights to be surrendered by Germany.⁷ The alternatives are (a) that Germany should deliver all rights and powers to the victors, and (b) that the stipulations of the instrument be limited essentially to military terms.

Previous statements of American policy and the draft terms of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have adopted the former interpretation. The British draft likewise embodies this definition. The Soviet view, on the other hand, is that the surrender instrument should contain primarily the military terms designed to render Germany incapable of renewing hostilities with the understanding that other provisions relating to political and economic matters should subsequently be imposed on Germany. In Soviet opinion, German military leaders would more readily accept military terms and would, if confronted with the sweeping demands of the American draft, use them to spur the German people to renewed resistance. It may be said in criticism of the Soviet approach that it would not assure to the victors an adequate legal basis for such measures as the punishment of war criminals, the abolition of the Nazi dictatorship, the reordering of German economy, etc., which are among the aims of this country. Furthermore, the political after-effects of increasing the stringency of the surrender terms step by step would perhaps play into the hands of nationalistic agitators against the peace settlement, as that procedure did after the last war.

⁷ See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 167–172.

4. *A Long Versus a Short Surrender Document.*—In the discussions of the European Advisory Commission, question has arisen over whether the surrender document should contain detailed provisions or be limited to a general acknowledgment of the comprehensive rights of the victors and the unqualified obligations of the vanquished. Proponents of the longer instrument argue that German acceptance would be more readily given to it than to a “blank-check” instrument and that it would expressly obligate Germany to a complete range of military, political, and economic stipulations without limiting the freedom of the victors. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of their short document⁸ argue, in turn, that a comprehensive surrender of powers makes specific provisions unnecessary and that an enumeration of detailed stipulations in the surrender document would carry with it the implication of a limitation of powers to the provisions specified. They attribute certain difficulties in Italy to the restrictive character of the long document used there and contend that the application of the broad authority can best be effected by ordinances of the occupation commanders. The American position is in favor of a short document, and it is probable that the British Government will accept one if there is agreement on proclamations and ordinances designed to give effect to the surrender terms.

5. *Who Should Sign for Germany.*—The transfer of the full powers implicit in unconditional surrender can be effected only by the German Government, and the signatory or signatories should be duly authorized, therefore, by the Government. For psychological reasons it is desirable that the instrument likewise be signed on behalf of the German High Command and by as important an officer as can be found. In case of the existence at the time of a Nazi or quasi-Nazi Government, the signature of a highly placed civilian representative would be equally desirable. If a moderate regime is in power at the time of surrender, it might well be advisable to compel the military alone to bear the onus of signing. A military signature, however, would have to be authorized by whatever government was in power at that time.

6. *Ratification of the Signed Instrument.*—A further problem already posed is whether the signed instrument should be ratified by the German Government. Since no official can sign away more authority than he legally possesses, the unqualified legality of the sweeping delivery of powers through surrender will depend in German eyes on whether it is properly authorized by the Government in power at the time. It is recommended that the surrender instrument be ratified by whatever German Government is in power at the time of surrender.

⁸ Cf. *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, p. 210.

7. *Who Should Acquire the Enemy's Surrendered Rights.*—Whatever arguments might be advanced for vesting the rights over Germany in all of the states at war with it, the practical necessities for prompt action, and the responsibilities of the three major powers, make such an arrangement impossible. The real issue, therefore, is whether the rights surrendered by Germany should be transferred to the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Governments jointly, or to each of them separately. A provision in the surrender instrument explicitly naming the three powers as joint recipients would have the advantage of binding the three Governments to act jointly in the post-surrender treatment of Germany, and would help to avoid the confusions and suspicions which would arise if each had the right to deal separately with the defeated enemy. The disadvantage of vesting these powers in all three Governments jointly is that no one of them would, in theory at least, be allowed to act unless all three Governments were in agreement. On balance, however, the likelihood of bringing about a policy of uniform action towards Germany would be improved by vesting power over Germany in the three Governments jointly, and this alternative is consequently recommended.

The rights and powers accruing from the surrender of Germany are to be acquired and exercised jointly by the aforesaid powers in the interests of the United Nations.

B. *Occupation*

1. *Administrative Machinery.*—Since the main responsibility for the occupation of Germany must rest with the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, a basic problem arises as to how the interests and policies of the three powers are to be coordinated. The choice of a form of administrative machinery appears to lie between (a) a unified tripartite system, (b) a completely separate and independent administration in each of three zones, and (c) an intermediate arrangement.

Uniformity of procedure throughout Germany would be most easily obtained, and undue exercise of influence by any one of the occupation authorities would be most effectively forestalled, if there were a smoothly working unified tripartite control. Linguistic and other difficulties, however, appear to argue for separate zones to be administered by each of the three armies of occupation. Such an arrangement, while avoiding local friction, would pose the problems of uniform security measures and general coordination of policy in the treatment of Germany as a whole. A strict application of the second alternative, by suddenly breaking the normal unity of the land, might easily lead to economic and social catastrophe. If prolonged prostration is to be avoided, the essential administrative functions and

economic processes now operated on a national basis will need to be left intact and a high degree of uniformity maintained in the administration of any separate zones that may be established.

This Government has recommended the creation of a tripartite civil affairs agency for Germany to coordinate the military government of the proposed three zones of occupation. This plan emphasizes the consultative and advisory role of the tripartite board and the reservation of full administrative powers to the commander of each zone acting under direction of his own military superior. A British plan, questioning the adequacy of a purely advisory agency for coping with the highly unified administration of so many aspects of German life, proposes the establishment of a tripartite administrative board possessing the authority, within the limits of the agreement of the three Governments, to direct the application of approved policies to Germany as a whole. This proposal would limit the duty of the zonal commanders primarily to that of enforcing the administrative regulations of the central tripartite organ.

The American plan, approved by the Department of State and presented to the European Advisory Commission, is general in character. Further clarification as to whether the tripartite agency should be primarily consultative or should constitute a genuine joint administrative authority will be needed.

It is recommended that this Government favor the establishment of a tripartite organization with authority to direct the uniform administration of the whole of Germany.

2. *The Delimitation and Allocation of Zones.*—It is recommended that, in case three zones of occupation are established, this Government accept the boundaries proposed by the British and Soviet Governments.

This recommendation is made on the grounds that (a) a tripartite governing machinery for the whole of Germany, in which the three powers would be equal partners, would tend to minimize the significance of the exact location of zonal boundary lines, (b) an arrangement which would make each zone contiguous to Berlin is not feasible because of the location of the capital.

A further problem is presented by the allocation of the zones. The plans hitherto advanced agree in assigning the eastern zone to Soviet command. The British and Soviet proposals assign the northwestern zone to British command and the southern to American control. The President has stated, however, that, because of convenience of access, American troops should control the northwestern zone.

3. *Military Government and Subsequent Method of Control.*—At the time of post-surrender occupation the victors may either (a) set up a direct military government which would supplant the

German political authorities while using more or less fully the administrative machinery, or (b) govern Germany by means of directives to a central political regime.

Although a final decision should be made only after future developments are assessed, it is tentatively recommended that this Government favor the first alternative. Direct military government will probably be necessary because of prospective internal confusion and would, in any case, be an effective means of impressing the totality of defeat on the German mentality. If a quasi-Nazi or military group should be in power at the time of surrender, it would be desirable to have that regime bear the onus of admitting defeat and of executing the orders of the occupation forces, but the procedure would entail the political limitation of dealing with a regime repugnant to the peoples of the victor states. If a group of moderates should gain control of Germany, there might be advantages administratively in working through it. Such a method, however, would have a very heavy disadvantage of exposing the moderates to the charge of being the tools of the allied powers. The moderates would have a better chance of survival in the court of popular German opinion if they came into power as the successors and supplanters of direct military government than as its instrument.

On the assumption of the probability of direct military government, it is further recommended that, as soon as military considerations cease to be paramount, the control of Germany should be transferred to an inter-allied civilian agency.

The importance of strictly military dispositions will tend to recede when the German forces have been disarmed and order is established under allied military occupation. Progressively from the time of surrender, consequently, the major concern of the victors will be the inauguration of political and economic reforms within Germany looking to the uprooting of National Socialism and the eventual integration of Germany into the organized community of nations. It is believed that these functions are more logically the work of the civilian authorities of the Governments concerned and can more effectively be performed by them. This recommendation does not envisage the termination of military occupation at the time of the transfer of authority to the civilian agency, but merely the subordination of the military to the civilian.

The point at which civilian control should supplant the military cannot be determined now, but it is recommended that in principle the change be made as soon as the maintenance of orderly conditions in Germany is assured.

4. *Participation of the Smaller United Nations in the Control of Germany.*—The primary military responsibility of the three principal United Nations requires that they make the basic decisions regarding

the treatment of Germany in the transitional period and bear the principal burden of enforcing them. At the same time the smaller United Nations in Europe have a vital interest in what is done to Germany as well as in future international organization. Questions therefore have arisen as to their participation in (a) the formulation of surrender terms, (b) the military occupation of Germany, (c) the joint military governmental body, and (d) the proposed civilian control agency.

The first question has been resolved by the offer of the European Advisory Commission to receive their proposals. The others remain unanswered. While it is impossible here to present a comprehensive program for the future, it is recommended that this Government favor the principle of the fullest participation of the smaller United Nations compatible with the major military responsibility of the three Great Powers. Some positive role for the smaller nations, although making decision a more cumbersome process, would help to forestall the formation of a bloc of the lesser states and the appearance of disruptive political maneuvers. It would likewise establish a pattern of cooperation looking forward to international organization.

5. *Relation of Machinery for Control of Germany With Machinery for European Reconstruction.*—The security political and economic dispositions relating to Germany affect in so many vital respects the general problem of the reconstruction of Europe that the British Government has raised a question as to the advisability of creating some kind of inter-allied body for coordinating policies and actions with respect to Europe as a whole.

Under such a plan an Allied Commission, or a similar body, for control of Germany would report to and receive directives from a European Council or similar body which would coordinate policies relating to Germany with those which affect Europe as a whole. In the absence of such an agency, the various governments and their inter-governmental agencies, such as those relating to economic disarmament, collection and allocation of reparation, regulation of property rights, and revival of international trade, may find themselves working at cross purposes. On the other hand, in view of the risk that the operations of such a regional organization might tend to jeopardize the willingness of the various countries to cooperate in the early establishment of a general international organization, this Government has hitherto tended to discourage establishment of such a European body.

6. *Security Functions During Occupation.*—The following problems, among others, will require immediate action by the occupation authorities:

a. *Demobilization of German armed forces.*—Immediately upon the acceptance of Germany's surrender, the allies will be confronted with the problem of dealing with several million German soldiers. The

alternative solutions will be (1) demobilization and disbandment carried out as expeditiously as considerations of internal order and in so far as feasible, the absorptive capacity of German economy will allow, (2) a retention of the troops in their formations under some form of direct control, either to be held in restraint for security reasons or used for labor service until such time as their release will be expedient.

It is recommended that this Government favor in principle the first alternative because of the problems of control and maintenance involved in keeping so many troops in confinement. This recommendation would not exclude the use of Waffen SS and other Nazi military formations in performing labor service for the needs of European reconstruction but would oppose the use in labor service for an indefinite period of large numbers of Army units.

Further study is to be made of the problem of the employment of forced German labor in reconstruction work outside of Germany.

b. Disarmament and the disposition of surrendered German arms and military equipment.—It is recommended that German arms, ammunition and instruments of war be scrapped in so far as they are not wanted for use in the war against Japan or adaptable to peaceful uses.

Total and lasting disarmament of Germany is a formal commitment of the United States Government. Among the proposals for the disposition of German arms, ammunition and implements of war are (1) that they be given to the states overrun by Germany and (2) that they be scrapped in so far as they are not capable of conversion to peaceful purposes. While the first alternative might give Germany's neighbors a temporary sense of added security, the measure is fraught with dangers. The rearming of European nations with surrendered German war matériel would complicate the problem of restoring political stability, render future disarmament more difficult, tend to make the countries concerned look to Germany for spare parts and replacements, and might inaugurate an armaments race detrimental to international peace and security.

Further study is to be made of the post-surrender disposition of German armaments.

c. Dissolution of military and para-military agencies.—It is recommended that, except for a civil police force adequate to maintain order, the occupation authorities proceed to the immediate dissolution of the army, the General Staff, party military and quasi-military organizations, reserve corps, military academies and military training, the administrative agencies performing military functions, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition. All such organizations should be permanently prohibited.

d. Immediate measures for the control of German war potential.—The essential first steps in the control of German war potential involve (1) the immediate cessation of the manufacture of war matériel and prohibition of resumption except in so far as it may be desired to make a limited use of German industrial capacity in the prosecution of the war against Japan, (2) the establishment of controls over industrial production, importation, and other economic activities, and (3) the dismantling of industrial machinery and plants not convertible to peace-time production or presenting an insuperable security problem. Likewise, the occupation authorities should proceed to the early inauguration of reforms designed to eliminate a policy of German autarky and to integrate Germany into the world economy by increasing its dependence on foreign trade.

C. Political Dispositions

1. *Use of German Agencies and Personnel During Military Government.*—To the end that civilian life continue as smoothly as possible, it is recommended that the occupation authorities make maximum use of German administrative machinery in so far as it can serve the purposes of the occupation authorities and does not perpetuate Nazi control and abuses, and use of non-Nazi civil servants in so far as they are efficient and politically acceptable to the occupation authorities.

2. *Treatment of National Socialist Party and Party Members.*—The first act in the fulfillment of the commitment to eliminate National Socialism should be the abolition of the Party and the impounding of its assets and records. The numerous affiliated and supervised organizations should be dissolved promptly, although certain social services now performed by them should be transferred to state organs or to newly established voluntary associations.

It is recommended that the occupation authorities impose political and other restrictions on the categories of the more important leaders, both national and local, rather than on the whole membership of the Party. Theoretically the Party has probably more than 5 million members, about 2 million of whom are considered as "leaders". To impose comprehensive disabilities upon all Party members would involve undertaking an enormous administrative task and giving the same treatment to the active and incorrigible nucleus of leadership as to a great mass of passive, and by then presumably disillusioned, followers. The punishment of war criminals will in itself serve to exclude a certain number of important Nazis. It consequently seems desirable to favor the exclusion from government office and from enjoyment of political rights of certain broad categories of Nazis, rather than of all nominal members of the Party. Careful attention

will have to be given to the elimination of convinced Nazis and other politically objectionable elements from education, journalism, and from control of industrial and financial enterprises.

3. *Political Activity and Association.*—Upon the establishment of military government, the uncertainties of the first days will probably require a complete ban on political agitation and on the activities of political associations. Commitments require the lasting suppression of parties assuming the trappings of quasi-military organizations or espousing National Socialist ideals.

It is recommended, however, that as soon as military conditions permit, parties opposing Nazi and other kinds of ultra-nationalist ideology be permitted to organize and appeal for support. This recommendation is based on the conviction that the German people will need information, organization and public debate before they are prepared to decide their future form of government and that there is advantage in beginning these activities while National Socialism is under the immediate impact of defeat.

D. *Economic Dispositions*

1. *The Prevention of Collapse.*—A major concern of the victors at the time of occupation will of necessity be the prevention of an economic collapse or the revival of economic activity if a collapse has already occurred. A memorandum, which has been presented to the Committee on Post-War Programs (PWC-72a),⁹ has outlined a series of measures which appear essential to that end; they include the maintenance and strengthening of the existing machinery for price and credit control, for distribution of food and other civilian supplies, for the control of labor, for the allocation of raw materials and capital in the interest of maintaining production, and for reviving essential foreign trade.

2. *Exchange Rate.*—The rate of the mark for international transactions will need to be fixed with a view to both economic and political conditions, first consideration being given to stimulating confidence in the value of the currency. A rate which avoids undervaluation will be desirable in facilitating the best possible support for internal and external commerce.

3. *Reparation.*—The problem of reparation has been the subject of a separate report by the Committee on Reparation, Restitution and Property Rights (PWC-223, 224, 225, 226).¹⁰

⁹ Not printed.

¹⁰ For the text of this report, as revised during its consideration by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, see ECEFP D-37/44, August 12, 1944, *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. 1, p. 287.

4. *Economic Reorganization.*—While the immediate economic objective upon occupation is the prevention of collapse, the victor powers can hardly avoid dealing with many of the basic problems of the German economy. Among those problems are: creation of organizations designed to promote the unification of European transport and power and communication facilities; the prohibition or regulation of enduring international agreements between private firms; the breakup of the large landed estates; the reduction of over-concentration of financial and industrial control; the revival of international commerce by the reduction of trade barriers; the eventual development of multi-lateral trade and elimination of uneconomical enterprises developed under the banner of autarky; finally, the definitive determination of the most effective means for the control of Germany's economic war potential.

E. Establishment of Permanent Government

The establishment of military government over Germany will give the victors an opportunity to observe the new political conditions which may emerge before making a final decision with respect to a permanent German Government. Certain issues, however, merit consideration at this time.

1. *Termination of Allied Government.*—It is recommended that this Government favor the policy of terminating direct administration of the German governmental structure, whether by military or civilian agencies, as soon as prospects of order and the possibility of establishing an acceptable and competent German Government make its termination feasible. This recommendation would not affect the continued military occupation of Germany or the exercise of controls, by direct intervention if necessary, on the part of inter-allied agencies.

The duration of direct control, either military or civilian, will depend, among other things, on the continued need for order, on an assessment of the psychological effect of occupation government, and on an estimate of how ready the Germans are to organize a government. It may be anticipated that the major result of military government on German mentality will be achieved within a few months at the most. As they recover from the shock, the people may become progressively resentful over the delay in reviving their political activity, and friction would work to the advantage of the nationalistic elements. It is equally important, however, that the people should not give their decisive votes before an adequate period of public discussion has clarified the issues.

2. *Procedures for Restoration of Permanent Government.*—There are three general alternatives of procedure: (1) restoration of the pre-

Hitler Weimar constitution; (2) the convocation of a new constituent assembly; and (3) progressive extension of self-government from local units through the states to the federal Reich as the success of each step seemed assured. The principle of continuity would be observed by returning to the original Weimar text. Yet that document, while a good rational product, was not an organic part of German life, and it is doubtful if the mass of Germans would wish to go back to it. A new constitution drawn up after a decade of political sterility, however, might not prove a much more effective instrument. Fear has been expressed that an election for a constituent assembly as the first political experience of the German people would revive the old bankrupt political parties and focus all political attention on the central government to the detriment of healthy local and provincial political life. The third alternative, by reviving free local self-government, would provide a transition period in which the German people could develop new leaders and gain experience in democratic practice, central governmental functions being carried on meanwhile by civil servants under allied control.

If there is a period of direct military government, it is recommended that democratic self-government be established in local communities as soon as military necessities permit. Decision as to when the next step should be taken could profitably be made in consultation with responsible local leaders.

3. *The Exercise of External Influence.*—In fidelity to their commitment to uproot National Socialism, the victor powers will need to intervene in the process of reconstructing government to the extent of denying political rights to those categories of Nazis adjudged dangerous. An attempt positively to influence political decisions of the German people might be successful if the intervention were the joint work of the major powers, but in the course of time [the] habit of intervention, if developed, would probably outlive joint action, and, if so, Germany would become the hunting ground of competing influences and would be able to play off one rival against another, with disastrous consequences for any system of controls and for the peace.

These considerations point to the desirability of limiting positive influence to the encouragement of popular self-government and not attempting to determine precisely the forms of government to be established. At the same time, however, it is a dictate of security that the victor powers, and after them the international organization, should reserve the right, and be prepared, to intervene in Germany to prevent the re-emergence of dangerous nationalistic activities and to hold Germany to the observance of the obligations imposed by the peace settlement and by the post-war security system.

[Attachment 3]

*Memorandum by the Division of Central European Affairs*¹¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 22, 1944.

STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS ON GERMANY

NEGOTIATIONS IN THE E.A.C.

The European Advisory Commission, after six months of discussions, has formally recommended the surrender terms for Germany to the Governments of the U.S., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. The American Government has notified Ambassador Winant of its formal approval of these terms.¹² Approval by the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. is expected momentarily.

Attached to the recommendation of the Commission is a letter to the European United Nations inviting their views in writing on the question of the surrender of Germany. To date, we are not informed of what views have been submitted to the Commission.

Before the Commission at present are three other important matters: (a) the protocol on the occupation of Germany, (b) the protocol on the occupation of Austria, and (c) proposals for control machinery and military government in Germany.

With respect to the occupation of Germany, the boundaries of the three zones of occupation have been provisionally agreed upon, but the question of whether British or American troops will occupy the northwestern or southern zone is still undecided.¹³ The President has indicated he desires the American forces to occupy the northwestern zone and my information is to the effect that he is still awaiting Churchill's agreement on this point. Acting on the authority of the President, Ambassador Winant has agreed to a tripartite occupation of Austria but the protocol on this has not as yet been formally recommended by the EAC.

¹¹ This attachment was an abridgement of a memorandum of August 22, 1944 (not printed), from the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger) to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) and the Secretary of State (740.00119 Control (Germany)/8-2844). The passages of Riddleberger's memorandum which were omitted from the memorandum forwarded to Roosevelt dealt with differences between the military authorities and officers of the Department of State, particularly with respect to matters before the Working Security Committee.

¹² For the text of the document entitled "Unconditional Surrender of Germany", signed *ad referendum* at London, July 25, 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, p. 256. Concerning approval of this instrument by the United States, see *ibid.*, p. 265.

¹³ For a summary of Anglo-American differences of opinion on this question in the period before the Second Quebec Conference, see an undated memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (Elsey) printed *post*, p. 145.

With respect to control machinery for Germany, British and American proposals have been before the EAC for some months.¹⁴ The American proposal envisages a Supreme Authority consisting of the three Commanders-in-Chief and advised by a Control Council which would be established on a functional basis (political, economic, military, transport, etc. sections).

Under this proposal the separate American, British and Soviet zonal administrations would retain their identity and operate separately in their respective zones. The policies pursued in the zones would be coordinated by the Control Council in Berlin, which would make recommendations on all policies to be executed throughout Germany.

The British have submitted a somewhat similar proposal, which has likewise been before the EAC for some months. The Russians have not submitted any proposal on control machinery and have recently indicated that they are unwilling to discuss any further questions in the EAC until the dispute between the British and Americans over their respective zones of occupation has been settled.

DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON ON TREATMENT OF GERMANY

The Department has prepared, and the Committee on Post-War Programs has approved, a basic policy statement entitled "Treatment of Germany"¹⁵ to which is attached a summary of policy recommendations.¹⁶ This report was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff about a month ago through the Working Security Committee. The JCS, however, have not as yet made known their approval to this document or the comments thereon.¹⁷ It is envisaged that as soon as the JCS have acted on it that it will be submitted to the President and, if he approves, will be transmitted to London for the guidance of Ambassador Winant in his negotiations on the EAC. A similar paper on Austria¹⁸ has been approved by the President and transmitted to Ambassador Winant.

In addition to the foregoing, a basic report on economic policy towards Germany and on reparations¹⁹ has been prepared in the Department and has been cleared by the Executive Committee on Foreign Economic Policy. These will be submitted to the Secretary in the near future with a suggestion as to how they should be taken up with the military authorities.

¹⁴ For texts of the United States and British proposals referred to, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 185, 201.

¹⁵ *Ante*, p. 53.

¹⁶ *Ante*, p. 49.

¹⁷ See *ante*, p. 49, fn. 3.

¹⁸ See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, p. 438.

¹⁹ See *ante*, p. 60, fn. 6, and p. 70, fn. 10.

A vast amount of material has been prepared in the Department on a variety of problems which will arise from the occupation of Germany but it has not yet been approved. These papers cover a variety of subjects, of which a few are set forth below for the purpose of illustration:

- Abrogation of Nazi Laws
- Disposition of Nazi Organizations
- Displaced Persons
- Control of Political Activities
- Supervision of Education
- Use of German Officials in Administration
- Control of Communications
- Control of Industry Potential for War
- Disposition of Merchant Shipping, etc.

The Working Security Committee has now drafted a paper entitled "Statement of General Policies To Be Followed in the Administration of Germany".²⁰ This report will lay down the general policies to be agreed upon by the U.S., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. on most important matters requiring agreement by the three powers for the administration of Germany after occupation. It is based upon the assumption that agreement will be reached on zones of occupation and control machinery.

It is anticipated that this paper will be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval. If this approval is given, it will be possible for the Department to send to London a vast amount of detailed information respecting the policies to be applied in Germany after occupation.

DISCUSSIONS WITH THE BRITISH IN LONDON

The British authorities have prepared and submitted to the EAC a number of directives covering policies to be followed in Germany upon occupation. In general, they cover much the same subjects as those which have been prepared in Washington and which are briefly described in the preceding paragraph. On a number of them, our views are not very different from those submitted by the British, but a certain amount of negotiation will no doubt be necessary before complete agreement is reached on all directives submitted by them.

In addition, Ambassador Winant's Planning Group has likewise drafted a number of directives for consideration by the American authorities. The Working Security Committee is prepared to correlate the various statements that have been prepared as soon as the military members have received authority from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to operate under the statement of general policies described above.

²⁰ For the revision of this paper dated August 30, 1944, see *post*, p. 77.

CONCLUSION

The slowness in arriving at agreed policies on the treatment of Germany has resulted primarily from the unwillingness of the Russians to discuss the control machinery proposal until the zones of occupation are definitely decided. Without agreement on control machinery, it is difficult for the Department to make any real progress on the detailed planning. We have attempted through the Ambassador at Moscow to get the Russians to continue discussions, but without success to date.

Department of the Army Files

*The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 28, 1944.

DEAR DOC: Enclosed is a telephone conversation I had with Secretary Stimson this morning which I think it might be well for you to consider and perhaps show to the Secretary of State in connection with any meetings that this new group² may have.

I know that Mr. Stimson is feeling very strongly about the wisdom of imprisoning the Gestapo. I have asked our people to check up on the size and extent of the Gestapo, so far as we have any means of checking, with an idea of determining what is involved.

Sincerely,

JOHN J. MCCLOY

[Enclosure]

SECRET

AUGUST 28, 1944.

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY STIMSON, 12:30 P.M.

Four propositions.

1. Swift punishment should be visited on the Nazi leaders in respect of war crimes.

2. We should then go down by steps into the subordinates responsible for such crimes, beginning with the leaders of the Gestapo and investigating their individual responsibility and punishing it accordingly.

3. As a preliminary step to the above we should immediately upon the occupation of Germany arrest and intern the entire Gestapo and institute careful investigation into individual responsibility for these crimes. Encourage the making of such charges by the German people.

¹ McCloy sent copies of this letter to Hopkins, Hildring, and White.

² i.e., the Cabinet Committee on Germany. See *post*, p. 90.

4. Institute at once an investigation as to the responsibility of the Storm Troopers and their leaders for similar war crimes. Consider also the method of proceeding against the Storm Troopers in a way similar to that taken against the Gestapo. We should always have in mind the necessity of punishing effectively enough to bring home to the German people the wrongdoing done in their name, and thus prevent similar conduct in the future, without depriving them of the hope of a future respected German community. (Those are the two alternatives.) Remember this punishment is for the purpose of prevention and not for vengeance. An element in prevention is to secure in the person punished the conviction of guilt. The trial and punishment should be as prompt as possible and in all cases care should be taken against making martyrs of the individuals punished.

How far can we go under the Geneva Convention³ in educating war prisoners against Naziism?

How far can we go in protecting the remainder of the Germans from the contagion of the Nazis?

³ Signed July 27, 1929. For text, see Department of State, Treaty Series No. 846; Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949*, vol. 2, p. 932; 47 Stat. (2) 2021.

Lot 55 D 375

*Memorandum by the Working Security Committee*¹

TOP SECRET
WS-254b

[WASHINGTON,] August 30, 1944.

MILITARY AND POLITICAL POLICIES TO BE FOLLOWED IN
ADMINISTRATION OF GERMANY

(The following statement of policies is based on the assumption of prior agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on (a) surrender terms, (b) zones of occupation, and (c) control machinery:)

1. The administration of Germany will be firm but just. The occupation authorities will in particular punish fully and promptly any organization or individual who fails to render satisfactory cooperation with the military government or who fails to comply fully with any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions that will be issued.

¹ Hull forwarded this paper to the United States Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Winant) on September 16, 1944, with the following explanation of its status: "This document is now awaiting action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the meantime it is being forwarded . . . in as much as it has been cleared by the Department and represents its views with respect to the principal military and political policies to be followed in the administration of Germany." For the full text of the covering instruction, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. 1, p. 335.

2. All German armed forces and all German governmental officials, authorities and agents who are outside Germany at the time of surrender shall be returned as soon as practicable to such German territories as may be specified, subject to such arrangements as may be made with the authorities in the areas in which they are located and to such agreements as may be reached between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

3. As soon as practicable the Supreme Allied Authority shall dissolve the German armed forces and staff organizations, Nazi military, para-military and police organizations, reserve corps, military academies, the administrative agencies performing military functions, and all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military spirit. All such organizations shall be prohibited. The members of all such organizations shall be demobilized and disbanded as soon as practicable except that the respective commanding generals may retain any members of such organizations under their control for such purposes as may be authorized by the Supreme Allied Authority. All military training shall be forbidden and no secret organizations or societies shall be permitted. German civil police forces adequate to maintain order may be permitted.

4. All property acquired or coming under Allied control as a result of German defeat or surrender, including German resources in the respective zones of occupation, shall be disposed of only in accordance with principles established by the Supreme Allied Authority.

5. Prompt measures should be taken to seize and place under protective custody all important records whether governmental, party or private in character. All enemy information and records thus secured by virtue of the defeat and surrender of Germany will constitute a common pool and will be made available to the United States, United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. and upon agreement by them to other United Nations without regard to the physical location or custody of such records.

6. All German arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be destroyed or scrapped except as otherwise agreed by the three Powers. All permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses, and other fortified areas shall be destroyed.

7. The further manufacture in Germany of arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be prohibited.

8. The National Socialist Party and all organizations associated with it shall be dissolved. Provision may be made for the continuance by public agencies or voluntary associations of any desirable social services now performed by certain of these organizations. The activities of persons who have been active Nazis shall be restricted with a view to destroying their influence in Germany.

9. The key laws and decrees establishing the political structure of National Socialism and implementing its ideology and objectives shall be systematically abrogated.

10. To the extent possible, German administrative machinery and German personnel shall be used for the execution of Allied policies and for the routine administration of Germany. Active Nazis and persons suspected of being war criminals or otherwise unreliable shall not be employed in German administrative agencies.

11. Political activity shall be prohibited except as authorized by the Supreme Allied Authority. When considerations of military security permit, parties opposing Nazi and kindred ideologies shall be allowed to organize and appeal for popular support.

12. Subject to considerations of military security the Supreme Allied Authority shall authorize the formation of voluntary labor organizations possessing the rights of association and of collective bargaining.

13. The Supreme Allied Authority shall suspend all German laws discriminating against persons on grounds of race, color, creed or political opinion and shall take action necessary to annul such laws. In the absence of security objection persons detained under any such laws shall be released.

14. To the extent consistent with military security and the destruction of National Socialism freedom of speech and press and freedom of religious activity shall be permitted.

15. All information services (press, radio, cinema, etc.) and all channels of communication shall be administered under policies formulated by the Supreme Allied Authority and shall be subject to such censorship as will:

insure against further dissemination of Nazi propaganda,
facilitate the revival of free expression so far as consistent with security needs and the destruction of National Socialism, and
implement other policies of the Supreme Allied Authority.

16. The following shall be arrested and held for investigation and subsequent disposition:

- (a) Adolf Hitler and his chief Nazi associates,
- (b) the officials who have held ministerial and other important governmental positions under the Nazi regime,
- (c) comparable officials of other governments which have been at war with any of the United Nations,
- (d) persons suspected of having committed war crimes,
- (e) nationals of any of the United Nations or associated states alleged to have committed offenses against their national laws, and
- (f) any other persons designated by the United States, the United Kingdom or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

17. Schools shall be re-opened as speedily as military considerations permit and as material and personnel requirements can be met. The entire educational system shall operate under the supervision of the Supreme Allied Authority with the fullest possible utilization of reliable German administrators and teachers. Active Nazis shall be removed from the staffs and all Nazi and kindred influences eliminated from the curricula. Positive educational reconstruction shall be left to competent and politically trustworthy German leadership.

18. The administration of justice by civilian courts shall be reestablished as speedily as will be compatible with the elimination of active Nazi personnel and replacement by qualified non-Nazis. Special party-created tribunals shall be abolished.

19. All possible aid consistent with the means at hand will be rendered to Allied prisoners of war, including those persons who have been deprived of this status involuntarily, to the end that their safety and well being is not jeopardized by the collapse of Germany, and such prisoners of war will be repatriated as soon as practicable upon the cessation of hostilities. The repatriation of prisoners of war will have priority over the repatriation of other displaced persons. No priority with respect to repatriation should be established in advance by which the prisoners of any nation or nations will be favored. The time and order in which prisoners will be repatriated must be determined in the light of the situation existing after the collapse of Germany.

20. Movement of all persons across German frontiers shall be regulated under policies laid down by the Supreme Allied Authority.

21. Relations between Germany and any states still at war with any of the United Nations and associated states shall be broken off. Relations between Germany and any other states shall be carried on to the extent and in the manner determined by the Supreme Allied Authority.

Hopkins Papers

*The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger)
to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*¹

[WASHINGTON,] September 1, 1944.

DEAR MR. HOPKINS. Attached is the memo which I promised for use in the meeting at your office tomorrow morning. I shall bring enough copies for all. It's a rush job, but I think I have hit most of the high spots.

JIMMIE RIDDLEBERGER

¹ This covering memorandum is entirely in Riddleberger's handwriting.

[Attachment]

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Central European
Affairs (Riddleberger)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 1, 1944.

AMERICAN POLICY FOR TREATMENT OF GERMANY AFTER SURRENDER

It is essential that a number of important decisions be made respecting American policy for the treatment of Germany after surrender, particularly as certain of these questions will have to be negotiated with the British and the Russians. There is accordingly set forth below a summary of the decisions that have been made to date and a statement of important problems on which final American policy has not been formulated.

1. *Status of Negotiations in the EAC*²

(a) *Surrender Terms.* The instrument of unconditional surrender of Germany has been recommended by the European Advisory Commission and has been formally approved by the American Government. It is anticipated that British and Russian approval will be forthcoming. These surrender terms are the outcome of prolonged negotiations in which considerable differences of opinion had to be ironed out. The surrender instrument is essentially a military document in which the German Government and the German High Command announces Germany's unconditional surrender. The first eleven articles relate primarily to military dispositions and are supplemented by a general clause in which it is stated that the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R. will exercise supreme authority with respect to Germany and will present additional, political, administrative, economic, financial and other requirements which the German Government, High Command and people will carry out unconditionally.

(b) *Zones of Occupation.* Tentative, but not formal, agreement has been reached in the EAC respecting the demarcation of three zones of occupation which will be confided to Russian, British and American troops. The Soviet forces will occupy the eastern zone, but whether British or American troops will occupy the northwestern and southern zones is not as yet decided. The protocol on occupation has therefore not been formally recommended by the EAC as the Russians stated they did not desire to submit a document to Moscow containing blank spaces. It has been agreed that Austria will be jointly occupied by the three powers with American military participation limited to a token force. The area of Greater Berlin will likewise be subject to tripartite occupation.

² Cf. the memorandum on this subject dated August 22, 1944, *ante*, p. 73.

(c) *Control Machinery and Military Government.* Both the American and British Governments submitted to the EAC in March 1944 proposals for control machinery and military government in Germany. The Russian delegates refused to discuss these proposals in EAC until the surrender terms had been agreed upon and subsequently refused to discuss them until the occupation protocols had been finally recommended. After some pressure had been exerted in Moscow, the Russians have now agreed to discuss control machinery and have submitted a proposal to the EAC. This proposal has not as yet been received in Washington.³

The American proposal for the administration of Germany contemplates a Supreme Authority consisting of the three Commanding Generals of the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R., which would coordinate Allied activity throughout Germany and supervise such centralized governmental functions and economic activities which the three powers deem essential. A Control Council, composed of representatives in equal numbers from each of the three Allied Governments, will be established by the Supreme Allied Authority and will coordinate the administration of military government throughout Germany, including detailed planning for the execution of directives received from the three governments. The British proposal is not dissimilar in its broad outline from the American plan.

2. *Important Problems for Which High Policy Decisions Are Urgently Required*

The fundamental question to be decided is what kind of a Germany do we want and what policies should be put into effect during occupation to attain our objectives. The most important of these problems are set forth below with an explanation of the State Department's attitude to them:

(a) *Partition.* It must be explained at the outset that "partition" as used here does not refer to frontier adjustments or territorial amputations in the outer borders of the Reich. For example, the annexation of East Prussia and Danzig by Poland is not excluded in the recommendations set forth below on partition. By partition is meant the division of what is left of Germany into two, three or more independent states. While it can be argued that partition is not necessarily an urgent question, it is undoubtedly true that if partition were decided upon, we might desire to determine the zones of occupation to conform to a subsequent partition.

³ The text of the Soviet proposal was received by the Department of State on September 2, 1944. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, p. 299.

The State Department is, in general, opposed to the forcible partition of Germany. An imposed dismemberment of Germany into two or more separate states has been advocated as a practicable means of forestalling any renewal of German aggression. Such a measure, however drastic in itself, would not obviate the necessity of imposing and enforcing far-reaching security controls upon Germany for an indeterminate future, whether Germany is left united or is divided. Moreover, because of the high degree of economic, political and cultural integration in Germany, it must be anticipated that partition would not only have to be imposed but also maintained by force. The victor powers, by imposing partition, would take on themselves a burdensome and neverending task of preventing surreptitious collaboration between the partite states and of restraining the nationalistic determination to reunite, which would, in all probability, be the response of the German people. Finally, the disruption of German economic unity would carry with it grave dangers for the economic stability of Europe as a whole, and not merely to Germany. We should not, however, oppose any spontaneous German movements for partition.

In place of partition, it is recommended that every effort be made to promote a federal system of government in Germany and a division of Prussia into a number of medium-sized states. Prussia in 1938 included 62% of the area and two-thirds of the population of Germany and it may well be that in reaction to Nazi over-centralization many Germans would want to return to a considerable degree of federal decentralization, including the breakup of Prussia.

(b) *Dissolution of German Armed Forces.* There is general agreement that the German armed forces and staff organizations, Nazi military, para-military and police organizations, reserve corps, military academies, [and] administrative agencies performing military functions shall be dissolved and prohibited. Their members shall be demobilized and disbanded as soon as practicable. All German arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be destroyed or scrapped, except as otherwise agreed, and the further manufacture in Germany of arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be prohibited.

(c) *Liquidation of the Nazi Party.* There is general agreement that the Nazi Party and all organizations associated with it shall be dissolved. The activities of persons who have been active Nazis shall be restricted. In effecting the abolition of the Nazi Party, it is contemplated that it shall be completely destroyed in all of its manifestations, including the SA, the SS, Hitler Youth, the Motor Corps, the Women's League, the Student's League, the University Teachers and all affiliated organizations such as the Labor Front, the Association for

War Victims, the Guardians of the Law, the Public Welfare Organization and special party schools. Party members shall be excluded from political or civil activity and subjected to a number of restrictions. Any laws and decrees establishing the political structure of National Socialism shall be abrogated. Political activity shall be prohibited, except as authorized by the Supreme Allied Authority. All laws discriminating against persons on grounds of race, color, creed or political opinion shall be annulled.

(d) *War Criminals.* There is general agreement that Adolf Hitler, his chief Nazi associates, officials who have held ministerial and other important posts, persons suspected of having committed war crimes, and other persons designated by the U.S., the U.K. or the U.S.S.R. shall be arrested and held for "subsequent disposition".

(e) *Control of Communications.* There is general agreement that all information services (press, radio, cinema, etc.) and all channels of communication shall be administered under policies formulated by the Supreme Allied Authority.

(f) *Economic Measures.* American economic policy with respect to Germany envisages the reservation of far-reaching rights of control over German economy after surrender. There is no disagreement on this point. However, it is apparent that considerable differences of opinion have developed as to the purpose toward which this control should be directed. The Department of State has drafted and approved a statement on the general objectives of American economic policy and has received the approval to this document by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy.⁴ Without attempting to summarize here all of the reasoning contained in this document, there is [are] quoted below the four major objectives to be sought:

1. The performance by Germany of acts of restitution and reparation required by the United Nations.
2. The control of Germany's economic war potential, by the conversion of German economic capacity directed to war purposes, and by rendering vulnerable to outside control the reconversion of Germany into a war economy able to launch and sustain a war of aggression.
3. The elimination of German economic domination in Europe, which Germany achieved by the systematic exploitation of the so-called "New Order" in Europe and by a series of other practices.
4. Effecting a fundamental change in the organization and conduct of German economic life to the end that German economy can be integrated into an inter-dependent world economy.

⁴ ECEFP D-36/44, "Germany: General Objectives of United States Economic Policy With Respect to Germany", dated August 14, 1944, but approved on August 4. For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. 1, p. 278.

These statements, together with the justification thereof, have now been presented to the Secretaries of War and Navy for their comment.⁵

In the meantime, the State Department has received, in the course of drafting instruction[s] to its representative on the EAC, various proposals from the military authorities which apparently contemplate the dismantlement or destruction of all German industry capable of producing war material. Its objection is that such proposals contradict the general objectives quoted above, particularly paragraph 2. They would likewise presumably remove the possibility of extracting reparation goods from Germany.

The problem of German reparations is obviously closely linked to two others: (a) the level of subsistence which will be determined for the German people, and (b) the extent to which German industry may be dismantled or destroyed either for the purpose of long-term security or for short-term reparation payment.

Therefore it seems essential that this Government should determine its basic policy and should decide at an early date what kind of economic structure it proposes to leave to Germany. If a far-reaching program of industrial destruction or dismantlement is agreed upon, it is apparent that, if put into effect, it will bring about extensive and important changes in European economy as a whole. Germany is a deficit country in foodstuffs and it is doubtful if a plan of making Germany predominantly agricultural can be put into effect without the liquidation or emigration of X-millions of Germans. Germany is furthermore an important producer of certain raw materials, namely coal and bauxite, for Europe as a whole, not to speak of the vast amount of industrial goods which Germany normally exports. If we advocate a "wrecking program" as the best means of assuring our security, we may face considerable European opposition on account of its effect on European economy, and if we desire continuing reparations out of Germany, we shall eliminate any such program by a policy of destruction of German industry.

⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. 1, pp. 276-277.

Roosevelt Papers

*Memorandum Prepared in the Treasury Department*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 1, 1944.

SUGGESTED POST-SURRENDER PROGRAM FOR GERMANY

It is suggested that the position of the United States should be determined on the basis of the following principles:

1. *Demilitarization of Germany*

It should be the aim of the Allied Forces to accomplish the complete demilitarization of Germany in the shortest possible period of time after surrender. This means completely disarming the German Army and people (including the withdrawal or destruction of all war material) and the total destruction of the whole German armament industry as well as those parts of supporting industries having no other justification.

2. *Partitioning of Germany*

(a) Poland should get that part of East Prussia which doesn't go to the U.S.S.R. and the southern portion of Silesia as indicated on the map.²

(b) France should get the Saar and the adjacent territories bounded by the Rhine and the Moselle Rivers.

(c) As indicated in part 3 an International Zone should be created containing the Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas.³


(d) Denmark should be given the territories between its present borders and the International Zone, north of the Kiel Canal.

(e) The remaining portion of Germany should be divided into two autonomous, independent states, (1) a South German state comprising Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, Baden and some smaller areas and (2) a North German state comprising a large part of the old state of Prussia, Saxony, Thuringia and several smaller states.

¹The source text bears the following manuscript notation by the President's Naval Aide (Brown): "When received for filing, the originator of this paper was not indicated W B", but it is undoubtedly the memorandum which Morgenthau gave to Roosevelt on September 2, 1944, at the Morgenthau home near Fishkill, New York. See Blum, pp. 351-354. A copy of the same memorandum in the Hopkins Papers (which has one substantive variation noted in fn. 3, below) bears the following manuscript endorsement by Hopkins: "From Treasury by Harry White". The memorandum had been drafted, under Morgenthau's direction, by a committee in the Treasury Department consisting of White, John Pehle, and Ansel Luxford. See Blum, pp. 342-343; *Morgenthau Diary (Germany)*, vol. 1, p. 426. As it appears in the last-named source, pp. 463 ff., the memorandum is printed with an enclosure in the form of a draft directive for military government in Germany. No such enclosure is filed with the copies of the memorandum in the Roosevelt or Hopkins Papers.

²Facing this page.

³The copy of this memorandum in the Hopkins Papers has the additional words "and the Kiel Canal" at the end of this paragraph.



There shall be a custom union between the new South German state and Austria, which will be restored to her pre-1938 political borders.

3. *The Ruhr*

Here lies the heart of German industrial power. It should be dealt with as follows:

(a) An International Zone should be created containing the Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas. Included in the Zone should be the Kiel Canal and the Rhineland. The Zone should be governed by the international security organization to be established by the United Nations. The approximate borders of the Zone are shown on the attached map.

(b) The internationalization of this area shall in no way interfere with: (a) total destruction of the German armament industry and supporting industries in the Ruhr in accordance with Part 1 of this memorandum, (b) restitution and reparations, including removal and distribution of industrial plants and equipment, in accordance with Part 4 of this memorandum.

(c) Ownership and control of major industrial properties remaining shall be transferred to the international organization.

(d) The international organization shall be governed by the following general principles:

(i) The natural resources and the industrial capacity of the Ruhr area shall not be used or developed so as to contribute in any way to the military potential of Germany or the Ruhr area.

(ii) The Zone will be a free trade area. However, the importation of capital should be discouraged.

4. *Restitution and Reparation*

Reparations, in the form of recurrent payments and deliveries, should *not* be demanded. Restitution and reparation shall be effected by the transfer of existing German resources and territories, e.g.,

(a) by restitution of property looted by the Germans in territories occupied by them.

(b) by transfer of German territory and German private rights in industrial property situated in such territory to invaded countries and the international organization under the program of partition.

(c) by the removal and distribution among devastated countries of industrial plants and equipment situated within the International Zone and the North and South German states delimited in the section on partition.

(d) by forced German labor outside Germany.

(e) by confiscation of all German assets of any character whatsoever outside of Germany.

5. *Treatment of Special Groups*

(a) A particularly intensive effort must be made to apprehend and punish war criminals.

(b) All members of the following groups should be detained until the extent of the guilt of each individual is determined :

(i) The S.S.

(ii) The Gestapo.

(iii) All high officials of the police, S.A. and other security organizations.

(iv) All high Government and Nazi party officials.

(v) All leading public figures closely identified with Nazism.

(c) Apart from the question of established guilt for special crimes, mere membership in the S.S., the Gestapo and similar groups will constitute the basis for inclusion into compulsory labor battalion to serve outside Germany for reconstruction purposes.

(d) The Nazi Party and all affiliated organizations such as the Labor Front, The Hitler Youth, The Strength-through-Joy, etc., should be dissolved and their properties and records confiscated. Every possible effort should be made to prevent any attempts to reconstitute them in underground or disguised form.

(e) All members of the following groups should be dismissed from public office, disenfranchised and disqualified to hold any public office or to engage in the journalist, teaching, and legal professions, or, in any managerial capacity in banking, manufacturing or trade :

(i) The Nazi Party.

(ii) Nazi sympathizers who by their words or deeds materially aided or abetted the Nazi program.

(iii) The Junkers.

(iv) Military and Naval officers.

(f) All Junker estates should be broken up and divided among the peasants and the system of primogeniture and entail should be abolished.

6. There should be abrogated and declared null and void all pre-surrender laws, decrees, regulations or aspects of the same which discriminate on the basis of race, color, creed or political opinions.

7. *Education and Propaganda*

(a) All schools and universities will be closed until an Allied Commission of Education has formulated an effective reorganization program. It is contemplated that it may require a considerable period of time before any institutions of higher education are reopened. Meanwhile the education of German students in foreign universities will not be prohibited. Elementary schools will be reopened as quickly as appropriate teachers and textbooks are available.

(b) All German newspapers, magazines, weeklies, etc., will cease publication immediately and shall not resume publication until so directed.

(c) All German radio stations will be discontinued immediately and shall not be permitted to resume operations until so directed.

8. *Political Decentralization*

The military administration in Germany in the initial period should be carried out with a view toward the eventual partitioning of Germany into three states. To facilitate partitioning and to assure its permanence the military authorities should be guided by the following principles:

(i) Dismiss all policy-making officials of the Reich government and deal primarily with local governments.

(ii) Encourage the reestablishment of state governments in each of the states (*Länder*) corresponding to 18 states into which Germany is presently divided and in addition make the Prussian provinces separate states.

(iii) Upon the partition of Germany, the various state governments should be encouraged to organize a federal government for each of the newly partitioned areas. Such new governments should be in the form of a loose confederation of states, with emphasis on states' rights and a large degree of local autonomy. Eventually such confederacies would assume sovereign functions, including separate currency and postal systems, powers of foreign representation and negotiation, etc.

9. *German Economy*

The sole purpose of the military in control of the German economy shall be to facilitate military operations and military occupation. The Allied Military Government shall not assume responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing, or transportation, or take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy, except those which are essential to military operations and are indicated above. The responsibility for sustaining the German economy and people rests with the German people with such facilities as may be available under the circumstances.

10. *United States Responsibility*

(a) The responsibility for the execution of the post-surrender program for Germany set forth in this memorandum is the joint responsibility of the United Nations. The execution of the joint policy agreed upon should therefore eventually be entrusted to the international body which emerges from United Nations discussions.

Consideration of the specific measures to be taken in carrying out the joint program suggests the desirability of separating the task to

be performed during the initial period of military occupation from those which will require a much longer period of execution. While the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R., will, for practical reasons, play the major role (of course aided by the military forces of other United Nations) in demilitarizing Germany (point 1), the detailed execution of other parts of the program can best be handled by Germany's continental neighbors.

(b) When Germany has been completely demilitarized there would be the following distribution of duties in carrying out the German program:

(i) The U.S. would have military and civilian representation on whatever international commission or commissions may be established for the execution of the whole German program and such representatives should have adequate U.S. staffs.

(ii) The primary responsibility for the policing of Germany and for civil administration in Germany would be assumed by the military forces of Germany's continental neighbors. Specifically, these should include Russian, French, Polish, Czech, Greek, Yugoslav, Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian soldiers.

(c) Under this program United States troops could be withdrawn within a relatively short time. Actual withdrawal of United States troops should not precede agreement with the U.S.S.R. and the U.K. on the principles set forth in the above parts of this memorandum.

Editorial Note

The following information on a meeting at the White House on September 2, 1944, with reference to Germany is taken from a memorandum of October 28, 1944, from the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius):¹

"On September 1, 1944, Mr. Harry Hopkins informed the Secretary of the President's desire to establish a Cabinet Committee on Germany and, with the Secretary's permission, arranged for a meeting in his office on September 2 of officials of State, War and Treasury Departments. At this meeting Mr. McCloy and General Hilldring of the War Department, Dr. Harry White from the Treasury, and Mr. Matthews and Mr. Riddleberger from the State Department, and Mr. Harry Hopkins were present.

"It was at this meeting that Dr. White produced the Treasury plan for Germany² and gave a lengthy interpretation of this plan which, in its general tenor, was more extreme than the memorandum itself. The plan contemplated the internationalization of the Rhineland together

¹ For the full text of Riddleberger's memorandum, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 160-163.

² *Supra*.

with a strip of German territory extending through Westphalia, Hannover and Holstein to and including the Kiel Canal. Poland would receive East Prussia and Upper Silesia; France would receive the Saar and German territory bounded by the Rhine and Moselle rivers. The remainder of the Reich would be divided into two independent states. In explaining this plan, Dr. White insisted that no trade would be permitted between the proposed international zone and the rest of the Reich, and he emphasized that the productivity of this zone should not in any way contribute to German economy. No recurrent reparations deliveries would be demanded and reparations would be dealt with by transfer of territory, equipment and labor service.

"A lengthy discussion followed, in which Mr. Matthews and Mr. Riddleberger presented a State Department memorandum³ and explained at some length how our views fitted into the British and Russian ideas to the extent which we were aware of them. After a lengthy discussion in which Mr. McCloy pointed out the difficulties which would arise for the military authorities under the Treasury plan, he stated that on many subjects there was a large area of agreement and he suggested that Mr. Riddleberger draft a memorandum for the Cabinet Committee which would include all points on which there was obvious agreement. These points related primarily to the dissolution of the Nazi Party; the demilitarization of Germany; controls over communications, press and propaganda; and reparations. Mr. Riddleberger accordingly drafted this memorandum,⁴ which was discussed by the three Secretaries on September 5." (862.50/9-2844)

³ *Ante*, p. 81.

⁴ *Post*, p. 95.

PR 10 Foreign Relations of U.S./8-20/71

*Memorandum by the British Lord Chancellor (Simon)*¹

MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

I was asked by the War Cabinet (W.M. (44) 83rd Conclusions²) to consider further, and to report upon, proposals for dealing with the *major* war criminals. The following appear to be some of the principal considerations to be borne in mind:

1. The Moscow Tri-partite Declaration (Nov. 1st, 1943)³ concluded with the statement that it was made "without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offences have no particular geographical localisation, and who will be punished by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies". This statement has as yet never been amplified either by public announcement, or (as far as I know) by consultation between the Allies.

¹ This paper was apparently shown to Roosevelt during the Quebec Conference. See a minute on the subject of war criminals which Roosevelt and Churchill approved at Quebec on September 15, 1944, *post*, p. 467. Cf. a draft message to Stalin on the same subject, *post*, p. 489.

² The War Cabinet papers referred to in this memorandum are not available in United States files.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. 1, pp. 768-769.

2. In view of the progress made towards final victory over Germany, has not the time arrived to raise—with President Roosevelt, at any rate—certain questions connected with the carrying out of this announcement of intended punishment? It is much to be hoped that the principal criminals may, before the end, be disposed of by the people whom they have led to destruction, or may take their own lives—but if they fall alive into the hands of the Allies, what is to be done with them?

3. I am strongly of opinion that the method by trial, conviction, and judicial sentence is quite inappropriate for notorious ringleaders such as Hitler, Himmler, Goering, Goebbels and Ribbentrop. Apart from the formidable difficulties of constituting the Court, formulating the charge, and assembling the evidence, the question of their fate *is a political, not a judicial, question*. It could not rest with judges, however eminent or learned, to decide finally a matter like this, which is of the widest and most vital public policy. The decision must be “the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies”. The Moscow Declaration, indeed, has already said so.

4. I am equally clear that these leading and notorious criminals cannot be left untouched, while lesser people who have committed atrocities and war-crimes under their orders and with their approval are tried and heavily punished. Such a course would be universally, and rightly, condemned. It may not be essential to make a precise public announcement of Allied intentions as regards the major criminals at present—the Moscow Declaration is itself a general indication, and a new statement might evoke reprisals against Allied individuals in German hands—but it seems to me most desirable to open confidential consultations on the subject with some of our Allies, and to get a decision now as to what is to be done. Otherwise, when the time comes, there may be a disastrous difference of view.

5. The list of war criminals who might be dealt with without trial, which was prepared by the Foreign Secretary ⁴ (W.P.(44)330), was criticised in some quarters for its omissions (W.P.(44)345), but I am disposed to think that this method will only be considered appropriate and justified in the case of the small group of leaders who are known to have been responsible for the conduct of the war, and who have at headquarters authorised, approved or acquiesced in the horrible atrocities that have been committed.

6. A formula which might meet the Prime Minister's suggested views would be as follows:—

“The Moscow Tri-partite Declaration of November 1st, 1943, announced that the Allies intended to arrange for the trial and punish-

⁴ Anthony Eden.

ment of enemy war criminals who had already been captured or who fell into their hands, but the Moscow Declaration was stated to be made 'without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offences have no particular geographical localisation, and who will be punished by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies'. The time has come to announce that among these major criminals are Hitler, Himmler, Goering, Goebbels and Ribbentrop, but the Allies reserve the right to add to their number. Upon any of these major criminals falling into Allied hands, the Allies will decide how they are to be disposed of, and the execution of this decision will be carried out immediately."

S[IMON]

[LONDON,] 4th September, 1944.

740.00119 EW/9-444

The Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger)
to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1944.

THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY

S—MR. SECRETARY: At the request of the President, Mr. Harry Hopkins has called together several advisers to the Secretaries of the State, War and Treasury [Departments] for an exchange of views prior to a meeting of the three Secretaries to discuss the treatment of Germany. Three meetings were held over the weekend in which the following participated:

Messrs. Dunn, Matthews and Riddleberger for the State Department;

Mr. McCloy and General Hildring for the War Department;

Dr. Harry White for the Treasury Department.

At the first meeting both State and Treasury presented memoranda relative to the post-surrender treatment of Germany. Copies of these two memoranda are attached hereto.¹ A comparison of these memoranda is set forth below.

1. *Points of Agreement*

(a) Demilitarization of Germany, including the complete dissolution of all German armed forces and all Nazi military, para-military and police organizations, and the destruction or scrapping of all arms, ammunition and implements of war. Further manufacture in Germany of arms, ammunition and implements of war should be prohibited.

¹ See *ante*, pp. 81, 86.

(b) Dissolution of the Nazi Party and all affiliated organizations. Large groups of particularly objectionable elements, such as the SS and the Gestapo, would be arrested and interned and possibly tried. Party members would be excluded from political or civil activity and subject to a number of restrictions. All laws discriminating against persons on grounds of race, color, creed or political opinion shall be annulled.

(c) There will be extensive controls over communications, press and propaganda.

(d) There will be extensive controls over the German educational system.

(e) A decentralization of the German Government is favored.

2. *Points of Disagreement*

(a) The State Department is, in general, opposed to the forcible partition of Germany. Such a measure, however drastic, would not remove the necessity of imposing and enforcing extensive security controls upon Germany for an indeterminate future, whether Germany is left united or divided. It would, furthermore, probably lead to a preferred treatment for certain succession states and would create a situation whereby any policy based on "spheres of influence" would have much greater chance of success. Furthermore, the disruption of German economic unity would carry with it grave dangers for the economic stability of Europe as a whole. Finally, the victor powers, by imposing partition, would take upon themselves the burdensome task of preventing surreptitious collaboration and of restraining a nationalistic determination to reunite.

The Treasury memorandum advocates the partition of Germany in the following manner: The Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas of the Rhineland and an area extending to the Kiel Canal should be made an international zone to be governed by the International Security Organization established by the United Nations. The remainder of Germany should be divided into two independent states: (1) A South German state comprising Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, Baden and some smaller areas, and (2) a North German state comprising parts of Prussia, Saxony and Thuringia and several smaller states. It is suggested that a customs union be permitted between the South German State and Austria.

(b) *Economic Policy.* The State Department advocates far-reaching rights of control over German economy after surrender for the purpose of effecting performance by Germany of acts of restitution and reparation. This control would furthermore force the conversion of German economic capacity from a war to a peace production and would eliminate German economic domination in Europe. Its ultimate purpose would be to effect a fundamental change in the organization

and conduct of German economic life so that German economy can eventually be integrated into an interdependent world economy.

The Treasury memorandum contends that reparations in the form of recurrent payments and deliveries should not be demanded; restitution and reparation should be effected by the transfer of German resources and territories, i.e., particularly the internationalization of the Ruhr area.

3. *Appointment of an American High Commissioner for Germany*

In addition to the subjects discussed above, the Cabinet Committee on Germany might consider another most important question, namely, the appointment in the near future of an American High Commissioner for Germany. Immediately upon occupation many important problems will have to be decided on a tripartite basis. The European Advisory Commission has not been able to consider many of these problems and has concentrated primarily on the organization that would be set up for the control of Germany. Once the first military phase of occupation is completed, it is essential that a tripartite board be established as soon as possible to assume the political and economic responsibility for the control of Germany and to advise the military commanders how the objectives of occupation can best be obtained. The High Commissioner should be a person of great political ability and prestige who would be able to work out with both the British and Russians a common policy and who would be capable of directing the control organization to be established in Germany. This appointment should preferably be made as soon as possible in order that he may meet with officials both here and in London who have been working on these problems.

740.00119 EW/9-444

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1944.

SUGGESTED RECOMMENDATIONS ON TREATMENT OF GERMANY FROM THE CABINET COMMITTEE FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. *Appointment of an American High Commissioner*

It has become urgent that an American High Commissioner for Germany be appointed. Immediately upon occupation of Germany

¹The source text bears the typed endorsement "(O.K. Hull)". The memorandum, which had been drafted by Riddleberger, was presented at the first meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Germany on September 5, 1944 (see the editorial note, *post*, p. 97), and was presented to Roosevelt on September 6 (see Hull, p. 1609).

many important problems will have to be decided on a tripartite basis between the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R. These problems will have not only important military aspects but will require the working out of a common policy in the political and economic fields as well. The American High Commissioner should be an official of high political ability and considerable prestige who can speak with authority for this Government in all matters where a common policy must be worked out with the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. The appointment should be made as soon as possible.

2. *American Policy for the Treatment of Germany*

The following policies for the treatment of Germany are recommended as the objectives of the United States, and for which we should seek agreement with the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. :

(a) *Demilitarization of Germany*, including the complete dissolution of all German armed forces and all Nazi military, para-military and police organizations, and the destruction or scrapping of all arms, ammunition and implements of war. Further manufacture in Germany of arms, ammunition and implements of war should be prohibited.

(b) *Dissolution of the Nazi Party and all affiliated organizations*. Large groups of particularly objectionable elements, especially the SS and the Gestapo, should be arrested and interned and war criminals should be tried and executed. Party members should be excluded from political or civil activity and subject to a number of restrictions. All laws discriminating against persons on grounds of race, color, creed or political opinion should be annulled.

(c) *Extensive controls should be maintained over communications, press and propaganda* for the purpose of eliminating Nazi doctrines or similar teachings.

(d) *Extensive controls over German educational system* should be established for the purpose of eliminating all Nazi influence and propaganda.

(e) *No decision should be taken on the possible partition of Germany* (as distinguished from territorial amputations) until we see what the internal situation is and what is the attitude of our principal Allies on this question. We should encourage a decentralization of the German governmental structure and if any tendencies toward spontaneous partition of Germany arise they should not be discouraged.

(f) *The American Government has no direct interest in obtaining reparations from Germany* and consequently no interest in building up German economy in order to collect continuing reparations. However, the U.K. and the U.S.S.R., together with a number of smaller states which have been victims of German exploitation, may have claims on German production which they will require for purposes of rehabilitation and reconstruction. Consequently, we should not take a fixed position on reparations at this time but should await the views of governments which have a more direct interest.

(g) *As the great Junker estates* have provided the economic basis for the military caste in Germany, these estates *should be broken up and the holdings distributed* to tenants.

(h) The primary objectives of our economic policy are: (1) the standard of living of the German population shall be held down to subsistence levels; (2) German economic position of power in Europe must be eliminated; (3) German economic capacity must be converted in such manner that it will be so dependent on imports and exports that Germany cannot by its own devices reconvert to war production.

740.00119 EW/10-1344

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 4 September 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: It is understood that the immediate disposition of units of the German fleet in connection with the imposition of surrender terms upon the defeat of Germany is presently under advisement in the European Advisory Commission, and that it has been tentatively agreed that the ultimate disposition of the units of the German fleet will be a matter for decision by the governments of the United Nations concerned.

It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, except for the retention of a limited number of ships for experimental and test purposes, the German fleet should be completely destroyed.

In the event that agreement cannot be reached with the Russians and the British on this basis, the United States should press for either:

- a. A one-third share of each category of ships in the German fleet; or
- b. Agreement that all capital ships, such as battleships, pocket battleships and heavy cruisers, and submarines be destroyed, while smaller craft and more lightly armed vessels be shared equally by the United States, Russia, and Great Britain.¹

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

Admiral, U.S. Navy

Chief of Staff to the

Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

¹ For action taken on this memorandum by Roosevelt after the Second Quebec Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, p. 356.

Editorial Note

The Cabinet Committee on Germany (i.e., Hull, Hopkins, Stimson, and Morgenthau) held its first meeting in Hull's office on the morning of September 5, 1944. The paper entitled "Suggested Recommendations on Treatment of Germany From the Cabinet Committee for the President", September 4, 1944, *ante*, p. 95, was presented at this meet-

ing. No official minutes of the meeting have been found, but information on the meeting is included in Hull, pp. 1608-1609; Stimson and Bundy, pp. 569-570; Morgenthau material printed in Blum, pp. 359-360, and *Morgenthau Diary (Germany)*, vol. I, pp. 524-528; and *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 161.

740.00119 EW/9-444

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 5, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: With minor reservations about language which do not affect the intent of the document, "Suggested Recommendations on Treatment of Germany from the Cabinet Committee for the President",¹ I approve of it.

If there be agreement on policies, then it becomes of the utmost importance for the proper Government Officials to indicate how the policies in this document are to be implemented.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY L. HOPKINS

¹ *Ante*, p. 95.

Roosevelt Papers

*The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President*¹

[WASHINGTON, September 5, 1944.]

I have considered the paper entitled "Suggested Recommendations on Treatment of Germany from the Cabinet Committee for the President", dated September 4th,² submitted to the Committee by the Secretary of State and have discussed it with my colleagues on the Committee.

With the exception of the last paragraph I find myself in agreement with the principles stated therein and they are in conformity with the lines upon which we have been proceeding in the War Department in our directives to the Armed Forces.

The last paragraph, however, is as follows:

"h. The primary objectives of our economic policy are (1) the standard of living of the German population shall be held down to subsistence levels; (2) German economic position of power in Europe must be eliminated; (3) German economic capacity must be converted in such manner that it will be so dependent upon imports and exports that Germany cannot by its own devices reconvert to war production".

¹ Sent to Hull for forwarding to the President. Stimson sent copies also to Hopkins and Morgenthau. See Stimson and Bundy, p. 570.

² *Ante*, p. 95.

While certain of these statements by themselves may possibly be susceptible of a construction with which I would not be at variance, the construction put upon them at the discussion this morning certainly reached positions to which I am utterly opposed. The position frankly taken by some of my colleagues was that the great industrial regions of Germany known as the Saar and the Ruhr with their very important deposits of coal and ore should be totally transformed into a non-industrialized area of agricultural land.³

I cannot conceive of such a proposition being either possible or effective and I can see enormous general evils coming from an attempt to so treat it. During the past eighty years of European history this portion of Germany was one of the most important sources of the raw materials upon which the industrial and economic livelihood of Europe was based. Upon the production which came from the raw materials of this region during those years, the commerce of Europe was very largely predicated. Upon that production Germany became the largest source of supply to no less than ten European countries, viz: Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria; and the second largest source of supply to Great Britain, Belgium, and France. By the same commerce, which in large part arose from this production, Germany also became the best buyer or customer of Russia, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria-Hungary; and the second best customer of Great Britain, Sweden, and Denmark. The production of these materials from this region could not be sealed up and obliterated as was proposed this morning, without manifestly causing a great dislocation to the trade upon which Europe has lived. In Germany itself this commerce has built up since 1870 a population of approximately thirty million more people than were ever supported upon the agricultural soil of Germany alone. Undoubtedly a similar growth of population took place in the nations which indirectly participated in the commerce based upon this production.

I cannot treat as realistic the suggestion that such an area in the present economic condition of the world can be turned into a non-productive "ghost territory" when it has become the center of one of the most industrialized continents in the world, populated by peoples of energy, vigor and progressiveness.

I can conceive of endeavoring to meet the misuse which Germany has recently made of this production by wise systems of control or

³ Morgenthau wrote to Stimson on September 6, 1944: "Thank you for sending me a copy of your memorandum. In reading it over, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that I do not remember anybody suggesting closing down the Saar." (*Morgenthau Diary (Germany)*, vol. I, p. 547)

trusteeship or even transfers of ownership to other nations. But I cannot conceive of turning such a gift of nature into a dust heap.

War is destruction. This war more than any previous war has caused gigantic destruction. The need for the recuperative benefits of productivity is more evident now than ever before throughout the world. Not to speak of Germany at all or even her satellites, our Allies in Europe will feel the need of the benefit of such productivity if it should be destroyed. Moreover, speed of reconstruction is of great importance, if we hope to avoid dangerous convulsions in Europe.

We contemplate the transfer from Germany of ownership of East Prussia, Upper Silesia, Alsace and Lorraine (each of them except the first containing raw materials of importance) together with the imposition of general economic controls. We also are considering the wisdom of a possible partition of Germany into north and south sections, as well as the creation of an internationalized State in the Ruhr. With such precautions, or indeed with only some of them, it certainly should not be necessary for us to obliterate all industrial productivity in the Ruhr area, in order to preclude its future misuse.

Nor can I agree that it should be one of our purposes to hold the German population "to a subsistence level" if this means the edge of poverty. This would mean condemning the German people to a condition of servitude in which, no matter how hard or how effectively a man worked, he could not materially increase his economic condition in the world. Such a program would, I believe, create tensions and resentments far outweighing any immediate advantage of security and would tend to obscure the guilt of the Nazis and the viciousness of their doctrines and their acts.

By such economic mistakes I cannot but feel that you would also be poisoning the springs out of which we hope that the future peace of the world can be maintained.

It is primarily by the thorough apprehension, investigation, and trial of all the Nazi leaders and instruments of the Nazi system of terrorism, such as the Gestapo, with punishment delivered as promptly, swiftly, and severely as possible, that we can demonstrate the abhorrence which the world has for such a system and bring home to the German people our determination to extirpate it and all its fruits forever.

My basic objection to the proposed methods of treating Germany which were discussed this morning was that in addition to a system of preventive and educative punishment they would add the dangerous weapon of complete economic oppression. Such methods, in my opinion, do not prevent war; they tend to breed war.

HENRY L STIMSON

Morgenthau Papers

*The Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) to the Secretary of State*¹

[WASHINGTON,] September 6, 1944.

MY DEAR CORDELL: I was delighted at the attitude which you expressed yesterday in regard to the treatment of the German people.

We here in the Treasury have prepared a much more detailed memorandum, and I feel that it might serve a useful purpose if the President were given a copy of it. I am also enclosing a copy for yourself.

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

HENRY

[Enclosure]

*The Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) to the President*²

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON, September 5, 1944.]

SUGGESTED POST-SURRENDER PROGRAM FOR GERMANY

1. *Demilitarization of Germany*

It should be the aim of the Allied Forces to accomplish the complete demilitarization of Germany in the shortest possible period of time after surrender. This means completely disarming the German Army and people (including the removal or destruction of all war material), the total destruction of the whole German armament industry, and the removal or destruction of other key industries which are basic to military strength.

2. *Partitioning of Germany*

(a) Poland should get that part of East Prussia which doesn't go to the U.S.S.R. and the southern portion of Silesia as indicated on the attached map (Appendix A).³

(b) France should get the Saar and the adjacent territories bounded by the Rhine and the Moselle Rivers.

(c) As indicated in part 3 an International Zone should be created containing the Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas.

(d) The remaining portion of Germany should be divided into two autonomous, independent states, (1) a South German state comprising

¹ The ribbon copy of this letter has not been found in Department of State files. The enclosure and appendix B thereto are printed from the Roosevelt Papers.

² The source text is not dated, but a copy in the Morgenthau Papers bears the following notation: "Treasury—9/5/44. As sent to Hull 9/6/44". Cf. the Treasury memorandum of September 1, 1944, *ante*, p. 86, and two papers on this subject dated September 4, 1944, printed in *Morgenthau Diary (Germany)*, vol. I, pp. 503-509, 517-519.

³ Appendix A is identical to the map printed facing p. 86.

Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, Baden and some smaller areas and (2) a North German state comprising a large part of the old state of Prussia, Saxony, Thuringia and several smaller states.

There shall be a custom union between the new South German state and Austria, which will be restored to her pre-1938 political borders.

3. *The Ruhr Area*

(The Ruhr, surrounding industrial areas, as shown on the attached map, including the Rhineland, the Kiel Canal, and all German territory north of the Kiel Canal.)

Here lies the heart of German industrial power, the caldron of wars. This area should not only be stripped of all presently existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it can not in the foreseeable future become an industrial area. The following steps will accomplish this:

(a) Within a short period, if possible not longer than 6 months after the cessation of hostilities, all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed by military action shall either be completely dismantled and removed from the area or completely destroyed. All equipment shall be removed from the mines and the mines shall be thoroughly wrecked.

It is anticipated that the stripping of this area would be accomplished in three stages:

(i) The military forces immediately upon entry into the area shall destroy all plants and equipment which cannot be removed.

(ii) Removal of plants and equipment by members of the United Nations as restitution and reparation (Paragraph 4).

(iii) All plants and equipment not removed within a stated period of time, say 6 months, will be completely destroyed or reduced to scrap and allocated to the United Nations.

(b) All people within the area should be made to understand that this area will not again be allowed to become an industrial area. Accordingly, all people and their families within the area having special skills or technical training should be encouraged to migrate permanently from the area and should be as widely dispersed as possible.

(c) The area should be made an international zone to be governed by an international security organization to be established by the United Nations. In governing the area the international organization should be guided by policies designed to further the above stated objectives.

4. *Restitution and Reparation*

Reparations, in the form of recurrent payments and deliveries, should not be demanded. Restitution and reparation shall be effected by the transfer of existing German resources and territories, e.g.,

(a) by restitution of property looted by the Germans in territories occupied by them;

(b) by transfer of German territory and German private rights in industrial property situated in such territory to invaded countries and the international organization under the program of partition;

(c) by the removal and distribution among devastated countries of industrial plants and equipment situated within the International Zone and the North and South German states delimited in the section on partition;

(d) by forced German labor outside Germany; and

(e) by confiscation of all German assets of any character whatsoever outside of Germany.

5. *Education and Propaganda*

(a) All schools and universities will be closed until an Allied Commission of Education has formulated an effective reorganization program. It is contemplated that it may require a considerable period of time before any institutions of higher education are reopened. Meanwhile the education of German students in foreign universities will not be prohibited. Elementary schools will be reopened as quickly as appropriate teachers and textbooks are available.

(b) All German radio stations and newspapers, magazines, weeklies, etc. shall be discontinued until adequate controls are established and an appropriate program formulated.

6. *Political Decentralization*

The military administration in Germany in the initial period should be carried out with a view toward the eventual partitioning of Germany into three states. To facilitate partitioning and to assure its permanence the military authorities should be guided by the following principles:

(a) Dismiss all policy-making officials of the Reich government and deal primarily with local governments.

(b) Encourage the reestablishment of state governments in each of the states (*Länder*) corresponding to 18 states into which Germany is presently divided and in addition make the Prussian provinces separate states.

(c) Upon the partition of Germany, the various state governments should be encouraged to organize a federal government for each of the newly partitioned areas. Such new governments should be in the form of a confederation of states, with emphasis on states' rights and a large degree of local autonomy.

7. *Responsibility of Military for Local German Economy*

The sole purpose of the military in control of the German economy shall be to facilitate military operations and military occupation. The

Allied Military Government shall not assume responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing, or transportation, or take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen [the German economy, except those which are essential to military⁴] operations. The responsibility for sustaining the German economy and people rests with the German people with such facilities as may be available under the circumstances.

8. *Controls Over Development of German Economy*

During a period of at least twenty years after surrender adequate controls, including controls over foreign trade and tight restrictions on capital imports, shall be maintained by the United Nations designed to prevent in the newly-established states the establishment or expansion of key industries basic to the German military potential and to control other key industries.

9. *Punishment of War Crimes and Treatment of Special Groups*

There is attached (Appendix B) a program for the punishment of certain war crimes and for the treatment of Nazi organizations and other special groups.

10. *Wearing of Insignia and Uniforms*

(a) No person in German[y] (except members of the United Nations and neutral countries) shall be permitted to wear any military insignia of rank or branch of service, service ribbons or military medals.

(b) No such person shall be permitted to wear, after 6 months from the cessation of hostilities any military uniform or any uniform of any quasi military organizations.

11. *Prohibition on Parades*

No military parades shall be permitted anywhere in German[y] and all military bands shall be disbanded.

12. *Aircraft*

All aircraft (including gliders), whether military or commercial, will be confiscated for later disposition. No German shall be permitted to operate or to help operate such aircraft, including those owned by foreign interests.

13. *United States Responsibility*

(a) The responsibility for the execution of the post-surrender program for Germany set forth in this memorandum is the joint responsi-

⁴The words in brackets appear to have been omitted inadvertently. Cf. the parallel passage in the versions of this paragraph dated September 1 and 9, 1944, *ante*, p. 89, and *post*, p. 130, respectively.

bility of the United Nations. The execution of the joint policy agreed upon should therefore eventually be entrusted to the international body which emerges from United Nations discussions.

Consideration of the specific measures to be taken in carrying out the joint program suggests the desirability of separating the task to be performed during the initial period of military occupation from those which will require a much longer period of execution. While the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. will, for practical reasons, play the major role (of course aided by the military forces of other United Nations) in demilitarizing Germany (point 1) the detailed execution of other parts of the program can best be handled by Germany's continental neighbors.

(b) When Germany has been completely demilitarized there would be the following distribution of duties in carrying out the German program:

(i) The U.S. would have military and civilian representation on whatever international commission or commissions may be established for the execution of the whole German program and such representatives should have adequate U.S. staffs.

(ii) The primary responsibility for the policing of Germany and for civil administration in Germany would be assumed by the military forces of Germany's continental neighbors. Specifically these should include Russian, French, Polish, Czech, Greek, Yugoslav, Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian soldiers.

(c) Under this program United States troops could be withdrawn within a relatively short time. Actual withdrawal of United States troops should not precede agreement with the U.S.S.R. and the U.K. on the principles set forth in this memorandum.

14. *Appointment of an American High Commissioner*

An American High Commissioner for Germany should be appointed as soon as possible, so that he can sit in on the development of the American views on this problem.

Appendix B

PUNISHMENT OF CERTAIN WAR CRIMES AND TREATMENT OF SPECIAL GROUPS

A. *Punishment of Certain War Criminals*

(1) *Arch-criminals.*

A list of the arch-criminals of this war whose obvious guilt has generally been recognized by the United Nations shall be drawn up as soon as possible and transmitted to the appropriate military au-

thorities. The military authorities shall be instructed with respect to all persons who are on such list as follows:

(a) They shall be apprehended as soon as possible and identified as soon as possible after apprehension, the identification to be approved by an officer of the General rank.

(b) When such identification has been made the person identified shall be put to death forthwith by firing squads made up of soldiers of the United Nations.

(2) *Certain Other War Criminals.*

(a) Military commissions shall be established by the Allied Military Government for the trial of certain crimes which have been committed against civilization during this war. As soon as practicable, representatives of the liberated countries of Europe shall be included on such commissions. These crimes shall include those crimes covered by the following section and such other crimes as such military commissions may be ordered to try from time to time.

(b) Any person who is suspected of being responsible for (through the issuance of orders or otherwise), or having participated in, causing the death of any human being in the following situations shall be arrested and tried promptly by such military commissions, unless prior to trial one of the United Nations has requested that such person be placed in its custody for trial on similar charges for acts committed within its territory:

(i) The death was caused by action in violation of the rules of war.

(ii) The victim was killed as a hostage in reprisal for the deeds of other persons.

(iii) The victim met death because of his nationality, race, color, creed, or political conviction.

(c) Any person who is convicted by the military commissions of the crimes specified in paragraph (b) shall be sentenced to death, unless the military commissions, in exceptional cases, determine that there are extenuating circumstances, in which case other punishment may be meted out, including deportation to a penal colony outside of Germany. Upon conviction, the sentence shall be carried out immediately.

B. Detention of Certain Groups

All members of the following groups should be detained until the extent of the guilt of each individual is determined:

(a) The S.S.

(b) The Gestapo.

(c) All high officials of the police, S.A. and other security organizations.

(d) All high Government and Nazi Party officials.

(e) All leading public figures closely identified with Nazism.

C. *Registration of Males*

An appropriate program will be formulated for the re-registration as soon as possible of all males of the age of 14 or over. The registration shall be on a form and in a manner to be prescribed by the military authorities and shall show, among other things, whether or not the person registering is a member of the Nazi Party or affiliated organizations, the Gestapo, S.S., S.A. or *Kraft Korps*.⁵

D. *Labor Battalions*

Apart from the question of established guilt for special crimes, mere membership in the S.S., the Gestapo and similar groups will constitute the basis for inclusion into compulsory labor battalion to serve outside Germany for reconstruction purposes.

E. *Dissolution of Nazi Organizations*

The Nazi Party and all affiliated organizations such as the Labor Front, The Hitler Youth, The Strength-through-Joy, etc., should be dissolved and their properties and records confiscated. Every possible effort should be made to prevent any attempts to reconstitute them in underground or disguised form.

F. *Prohibition on Exercise of Certain Privileges*

All members of the following groups should be dismissed from public office, disenfranchised and disqualified to hold any public office or to engage in journalist, teaching, and legal professions, or, in any managerial capacity in banking, manufacturing or trade:

(1) The Nazi Party.

(2) Nazi sympathizers who by their words or deeds materially aided or abetted the Nazi program.

(3) The Junkers.

(4) Military and Naval officers.

G. *Junker Estates*

All Junker estates should be broken up and divided among the peasants and the system of primogeniture and entail should be abolished.

H. *Prohibition on Emigration*

(1) A Proclamation shall be issued prohibiting any person resident in Germany from leaving or attempting to leave Germany, except with permission from the Allied Military Government.

⁵ i.e., the motor corps of the Nazi Party (*Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrkorps*).

(2) Violation of this Proclamation shall be an offense triable by military commissions of the Allied Military Government and heavy penalties shall be prescribed, including death.

(3) All possible steps shall be taken by the military authorities to prevent any such person from leaving (without permission).

HENRY MORGENTHAU JR.

Editorial Note

The Cabinet Committee on Germany met with Roosevelt on September 6, 1944, and discussed the memoranda prepared by the State, War, and Treasury Departments (*ante*, pp. 95, 98, and 101, respectively). No official minutes of the meeting have been found, but information on the meeting is included in Hull, p. 1609; Stimson and Bundy, pp. 573-574; and Morgenthau material printed in Blum, pp. 362-363, and *Morgenthau Diary (Germany)*, vol. I, pp. 536-538.

740.00119 Control (Germany)/9-644

The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 6, 1944.

DEAR DOC: Here is a draft of our post-surrender directive to Eisenhower.¹ It is something which the Committee, I believe, in view of what has gone before, should approve. It seems to me that this is very much in line with your paper² which was discussed in the Secretary's

¹ For a draft directive to the three Allied commanders-in-chief relating to the post-surrender period in Germany, prepared by the Planning Committee of the United States Delegation to the European Advisory Commission and dated July 12, 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 244-246. In the absence of action on a tripartite basis with respect to such a directive, the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, in C.C.S. 658, August 23, 1944 (not printed), suggested the preparation of an American-British directive to Eisenhower on the military government of Germany after Germany's surrender. This suggestion was referred to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee for study and the War Department prepared a draft of such a directive. The draft printed below is not known to have been referred to at the Second Quebec Conference, but it formed part of the background of the discussion of German problems within the Cabinet Committee on Germany and between the Committee and Roosevelt. Following the Quebec Conference an amended version of this draft (dated September 22, 1944) was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as enclosure C to J.C.S. 1067, September 24, 1944, and was forwarded to Winant on September 27. For the covering instruction to Winant and for the text of the draft of September 22, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 142-154.

² "Suggested Recommendations on Treatment of Germany From the Cabinet Committee for the President", September 4, 1944, *ante*, p. 95.

office yesterday. We would now be able to add, of course, a provision regarding regional movements. The directive would provide that they should not be discouraged. We are generally working on improving the language and in some cases the order of the document, but in general this is the idea. I think that if the Committee could approve it generally, without going through it with a fine tooth comb, it would leave us room in the [Combined] Civil Affairs Committee to work out the final language and the clearance with the British.

Secretary Stimson was very much disturbed this morning at the line that was taken throughout the discussion on the matter of economic repression of Germany. He felt that the last paragraph of the paper, I believe it was sub-paragraph (h),³ although objectionable in some form, could be interpreted in a way which would meet his views, but the tone of the discussion convinced him that its interpretation by those present amounted to such severe destruction of values in the case of properties and facilities and such severe limitation on the economy of the individual, that he felt he could not go along with the implications of this paragraph and has so communicated to Mr. Hull.⁴

I was not present at the discussion, so I do not know what happened. I don't believe that the Secretary, from my long talk with him yesterday, however, is at all at variance with your and my thinking on the subject. I hope you will take a look at Mr. Stimson's comments.

I have one other comment which I did not ask him to include because it was relatively minor. Somewhere in your paper there is a statement to the effect that Party members should not be permitted any political or civic activity. I think this must refer only to the leaders, because Party members who were only such in order to keep jobs will have to be permitted to carry on some civic activity, and possibly political activity if by political activity you mean employment in a government field. The provision as written would preclude any Party member from voting, practising law, or taking any part at all in any municipal or other governmental activity. I just do not believe that this is practicable and some modification of this language may be necessary in order to enable the military government to function.

Sincerely,

JOHN J McCLOY

³ See *ante*, p. 97.

⁴ See Stimson's memorandum for Roosevelt, September 5, 1944, *ante*, p. 98, which was submitted via Hull.

[Attachment⁵]*Draft of an Interim Directive to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Eisenhower)*⁶

TOP SECRET

INTERIM DIRECTIVE TO SCAEF REGARDING THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE CESSATION OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE (POST-DEFEAT)

1. In the event that RANKIN "C" conditions obtain in Germany or that the German forces are either defeated or surrender before you have received a directive containing policies agreed upon by the three governments of the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R., you will be guided by the following policies, principles and instructions.

2. Your primary objectives are of short term and military character rather than of a long view governmental policy type. Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation. The clear fact of German military defeat and the undesirability of the results of aggression must be appreciated by all levels of the German population. The German people must bear the inevitable

⁵ Not filed with the ribbon copy of McCloy's letter to Matthews, above; supplied from Roosevelt Papers. McCloy also sent a copy of this draft to Hopkins on September 6, 1944 (Hopkins Papers), and another copy is in the Morgenthau Diary, vol. 768 (see *Morgenthau Diary (Germany)*, vol. I, p. 509).

⁶ At the same time that this draft directive was in preparation, a draft *Handbook of Military Government in Germany*, prepared to provide guidance to military government officers on the objectives of military government, was under discussion in Washington. Morgenthau called Roosevelt's attention to the *Handbook* and in a memorandum for the President dated August 25, 1944, quoted extracts which he considered particularly objectionable. Using the Morgenthau memorandum as a basis, Roosevelt instructed Stimson on August 26 to withdraw the *Handbook*. Roosevelt's memorandum to Stimson stated:

"It is of the utmost importance that every person in Germany should realize that this time Germany is a defeated nation. I do not want them to starve to death but, as an example, if they need food to keep body and soul together beyond what they have, they should be fed three times a day with soup from Army soup kitchens. That will keep them perfectly healthy and they will remember the experience all their lives. The fact that they are a defeated nation, collectively and individually, must be so impressed upon them that they will hesitate to start any new war.

.

"There exists a school of thought both in London and here which would, in effect, do for Germany what this government did to its own citizens in 1933 when they were flat on their backs. I see no reason for starting a WPA, PWA, or a CCC for Germany when we go in with our Army of Occupation.

"Too many people here and in England hold to the view that the German people as a whole are not responsible for what has taken place—that only a few Nazi leaders are responsible. That unfortunately is not based on fact. The German people as a whole must have it driven home to them that the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization."

For the text of Morgenthau's memorandum to Roosevelt, see *Morgenthau Diary (Germany)*, vol. I, pp. 440-442. For the full text of Roosevelt's memorandum to Stimson, see *ibid.*, pp. 443-445; *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 544-546.

consequences of their own acts. Your occupation and administration will be just but firm and distant. You will strongly discourage fraternization between Allied troops and the German officials and population.

3. Military government will be established and will extend over all parts of Germany under your command. Your rights, powers and status in Germany are based upon the unconditional surrender or the complete defeat of Germany.

4. *a.* By virtue of your position you are clothed with supreme legislative, executive and judicial authority and power in the areas occupied by forces under your command. This authority will be broadly construed and includes authority to take all measures deemed by you necessary, desirable or appropriate in relation to military exigencies and the objectives of a firm military government.

b. You are authorized at your discretion to delegate the authority herein granted to you in whole or in part to members of your command and further to authorize them at their discretion to make appropriate subdelegations.

c. You should take the necessary measures to enforce the terms of surrender and complete the disarmament of Germany.

d. The military government shall be a military administration which, until you receive further advices, will show the characteristics of an Allied undertaking acting in the interests of the United Nations.

5. The administrative policies shall be uniform throughout those parts of Germany occupied by forces under your command subject to any special requirements due to local circumstances.

6. Representatives of civilian agencies of the U.S. or U.K. Governments or of UNRRA shall not participate unless and until you consider such participation desirable when it will be subject, as to time and extent, to decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on your recommendation.

7. It is contemplated that a tripartite administration by the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. covering the whole of Germany will be established. You have previously received advices in this connection.

8. You are authorized as SCAEF to enter into arrangements with the U.S.S.R. military commanders as may be necessary for the occupation of Germany by the three powers.

9. Appendix "A", Political Directive; Appendix "B", Financial Directive; Appendix "C", Economic Directive; and Appendix "D", Relief Directive, are attached hereto. At Appendix "E" there is a chart⁷ suggestive of the tripartite form which military government for Germany might take. At Appendix "F" there is attached the draft instrument of unconditional surrender for Germany.⁸

⁷ Not attached to the source text.

⁸ Not attached to the source text. Concerning the drafting of the German surrender instrument, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 484 ff.

Appendix "A"

POLITICAL DIRECTIVE

1. The following persons will be arrested and held, pending receipt by you of further instructions as to their disposition:

(a) Adolf Hitler, his chief Nazi associates, and Nazi officials down to and including the secretaries of local party units.

(b) All persons suspected of having committed war crimes.⁹

(c) The leading officials of all ministries and other high political officials of Germany and those persons who have held high position, either civil or military, in the administration of German occupied countries.¹⁰

(d) Prominent Nazis holding important and key positions in (1) National and *Gau* civic and economic organizations, (2) corporations and other organizations in which the government has a major financial interest, (3) industry, (4) finance, (5) education, (6) the judiciary, (7) the press and other agencies disseminating news and propaganda.

(e) All judges, prosecutors and officials of the People's Court.

(f) Any national of any of the United Nations who is believed to have committed offenses against his national law in support of the German war effort.

2. You will issue a proclamation dissolving the Nazi party and its affiliates throughout Germany. You will take all practicable measures to uproot and discredit Nazi doctrines. No secret organizations or societies of any kind shall be permitted. Property, real and personal, of the Nazi party and its affiliates, wherever found, will be regarded as public property.

3. You will make special efforts to preserve all records and plans of

(a) The German government

(b) German military organizations

(c) All organizations engaged in military research

(d) The Nazi party and affiliated organizations

(e) Security, criminal and ordinary police

(f) Nazi economic organizations and industrial establishments

(g) Institutes and special bureaus established in Germany, devoting themselves to race, political, or similar research.

4. You will take immediate steps to abrogate all laws, decrees, regulations or aspects thereof, which discriminate on the basis of race, color, creed, or political opinions. All persons who are detained or placed in custody by the Nazis on these grounds will be released, subject to requirements of security and interests of the individuals concerned.

⁹ There is the following notation, in an unidentified handwriting, in the margin opposite this paragraph: "How many thousand?"

¹⁰ There is the following notation, in an unidentified handwriting, in the margin opposite this paragraph: "Are they to be put to work while in custody?"

5. The criminal and civil courts of Germany will be closed. After the elimination of all Nazi elements, at such time and under such regulations, supervision and control as you may determine, you may permit the courts to resume functioning. All politically objectionable courts, e.g., People's Courts, will be abolished. All security and political police, excluding criminal and order [*ordinary*?] police, but including the Gestapo and *Sicherheitsdienst der S.S.*, will be disbanded, arrested and their members disarmed and held for disposition. Criminal and ordinary police, and such others as it may be proper to retain, must be purged of Nazi or otherwise undesirable elements, who will also be arrested and held for disposition. It is imperative to arrest and hold all high police presidents and leaders.

6. No person in Germany, other than United Nations nationals as authorized by you, shall be permitted to possess arms of any character except that such local police as you may utilize to maintain order may be armed with such law enforcement weapons as you may deem appropriate.

7. You will decide whether the objectives of military government are better served by the appointment of officers of the occupation forces or by the use of the services of Germans. It shall be made clear to all other government officials and employees that their continued employment is solely on the basis of cooperation, performance and behavior satisfactory to you. The replacement of any local government officials who may be removed will rest with you. In general, the entire Nazi leadership shall be removed from all posts of authority and no person who was a member of the German General Staff or Supreme Command or the Nazi hierarchy will occupy any important governmental or civilian position. Under no circumstances shall active Nazis or ardent sympathizers be retained in office for the purpose of administrative convenience or expediency.

8. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 11 and to the extent that military interests are not prejudiced, freedom of speech and press, and of religious worship will be permitted. Consistent with military necessity, all religious institutions will be respected and all efforts will be made to preserve historical archives, classical monuments and fine arts.

9. *a.* Diplomatic and consular officials of countries at war with any of the United Nations will be taken into protective custody and held for further disposition. Diplomatic and consular officials of neutrals will be dealt with in accordance with instructions to be issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. All German diplomats and consular officials and other agents will be recalled. If their recall cannot be effected or if their recall is not practicable by reasons of nationality, their authority as agents for

Germany will be terminated. All records and files of these agents and officers will be ordered returned to Germany or otherwise made available for appropriate inspection.

10. *a.* All practical measures will be taken to insure the health and welfare of United Nations nationals and neutral internees, including provision of employment as practicable, and repatriation should be undertaken as rapidly as military conditions permit. It shall be within your discretion to determine whether such persons should or should not be allowed to disperse, pending the completion of plans for their employment or other disposition.

b. Nationals of countries with which any of the United Nations are or have been at war (except Germany) will be identified and registered, and those whose freedom of movement would endanger the security of the armed forces or be otherwise undesirable will be interned or their activities curtailed as may be necessary under the circumstances.

11. *a.* Propagation of Nazi doctrines and Nazi propaganda in any form shall be prohibited. All schools and universities will be closed. Elementary schools only will be reopened as soon as possible after Nazi personnel has been eliminated and text books and curricula provided which are free of Nazi doctrines. Further guidance on German education and schools will be given to you in a separate directive.

b. No political activities of any kind shall be countenanced unless authorized by you. Unless you deem otherwise, no political personalities or organized political groups shall have any part in determining the policies of the military administration. It is essential to avoid any commitments to or negotiations with any political elements.

c. The publication of all newspapers, magazines, weeklies and other publications and the operation of all German radio stations throughout the area under your command will be suspended. Thereafter you will permit the dissemination of news or information subject to such censorship and control as you consider necessary in the interests of military security and intelligence and to carry out the principles laid down in this directive.

12. No persons shall be permitted to leave or enter the area under your command without your authority.

Appendix "B"

FINANCIAL DIRECTIVE

1. United States, British and other Allied forces will use Allied Military marks and Reichsmark currency or coins in their possession. Allied Military marks and Reichsmark currency and coin now in

circulation in Germany will be legal tender without distinction and will be interchangeable at a rate of 1 Allied Military mark for 1 Reichsmark. Records will be kept of the amounts of the German marks used by the forces of each nation. *Reichskreditkassenscheine* and other German Military currency will not be legal tender in Germany.

2. In the event, however, that for any reason adequate supplies of Allied Military marks and/or Reichsmarks are not available, the United States forces will use yellow seal dollars and regular United States coins and the British forces will use British Military Authority notes and regular British coins. Records will be kept of the amounts of currencies used by the United States and British forces.

3. If it is found necessary to use U.S. yellow seal dollars and BMA notes, the following provisions will apply to such use:

a. The rate of exchange between the U.S. yellow seal dollar and the BMA notes will be 4.035 dollars to one pound, and the two currencies will be interchangeable at that rate. The United States Treasury will make the necessary arrangements with the British Treasury.

b. You will issue a proclamation, if necessary, requiring all persons to accept U.S. yellow seal dollars and BMA notes at the decreed rates. Transactions at any other rates will be prohibited.

c. The issuance of yellow seal dollars and BMA notes will cease and Allied Military mark and/or Reichsmark currency will be used in their place as soon as available.

d. U.S. yellow seal dollars and BMA notes will be withdrawn from circulation as soon as such withdrawal can be satisfactorily accomplished.

e. Records will be kept of the amounts of such currencies used by the United States, British and other Allied forces.

4. The rate of exchange to be used only for the purpose of paying personnel of the armed forces will be ———¹¹ marks to the dollar and ——— marks to the pound sterling. A general rate of exchange may be furnished to you later. Holders of mark currency or deposits will not be entitled to purchase foreign exchange without special permission. They will obtain dollars or pounds, or any other foreign currency or foreign exchange credits, only in accordance with exchange regulations issued by you.

5. The Financial Division of the Civil Affairs Section for Germany will include in its functions the control of all funds to be used by the Allied Military forces within the area, except yellow seal dollars and BMA notes which will be under the control of U.S. and British forces respectively. It will maintain all the accounts and records necessary to indicate the supply, control, and movement of these currencies including yellow seal dollars and BMA notes, and other funds, as well as

¹¹ Blanks in this paragraph appear in the source text.

financial data required for the determination of expenditures arising out of operations or activities involving participation of Allied Military forces.

a. Insofar as operations relate to the provision of currencies for the pay and other cash requirements of military components of the Allied forces, the Financial Division will supply Allied Military marks from currency on hand and will record the debit against the military force concerned at the rate of exchange prescribed in paragraph 4 above.

b. Insofar as operations relate to the provision of currencies for civil administration, the Finance Division will supply Allied Military marks from currency on hand and will record the debit against the Allied Military Government.

c. If found practicable and desirable, you will designate, under direct military control and supervision, the Reichsbank, or any branch thereof, or any other bank satisfactory to you, as agent for the Financial Division of the Civil Affairs Section. When satisfied that the Reichsbank, or any branch thereof, or other designated bank, is under adequate military control and supervision, you may use that bank for official business, and, if necessary, by making credits available, place such bank or banks in a position to finance other banks and branches thereof, for the conduct of their business as approved by the Allied Military authorities.

d. The records of the Financial Division of the Civil Affairs Section established within the area will indicate in all cases in what currency receipts were obtained or disbursements made by the Financial Division.

6. You will take the following steps and will put into effect only such further financial measures as you may deem to be necessary from a strictly military standpoint:

a. You will declare a general or limited moratorium if you deem such measure to be necessary. In particular, it may prove desirable to prevent foreclosures of mortgages and the exercise of similar remedies by creditors against individuals and small business enterprises.

b. Banks should be placed under such control as deemed necessary by you in order that adequate facilities for military needs may be provided and to insure that instructions and regulations issued by military authorities will be fully complied with. Banks should be closed only long enough to introduce satisfactory control, to remove Nazi elements and other objectionable personnel, and to issue instructions for the determination of accounts to be blocked under paragraph *e* below. As soon as practicable, banks should be required to file reports listing assets, liabilities, and all accounts in excess of 25,000 marks.

c. You will issue regulations prescribing the purposes for which credit may be extended and the terms and conditions governing the extension of credit. If banking facilities are not available you may establish such credits or make such loans as you deem necessary for essential economic activities. These will be restricted to mark credits and loans.

d. You will close all stock exchanges and similar financial institutions for such period as you deem desirable.

e. Pending determination of future disposition, all gold, foreign currencies, foreign securities, accounts in financial institutions, credits,

valuable papers and all similar assets held by or on behalf of the following, will be impounded or blocked and will be used or otherwise dealt with only as permitted under licenses or other instructions which you may issue:

(1) German national, state, provincial, and local governments, and agencies and instrumentalities thereof.

(2) Other enemy governments, the agencies and instrumentalities thereof and their nationals.

(3) Owners and holders, including neutral and United Nations Governments or national authorities, absent from the areas of Germany under your control.

(4) Nazi party organizations, including the party formations, affiliates, and supervised associations, and the officials, leading members, and supporters thereof.

(5) Persons under detention or other types of custody by Allied Military authorities and other persons whose activities are hostile to the interests of the military government.

f. No governmental or private bank or agency will be authorized to issue banknotes or currency except that, if found practicable and desirable, you may so authorize the Reichsbank and the Rentenbank when they are under adequate military control and supervision.

g. You will issue immediately a proclamation prohibiting all transfers of or other dealings in securities, other than central government securities, for such period as you may deem desirable. You may, however, prohibit or limit dealings in central government securities, but only pending resumption of service on the public debt.

7. All dealings in gold and foreign exchange and all foreign financial and foreign trade transactions of any kind, including all exports and imports of currency, will be prohibited except as permitted under such regulations as you may issue relative thereto. Except as you may otherwise authorize, local banks will be permitted to open and operate only mark accounts, but if yellow seal dollars and BMA notes are legal tender, they may be accepted at the decreed general rate of exchange and will be turned in as directed by you in exchange for mark currency at the decreed general rate of exchange.

8. Non-yellow seal U.S. dollar notes and regular British pound notes will not be legal tender. No person, agency or bank engaged in the exchange of money will acquire or otherwise deal in those notes except as you may so authorize. U.S. Army and Navy Finance Officers and British Paymasters may, however, be authorized to accept non-yellow seal U.S. dollar notes and regular British pound notes from United States and British Military or authorized personnel for conversion into Allied Military mark or Reichsmark currency at the decreed general rate of exchange, after satisfying themselves as to the source of the notes.

9. All bona fide government pensions, allowances, and social security payments will continue to be paid, but steps will be taken as soon as practicable for a study of pensioners' records with a view to nullifying

all unnecessary and undesirable pensions and bonuses of Nazi inception.

10. The railways, postal, telegraph and telephone service, radio and all government monopolies will be placed under your control and their revenues made available to the military government.

11. You will, consistent with international custom and usage, maintain existing tax laws, except that discriminatory taxes introduced under the Nazi regime will be abolished. Prompt action should be taken to maintain the inflow of revenue at the highest possible level. You will resume service on the public debt as soon as military and financial conditions permit.

Appendix "C"

ECONOMIC DIRECTIVE

1. You will assume control of existing German industrial, agricultural, utility, communication and transportation facilities, supplies and services, and of German domestic and foreign trade, for the purposes of

a. Assuring the immediate cessation of the production, acquisition or development of implements of war.

b. Assuring the production and maintenance of goods and services essential

(1) to prevent or alleviate epidemic or serious disease and serious civil unrest and disorder which would endanger the occupying forces and the accomplishment of the objectives of the occupation.¹²

(2) to the prosecution of the war against Japan (but only to the extent that specific directives of higher authority call for such goods or services) and

(3) to the provision of relief and rehabilitation supplies to the Allied nations and to the performance by Germany of such further acts of restitution as may be determined by the Allied governments.¹³

2. You may impose such other economic measures as you deem necessary to prevent serious civil unrest and disorder which would endanger the occupying forces and the accomplishment of the objectives of the occupation.

3. A plan should be prepared by you ¹⁴ to prevent transfers of title of real and personal property intended to defeat, evade or avoid the

¹² There is a marginal manuscript notation on the source text that the following language is to be inserted in this paragraph: "and the necessity for the provision of civilian relief".

¹³ At this point in the source text there is the following addition, in an unidentified handwriting: "(4) to contribute to the expenses of the occupation".

¹⁴ A handwritten notation on the source text substitutes "You should take measures" for the first seven words of this paragraph.

orders, proclamations or decrees of the military government or the decision[s] of the courts established by it.

4. Substantial amounts of private property of various categories has [*have*] been seized, looted or otherwise improperly acquired by various Nazi officials.¹⁵ While it is contemplated that a suitable commission will ultimately deal with this problem, you should take such steps as may be practicable to collect any available information and to preserve¹⁶ any property of this kind found in the area under your control.

5. *a.* All property in the German territory belonging to any country with which any of the United Nations are, or have been, at war may be controlled, subject to such use thereof as you may direct.

b. Your responsibility for the property of the United Nations, other than U.K. and U.S. and their nationals, in areas occupied by Allied forces shall be the same as for the property of U.K. and U.S. and their nationals, except where a distinction is expressly provided by treaty or agreement. Within such limits as are imposed by the military situation you should take all reasonable steps necessary to preserve and protect such property.

6. You will permit the formation of democratic labor unions and other forms of free economic association, exercising safeguards necessary to eliminate Nazi labor institutions and to prevent or eradicate underground, secret, or subversive activities or organizations.

Appendix "D"

RELIEF DIRECTIVE

1. You will be responsible for the provision and distribution of supplies for civilian relief, to the extent defined below, in all areas of Germany under your command. In connection with this responsibility, you will make maximum use of supplies, stockpiles and resources available within Germany in order to limit the extent to which imports, if any, will be required.

2. The scale of relief to be provided will in no event exceed the minimum quantity of food, fuel, medical, sanitary and agreed essential supplies necessary to maintain the health and working capacity of the civilian population, to preserve public order, to develop local resources in order to lighten the burden on the Allied armies, and to accomplish the objectives of the occupation.

¹⁵ The last four words of this sentence have been changed by hand on the source text to read "the Nazi Govt, its officials and nationals".

¹⁶ The source text has been changed at this point to read "to identify, preserve and control".

3. You will provide for importation of civilian supplies into Germany only to the extent that critical shortages of any essential items threaten clear and imminent interference with the policies set forth in paragraph 2 of this directive.

4. You will undertake measures necessary for the control, prevention and treatment of epidemic and other diseases and the promulgation of such medical and sanitation measures, including emergency shelter, as will preserve the state of public health and protect the occupying forces.

Roosevelt Papers

The Secretary of State to the President

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In line with our personal conversation about answers to questions that Churchill might ask, I herewith attach several documents which deal with the titles indicated. I believe they will be of some use to you.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Attachment]

The Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 6, 1944.¹

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

As of possible assistance to you in your conversations with Mr. Churchill, I attach memoranda concerning the following subjects:

[Here follows a numbered list of the titles of ten Department of State briefing papers.²]

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Annex 4]

Department of State Briefing Paper

SECRET

[Undated.]

GERMANY: PARTITION

In discussing the partition of Germany as set forth below, it should be made clear that these views on partition do not, of course, exclude

¹ The Department of State file copy of this memorandum bears the following manuscript endorsement: "Sent to the White House 1: 20 p. m. Sept. 8. J[AMES] E B[ROWN] JR." (740.0011 E.W./9-644)

² Annexes 4 and 5 to this memorandum are printed here. For annexes 1-3 and 6-10, see *post*, pp. 190, 192, 194, 207, 212, 214, 229, and 172, respectively.

the question of major and minor frontier adjustments affecting present German territory (East Prussia, Danzig, etc.).

This Government has not to date given its representative on the European Advisory Commission³ any instructions relative to a possible partition of Germany. Shortly after the European Advisory Commission was established, a Sub-committee on Partition was set up but no reports have ever been received and apparently no discussion on this question has taken place in London.

It is the view of the Department of State that this Government should oppose a forcible partition of Germany. An imposed dismemberment of Germany into two or more separate states has been advocated as a practicable means of forestalling any renewal of German aggression. However, such a measure would not remove the necessity of imposing and enforcing far-reaching security control upon Germany for an undetermined period whether Germany is left united or is partitioned.

Furthermore, because of the high degree of economic, political and cultural integration in Germany which has developed over the past 75 years, it must be anticipated that partition would not only have to be imposed, but also maintained by force. The victor powers, by imposing partition, would assume a burdensome and continuing task of preventing surreptitious collaboration between the partite states and of restraining a nationalistic determination to reunite, which would probably be the response of the German people. Finally, the disruption of German economic unity might menace the economic stability of Europe as a whole.

In place of partition, the Department of State would favor a return to a federal system of government in Germany, including the division of Prussia into a number of medium-sized states. In reaction to Nazi over-centralization, the Germans might return to a considerable degree of federal decentralization, including the breakup of Prussia which in 1938 included 62% of the area and two-thirds of the population of Germany.

[Annex 5]

Department of State Briefing Paper

SECRET

[Undated.]

ARMING OF FRENCH FORCES

On August 19, 1944 the British Embassy raised with the State Department the question of equipping adequate armed forces of the

³ John G. Winant. Concerning the work of the European Advisory Commission in 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

Western European Allies to enable them to maintain security in their own countries and to take part in the occupation of Germany.⁴

The Netherlands Government has accepted in principle that the Dutch Army will be re-equipped with British types of arms and, while desiring to avoid the appearance of competing with the United States, the British apparently desire to assume the same responsibility for rearming the Belgians, Norwegians and Danes. They suggest that during the next few years the equipping of the French Army should be carried out from American sources, not only because the French land forces are at present provided with American type equipment,⁵ but because it would be very difficult for the British to accept the added burden. The British conclude that if this Government is unwilling to accept the proposed commitment they will have to reconsider the situation.

Presumably the technical aspects of the question are being studied by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to whom supporting figures have been furnished by the British. The financial ramifications will also require careful study.

Our present policy toward France is based on the belief that it is in the best interests of the United States that France resume her traditional position as a principal power, capable of playing a part in the occupation of Germany and in maintaining peace in Europe. The recruiting and equipping of French land forces would be a natural corollary of that policy, leaving for decision the question of the source from which the arms should be obtained and the quantity which should be provided.

It would seem advantageous to this country to have the rearming carried out from American sources. Politically it could be portrayed as a further evidence of American friendship for France and a proof of our desire to see France restored to a strong position. American influence and prestige would be enhanced. Furthermore French reliance on the United States for arms would provide us with a lever which might enable us to exercise a certain measure of influence on French policy for a number of years. Conversely it is certain that, in their present highly nationalistic and aggressive frame of mind, the French will make every effort to obtain arms from one source or another. If they obtain them from a source other than the United

⁴ The British *aide-mémoire* referred to, which was delivered to the Department of State on August 23, 1944, is not printed (840.20/8-1944). On August 25 Hull sent copies of the *aide-mémoire* to the War and Navy Departments and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with a request for the views of those organizations. Replies were not received until after the Second Quebec Conference, and no evidence has been found to indicate that this subject was discussed at Quebec.

⁵ Concerning the United States role in equipping French forces, see Marcel Vigneras, *Rearming the French* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), in the series *United States Army in World War II: Special Studies*.

States, they may be compelled to accept conditions of a political or other nature which run counter to American aims.

In making the above recommendation I have not failed to give careful consideration to the fact that British policy aims at forming, and playing the leading role in, a group of Western European countries, including France, and that one of the objects of the British Government in suggesting the rearming of France by the United States is thereby to create a link between this country and the Western European nations which might be useful to them in the future. This I believe is the primary and all important reason behind the British request and it may, of course, have important long-range strategic implications.

740.00119 EW/9-944

The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1944.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I enclose herewith

1. Copy of the memorandum dated September 9th which gives to the President my general views as to the matters contained in your memorandum of September 4th¹ as well as some comments on the papers submitted by Mr. Morgenthau² to the President with your aforesaid memorandum of September 4th.

2. My suggested changes to your memorandum of September 4th which have been under study between Mr. Matthews and Mr. McCloy, as I told you in the President's conference.³

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L STIMSON

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Stimson)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1944.

Our discussions relate to a matter of method entirely; our objective is the same. It is not a question of a soft treatment of Germany or a harsh treatment of Germany. We are all trying to devise protection against recurrence by Germany of her attempts to dominate the world. We differ as to method. The fundamental remedy of Mr. Morgenthau is to provide that the industry of Germany shall be substantially obliterated. Although expressed only in terms of the Ruhr, the fact

¹ *Ante*, p. 95.

² *Ante*, p. 101.

³ Stimson's Diary for September 7, 8, and 9, 1944, indicates that the two enclosures were prepared with McCloy's assistance and that Stimson presented them at a meeting which the Cabinet Committee on Germany had with Roosevelt on September 9 (Stimson Papers).

of the matter is that the Ruhr and the adjacent territories which Mr. Morgenthau would include in his program constitute, particularly after the amputations that are proposed, the core of German industry. His proposition is

"the total destruction of the whole German armament industry and the removal or destruction of other key industries which are basic to military strength."

In speaking of the Ruhr and surrounding industrial areas, he says:

"This area should not only be stripped of all presently existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it cannot in the foreseeable future become an industrial area—all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed by military action shall either be completely dismantled or removed from the area or completely destroyed, all equipment shall be removed from the mines and the mines shall be thoroughly wrecked."⁴

I am unalterably opposed to such a program for the reasons given in my memorandum dated September 5⁵ which is already before the President. I do not think that the reasons there stated need again be elaborated. In substance, my point is that these resources constitute a natural and necessary asset for the productivity of Europe. In a period when the world is suffering from destruction and from want of production, the concept of the total obliteration of these values is to my mind wholly wrong. My insistence is that these assets be conserved and made available for the benefit of the whole of Europe, including particularly Great Britain. The internationalization of the Ruhr or the trusteeship of its products—I am not prepared at the moment to discuss details of method—constitutes a treatment of the problem in accord with the needs and interests of the world. To argue that we are incapable of sustained effort to control such wealth within proper channels is to destroy any hope for the future of the world. I believe that the education furnished us by the Germans in two world wars, plus the continuity of interest which such a trusteeship would stimulate is sufficient insurance that we can be trusted to deal with the problem. The unnatural destruction of this industry would, on the other hand, be so certain, in my judgment, to provoke sympathy for the Germans that we would create friends both in this country and abroad for the Germans, whereas now most of the peoples of the world are thoroughly antipathetic to them.

The other fundamental point upon which I feel we differ is the matter of the trial and punishment of those Germans who are responsible for crimes and depredations. Under the plan proposed by Mr. Morgenthau, the so-called arch-criminals shall be put to death by the

⁴ The dash in the passage quoted indicates the omission of several words from the text of the Treasury memorandum. Cf. *ante*, p. 102.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 98.

military without provision for any trial and upon mere identification after apprehension. The method of dealing with these and other criminals requires careful thought and a well-defined procedure. Such procedure must embody, in my judgment, at least the rudimentary aspects of the Bill of Rights, namely, notification to the accused of the charge, the right to be heard and, within reasonable limits, to call witnesses in his defense. I do not mean to favor the institution of state trials or to introduce any cumbersome machinery but the very punishment of these men in a dignified manner consistent with the advance of civilization, will have all the greater effect upon posterity. Furthermore, it will afford the most effective way of making a record of the Nazi system of terrorism and of the effort of the Allies to terminate the system and prevent its recurrence.

I am disposed to believe that at least as to the chief Nazi officials, we should participate in an international tribunal constituted to try them. They should be charged with offences against the laws of the Rules of War in that they have committed wanton and unnecessary cruelties in connection with the prosecution of the war. This law of the Rules of War has been upheld by our own Supreme Court and will be the basis of judicial action against the Nazis.

Even though these offences have not been committed against our troops, I feel that our moral position is better if we take our share in their conviction. Other war criminals who have committed crimes in subjugated territory should be returned in accordance with the Moscow Declaration^a to those territories for trial by national military commissions having jurisdiction of the offence under the same Rules of War. I have great difficulty in finding any means whereby military commissions may try and convict those responsible for excesses committed within Germany both before and during the war which have no relation to the conduct of the war. I would be prepared to construe broadly what constituted a violation of the Rules of War but there is a certain field in which I fear that external courts cannot move. Such courts would be without jurisdiction in precisely the same way that any foreign court would be without jurisdiction to try those who were guilty of, or condoned, lynching in our own country.

The above are the two main points with which I differ from the proposed program submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury.

Partition

I have an open mind on partition and although I have given the matter substantial consideration I have, as yet, come to no conclusion

^a i.e., the Declaration of German Atrocities approved at the Tripartite Conference held at Moscow, October 18–November 1, 1943. For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 768–769; Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, November 6, 1943, pp. 310–311.

as to wisdom or method of partition. I feel we cannot deal effectively with that subject until we have had an interchange of views with the English and the Russians. I, myself, seek further light on this subject. I, certainly, would not discourage any spontaneous effort toward separation of the country into two or more groups.

Amputation

I understand that there is some general recognition of the probability of Russia or the Poles taking East Prussia and some parts of Silesia. I suggest that we interpose no objection to this but that we take no part in the administration of the area. On the Western border the primary question is the matter of dealing with the Ruhr but it has also been suggested that the Rhineland and the Saar be delivered to France. Naturally I am in favor of the automatic return of Alsace and Lorraine to France but though my mind is not irrevocably closed against it, I feel that the burden of proof lies on those who suggest giving France more territory. She will come out of this war with her Empire practically intact, with a reduced population and already possessing a very valuable bit of ore in the Longwy-Briey area. To give her a substantial territory of German-speaking and German-bred people would create another problem in the balance of Europe. To counteract this, I would give France a share in the benefits of the internationalization of the Saar and the Ruhr and the advantage which this gives of what would in effect be an international barrier between France and Germany.

There are certain other methods of punishment affecting the personal lives of individual Germans proposed by the Secretary of the Treasury to which I am opposed as constituting irritations of no fundamental value and, indeed, of considerable danger, but these are primarily matters of administration which I think need not be discussed at this time. In some part, at least, they had best be determined by those who have the primary responsibility for the administration of the occupation.

As a suggestion, I propose that during the interim period, which is all that we can deal with at the moment, the President be recommended to approve a program generally in accord with the memorandum submitted by the Secretary of State at the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Tuesday, September 5, except for a modification of subparagraph 2 (*h*) of that memorandum and certain other additions on which I hope we can all agree, which suggested changes I append hereto.

[Enclosure 2]

Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Stimson)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 9, 1944.

SUGGESTED CHANGES IN CABINET COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS AS
STATED IN PAPER SEPTEMBER 4, 1944

To paragraph 2 (a) should be added the following:

"At least for an indefinite period Germany shall be denied the means or power to manufacture or design aeroplanes or gliders of any sort whether military, commercial or private, and Germany shall have no license to operate any airlines. During this period no schools or courses for the study of air flight in any form shall be permitted.

"All machines, plants and other instruments which are *peculiarly* adapted to the manufacture of arms and lethal weapons of any sort shall be dismantled or destroyed."

Paragraph 2 (b) should be rewritten to read as follows:

"Dissolution of the Nazi Party and all its affiliated and associated organizations should be effected immediately and all members of the Gestapo, viz., the so-called security or political police, prominent Nazis in whatever activity they may have operated, substantially if not all members of the S.S. organizations, and others who are suspected of having taken part in or had responsibility for the perpetration of war crimes, should be apprehended and held for further disposition. Prompt and summary trials shall be held of those charged with such crimes and punishment should be swift and severe.

"Studies should be instituted at once to determine the procedures to be followed in such trials, and they should be cleared with the British, Russians, and French as quickly as possible, so that they can be communicated to the appropriate occupying authorities without delay.

"All laws discriminating against persons on grounds of race, color, creed, political activity or opinion, should be annulled."

To paragraph (e) should be added the following:

"The territories of Germany which are to be ceded to other countries are understood to be all or most of East Prussia and some parts of Silesia. The question of the Rhineland and the Saar is closely connected with the treatment of the Ruhr. We recommend as the present view of the United States that a strong control over the products of this area must be maintained by means of some form of international trusteeship of its products and resources. It should not be obliterated as an industrial productive center, but it must be actively managed by others than Germans and otherwise completely taken from German domination.

"On the other hand no efforts shall be made to rebuild any of the destroyed plants in Germany until permission is given by appropriate Allied or United Nations authority."

Substitute for paragraph (h) the following:

"The primary objectives of our economic policy are: (1) the permanent elimination of German economic domination in Europe and (2) the conversion of German economic capacity in such manner that it will be so dependent upon imports and exports that Germany cannot by its own devices reconvert to war production."

Roosevelt Papers

*Briefing Book Prepared in the Treasury Department*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON, September 9, 1944.]

[Section 1]

PROGRAM TO PREVENT GERMANY FROM STARTING A WORLD WAR III²

1. *Demilitarization of Germany*

[This paragraph is identical with paragraph 1 of Morgenthau's memorandum of September 5, 1944, *ante*, p. 101.]

2. *New Boundaries of Germany*

(a) Poland should get that part of East Prussia which doesn't go to the U.S.S.R. and the southern portion of Silesia. (See map in 12 Appendix.³)

(b) France should get the Saar and the adjacent territories bounded by the Rhine and the Moselle Rivers.

(c) As indicated in 4 below an International Zone should be created containing the Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas.

¹ This briefing book was before Roosevelt during his meeting with the Cabinet Committee on Germany on September 9, 1944. See *Morgenthau Diary (Germany)*, vol. 1, pp. 608-609. Concerning the preparation of these briefing materials, see *ibid.*, pp. 591-596.

In the Roosevelt Papers these briefing papers are attached to and preceded by: (1) A typed memorandum reading, "This was done by Henry Morgenthau, Jr. and his people. In the conversations [at Quebec] with the Prof (Lord Cherwell) we used it in discussing the financial problems, but not the recommendations on the allocations of zones in Germany. F.D.R." (2) A table of contents listing serially (from 1 to 11) the titles of the individual sections of the briefing book and identifying the two maps and three charts which were included in the briefing materials. The table of contents indicates, however, that the third appended chart is entitled "Trade Pattern of Europe", whereas the final chart filed in the Roosevelt Papers is entitled "Coal Production in United Kingdom and Ruhr". Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 594-595.

² In Henry Morgenthau, Jr., *Germany Is Our Problem* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945), a facsimile of this section of the Treasury briefing book is reproduced before p. ix, and identified as "a photographic copy of the memorandum summarizing 'The Morgenthau Plan' which President Roosevelt took with him to the historic conference at Quebec in September of 1944." The briefing book taken as a whole is the fullest exposition of the "Morgenthau Plan" which has been found.

³ The maps and charts contained in the briefing book were appended in section 12, following the first 11 sections of the book. See *post*, p. 140.

3. *Partitioning of New Germany*

[This paragraph is identical with subparagraph 2 (d) of Morgenthau's memorandum of September 5, 1944, *ante*, p. 101.]

4. *The Ruhr Area*

(The Ruhr, surrounding industrial areas, as shown on the map, including the Rhineland, the Kiel Canal, and all German territory north of the Kiel Canal.)

Here lies the heart of German industrial power. This area should not only be stripped of all presently existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it can not in the foreseeable future become an industrial area. The following steps will accomplish this:

(a) Within a short period, if possible not longer than 6 months after the cessation of hostilities, all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed by military action shall be completely dismantled and transported to Allied Nations as restitution. All equipment shall be removed from the mines and the mines closed.

(b) The area should be made an international zone to be governed by an international security organization to be established by the United Nations. In governing the area the international organization should be guided by policies designed to further the above stated objective.

5. *Restitution and Reparation*

Reparations, in the form of future payments and deliveries, should not be demanded. Restitution and reparation shall be effected by the transfer of existing German resources and territories, e.g.,

(a) by restitution of property looted by the Germans in territories occupied by them;

(b) by transfer of German territory and German private rights in industrial property situated in such territory to invaded countries and the international organization under the program of partition;

(c) by the removal and distribution among devastated countries of industrial plants and equipment situated within the International Zone and the North and South German states delimited in the section on partition;

(d) by forced German labor outside Germany; and

(e) by confiscation of all German assets of any character whatsoever outside of Germany.

6. *Education and Propaganda*

[This paragraph is identical with paragraph 5 of Morgenthau's memorandum of September 5, 1944, *ante*, p. 103.]

7. *Political Decentralization*

The military administration in Germany in the initial period should be carried out with a view toward the eventual partitioning of Ger-

many. To facilitate partitioning and to assure its permanence the military authorities should be guided by the following principles:

(a) Dismiss all policy-making officials of the Reich government and deal primarily with local governments.

(b) Encourage the reestablishment of state governments in each of the states (*Länder*) corresponding to 18 states into which Germany is presently divided and in addition make the Prussian provinces separate states.

(c) Upon the partition of Germany, the various state governments should be encouraged to organize a federal government for each of the newly partitioned areas. Such new governments should be in the form of a confederation of states, with emphasis on states' rights and a large degree of local autonomy.

8. *Responsibility of Military for Local German Economy*

The sole purpose of the military in control of the German economy shall be to facilitate military operations and military occupation. The Allied Military Government shall not assume responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing, or transportation, or take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy, except those which are essential to military operations. The responsibility for sustaining the German economy and people rests with the German people with such facilities as may be available under the circumstances.

9. *Controls Over Development of German Economy*

[This paragraph is identical with paragraph 8 of Morgenthau's memorandum of September 5, 1944, *ante*, p. 104.]

10. *Agrarian Program*

All large estates should be broken up and divided among the peasants and the system of primogeniture and entail should be abolished.

11. *Punishment of War Crimes and Treatment of Special Groups*

A program for the punishment of certain war crimes and for the treatment of Nazi organizations and other special groups is contained in section 11.⁴

12. *Uniforms and Parades*

(a) No German shall be permitted to wear, after an appropriate period of time following the cessation of hostilities, any military uniform or any uniform of any quasi military organizations.

(b) No military parades shall be permitted anywhere in Germany and all military bands shall be disbanded.

⁴ *Post*, p. 140.

13. *Aircraft*

[This paragraph is identical with paragraph 12 of Morgenthau's memorandum of September 5, 1944, *ante*, p. 104.]

14. *United States Responsibility*

Although the United States would have full military and civilian representation on whatever international commission or commissions may be established for the execution of the whole German program, the primary responsibility for the policing of Germany and for civil administration in Germany should be assumed by the military forces of Germany's continental neighbors. Specifically, these should include Russian, French, Polish, Czech, Greek, Yugoslav, Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian soldiers.

Under this program United States troops could be withdrawn within a relatively short time.

[Section 2]

REPARATIONS MEAN A POWERFUL GERMANY

If we were to expect Germany to pay recurring reparations, whether in the form of money or goods, we would be forced at the very beginning to start a rehabilitation and reconstruction program for the German economy. For instance, we would have to supply her with transportation equipment, public utility repairs, food for her working population, machinery for heavy industry damaged by bombing, reconstruction of housing and industrial raw materials. No matter how the program would be dressed up, we would, in effect be doing for Germany what we expect to do for the liberated areas of Europe but perhaps on an even greater scale, because of Germany's more advanced industrialization.

When reparation deliveries cease Germany will be left with a more powerful economy and a larger share of foreign markets than she had in the Thirties.

Therefore, a program of large-scale reparations must be rejected for the following reasons:

1. Politically it would be very difficult to persuade people of liberated Europe and of the other United Nations, including the U.S., to accept a program of immediate reconstruction of the German economy.

2. If liberated Europe becomes economically dependent on Germany for reparations, her economic dependence cannot be broken off when reparations cease. The rest of Europe would continue to be dependent on Germany as a source of supply and as a market. These economic ties would also mean political ties. Germany would be right back where she was in the Thirties when she was able to dominate the rest of Europe economically through her industrial power and to exert her economic power to achieve political domination.

3. An economically powerful Germany *ipso facto* constitutes a military threat to world security.

4. The payment of reparations is directly competitive with the export industries of the U.S., the U.K. and France and would create political dissensions among the United Nations.

(a) Whatever the recipient countries get in reparations they will not buy from the Allied industrial powers in the post-war period.

(b) If Germany is placed on a reparations basis she will have to export industrial goods to non-European markets in order to get the necessary foreign exchange to import the raw materials for her industry. Therefore, she will again compete with England and the United States in the Latin American, African and Asiatic markets.

5. An economically powerful Germany would be able to compete more effectively with other countries as and when the payment of reparations ceases.

A reparations program for Germany after this war holds no greater promise of success than the Dawes and Young plans⁵ tried after the end of the first World War.

[Section 3]

ECONOMIC RESTITUTION BY GERMANY TO UNITED NATIONS

In lieu of recurring reparations payments the nation entitled to such payments will receive from Germany a lump sum payment in the form of German material resources, German human resources and German territory.

This lump sum payment, which may be described as restitution rather than reparations will be effected in the following manner:

(a) The transfer of German territory to liberated countries including the industrial installations located there. It is proposed that the great industrial areas of Silesia be transferred to Poland and the industry of the Saar and the adjacent territories be transferred to France. These territories will represent enormous wealth to the recipient countries.

⁵ The plans referred to were drawn up by two committees of experts headed, respectively, by Charles G. Dawes and Owen D. Young. For the text of the "Dawes Plan" (i.e., the report of the First Committee of Experts submitted April 9, 1924), see *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, vol. 10, May 1924, pp. 351-411; *Reports of the Expert Committees Appointed by the Reparation Commission* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1924; Cmd. 2105), pp. 2-125; or *The Experts' Plan for Reparation Payments* (Paris: The Reparation Commission, 1926), pp. 2-116, also printed with the same pagination in the series *Reparation Commission: Official Documents*, vol. xiv (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1927). For the text of the "Young Plan" (i.e., the report of the Committee of Experts submitted June 7, 1929), see *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, vol. 15, July 1929, pp. 465-494, or *Report of the Committee of Experts on Reparations* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1929; Cmd. 3343). Concerning the preparation and implementation of the Dawes and Young Plans, see, respectively, *Foreign Relations*, 1924, vol. II, pp. 1 ff., and *ibid.*, 1929, vol. II, pp. 1025 ff.

(b) By removal and distribution among devastated countries, of industrial plants and equipment and transportation facilities including railroads, situated within the remaining German territory and the Ruhr. It is expected that complete factory units, machinery, equipment, stocks of raw materials, railroad and shipping will be transferred to the devastated countries and will constitute a real basis for the reconstruction and industrialization of liberated Europe. To the extent possible the whole industry of the Ruhr will be so transferred.

(c) By the creation of German labor battalions to be used for reconstruction work outside Germany.

(d) By confiscation of all German foreign exchange assets of any character whatsoever.

The type of restitution described above will be more beneficial both politically and economically to recipient countries than would be any form of recurring reparations payments.

Benefits will be realized almost immediately by the receipt of machinery, equipment and manpower, and the economies of the recipient countries will be strengthened absolutely as well as relatively to that of Germany.

To the extent that the need of these countries for industrial products is supplied by U.S. and U.K. instead of by Germany, the receiving nations benefit by obtaining delivery more rapidly in the immediate post-war period. Also by supplying such goods U.S. and U.K. enjoy expanded foreign post-war markets.

[Section 4]

IT IS A FALLACY THAT EUROPE NEEDS A STRONG INDUSTRIAL GERMANY

1. The assumption sometimes made that Germany is an indispensable source of industrial supplies for the rest of Europe is not valid.

U.S., U.K. and the French-Luxembourg-Belgian industrial group could easily have supplied out of unused industrial capacity practically all that Germany supplied to Europe during the pre-war period. In the post-war period the expanded industrial capacity of the United Nations, particularly the U.S., can easily provide the reconstruction and industrial needs of Europe without German assistance.

Total German exports to the entire world in 1938 were only about \$2 billion, of which machinery steel and steel products amounted to about \$750 million, coal \$165 million and chemicals \$230 million.

These amounts are trivial in comparison with the increased industrial potential of the U.S. alone, or of the U.K. One-fifth of our lend-lease exports of 1943 would be sufficient to replace the full exports of Germany to the whole world.

2. A claim has been made that Europe is dependent upon Ruhr coal. The French-Belgian steel industry and some of the new industrial units which will arise in Europe after the war will need imported coal

supplies. However, the British coal industry which suffered from German competition before the war will be able to supply a major part if not all of these needs. The coal industries of France, Poland, Silesia and the Saar are also capable of further expansion if the competition of the Ruhr is eliminated. Further supplies if necessary could be obtained from the United States though at a much higher price. The different quality of the substitute coals may require some technological changes but the adjustment can be made.

Germany had a net export of coal of 32 million tons in 1937. The difference between the British coal production in a good year and a depressed year was more than the total German exports of coal. Moreover, at no time in the last 25 years has the British coal industry worked at full capacity.

3. Germany has been important to the rest of Europe as a market principally for surplus agricultural products. In 1937 Germany's food imports from the world were \$800 million, of which Europe supplied \$450 million. Total German purchases of raw materials from Europe in 1937 were about \$350 million. The loss of the German market will be largely compensated for by the following developments:

(a) If German industry is eliminated, no doubt the bulk of the industrial raw materials which Germany used to purchase will now be bought by other European nations which will henceforth produce the industrial commodities which Germany exported before to Europe.

(b) The industrialization and the heightened standard of living of the rest of Europe will absorb a part of the food surpluses which formerly went to Germany.

(c) Those part[s] of Germany which will be added to other countries (the Rhineland, Silesia, East Prussia) may have as high a volume of food imports as before, perhaps higher.

(d) The remaining part of Germany will continue to import some food, perhaps 25%-50% of former food imports.

4. Germany was important to the rest of Europe as a market to the following extent:

Percentage of each country's exports to Germany

	1938
United Kingdom	4%
France	6%
U.S.S.R.	7%
Belgium	12%
Norway	13%
Italy	15%
Czechoslovakia	15%
Netherlands	15%
Denmark	20%
Poland	24%
Yugoslavia	38%
Greece	38%

The U.K. exported principally coal and textile materials to Germany and the principal French exports were iron ore and wool. The elimination of German industrial exports will provide adequate markets for these exports and more.

The loss of the German market may be important to the Balkan countries. Agricultural exports of these countries to Germany were abnormally large in 1938 because of Germany's unscrupulous exploitation through clearing agreements and other devices. These countries will find markets for part of their food surplus through industrialization and a higher standard of living within their own country. German areas will continue to import some food from them. However, there may be a net loss of markets to Denmark, Holland, and Yugoslavia, and these countries will need to make an adjustment in their economies which should not be difficult in the period of greater adjustments which will come with liberation.

5. In short, the statement that a healthy European economy is dependent upon German industry was never true, nor will it be true in the future. Therefore the treatment to be accorded to Germany should be decided upon without reference to the economic consequences upon the rest of Europe. At the worst, these economic consequences will involve relatively minor economic disadvantages in certain sections of Europe. At best, they will speed up the industrial development of Europe outside of Germany. But any disadvantages will be more than offset by real gains to the political objectives and the economic interests of the United Nations as a whole.

[Section 5]

WHY THE RESOURCES OF THE RUHR SHOULD BE LOCKED UP AND THE EQUIPMENT REMOVED

During the last hundred years the basis of modern German militarism has been the industrial capacity of the Ruhr. Very large resources of high quality coal that lends itself particularly well to the production of coke and a fortunate geographic location which facilitated the importation of iron ore, were the foundation of an industrial apparatus that is unique throughout the world and the development of which has been deliberately guided by military objectives.

The elimination of this industrial apparatus is indispensable to rendering renewed German aggression impossible for many years to come. No other device could serve this main objective of the United Nations with the same effectiveness. Dismemberment of Germany alone would not suffice since political developments several decades hence may make a reunion of the several German states possible. In that case the reunited German State would immediately possess a huge industrial potential unless the Ruhr industry were destroyed.

If the Ruhr industry were eliminated, new iron and steel industries would unquestionably be built up in the rest of Europe to provide for those needs in iron and steel which the Ruhr used to satisfy, and to make use of the French iron ore production. Coal would become available from the Saar, from increased production in France, Great Britain, Silesia and Poland. The elimination of the Ruhr would hence be a welcome contribution to the prosperity of the coal industry of several United Nations. Great Britain has very large reserves of coal; her proved reserves are held to represent, at the present rate of extraction, about 500 years' supply.

Britain's coal production has severely declined in the inter-war period and never again reached its maximum of 1913 (293 million metric tons). The level of production in the years preceding this was that of the turn of the century, the increase between 1900 and 1913 having been lost. The production in 1938 was 60 million tons lower than in 1913.

The new iron and steel industries which will arise in Europe to take the place of the Ruhr will have such a powerful vested interest that they will constitute a permanent and effective barrier to the re-industrialization of the Ruhr.

[Section 6]

HOW BRITISH INDUSTRY WOULD BENEFIT BY PROPOSED PROGRAM

1. *The British coal industry would recover from its thirty year depression* by gaining new markets. Britain would meet the major portion of the European coal needs formerly met by the annual Ruhr production of 125 million tons. The consequent expansion of British coal output would allow for the development of a coherent program for the expansion and reorganization of what has been Britain's leading depressed industry since 1918 and facilitate the elimination of the depressed areas.

2. *The reduction in German industrial capacity would eliminate German competition with British exports* in the world market. Not only will England be in a position to recapture many of the foreign markets she lost to Germany after 1918, but she will participate in supplying the devastated countries of Europe with all types of consumer and industrial goods for their reconstruction needs in the immediate post-war years.

3. *Transference of a large section of German shipping*, both commercial and naval, and shipbuilding equipment to England will be an important item in England's program of post-war economic expansion of restitution.

4. *Britain's foreign exchange position will be strengthened* and the pressure on sterling reduced by the expansion of her exports and shipping services.

5. *The assurance of peace and security* would constitute England's greatest single economic benefit from the proposed program designed to put Germany in a position never again to wage effective war on the continent. England would be able to undertake the program for economic and social reconstruction advanced in the Beveridge plan⁶ and the Government program for full employment without having to worry about the future financial burdens of maintaining [a] large army and huge armament industries indefinitely.

6. *Britain's political stability would be reinforced* by her increased ability to meet the insistent domestic demands for economic reform resulting from the assurances of security and of an expansion of her exports.

[Section 7]

THE WELL-BEING OF THE GERMAN ECONOMY IS THE RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE GERMANS AND NOT OF THE ALLIED MILITARY AUTHORITIES

The economic rehabilitation of Germany is the problem of the German people and not of the Allied Military authorities. The German people must bear the consequences of their own acts.

The sole purpose of the military in control of the German economy should be to facilitate military operations and military occupation. The Allied Military Government should not assume responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing, or transportation, or take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy. The responsibility for sustaining the German economy and people rests with the German people with such facilities as may be available under the circumstances.

No relief supplies should be imported, or distributed from German stocks, beyond the minimum necessary to prevent disease and such disorder as might endanger or impede military operations or occupation. The Allied Military authorities should have no responsibility for the provision and distribution or [of] relief, including food and medical supplies. German import requirements should be strictly limited to minimum quotas of critical items and should not in any instance take precedence over the supply requirements of liberated territories.

Agricultural supplies in Germany should be utilized for the German population, provided, however, that German consumption shall be

⁶ See *Social Insurance and Allied Services: Report by Sir William Beveridge* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1942; Cmd. 6404).

held to a minimum so as to maximize the surplus of agricultural products available for liberated countries.

Allied Military authorities should not be concerned with restoring any physical destruction caused during hostilities, except as absolutely essential to the health of the population. The Germans will have that responsibility, to do the job as best they can.

[Section 8]

CONTROLS OVER DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN ECONOMY

A long range program should be put into effect for the purpose of controlling the strategic elements in the German economy for a prolonged period, at least 20 years. The elements which should be controlled are:

1. German foreign assets, including patents and copyrights.
2. German foreign trade.
3. Clearing and trade agreements with foreign countries.
4. Capital imports and capital exports.
5. Industries producing strategic materials other than those for which special provision has been made.
6. The German commercial and fishing fleet.
7. Inland navigation, e.g., canals and rivers.

It is essential that the foregoing strategic elements in the German economy be controlled lest through their use, the Germans once again proceed to build up various aspects of their industrial and economic structure for future militaristic and aggressive purposes. Germany has been the leader in the world in using customs tariffs, trade preferences, foreign exchange control, control over transit trade, import quotas, international cartels, patents and copyrights for discriminatory and unfair trade advantages against her neighbors. It has been the focal point for many of the festering sores and competitive trade wars throughout the 1920's and 30's.

[Section 9]

WHAT TO DO ABOUT GERMAN EDUCATION

The militaristic spirit which pervades the German people has been deliberately fostered by all educational institutions in Germany for many decades. Schools, Colleges and Universities were used with great effectiveness to instill into the children and the youth of the nation the seeds of aggressive nationalism and the desire for world domination. Re-education of the German people must hence be part of the program to render Germany ineffective as an aggressive power.

Re-education cannot be effectively undertaken from outside the country and by teachers from abroad. It must be done by the Germans

themselves. The hard facts of defeat and of the need for political, economic and social reorientation must be the teachers of the German people. The existing educational system which is utterly nazified must be completely reorganized and reformed. The chief task will be to locate politically reliable teachers and to educate, as soon as possible, new teachers who are animated by a new spirit.

A United Nations Commission of Education should be created which will have supreme authority in all matters of education and organs of public opinion. All educational institutions of any type and character will be closed. Their reopening will depend (1) upon the possibility of assembling faculties in whom political confidence can be placed; (2) upon reorganization of curricula; (3) upon the completion of new text books to replace the utterly unusable books of the past. During a preliminary period only[,] appointments to faculties of educational institution[s] should be subject to the approval of the United Nations Commission of Education. While it may be possible to reassemble faculties for primary schools after a relatively short time, all institutions of higher learning, the chief centers of militaristic, pan-German propaganda in the past, may have to remain closed for a number of years.

[Section 10]

GERMAN MILITARISM CANNOT BE DESTROYED BY DESTROYING NAZISM
ALONE

(1) *The Nazi regime is essentially the culmination of the unchanging German drive toward aggression.*

(a) German society has been dominated for at least three generations by powerful forces fashioning the German state and nation into a machine for military conquest and self-aggrandizement. Since 1864 Germany has launched five wars of aggression against other powers, each war involving more destruction over larger areas than the previous one.

(b) As in the case of Japan, the rapid evolution of a modern industrial system in Germany immeasurably strengthened the economic base of German militarism without weakening the Prussian feudal ideology or its hold on German society.

(c) The Nazi regime is *not* an excrescence on an otherwise healthy society but an organic growth out of the German body politic. Even before the Nazi regime seized power, the German nation had demonstrated an unequalled capacity to be seduced by a militarist clique offering the promise of economic security and political domination in exchange for disciplined acceptance of its leadership. What the Nazi regime has done has been to systematically debauch the passive Ger-

man nation on an unprecedented scale and shape it into an organized and dehumanized military machine integrated by all the forces of modern technique and science.

(2) *The dissolution of the Nazi Party will not, therefore, by itself ensure the destruction of the militaristic spirit* instilled into the German people over generations and given an overwhelming impetus in the last decade. This will of necessity be an arduous process, and for a long time to come it would be gambling with the very destiny of civilization to rely on an unproven German capacity for self-regeneration in the face of its proven capacity for creating new weapons of destruction to be used in wars of aggression. Therefore, in addition to disarming and weakening Germany as a military power, the interests of world security will best be promoted by :

(a) Forcibly reducing Germany's industrial capacity so that she will cease to be a major economic, military and political power.

(b) Strengthening all Germany's neighbors politically and economically relatively to Germany. The more powerful her neighbors, the more likely she is to realize the futility of the militarist philosophy from which aggression ensues.

[Section 11]

PUNISHMENT OF CERTAIN WAR CRIMES AND TREATMENT OF SPECIAL GROUPS

[Paragraphs A and B of this section are identical with paragraphs A and B of appendix B to Morgenthau's memorandum of September 5, 1944, *ante*, p. 105.]

C. *Registration*

An appropriate registration program will be formulated designed to identify all members of the Nazi Party and affiliated organizations, the Gestapo, S.S. and S.A.

[Paragraphs D-F are identical with paragraphs D-F of appendix B to Morgenthau's memorandum of September 5, 1944, *ante*, p. 107.]


G. *Prohibition on Emigration*

[This paragraph is identical with paragraph H of appendix B to Morgenthau's memorandum of September 5, 1944, *ante*, p. 107.]


[Section 12]

[An appendix to the briefing book includes (1) a map (not printed herein, but reproduced in *Morgenthau Diary (Germany)*, vol. I, facing p. 554) on which the information shown is identical with that on the map printed *ante*, facing p. 86; (2) a map (not printed herein) entitled "Map of Lorraine Iron Districts and Tributary Coal Fields"; and (3) the three charts which follow.]

EUROPEAN COAL PRODUCTION IN 1929 AND 1937 By Geographical Areas.




PRODUCTION OF COAL, IRON AND STEEL IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES IN 1937



COAL PRODUCTION IN UNITED KINGDOM AND RUHR

Yearly, 1922-1938



Editorial Note

The Cabinet Committee on Germany met with Roosevelt on September 9, 1944, and discussed the postwar treatment of Germany. No official minutes of the meeting have been found, but for information on the meeting based on Morgenthau material see Blum, pp. 367-368, and *Morgenthau Diary (Germany)*, vol. I, pp. 608-611.

740.00119 Control (Germany)/9-944

Memorandum by the Political Adviser on Germany (Murphy)

[WASHINGTON,] September 9, 1944.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

The President began with an account of his boyhood studies in Germany when, he said, he grew fond of the German people as they were in the 1890's—their music and love of liberty, and the absence of militarism. No one at that time wore a uniform. Even the railroad station masters would wear civilian clothes, with only a uniform cap. The President said that four years later he visited Germany again and found a great change in this respect—the students had started wearing uniforms and were marching in formation. Militarism took the ascendancy from then on.

The President stated his belief that all of this must be eradicated and a new process of demilitarized education begun. This might well take forty years to accomplish.

The President mentioned the report that the Germans were flooding parts of Holland. He said that where sea water is allowed to flood land it ruins it for agricultural purposes for as much as twenty-five years. Therefore, if Holland suffered this loss, it would seem to be fair that Holland receive certain compensation from German territory. In that connection he spoke of an international zone or trusteeship which would be created embracing the territory, roughly, from the Kiel Canal down to about Hanover, including the Ruhr and a strip of territory west of the Rhine, but not including the city of Cologne, down to and including the Saar. The President was non-committal as to whether the trustees under such an arrangement should include more than the three great powers, France for example. He did indicate that he considered that France would emerge from this war in a strong position, relatively stronger, he said, than Great Britain, with the French Empire probably intact.

The President said that the United States was not interested in reparations from Germany, but that he realized that other countries were, and was in accord that the Soviet Union, Great Britain and

others should benefit by the use of German labor and equipment. He expressed the opinion that the British Empire was bankrupt and that we could not afford to see it disintegrate. He was willing to see Great Britain, as he was the Soviet Union, profit by German assets.

The President also expressed the view that it might be better for the Allies in concluding hostilities with the Germans to deal only with local commanders and authorities, rather than with a central authority and the German high command. This, he indicated, would protect us from the charge of having made a deal with anybody or to have become affiliated with a group which, while pretending to be anti-Nazi, might be a cover for unwelcome elements.

War criminals, the President hoped might be dealt with summarily. His principal preoccupation was that they be properly identified before being disposed of, but he expressed himself as very much opposed to long, drawn-out legal procedure.

The President also discussed French and Italian affairs, and I gathered from his comments on the French situation that he believed some time would elapse before a stable French central government is established. He asked a number of questions about Italian affairs, particularly the status and future possibilities of Umberto, the Prince of Naples. He seemed to favor economic cooperation with Italy and a friendly effort to improve the condition of the Italian people.

R[OBERT] D M[URPHY]

Roosevelt Papers

*Memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (Elsey)*¹

[Undated.]

ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN EUROPE

At the Quebec Conference of the President and Prime Minister Churchill with their Chiefs of Staff in August 1943, an outline plan was presented by Lieutenant General Morgan for an emergency return to Europe by Allied troops should German resistance in the West suddenly weaken or collapse before the Invasion of France was launched in the Spring of 1944.² General Morgan had been appointed

¹ Elsey informed the Historical Office of the Department of State on January 12, 1955, that he had prepared this memorandum "immediately prior to" the Second Quebec Conference at the request of the President's Naval Aide (Brown). "Knowing that the subject of zones of occupation would have a prominent place on the agenda of that conference, Admiral Brown directed me to write a briefing paper on the issues between the United Kingdom and the United States on zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, the paper to be based on the Map Room files and the files of Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy and the President." (Historical Office Files)

² See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, p. 940.

by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in May 1943 as Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (abbreviated to COSSAC) to begin planning for the invasion, and, as a corollary, to prepare plans for the emergency return should that become possible. The purpose of COSSAC's plan, named RANKIN, was to introduce as many Allied troops into western Europe as possible to prevent chaos and ruin resulting from disintegration of the German war machine. RANKIN proposed that France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Rhine Valley to Düsseldorf be regarded as a sphere under U.S. control while Holland, Denmark, and northwestern Germany from the Ruhr Valley to Lübeck be controlled by British forces.*

RANKIN was approved "in principle" by the Combined Chiefs on August 23, 1943.† On the same day, at the second and final meeting of the President and the Prime Minister with the Chiefs of Staff at the Citadel, the President inquired if plans were being made for an emergency return to the continent and added that he desired United Nations troops to reach Berlin as soon as did the Russians.‡ The President was informed of the COSSAC plan and in the final report of the conference submitted to him the next day a statement on RANKIN was included. "We have examined," the Chiefs of Staff said, "the plans that have been proposed [*prepared*] by General Morgan's staff for an emergency operation to enter the Continent. We have taken note of these plans and have directed that they be kept under continuous review."§

By concurring with the British Chiefs in approving "in principle" the recommendations of COSSAC, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff were accepting without thorough examination and without guidance or direction from the President the proposal that in any emergency entrance into the Continent U.S. forces would occupy France and Belgium and southwestern Germany. This decision was to have far-reaching consequences and was to become, in short order, a bone of contention between Great Britain and the United States which has not yet been buried.

After the Quebec Conference the U.S. Joint Chiefs shelved the question of RANKIN but the British Chiefs and COSSAC continued active study and planning.

In early November, on the eve of departure of the President and the Chiefs of Staff for the SEXTANT Conference at Cairo,³ General Morgan

*C.C.S. 320, 20 August 1943. [Footnote in the source text. See *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*, p. 1010.]

†C.C.S. 115th Meeting, 23 August 1943. [Footnote in the source text. See *ibid.*, p. 940.]

‡Second Citadel meeting, 23 August 1943 (Minutes printed in QUADRANT Conference report.) [Footnote in the source text. See *ibid.*, p. 942.]

§ C.C.S. 319/5, 24 August 1943. [Footnote in the source text. See *ibid.*, p. 1121.]

³ See *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*.

submitted in person to General Marshall a proposed revision of the RANKIN plan approved "in principle" at Quebec.¶ The major change was in the delineation of spheres to be controlled by Great Britain and the United States. In discussing the problem, COSSAC stated: "In making our original recommendation . . .⁴ we were handicapped by the fact that at that time (August 1943) no consideration had been given by the Allied Governments as to their policy for the disarmament and control of Germany." He had assumed, however, that Anglo-American forces would be required at least to control the Rhine and Ruhr Valleys and northwest Germany and to assist in the restoration of France, Belgium, Holland and Denmark and had made his original recommendation for the two spheres on that assumption. After QUADRANT, the British Chiefs of Staff had examined RANKIN carefully and had asked COSSAC to reexamine the plan with a view to establishing mobile land and air forces in the best strategic positions from which control of German industry could be ensured. COSSAC's staff had consulted the Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee of the War Cabinet and documents prepared by the British Planning Staff and the Foreign Office. As a result of this additional study, COSSAC now wished to withdraw his original recommendation on zones and substitute a new one along the lines of the Post-Hostilities Committee's zoning. Accordingly, he now proposed that the U.S. sphere should comprise southern Germany, Austria and France and the English sphere should consist of northwest Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland and Denmark. The Russians should occupy territory to the eastward. This zoning, COSSAC remarked in his recommendation to General Marshall, provides a more equitable sharing in the task of restoring liberated countries than the original scheme and leaves the U.S. forces free to devote full attention to the "sufficiently formidable task of France." General Morgan added that planning was in progress on this basis.¶

The changes proposed by COSSAC did not involve large areas. Belgium and Luxembourg were transferred from the American to the British zone and Austria was added as an American responsibility whereas it had not been included in the original COSSAC plan. France, with the largest population and area of the "liberated countries", remained American. The significance of the new COSSAC proposal was that it focused American attention on RANKIN as it had not been before. The allocation of spheres had been tentatively set down as "strategic recommendations" in August but now the Joint Chiefs of Staff learned that full-scale planning and preparations were proceeding in London along British lines.

¶ J.C.S. 577, 8 November 1943. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ Marks of ellipsis throughout this document appear in the source text.

¶ C.C.S. 320/2, 8 November 1943. [Footnote in the source text.]

General Morgan's recommendations were reviewed by the U.S. Joint Staff Planners who reported that action on them by the Joint Chiefs should be deferred pending information on our post-war political and economic policies. It was at once apparent to the Planners that COSSAC's plan reflected deep and careful study; he had coordinated his efforts with the Foreign Office and the War Cabinet; and his plan reflected British political and economic as well as military policy. Similar guidance and direction was needed, they felt, by the U.S. Chiefs before commitments on the COSSAC plan were made.**

The U.S. Joint Chiefs acted on their Planning Committee's advice at once. At a meeting held aboard the USS *Iowa* on 17 November, en route Cairo, the Chiefs prepared a paper for the British Chiefs stating that they had not approved the revision of RANKIN which appeared to have far-reaching political and economic implications extending beyond their cognizance and on which the Department of State and the President had not expressed themselves.††

On the same day, the Joint Chiefs addressed a letter to the President. Explaining the new COSSAC proposals which divided Europe into three spheres of responsibility, the Chiefs stated that exact boundaries between U.S., British and Soviet zones could not be defined until agreement on the subject had been reached by the three governments. Due to a rapidly developing military situation it was necessary to come to this agreement as soon as possible but before it could be done, they needed guidance so that an occupation plan would be in accord with American political and economic policies and with international agreements.‡‡

The President replied immediately to the request of the Joint Chiefs for advice and for information on U.S. policy. He informed Admiral Leahy that he could not agree to the areas of occupation which General Morgan had proposed and that he wished American forces to occupy northern Europe, that is, Scandinavia, Denmark, and northern Germany and not the area which COSSAC had recommended.§§

On November 19, while still embarked in the *Iowa*, the President met with the Joint Chiefs for a full discussion of the problem. He again defined the area which he wished American forces to occupy, and stated that the British should be responsible for France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and southern Germany and that the U.S.S.R. should occupy eastern Germany.

**J.C.S. 577, 8 November 1943. J.C.S. 577/1, 16 November 1943. [Footnote in the source text.]

††C.C.S. 320/3, 18 November 1943. J.C.S. 124th Meeting, 17 November 1943. [Footnote in the source text.]

‡‡J.C.S. 577/2, 17 November 1943. Memorandum for the President from Admiral Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 November 1943. [Footnote in the source text.]

§§ J.C.S. 125th Meeting, 18 November 1943. [Footnote in the source text.]

The President also discussed other implications of RANKIN. He told the Joint Chiefs that British political considerations were very evident in the COSSAC plan and he again emphasized that we should get U.S. troops into Berlin as soon as possible after German collapse or surrender.¶¶

After the President had expressed his views to the Chiefs, it was possible for planning groups to initiate definite studies. The Joint Staff Planners examined the feasibility of American occupation of the northern area proposed by the President and concluded that it was more advantageous from a military as well as a political point of view. The people in the northern area are more stable racially and politically, ports and lines of communications are better and less liable to sabotage, and they concluded that we should have to remain there less time. The defeat of Japan is a primary concern, taking priority over restoration and rehabilitation of Europe; supplies and shipping must not be tied up in Europe when they can be used in the Pacific war. Hence the area committing least forces for the shortest time is most desirable for American occupation. The Joint Staff Planners also considered the problem of "cross-over". Plans for the invasion of France called for American forces on the right or west flank of the Norman coast and British on the east. Should Germany not weaken suddenly or collapse and should we have a prolonged engagement in France, the line of battle would swing to a north-south axis with Americans still on the right and hence southern flank. Thus, if the U.S. should occupy north-western Germany after her defeat or collapse as the President proposed, U.S. troops would have to transfer through British forces moving into southern Germany. This would be difficult with railroads, bridges and highways damaged by air bombardment but by careful coordination with the British our Staff Planners considered it feasible.¶¶

By Presidential direction and with this military study supporting their position, the U.S. Joint Chiefs on December 4 at Cairo replied to the British proposal on division of occupied territories. Rather than permit COSSAC to continue planning on American occupation of southern Germany and British occupation of the northwest, the U.S. Chiefs proposed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff direct him to revise his planning at once on the basis of the U.S. in the general area of the Netherlands, Northern Germany, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, with the British west and south of the American position.*

¶¶Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the President, 19 November 1943. [Footnote in the source text. See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 253-256, 261; Matloff, map facing p. 341.]

¶¶ J.C.S. 577/3, SEXTANT, 2 December 1943. [Footnote in the source text.]

*C.C.S. 320/4, SEXTANT, 4 December 1943. [Footnote in the source text. For the text of C.C.S. 320/4 (Revised), see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 786-787. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 688, fn. 13.]

To this reallocation of zones which was a complete reversal, the British Chiefs refused to consent. At the end of the Conference the British and U.S. Chiefs were still in disagreement and after lengthy discussion they could agree only that COSSAC should be directed to "examine and report on the implications of revising his planning on the basis of the new allocation of spheres."[†]

Here the matter rested for a month, during which the COSSAC staff continued planning on the basis of Americans in southern Germany and British in the north. On January 7 the British Chiefs replied to the American proposal made at Cairo. "The difficulties in implementing it are such," they stated, "that it should not be proceeded further with." In a very lengthy report they elaborated the difficulties. If the occupation of Germany were not to occur until the invasion of France was well under way, transport difficulties of a "cross-over" would be insurmountable, as U.S. Army staffs operating in the southern sector would have to occupy later the northern area. COSSAC also believed that working up intelligence on the whole area from Denmark to the Swiss frontier which would be necessary for each Army Group would be too great a burden for the staffs. The greatest objection which COSSAC had to the change, however, was that diversion of his own staff to the replanning of RANKIN would be so serious a detriment to preparations for OVERLORD that the invasion target date would have to be postponed.[‡]

The U.S. Joint Staff Planners studied this rebuttal of their earlier recommendations and prepared a counter-claim. They informed the Joint Chiefs that they agreed that logistic difficulties of a "cross-over" would be great, but they strongly disagreed that they were insurmountable. As for replanning causing postponement of the invasion, they presented a letter from Lieutenant General Devers, Commanding General of the European Theatre of Operations, which stated changes could be made on the part of U.S. Forces without any prejudice to OVERLORD. The Civil Affairs Division of the War Department added that the proposed revision would not create additional burdens nor present additional difficulties; it was possible and desirable. The Staff Planners' paper concluded with the comment that "the most important point is that time is working against us. If the U.S. proposal is to be put into effect, the decision should be announced without delay."[§]

The Joint Chiefs on January 25 made formal reply to the British refusal to accept their proposals. Denying that a change in zones would

[†]C.C.S. 134th Meeting, SEXTANT, 4 December 1943. C.C.S. 320/4 Revised, SEXTANT, 4 December 1943. C.C.S. 426/1, SEXTANT, 6 December 1943. (Final Report of Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister.) [Footnote in the source text. See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 688, 786-787, 813.]

[‡]C.C.S. 320/8, 7 January 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

[§]J.C.S. 577/6, 23 January 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

so absorb planning staffs that OVERLORD would be postponed as a result, and suggesting ways to avoid "cross-over" difficulties by supplying British troops for the southern area from the Mediterranean theatre, the Americans again recommended that RANKIN be replanned on the U.S. basis.||

On February 2 the British replied and added new objections to the change which they had not previously presented. Now they spoke about the desirability of British control of German naval bases in the Baltic and their close working relationship with the air forces and navies of Belgium and Norway during the war, and added the usual comments about the difficulties of "cross-over." Pointedly, they noted that the U.S. had failed to advance reasons for the proposed change but had simply demanded it and denied the difficulties of its execution.||

There was now a deadlock. The COSSAC Staff, becoming General Eisenhower's staff when he assumed command of the Allied Expeditionary Force in January, had been directed to make plans for an emergency return to the continent in the case of the complete collapse or sudden surrender of Germany. These tentative plans had been approved "in principle" only by the Combined Chiefs at Quebec in August. The deadlock resulted because, without direction and without approval by the Combined Chiefs, General Morgan proceeded to make specific plans for the occupation by British and U.S. forces on the basis of zones proposed by the British War Cabinet and Foreign Office. When the U.S. Chiefs had been informed what the boundaries of these areas were, they ascertained the views of the President and protested, recommending that the zones be changed. The British Chiefs had refused the change. A series of papers had been exchanged without result. Now, on February 4 the Combined Chiefs agreed that they could not reach a decision, that the matter was beyond their cognizance, and that it would have to be referred to the President and the Prime Minister for decision.**

The President acted at once. On February 7 he sent a dispatch to the Prime Minister outlining the impasse confronting the Combined Chiefs. A decision by them was necessary, he said, before the invasion. He put the problems squarely to the Prime Minister: "I am absolutely unwilling to police France and possibly Italy and the Balkans as well. After all, France is your baby and will take a lot of nursing in order to bring it to the point of walking alone. It would be very difficult for me to keep in France my military force or management for any length of time."††

||C.C.S. 320/9, 25 January 1944. J.C.S. 143rd Meeting, 25 January 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

¶C.C.S. 320/10, 2 February 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

**C.C.S. 144th Meeting, 4 February 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

††Message from the President for the Prime Minister, Number 457, 7 February 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. 1, p. 166.]

The Prime Minister's reply on February 23 echoed the old cries of the British Staff. He complained that the U.S. Chiefs had never given reasons for the reallocation of spheres. He ran through the standard objections: "crossing" of lines of communication, British need to control German naval ports on the Baltic, and the relationship between the RAF and Norwegian and Netherlands air forces. The Prime Minister failed to understand, he said, the President's aversion to police work in France. Communications through France did not in his estimate involve policing and in any case, the French provisional government would be in effective control. The Prime Minister rejected the President's appeal. "All our thoughts and energies must be given to making a success of OVERLORD," he concluded. "I consider that only reasons of over-riding importance could justify such a fundamental change of plan as that proposed."††

The President provided such reasons in a letter to the Prime Minister on February 29. "Do please don't ask me to keep any American forces in France. I just cannot do it! I would have to bring them all back home. As I suggested before, I denounce and protest the paternity of Belgium, France and Italy. You really ought to bring up and discipline your own children. In view of the fact that they may be your bulwark in future days, you should at least pay for their schooling now."§§

To this letter Prime Minister Churchill made no reply.

Time was short before OVERLORD, and inasmuch as planning and preparations continued along the lines of British desire, every delay strengthened the British position and made it more difficult to advance our own views. When no reply had come from the Prime Minister after two months, the President in Georgetown, South Carolina, directed General Marshall, senior member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, to prepare a directive to General Eisenhower. The directive should order Eisenhower to plan to send U.S. troops to the Netherlands and northwest Germany as occupation forces when the armistice should be signed.¶¶ On April 25 General Marshall sent such a directive to the President.¶¶ The President approved it but took no action for one more month. He then reconsidered it and inasmuch as there was still no reply from the Prime Minister to his letter of February 29, and on General Marshall's suggestion, the President sent the proposed directive to Mr. Churchill for his concurrence on May 27.*

††Message for the President from the Prime Minister, Number 589, 23 February 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 180-182.]

§§Letter from the President to the Prime Minister, 29 February 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See *ibid.*, pp. 188-189.]

¶¶ White House Map Room message from Admiral Leahy for General Marshall (BLACK 61), 23 April 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

¶¶ White House Map Room message for Admiral Leahy from General Marshall (WHITE 116), 25 April 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

*Memorandum from the President for Admiral Leahy, 22 May 1944. Message from the President for the Prime Minister, Number 545, 27 May 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, p. 223.]

The directive stated:

"You are hereby directed to make such plans as are practicable to send American troops to the Netherlands and northwest Germany as forces of occupation when hostilities with Germany cease. For planning purposes, the area in Germany to be occupied by U.S. Forces will comprise the states of Schleswig, Hanover, Brunswick, Westphalia, Hesse-Nassau and the Rhine Province.

"It will be assumed in this plan that France, Austria and the Balkans will not be included in an American zone of responsibility and that Berlin will be occupied jointly by the U.S., British and Soviet Forces."

The Prime Minister's reaction was immediate. He said that he had not heard of the matter since he had rejected the President's first approach on February 23 and he had assumed that the subject was settled. This of course was ignoring the President's letter of February 29 which was the strongest statement of the American case. "A change of policy such as you now propose would have grave consequences" was the Prime Minister's manner of disapproving the proposed directive.†

The next round was the President's. By dispatch on June 2 he repeated his letter of February 29 and remarked that he had been awaiting the Prime Minister's reply to it. He had expected, he said, as a result of that letter that at least tentative plans would have been made for the occupation of northwestern Germany by American forces. "In view of my clearly stated inability to police the south and southwestern areas . . . I really think it is necessary that General Eisenhower should [*shall*] even now make such plans as are practical to use American forces of occupation in northwestern Europe during the occupation period. . . . There is ample time for this," the President continued, "unless Germany suddenly collapses. . . . Under my plan all of your needs can and will be taken care of in the northwest area, but I hope you will realize that I am in such a position that I cannot go along with the British General Staff plan. The reasons are political, as you well know, though, as a result, they enter necessarily into the military."‡

The Prime Minister never replied to this dispatch.

The Chiefs of Staff had been unable to solve the problems of post-war occupation because complex political factors beyond their scope confronted them. They had referred the problem to "highest quarters"; here the complexity of political factors was such that the Prime Minister chose to reject the American proposals when first presented to him and to fail to answer them when re-presented. The deadlock

†Message for the President from the Prime Minister, Number 686, 31 May 1944.
[Footnote in the source text. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. 1, p. 224.]

‡Message from the President for the Prime Minister, Number 549, 2 June 1944.
[Footnote in the source text. See *ibid.*, p. 232.]

confronting the Combined Chiefs now extended to the President and Mr. Churchill.

While the President had been pressing the Prime Minister for a decision, preparations for occupation along British lines had been continued by General Eisenhower's staff. And, as the invasion date drew near, the European Advisory Commission in London intensified its work on surrender terms for Germany and control machinery for the post-surrender period.⁵ The Commission was a product of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of October–November 1943.⁶ Members were appointed at the Cairo–Teheran Staff Conferences and their first meeting was held in London in December. On January 15, the British proposals for surrender terms were presented to the Commission for consideration.⁷ The terms were based on the assumption that Germany would be divided into three zones for control purposes. The zones were those proposed by the Foreign Office and War Cabinet and were the same which the British Chiefs had introduced into Combined Chiefs of Staff discussions in November.⁸

British and Soviet foreign secretaries had agreed to this delineation of areas even before the Commission had been organized,⁹ hence the Soviet draft of surrender terms presented on February 16 proposed the same zones.⁸ In addition, the Soviets recommended that Austria and Berlin be occupied jointly by British, American and Red forces.¹⁰ The American representative, Ambassador Winant, lacked specific instructions on the American point of view and was unable to present the American case to the Commission until instructed. Hence on February 19 the Acting Secretary of State wrote to the President asking for information. "We do not know what your thinking on this subject has been," wrote Mr. Stettinius, "and we have been unable to give instructions to Ambassador Winant relative to the American position."¹¹

The President outlined American policy with respect to post-war occupation of Europe very thoroughly in his reply to the Department

⁵ With respect to the work of the European Advisory Commission on questions of terms of surrender, zones of occupation, and control machinery for Germany, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 100 ff.

⁶ See *ibid.*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 751, 756–757.

⁷ See *ibid.*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 112 ff.

⁸ Memorandum for the President from the Acting Secretary of State, 19 February 1944. J.C.S. 577/9, 12 April 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See *ibid.*, pp. 179–180.]

⁹ Message for the Secretary of State from Ambassador Winant, 17 June 1944, quoted in J.C.S. 577/15, 3 July 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See *ibid.*, pp. 436–437.]

¹⁰ See *ibid.*, pp. 173–179.

¹¹ J.C.S. 577/8, 27 February 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

¹² Memorandum for the President from the Acting Secretary of State, 19 February 1944. [Footnote in the source text. The passage in quotation marks is a paraphrase rather than an exact quotation from Stettinius' memorandum. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 179–180.]

of State. At the outset he denounced the British proposal that the United States should occupy southern Germany and France or have any responsibility for Italy and the Balkans. The burden of reconstruction of those areas is "not our natural task at a distance of 3500 miles or more." The President defined the principal object of the United States as "not to take part in internal problems in southern Europe but . . . rather to take part in eliminating Germany as a possible and even probable cause of a third world war." This we could best do from the northwest. British objections to American occupation of this area were dismissed by the President. "Cross-over" of military forces is entirely feasible, the British desire to control naval bases on the Baltic is a question of long-range security, not of first occupation, and there will be, thought the President, ample time to work that out. "Americans by that time will be only too glad to retire all their military forces from Europe." Supply and shipping problems for our war with Japan will provide enough problems at a distance of 3500 sea-miles without our becoming involved in land transport to the center of the continent of Europe. The President nailed down tightly his arguments in conclusion, "If anything further is needed to justify this agreement [*disagreement*] with the British line of demarcation, I can only add that political considerations in the United States make my decision conclusive."††

This statement of American policy was sent to Ambassador Winant on February 25 [26] together with a copy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposals which had been submitted to the British Chiefs at Cairo in December.†† Ambassador Winant replied, in response to these instructions, that he was unable to present the Chiefs of Staff proposals to the European Advisory Commission. It was now out-dated by late developments. The area boundaries defined by the United States would cut the Soviet area into half of that already agreed upon by the British and the Soviets. Such a counter-claim without adequate reasons to substantiate it, and these had not been furnished, would only jeopardize relations with the Soviet Union. Furthermore the Ambassador felt that the Joint Chiefs' proposals were faulty in that the zone lines did not follow German administrative boundaries. Mr. Winant therefore asked for a restatement of the American position which he could present to the Commission and he recommended that we accept the occupation boundaries as agreed upon by the British and the Soviets withholding, of course, approval of the allocation of southern Germany to the United States.§§

††Memorandum from the President for the Acting Secretary of State, 21 February 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, p. 184, fn. 12.]

††J.C.S. 577/8, 27 February 1944. Memorandum for the President from General Marshall for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 April 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See *ibid.*, p. 184.]

§§J.C.S. 577/9, 12 April 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See *ibid.*, p. 209.]

The President approved the Ambassador's recommendation and the Working Security Committee, representing the State, War and Navy Departments, prepared a new statement of policy. Their restatement, in brief, concurred in the British-Soviet boundary lines, re-emphasized the original instructions of February that the north-western area should be American and the southern British, and recommended that Austria be occupied by British forces alone.¶¶

This restatement received the imprimatur of the Joint Chiefs and the President and on May 1 was forwarded by the Secretary of State to Mr. Winant.¶¶ The Ambassador presented the "restatement" to the European Advisory Commission and in short order the Commission agreed upon the area of Russian jurisdiction which Mr. Winant had defined as "the objective of importance." The dividing line between northern and southern German occupation zones was also settled but inasmuch as Mr. Winant stoutly supported the President's views, within and without the Commission, that the British allocation of the two zones should be reversed, deadlock resulted again.* Here as with the Chiefs of Staff and in the discussion between President and the Prime Minister it was still an open question which should be British and which American.

The problem became acute in early August. The Soviet member of the European Advisory Commission declared that unless a decision were reached at once on assignment of occupation zones between England and the United States, the Soviets would refuse to continue discussions on surrender terms and machinery for post-war control. In forwarding this information to the President, who was at sea in the Pacific, on August 2, Mr. Stettinius suggested a compromise to end the long drawn-out controversy. The British should agree to occupy France, Italy and the Balkans should that become necessary; the United States and Great Britain should have joint use or control of northwest German ports thus avoiding any American dependence on French routes; and American forces should occupy southwestern Germany. To encourage acceptance of the compromise, Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the northern area would be more difficult than the southern to control (contrary to estimates of the Joint Chiefs) and that whoever accepted responsibility for it would have to remain "in residence" longer. This State Department compromise of course put American occupation forces in the area against which we had been

¶¶J.C.S. 577/10, 24 April 1944. Memorandum for the President from Admiral Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 April 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

¶¶J.C.S. 577/11, 1 May 1944. White House Map Room message from the President for the Secretary of State (BLACK 85), 30 April 1944. [Footnote in the source text. Cf. *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, p. 211.]

*Message for the Secretary of State from Ambassador Winant, 17 June 1944, quoted in J.C.S. 577/15, 3 July 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See *ibid.*, pp. 436-437.]

protesting for nine months but other provisions were designed to eliminate many of our objections to that area. The Undersecretary of State urged the President to approve because there was danger of a bad situation developing between Great Britain and the United States of which the Russians would be well aware. Secretaries Stimson and Forrestal concurred in this proposal.†

The President replied the next day. "It is essential," he said in rejecting the compromise, "that American troops of occupation will have no responsibility in southern Europe and will be withdrawn from there [Europe] ⁹ at earliest practicable date." He foresaw no difficulty with England in regard to her naval problems in northwest Germany and he re-asserted the need for our use of Hamburg and Bremen in view of 3000 miles of transport. The President awaited, he informed Mr. Stettinius, an agreement from the Prime Minister that we would police only Northwestern Germany and he could see no reason why the Soviets should express concern at this time since their area was agreed upon.‡

The Soviets did not make good their threat to walk out of the European Advisory Commission discussions, but their ultimatum had served to call attention again to the deadlock on the allocation of zones at a time when Allied armies in France were advancing at so fast a pace that optimists were predicting the end of the war in two months.

It was this lightning advance in fact which caused discussion to open upon a "fourth front." The Combined Chiefs of Staff, the President and the Prime Minister, and the European Advisory Commission had been unable to agree; now the Allied Military Commander in the field raised the question. General Eisenhower reported to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on August 17 that he might be faced with the occupation of Germany sooner than had been expected. The only possible planning which he could attempt was on a "purely military basis," the rapid follow-up of his armies by direct pressure on the enemy. His armies, as deployed in France, were placed with the British on the left or northern flank and the Americans on the right or southern flank. Hence Eisenhower found himself, due to the exigencies of war and the absence of basic decision on zones of occupation, making plans for the occupation of southern Germany by his American troops and northwestern Germany by the English.§ Quite naturally this solution pleased the British Chiefs of Staff, since it was in perfect accord with their views, and on August 19 they reported to the U.S. Joint Chiefs

† White House Map Room message for the President from [the] Acting Secretary of State (RED 225), 2 August 1944. [Footnote in the source text. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, p. 263, fn. 8.]

⁹ The word in brackets appears in the source text.

‡ White House Map Room message from the President for the Acting Secretary of State (BLUE 72), 3 August 1944. [Footnote in the source text. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 264.]

§ Message for the Combined Chiefs of Staff from General Eisenhower (SCAF 65), 17 August 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

that they were in complete agreement with General Eisenhower's solution.||

On August 23 General Eisenhower elaborated his estimate of the situation. Surrender terms as proposed by the European Advisory Commission and tentative control machinery were apparently based, reported the General, on the expectation that the German Army at some time would surrender en bloc. That now seemed very improbable and he believed it entirely possible that the German Army as a whole would never actually surrender, that Allied forces might enter the country finding no central German authority in control, "with the situation chaotic, probably guerilla fighting and possibly even civil war in certain districts. In these conditions the occupation of Germany will be a continuation of active operations. There can be no question of establishing central tripartite control . . . until Germany is occupied and order established."¶

That is how the question now stands. On the eve of another conference between the President and the Prime Minister, basic decisions on Allied zones of occupation in Europe still have to be made. The Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander made plans in the Fall of 1943 for an emergency return to Europe by British and U.S. forces should Germany weaken or collapse before the invasion of France was launched. Allocation of territory to be occupied by the two nations was on the basis of recommendations of various British agencies. This allocation was not to the liking of the President nor of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, but all efforts by the Chiefs to change it were fruitless, the President's appeals to the Prime Minister were unanswered, and the European Advisory Commission was deadlocked. COSSAC was superseded by the Supreme Allied Commander in January 1944 but planning along British lines continued as before. As the target date for the invasion drew near, and it was obvious that Germany would not collapse beforehand, the RANKIN plan was transformed from occupation of Europe after an "emergency return" to occupation after defeat in the field but areas to be occupied by Great Britain and the United States remained the same. The American reason for demanding a change in the allocation of occupation zones has remained the same throughout nine months of discussion—the political and military desire to be committed as little as possible in Europe after the defeat of Germany in order that our full attention can be devoted to the war with Japan. How effectively we can realize that desire will be determined by the second Quebec Conference.¹⁰

||C.C.S. 320/23, 19 August 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

¶Message for the Combined Chiefs of Staff from General Eisenhower (SCAF 68), 23 August 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

¹⁰For an appendix to this paper, entitled "Occupation of Austria and the Balkans", see *post*, p. 216.

B. ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM

Hopkins Papers

*Memorandum by the British Treasury Representative (Brand)*¹

[WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1944.

1. What is fundamental to us as regards Stage 2² is that, as stated in REMAC 638,³ the U.S. Administration shall act in such a manner as to recognize the need for a reasonable measure of recovery of U.K. civilian economy and the progressive restoration of U.K. export trade. It should be easy to explain to the American people the justice of such a claim, but it requires explanation first to the authorities at the top, and then to the people, and through the people to Congress. The only men who can put our case broadcast to the American people are (1) the President, or (2) the Prime Minister. Presumably it must be done by the President.

2. Following are a few notes on the British position which indicate to my mind that it would not be difficult to put forward a very compelling case.

3. For the British people the end of the German war must be the end of the war which really matters to them. It will be the end of danger at their doors, the end of bombs on England, the end of blackout. They will still be at war, but they will feel more like what the American people feel now than what they have felt during the last five years.

4. After five years of danger, incessant effort and privation, endless blackout, there must be some let up if the British population is to go on making a great effort; *some* variation in food, *some* more clothes, and boots and shoes, *some* relaxation of effort, *some* more home life for women, *some* more holidays. If the U.K. is to continue to fight the Japanese war, as it must, and to play its heavy part in the occupation of Europe, it cannot abandon everything, as now, to the war effort. It must begin to pay more attention to how to pay its way, how to feed and clothe its people, out of its own resources. It *must* increase its civilian production, it *must* begin to restore its lost export trade.

5. Consider what the alternative would be. The British people, with the Dominions, is the only nation which has been in the front line from the first to the last day of the German war. It has expended itself in the effort, and unlike any other of the United Nations, has burdened

¹ This memorandum was probably given to Hopkins as a follow-up to Churchill's telegram to Hopkins of August 10, 1944, *ante*, p. 16.

² The phrases "stage II" and "phase II" refer to the furnishing of lend-lease aid in the period between the surrender of Germany and the surrender of Japan. For background on Anglo-American discussions on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, pp. 31 ff.; Hancock and Gowing, pp. 515 ff.; Hall, pp. 434-447.

³ Not printed.

itself for a generation or more. Beyond that, and to a greater extent than any other nation, it has endangered for the transition period after the war, its actual means of livelihood. Now unlike any other European nation, except perhaps the Dutch, it must continue to fight the Japanese war, but much more than that it must face the heaviest burden in occupying Europe. It *could* not be that the liberated countries, the neutrals, even Germany and Italy, should all be at peace and all turn to the arts of peace, all restore their civilian life, all restore their export trade, while the British people, having fought from first to last, having conquered their enemies and liberated their friends, staggering under the burden of this great effort, and with the heavy task of occupying Europe and keeping up their production of all munitions, should remain sunk in total war, mobilized almost to the full, daily adding to their foreign debt, their export trade still languishing, nothing but extreme austerity and still greater trials for many years to come before them. Yet that would be almost the case if the theory of the American Military authorities were to rule, and only such war supplies be found under Lend Lease as it was impossible for the U.K. to make itself. Clearly to hold up such a view to the British people at the end of the German war would be to risk a political explosion.

6. That the American people should be asked explicitly to continue Lend Lease in order that the U.K. may be able to divert capacity to civilian production, whether for home consumption or for export, is undoubtedly, as REMAC 638 says, "hard political doctrine for the President to put over". It can to my mind only be put over by some very broad statement by the President of the true position, but this never will and never can be done unless the President is fully seized of the true picture.

Hopkins Papers

Memorandum by the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1944—5 p. m.

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT

Subject: British Munitions Requirements After the Collapse of Germany

I told the President that either at our request or on British initiative the British had submitted a list of military requirements¹ for a period of one year after the collapse of Germany; that these requirements were obviously made by the British with full consideration of

¹ Not printed.

their internal economy and particularly their export trade. In effect the British are asking us to produce munitions for them at a very high rate while they would turn many of their factories over to consumer production—much of it for export.

I told the President that the merits of the British position were being discussed on a low level within our army and navy and that it did not seem to me that this was the proper place to discuss this and, under any circumstances, the British contribution to the final defeat of Japan had not been determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, therefore, I could not see how it is possible to even discuss requirements at this time.

I told the President that I thought, in effect, the British Government should withdraw their requirements; that we, on our part, should not reduce the production facilities now available to the British; that he and Churchill discuss this matter at Quebec and that a final decision be postponed until the extent of British participation in the war against Japan was determined upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The President agreed with this.

I told him I was going to tell the British in the morning.²

The President commented further that, in his opinion, it would be very unwise to make formal commitments tying up our industrial machinery, because he felt it quite possible that, with the defeat of Germany, Japan might well cave in. The primary reason would be that Russia might well tell the Japanese that Russia's hands are now free; that Russia will not tolerate Japanese forces in Manchuria, China or Korea; that, in effect, will be an ultimatum to Japan to withdraw from these countries. The implications of that ultimatum will be such that the President believes that Japan may throw up the sponge immediately. If this should occur, then the whole requirements picture would be immediately changed. All of this is an added reason for not settling the problem of British requirements at the moment.

Since talking to the President I have an agreement on this policy with Secy. Morgenthau, Admiral Leahy, Leo Crowley, Dean Acheson, and General Clay who is going to communicate it to Admiral Reeves.

I have arranged an appointment with Ambassador Halifax at the British Embassy tomorrow morning to acquaint him of the decision of our government.³

H[ARRY] L. H[OPKINS]

² See Hopkins' telegram to Churchill of August 19, 1944, *ante*, p. 17.

³ No record of Hopkins' conversation with Halifax has been found.

FW 550 AD 2/8-2444

*The Secretary of Agriculture (Wickard) to the President*¹

WASHINGTON, August 23, 1944.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Your remarks at the Cabinet meeting on Friday, August 18, in regard to our relations with the British Government were of special interest to me. While I realize that these matters are being carefully considered in the State Department and in inter-departmental circles, their special significance for agriculture leads me to submit certain points for your consideration and for possible background in connection with your forthcoming meeting with Prime Minister Churchill.

After the war the United States and a good many other countries will have substantial surpluses of agricultural products for export. Even if it were to prove possible to maintain a high level of employment and purchasing power in the United States and abroad, the world agricultural surplus disposal problem would still be substantial. To protect their farmers against this situation, countries throughout the world are setting up national programs involving price supports and governmental control of foreign trade. It is important, it seems to me, to minimize or forestall clashes between these national programs.

At recent international conferences, it has been agreed that the problem of agricultural surpluses is international in scope and should be approached through multilateral rather than unilateral action. This means the negotiation of international arrangements with respect to individual commodities, in which all producing and consuming countries, large and small, having a substantial interest in the commodity would have an opportunity to participate. Such arrangements could make possible an orderly expansion in world trade and consumption. This approach was specifically endorsed by the Hot Springs Conference.² Moreover, in its First Report to the Governments of the United Nations, released to the press yesterday,³ the Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture recommended that a special conference be held to set up an international commodity organization.

Under these circumstances we in this Department are much concerned as to the implications of the present British policy of negotiating bilateral purchase contracts which discriminate against United States agriculture in the postwar British market. The British Ministry of Food has contracted with the governments of Canada and New

¹ Roosevelt forwarded this letter to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) on August 24, 1944, with the request that the Department of State draft a reply. See Hull's memorandum to Roosevelt of September 2, 1944, *post*, p. 168.

² I.e., the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, held at Hot Springs, Virginia, May 18-June 3, 1943. For documents concerning this conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 820 ff.

³ For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XI, August 27, 1944, pp. 207-208.

Zealand to buy their surplus meat and dairy products for four years ending in 1948 and have given price guarantees for 1945 and 1946. Negotiations with Australia are under way and I understand that an inquiry has been made by the British Ministry of Food as to the attitude of this Government toward their making a similar commitment to buy Argentine beef.⁴ It seems to me that these contracts, especially if they represent settled policy rather than mere temporary measures, run counter to Section 7 of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement⁵ and Paragraph 4 of the Atlantic Charter.⁶

It would, therefore, be helpful if the views of the Prime Minister were ascertained on the following points:

1. Does the British Government consider the present bilateral purchasing arrangements and those under negotiation as no more than stop-gap measures to be replaced in due course by multilateral arrangements?

2. Is the British Government now ready for the early convening of an international conference to formulate principles for international commodity arrangements and to establish an international commodity organization?

Respectfully,

CLAUDE R. WICKARD
Secretary

⁴ Churchill had sent to Roosevelt on July 14, 1944, a minute by the British Minister of Food (Llewellyn) concerning British purchases of Argentine beef. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. VII, p. 333.

⁵ Signed at Washington, February 23, 1942. For text, see Department of State, Executive Agreement Series No. 241; 56 Stat. (2) 1433.

⁶ Released August 14, 1941. For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367; Department of State, Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1603.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

[ROME,] 23 August 1944.

766. As you see our point about getting a new meat contract with Argentina,² for which I am thankful, we are moving ahead with these difficult negotiations and I hope that they won't be upset. To present the Colonels with anything they can construe as a triumph of diplomacy is neither desired nor intended by us.

In my speech on August 2nd I made reference to Argentina,³ which I hope you liked. From all accounts the Argentines did not. I hope

¹ Channel of transmission not indicated, but presumably sent via London through military channels. The White House Map Room sent a copy of this message to Hull for his information on August 23, 1944.

² Roosevelt had told Churchill on July 22, 1944, that the United States would do nothing to prevent the British from getting a new contract for Argentine meat. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. VII, p. 333.

³ For the text of Churchill's statement concerning Argentina in the House of Commons, August 2, 1944, see *ibid.*, pp. 337-338.

we can agree on tactics, since we seem to be in accord on objectives. Until we discuss with you what we think the situation requires, we will neither recognize the Argentine Government nor permit our Ambassador⁴ to return. Our views have been passed to our Embassy, which has given them to your State Department.⁵ An opportunity for both of us to examine a common policy and the Argentines a chance to mend their ways, which under the glare of public indictment they can never do, seems to be in order. For that reason, now that we have said in public just what we think of the present Argentina Government, I do most earnestly hope that you will ignore the Colonels for a good many weeks.

⁴ Sir David Kelly.

⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. VII, pp. 338-340.

841.244/8-2544 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, August 25, 1944.

US URGENT

6927. In following up my 6510 of August 14¹ I am cabling you below the text of a letter dated August 25 which I have received from Mr. Eden regarding the meat negotiations and the freezing of Argentine funds:

"Thank you for your letter of the 14th August² containing the State Department's suggestions as to the handling of our meat negotiations with Argentina, the freezing of Argentine funds in the United States and the discontinuance by our two Governments of all non-essential purchases of Argentine products.

I had already heard from Law about his conversation with Stettinius.³ We are fully alive to the desirability of not allowing the Argentines to derive any unnecessary comfort from the renewal of our meat contract, and we are consulting the Ministry of Food as to what we can do to meet this point. I hope to be able to let you have our reply in a few days.

On the question of the freezing of Argentine funds contemplated by your Government, I note that action has now been taken by the United States Treasury that has the effect of placing Argentina in the same class as other neutrals whose funds have been frozen. As the State Department appreciate, His Majesty's Government themselves apply similar restrictions to Argentina as a neutral.

We could clearly not wish to discourage your Government from discontinuing any inessential purchases from Argentina at the present juncture. We should, however, hope that, if it is decided to take such

¹ Not printed (835.01/8-1444).

² Not printed.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. VII, pp. 342-343.

action, it will be taken in the spirit of the quiet period which we have advocated.

I shall be very surprised if it is found that we ourselves are making any purchases in Argentina which are not essential for the prosecution of the war or the maintenance of the essential economy of this country. I am, however, consulting the Ministry of Supply on this point and will let you have a reply in a few days."

WINANT

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 26 August 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 607, secret and personal, from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Your 766.² We are watching with sympathetic interest your efforts to get Argentina in line with our appetites, and we hope your efforts will be crowned with success. I have no doubt that a satisfactory meat contract will be arranged. After all they must sell their beef and no other diner is in sight.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels. The White House Map Room sent a paraphrase of this message to Hull for his information on August 28, 1944 (841.244/8-2844).

² *Ante*, p. 163.

835.01/8-444

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax)

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1944.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Sir Ronald Campbell's note No. 487 of August 4, 1944¹ transmitting the views of your Government with respect to Argentina.²

10. Consistently with the desire of the Government of the United States to consult fully with the British Government prior to taking new action with relation to Argentina, this Government has resorted to various channels to bring its views with regard to a possible next step fully to the attention of the British Government.

On August 9 the Acting Secretary of State met with Sir [Mr.] Richard Law, Sir Ronald Campbell, and Mr. Robert Henry Hadow,

¹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. VII, p. 338.

² Paragraphs 6-8 of this note, omitted here, are printed *ibid.*, pp. 345-347.

and stated that while the Government of the United States fully appreciates the British desire to obtain adequate meat supplies, it trusts that the negotiations with Argentina can be so handled as to reinforce our common political position. The Acting Secretary urged that the negotiations be prolonged and that any contract which may eventually be concluded be for a short term. Mr. Stettinius also emphasized the hope of this Government that the meat purchase may be treated as an isolated commercial transaction dictated by special war needs and, therefore, entirely separate from fundamental political and economic policies. In the same meeting, Mr. Stettinius informed the representatives of the British Government that we are considering a cut in our purchases from Argentina by from 40% to 60% and that serious consideration is being given to the freezing of Argentine funds.

On August 2 and again on August 11, Ambassador Winant was instructed to inform the Foreign Secretary of our views both with respect to the meat contract and with respect to possible reduction of purchases and freezing of Argentine funds.

In connection with the proposed reduction of purchases, Ambassador Winant was instructed to express our hope that the British Government may be prepared to take parallel action, thus eliminating all purchases of Argentine products not essential for the satisfaction of immediate needs.

Ambassador Winant has now informed the Department of State that he has received a letter from Mr. Eden dated August 25,³ in which the Foreign Secretary states that the British Government is fully alive to the issue raised by our messages relative to the meat contract. In his letter, Mr. Eden also recognizes the reasons why we propose to discontinue non-essential purchases at the present time and states that he is consulting the Ministry of Supply with respect to possible reduction of British purchases. With respect to the matter of freezing Argentine funds, the Foreign Secretary assumes that the action of our Treasury Department in recently prohibiting the export of two shipments of Argentine gold is tantamount to the freezing of funds and adds that the British Government has already applied "similar restrictions to Argentina as a neutral".

It has been the opinion of this Government that these economic steps constitute a necessary implementation of the nonrecognition policy. In view of Mr. Eden's recognition of the reasons which have induced that opinion, we are considering taking the indicated action at an early date. However, having in mind the thought expressed by Mr. Eden, we hope so far as possible to avoid undue publicity.

Accept [etc.]

CORDELL HULL

³ See *ante*, p. 164.

841.244/8-3044

The Secretary of State to the President

[WASHINGTON,] August 30, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Argentina

I attach hereto a draft of telegram which I would suggest that you send to the Prime Minister, if you agree.¹

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

¹ Roosevelt sent the suggested message to Churchill on August 31, 1944. See *infra*.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 31 August 1944.

Number 613, personal and top secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.

In connection with the Argentine meat negotiations you have no doubt seen the message to Buenos Aires from the Argentine Ambassador in London² in which the Ambassador warned his government that its difficulties were "no longer centered on suspension of relations with the United States" and that Argentina was being placed "in a position of isolation vis-à-vis the Allied and friendly nations." He added that according to a "big meat packer the Allied Nations are now in a position to do without Argentine meat for six months with no trouble at all and for twelve months with some sacrifice." The Ambassador also said that his information tallies with that from the Argentine Commercial Counsellor in Washington³ and with the view expressed for some time past by the Ambassador himself that the United Nations may make fewer purchases from Argentina.

Since we know that the Colonels are falling all over themselves to get you to buy their meat, I am confident that you will agree that the Ambassador's message was an extremely bad piece of news for them.

All the evidence that has come to my attention reinforces our belief that you are in an excellent position to use the negotiations to support the whole Allied stand in this Hemisphere against this broad Fascist movement. You will certainly have no trouble on the beef and mutton matter in any event.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² Miguel Angel Cárcano.

³ Miguel E. Quirino-Lavalle.

550 AD 2/8-2444

The Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, September 2, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I attach hereto a letter¹ which you may wish to send to the Secretary of Agriculture in answer to his letter to you of August 23² regarding the recommendation of the Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture on an international commodity organization, the general problem of agricultural surpluses and bilateral purchase contracts.

As you know, about a year ago we held, in cooperation with the interested agencies of the government, including the Department of Agriculture, informal conversations with both the British and the Canadians on the implementation of Article VII of the Mutual-Aid Agreements.³ These discussions covered commercial policy, commodity policy, cartel policy and state trading. The specific points raised in Mr. Wickard's letter were covered in a preliminary way in these discussions.

It was our understanding when the talks terminated last year that conversations would be resumed at an early convenient date. Our latest on this is a telegram from Ambassador Winant dated August 11,¹ stating that Mr. Ronald of the Foreign Office gave the impression that a date for resumption of conversations might be arranged in the autumn to suit our convenience.

Interdepartmental committees including representatives of the Department of Agriculture have been active on this group of problems. Reports of these committees come to me through the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy. In the near future I shall place before you definite recommendations on these matters. Taking everything into consideration, we believe that the conversations should be resumed before the end of October, preferably about the middle of the month. Rather than talking with the Prime Minister on the specific questions suggested by Mr. Wickard, we believe that it would be most desirable if you could gain the wholehearted support of Mr. Churchill for the resumption of conversations about the middle of October on the whole range of subjects covered in a preliminary way last year. In these second conversations with the British the objective would be to obtain agreement not only on principles, but also on the text of a draft multilateral convention to serve as the basis for similar conversations with representatives of other governments, looking toward a conference of the United and Associated Nations.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

¹ Not printed.² *Ante*, p. 162.³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 766-767.

Hopkins Papers

*Memorandum Prepared in the British Treasury*¹

TOP SECRET

[LONDON, September 4, 1944.]

LEND-LEASE SUPPLIES FOR BRITAIN IN STAGE II

1. The President, in transmitting to Congress the Sixteenth Quarterly Report on Lend-Lease Operations, has recommended that "until the unconditional surrender of both Japan and Germany, (the United States) should continue the Lend-Lease programme on whatever scale is necessary to make the combined striking power of all the United Nations against our enemies as overwhelming and as effective as we can make it".² There are several problems concerned with the application of this policy which require decision at the forthcoming Conference.

2. The object of Lend-Lease assistance hitherto has been to satisfy our justifiable requirements in excess of those which we can furnish ourselves in conditions of *full* mobilisation of manpower for war purposes. In other words, Lend-Lease has been treated hitherto as *residual*. If it is accepted that during Stage II the continuance of Lend-Lease assistance should be compatible with some appropriate degree of war demobilisation in the United Kingdom below the 1944 level, the above criterion of Lend-Lease availability will no longer be applicable. The appropriate criterion henceforward must necessarily be one of what absolute amount of assistance is appropriate to the changed conditions. The President will be asked to recognise this new situation by agreeing to the preparation of a firm agreement specifying the amount and character of the assistance on which we can rely.

3. Until strategical plans are completed, Britain's requirements for munitions in Stage II cannot be stated with precision. Our production plans are for the moment based on the estimate that the strategy will require the provision for the Forces under British supply responsibilities of something over 60 per cent of the present volume of munitions over the first year, as a whole, falling to something over 50 per cent by the end of the year.

¹ In the Hopkins Papers this memorandum, which bears the typed notation "Note for President of U.S.A.", is filed with the following typed note dated September 10, 1944: "This was handed to me today by Sir Ronald Campbell and indicates what Churchill is going to say, at Quebec, to the President about Lend Lease. H[ARRY] L. H[OPKINS]." Cherwell gave another copy of this memorandum to Morgenthau at Quebec, as indicated by the following memorandum from Morgenthau to Roosevelt dated September 25, 1944: "While at Quebec, Lord Cherwell handed me the enclosed memorandum from the British Treasury. I only noted the other day that it was addressed to you, so I am sending it to you for your records." (S41.24/9-2944)

² For the text of Roosevelt's letter of transmittal, dated August 23, 1944, see Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XI, August 27, 1944, p. 205.

4. The munitions supplies of the British Empire have been drawn during the German war from a number of sources. A little under 60 per cent has come from Britain; about 27 per cent has come from the U.S.A.; about 10 per cent has come from Canada; the remainder has been drawn from other countries in the British Empire. If the total of British munitions requirements had to be provided from British Empire sources, there could be little if any reduction from the present output of munitions in the United Kingdom, even if production could be switched to other types of munitions in time to make them effective.

5. At the end of five years of war, some relaxation in the pressure on British civilian standards of life is necessary. It is necessary also to begin to rebuild the damaged cities, to devote more work to the overdue repairs to industry and public utilities, and to make first steps towards restoring our export trade; without exports Britain can neither meet her immediate obligations nor assure her purchases of necessary imports. These needs cannot be further deferred.

6. In working out the assistance to be afforded, a simple principle, which in practice would probably yield the minimum required—and might at the same time be regarded as rough justice—would be that the proportion of our total munitions supplies furnished on Lend-Lease should be the same in Stage II as it has been in 1944. If, for example, our munition needs from all sources are reduced by, say, one third, the amount of munitions furnished on Lend-Lease should also be reduced in the same proportion of one third.

7. The President will be asked for a firm commitment that we shall be given munitions on Lend-Lease terms on some such scale; this would either fix the total volume of munitions assistance in Stage II or would endorse the principle outlined above. It would then be possible for our respective officers to work out the detailed programme of supply correspondingly.

8. The amount of non-munitions assistance covering food, shipping, oil, raw materials, etc., which we shall continue to require would not depend to any great extent on the degree of our domestic reconversion, since only a small part of such assistance has been concerned with goods which we are in a position to produce. Some reduction is, however, possible in so far as such supplies have been for the purposes, not of civilian consumption, but of armed forces. For this reason the aggregate requirements of the United Kingdom are put at about \$3 billions during the first year of Stage II compared with \$3.9 billions in the programme for the current year.

9. To sum up, Britain's needs can only be met by a continuance of Lend-Lease through Stage II. The result of our examination is to show that we shall need :—

(a) Lend-Lease for munitions on a scale to be defined at the Conference.

(b) Lend-Lease for foodstuffs, raw materials, oil, shipping, etc., sufficient to meet the reasonable needs in these respects of the United Kingdom for supplies from U.S. sources.

10. In order to give effect to those decisions it is suggested that the President and the Prime Minister should appoint a Committee with power to appoint technical Sub-Committees which would of course report to the main Committee. One Sub-Committee would, as a matter of urgency, consider the proposals of the British Government's representatives for the munitions asked for under Lend-Lease, with the aim of reaching agreement as to:—

(a) the amount involved by the application of the principle of proportionate aid (unless this has been determined at the Conference itself).

(b) the most appropriate sub-division of that amount between the various broad classes of equipment for each of the Services.

(c) the arrangement for settling the details of the munitions programme as quickly as possible within that broad pattern.

11. The instructions to the main Committee should, of course, cover the whole ground of Lend-Lease Munitions and Non-Munitions, Reverse Lend-Lease and Export Policies and might be somewhat as follows:—

(a) So far as munitions are concerned, it would be the duty of the Committee to approve a report of the Sub-Committee mentioned above embodying a programme capable of fulfilling the agreed conditions in the manner most convenient and efficient from the point of view of the Government.

(b) So far as non-munitions are concerned, the Committee, through such Sub-Committees as might be found convenient, would examine the British position with a view to determining the appropriate scale of assistance and should in this connection consider the advisability of possible modification in the fields to be covered by Lend-Lease and Reverse Lend-Lease respectively with a view to simplification and concentration.

(c) So far as exports are concerned, it should be an instruction to the Committee to propose the principles which should govern henceforth the relationship between Lend-Lease and Reverse Lend-Lease assistance and the export policies of the two countries, with a view to minimising the measures of restriction and regulation; and in arranging in detail the character of the aid to be furnished under the above Lend-Lease programme they should bear in mind the object of facilitating and simplifying the application of the principles, which they are proposing, in a manner likely to interfere with the respective export programmes of the two Governments to the least possible extent.

(d) Thus, generally the Committee and its Sub-Committees would be charged with the task of drawing up and agreeing [upon] pro-

grammes which would implement the decisions reached by the Conference. It would not be competent for them to reopen these decisions.

12. Since it is unlikely that the Committee could complete its deliberations, except on munitions, before, say, November, it is essential that a Directive should be given meanwhile which would prevent any steps being taken during the intervening weeks likely to be prejudicial to the carrying out, should they be approved, of any proposals which are brought before the Committee.

4th SEPTEMBER, 1944.

841.244/8-3044

The Secretary of State to the President

[WASHINGTON,] September 5, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

[Subject:] British Beef Purchases

We have been informed by Marvin Jones that we will soon have substantial supplies of so-called commercial and utility grades of beef which can be made available to the British. I therefore suggest that when you see the Prime Minister you discuss the possibility of British reduction of purchases from Argentina in the amount that we may be able to allocate from our supplies. It is believed that with supplies that we can make available, a considerable reduction of British meat purchases from Argentina may be entirely feasible.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

Roosevelt Papers

*Department of State Briefing Paper*¹

SECRET

[Undated.]

CREDITS FOR GREAT BRITAIN : COMMERCIAL POLICY

There are growing indications that the British Government contemplates approaching us concerning the seriousness of their financial situation. At one time they contemplated sending Sir John Anderson, Chancellor of the Exchequer, to Washington for this purpose. It is understood, however, that they have decided to defer Anderson's visit for several months. The Prime Minister may possibly raise this question with you at your forthcoming meeting.

¹ Annex 10 to Hull's memorandum to Roosevelt dated September 6, 1944, which was sent to the White House under cover of a further memorandum of September 8. See *ante*, p. 120.

It seems to me that it is in the interests of the people of the United States that we extend such credits and other financial assistance to the United Kingdom as may be necessary to reconstitute and restore what has traditionally been the largest market for American goods.

At the same time it is of fundamental importance to the interests of the United States and to the establishment of the kind of economic conditions which we hope to see prevail in the post-war world that we not blindly grant credits to the United Kingdom without taking into consideration the kind of commercial policy and trade practices which it may adopt.

The British may seek to take the position that unless wholly satisfactory financial arrangements are made for assisting them in meeting their admittedly serious balance-of-payments problems, they cannot pursue the liberal, multilateral trade policies we have advocated. That position would not be sound and we should not accept it.

Our position should be that whatever the British balance-of-payments problems may be and to whatever extent they may receive our help in meeting them, those problems will in our view be less difficult in a world in which the United States and Britain take the leadership in bringing about the greatest possible expansion of international trade on a multilateral nondiscriminatory basis; that balance-of-payments problems will be more difficult to meet if bilateralistic practices on the German pattern, high tariffs, quotas and discriminations result in a scramble among nations for a diminishing volume of world trade.

In brief, in dealing with the British in regard to financial and other economic problems, I believe our basic position should be that the trade policies we advocate are not something the British should do for us in return for our financial help, but that, irrespective of such help, liberal trade policies designed to bring about an expanding world trade are in Britain's own interest.

Obviously, therefore, we should not offer to extend generous credits to Great Britain at a low rate of interest in return for commitments regarding commercial policy and imperial preference (which we already have, in preliminary form, in the Basic Lend-Lease Agreement). The field for bargaining about these matters should be the narrow one of respective tariff concessions. It seems to me, however, that we may properly bear in mind that the United Kingdom will not be a good credit risk unless she embarks on a sound commercial policy.

The discussion of trade policies which may take place with the British in the near future will be more fruitful from our standpoint, if there can be complete understanding on the above point before those discussions are undertaken.

Hopkins Papers

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 7, 1944.

MEMORANDUM RELATIVE TO "POLICY CONCERNING DISPOSITION OF
LEND-LEASE MATERIAL FOLLOWING THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY"

References:¹ a. J.C.S. 771/3; 771/4
b. J.C.S. 162nd Meeting, Item 3
c. J.C.S. 165th Meeting, Item 5

I think that this document² should not be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the following reasons:

1. In Paragraph 3, Page 18, the report states—"Following the defeat of Germany, Lend-Lease nations outside the Western Hemisphere should be notified of and should accept their obligation to return to the continental United States or to the control of the United States Government, as may be determined by and in the priorities to be established by the United States, etc."

This action is contrary to a formal agreement between the allied nations, including Great Britain and Russia. Article 5 of the first Master Agreement between Great Britain and ourselves³ provides that "The Government of the United Kingdom will return to the United States of America at the end of the present emergency, as determined by the President, such defense articles, etc." Similar provisions are contained in all other Master Agreements. There is no language in these agreements that implies, directly or indirectly, that this action will be taken until the defeat of all our enemies.

2. The J.C.S. 771/6, in Paragraph 3, further states—"such munitions transferred under Lend-Lease as shall not have been destroyed, lost or consumed and as, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

¹ None printed. The references are those cited in J.C.S. 771/6 (not printed), of which Hopkins had a copy. J.C.S. 771/3 was the source of a memorandum containing the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on "Policy Concerning Assignments of Lend-Lease Munitions Following the Defeat of Germany", which the President had approved on May 10, 1944. J.C.S. 771/6 proposed a further memorandum to the President seeking approval of a more detailed elaboration of the policy. Following receipt of Hopkins' memorandum of September 7, and more particularly following receipt by Marshall and King of Roosevelt's letter of September 9 (*post*, p. 180), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, meeting at Quebec on September 12, suspended action on J.C.S. 771/6 and

"a. Took note of the President's wish that no policy for lend-lease be established for the future until further instructions from him.

"b. Instructed the Secretaries to inform all agencies to whom J.C.S. 771/3 had been forwarded that the paper had been withdrawn." (J.C.S. Files)

² i.e., J.C.S. 771/6.

³ Signed at Washington, February 23, 1942. For text, see Department of State, Executive Agreement Series No. 241; 56 Stat. (2) 1433.

are not required by such nations for their use against Japan in accordance with our agreed strategy or for other purposes within their cognizance as may be specified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

This, I believe, is contrary to an agreement between the American and the British Governments and, if not a formal agreement between the two governments, at least an agreement between the President and the Prime Minister. This agreement provides that the entire munition resources of Great Britain and the United States will be deemed to be in a common pool and that a Combined Board will advise on all assignments, both in quantity and priority, whether to Great Britain and the United States or other of the United Nations.

3. It seems to me that apart from the above reasons, at this particular stage of the war, such a unilateral action on our part is fraught with probabilities of unnecessary friction which should be, at the least, delayed until after the collapse of Germany. At that time the American policy in relation to this matter should be discussed fully with our allies.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

841.244/9-844 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, September 8, 1944.

US URGENT

7352. I am cabling you below the text of a letter dated September 7 which I have just received from Mr. Eden in relation to the renewal of the British meat contract with Argentina :

"In my letter to you of the 25th August,¹ I explained that I was consulting the Ministry of Food about the renewal of our meat contract with Argentina in the light of certain observations of the State Department which you were kind enough to send me on the 14th August.² I am now in a position to give you our answer on the general question of the particular points to which the United States Government attach importance.

The State Department suggest that, by prolonging the negotiations and taking a firm stand on price and other terms of the contract, these negotiations could be utilized to strengthen our common political stand. We have always been, as you know, most anxious to maintain a close parallel policy with the United States Government towards Argentina, and in the present instance, you may certainly rely on us to do everything we can to avoid allowing the Argentines to derive any political comfort or encouragement from the renewal of the contract. It is indeed inherently a commercial question and we anticipate

¹ See *ante*, p. 164.

² Not printed.

a period of hard commercial bargaining before the negotiations reach their eventual conclusion. In the nature of things, we have no interest in giving the Argentines any particular reason to suppose that a successful outcome is assured in advance or in agreeing to terms which they could interpret as reflecting any condonation of their political shortcomings.

Mr. Stettinius, in his recent conversation with the Minister of State,³ expressed the hope that the contract would cover only a short term.⁴ The question of the duration of the contract is, of course, a relative one, but we have to look to the needs of ourselves and our Allies during the critical post-war period as well as for the period of actual hostilities. We have no desire to conclude a contract running for a longer period than is strictly necessary. If nothing else, our own interests would dictate that the duration of the contract should be as short as possible since our meat purchases constitute one of the few weapons which we have left to protect our large interests in Argentina, which are threatened as never before by the present virulently nationalistic regime. This weapon would, for instance, normally be extremely useful in, say, a couple of years' time, when the imminent termination of the Mitre Law⁵ (in 1947) governing our railway concessions will leave these particularly vulnerable. But our paramount duty both to our own people and to certain of our Allies is to ensure that, during the acutely difficult post-war years, they shall be adequately fed; and the case made out by our Ministry of Food that only a longer contract will ensure this as regards meat is entirely convincing. I need not, I think, go into all the technical details including the reasons why it is so important that the Combined Food Board should be able to count not merely on obtaining Argentine meat at a reasonable commercial price, but on continuing to command the total exportable surplus. The British Food Mission in Washington are, of course, in possession of all the technical details involved and if it would interest the State Department to have a complete summary of the technical aspects of this complex question, we shall be ready to arrange for this to be given to them. Meanwhile, I trust that we can continue to enjoy the confidence of the United States Government while we play our difficult hand in this important matter which we shall hope to do without giving the Argentines any avoidable political advantages. We shall do our best to keep the Argentines guessing about all the aspects of this negotiation as far as is consistent with eventually bringing it to a successful conclusion and to see to it that the present regime derives no strength or authority from this commercial transaction in their own or anybody else's eyes. In this we should, of course, be helped by the absence of embarrassing press speculation, whether emanating from Washington or London."

³ Richard Law.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. VII, p. 342.

⁵ The reference is to article 8 of Argentine Law No. 5315 of October 1, 1907. The provisions of this article, which dealt with duty-free importation of materials used in railroad development in Argentina, were to expire in 1947. For text of the law, see *Registro nacional*, vol. IV, 1907, p. 441. For an English translation, see *General Railway Law and Regulations*, translated by the Buenos Aires Great Southern and Buenos Aires Western Railways (Buenos Aires: The English Printery, 1940), p. 191.

In connection with the foregoing, please see my 6927 of August 25⁶ and Department's 6091 of August 2⁷ and 6339 of August 11.⁸

WINANT

⁶ *Ante*, p. 164.

⁷ See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. VII, p. 337.

⁸ See *ibid.*, p. 342.

Roosevelt Papers

The Secretary of State to the President

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1944.

LEND-LEASE AND GENERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM IN "PHASE 2"

1. The most important international economic problem of the transition and post-war periods will be the situation of the United Kingdom: the sterling-dollar relationship, the change in Britain's creditor position, the prospects for British export trade, and the commercial and financial policies which she will adopt in the light of the situation. This problem has its long run aspect—associated with the loss of overseas investment; the probable reduction in shipping, international banking, and insurance earnings; and the difficulty of reestablishing and expanding British export markets in the post-war world. The main outlines of this problem have been developing for several decades, although war has accentuated the difficulties. It is the Department's view that it is in the best interests both directly of the British and of the world in general if this long run problem is attacked by the adoption by the British of a liberal commercial policy with foreign exchange and investment operations handled in accordance with the principles of Bretton Woods.¹

2. Nevertheless, strong economic and political pressures will be brought to bear upon the British Government to adopt restrictive policies of commerce and finance, and these pressures will be in considerable measure induced by pressing, critical, short run problems of British economic adjustment at the close of the war. The United States can contribute greatly to the possibility of Anglo-American collaboration in sound post-war economic policies and relationships and to the attainment of high levels of economic activity and international commerce in and between the two nations and the rest of the world, by doing everything in its power to permit and assist Britain to enter "Phase 3"² on as sound an economic foundation as possible.

¹ See *Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948; Department of State publication 2866, 2 vols.); *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. II, pp. 106 ff.

² i.e., the period following the surrender of Japan.

3. The potentialities of Anglo-American and general international economic collaboration in the reconstruction and development of the world economy in "Phase 3" are large. They include the establishment of the Fund and Bank blueprinted at Bretton Woods,³ and the setting up of machinery for collaboration in the commercial policy field. Direct assistance, largely of a financial character, will in all probability be essentially on a loan and repayment basis. The institutions for carrying out these programs have yet in the main to be created.

4. In "Phase 2" there is more which we can do quickly and directly to set the stage for a favorable but slower development in the post-war period.

5. Turning first to the military situation, I must of course defer to the armed forces in matters of strategic policy and decision. Nevertheless it is clear that one of the most important objectives of United States policy must be to bring the British into the war operations in the Far East to the greatest possible extent. The advantages of such a course are obvious in producing an early end of the war, with the resultant saving in human and material costs. The disadvantages of the failure of the British to participate to the full in the war in the Far East deserve special emphasis:

a. Political—any indication that British participation in the Far Eastern struggle is at a rate below their utmost capabilities will produce immediate and hostile public reaction in the United States.

b. Economic—a great expansion of British exports with relatively weak British participation in the Far Eastern war will stir up the resentment of our export manufacturers and traders.

c. Lend-Lease—a failure to obtain full British participation in the Far Eastern military operations will be regarded as at least a partial failure of lend-lease policies and will create unfortunate circumstances in which to arrange for lend-lease settlement.

d. General Post-War—all of these factors will combine to produce the most difficult of circumstances in which to attempt to build Anglo-American and general political and economic collaboration to face the problems of the post-war world.

6. The economic problem then in "Phase 2" will be to permit a reasonable degree of reconversion in the United Kingdom, to be divided among reconstruction, the satisfaction of domestic needs, and the reestablishment of exports to pay for the imports which are essential to the economic life of Great Britain. This must be done in such a way as to:

a. Meet the immediate British problem of avoiding economic disaster.

³ The reference is to the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

b. Avoid the creation of obligations that will later plague Anglo-American relations.

c. Reduce to a minimum tendencies towards the adoption of discriminatory trade policies by the British.

d. Be politically acceptable to the American public.

7. It has been indicated that in "Phase 2" American production for war may be reduced by as much as 40 percent with a resultant reconversion to meet domestic civilian demands as well as to permit some increase in commercial exports. It is essential that there be a synchronized British reconversion program. The strain of five years of war, with bombing, severe rationing, and the dislocation of life produced by national service, will require, from the point of view of any government in the United Kingdom, substantial improvement in the conditions of civilian life. The necessities of British physical reconstruction and balances of payments will almost certainly mean that British civilian standards will remain far below those in the United States. This should be recognized here as a laudable determination of the British to restrict consumption in accordance with the realities of their economic position.

8. If British reconversion is coordinated with our own, it will be right and proper, and it should be possible to justify to the Congress and the American people, to continue lend-lease aid on a reasonable scale to the British during the continuance of the Pacific war. It is my understanding that the British as yet have made no definite proposals for their overall lend-lease needs in "Phase 2", as they feel that the nature of these proposals must depend to a large degree on the strategic plans for the Far Eastern war. In view of the speed of military developments in Europe it is most important that we come to an early understanding with the British on this matter, so that a program of lend-lease can be worked out that will be fair to all concerned.

9. I therefore recommend the adoption of the following key economic policies with respect to the British in "Phase 2":

a. Synchronization of the American and British reconversion programs, recognizing that a greater proportion of the British productive capacity released from war production will be devoted to exports.

b. Maintenance of lend-lease deliveries to the United Kingdom in "Phase 2" reduced by about one-third overall. Lend-lease deliveries upon such a scale would recognize the continued British production for war, would not hamper reconversion in this country, and through the continuance of civilian items such as food (many items of which are likely to be in surplus in this country) would assist British reconversion without assuming responsibility for it.

10. These efforts to assist the British to enter "Phase 3" on as sound an economic foundation as possible must be accompanied by vigorous

British efforts to join with us in pressing a world-wide program of multilateral reduction in barriers to international trade. The Bretton Woods agreements with respect to exchange manipulations, restrictions, and discriminations constitute a very important part of our commercial policy program. The British must be urged to implement these arrangements, and to join with us—through the Article VII conversations and otherwise—in thorough consideration of the remaining elements of our international economic program. It is of fundamental importance to the interests of the United States and to the establishment of the kind of economic conditions which we hope to see prevail in the post-war world that in formulating a lend-lease policy for "Phase 2" which will further these objectives we have assurances from the British that they will actively cooperate with us in achieving them. You are aware of the political situation in the British government which has impeded this, and I know you will agree that it is time that some forward steps be taken to resolve it.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

Hopkins Papers

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I think it is important, in Quebec, that you tell the Prime Minister how strongly you feel about knocking down some of the trade barriers to get somewhere in terms of world trade.

I have a feeling that the Prime Minister thinks that that is a pet hobby of Secretary Hull's and that you may not think it of great importance.

I think it is essential to our future bargaining with Great Britain that you disabuse the Prime Minister's mind of this.

I rather think that he thinks that the genius of this program in America lies with Secretary Hull, while the truth of the matter is that it is a program that, from the beginning, has been pushed by you.

H[ARRY] L. H[OPKINS]

Roosevelt Papers

The President to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 9, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: There has been a good deal of discussion within the several Government Departments relative to our Lend Lease policy after the collapse of Germany.

It is my wish that no Department of the Government take unilateral action in regard to any matters that concern Lease Lend, because the implications of any such action are bound to affect other Departments of the Government and, indeed, our whole national policy. I am particularly anxious that any instructions which may have been issued, or are about to be issued regarding Lease Lend material or supplies to our allies after the collapse of Germany, be immediately cancelled and withdrawn.

I intend to give instructions to all Departments relative to the Lease Lend policy of this government at an early date.

Will you be sure, therefore, that your several bureaus and divisions are advised of my position at once?

I am sending identical letters to the Chief of Staff,¹ the Chief of Naval Operations,² the Secretary of the Treasury,³ the Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration⁴ and the Administrator of the War Shipping Administration.⁵

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

¹ General George C. Marshall.

² Admiral Ernest J. King.

³ Henry Morgenthau, Jr.

⁴ Leo T. Crowley.

⁵ Vice Admiral Emory S. Land.

C. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND AID TO THE WARSAW RESISTANCE

Editorial Note

For documentation dated in August 1944 concerning aid to the Polish underground army which had risen against the Germans in Warsaw as the Soviet Army approached that city, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, pp. 1372-1395; *Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations*, pp. 308 ff.; Woodward, pp. 300-305; Ehrman, pp. 369-375.¹

¹ As of September 1, 1944, an answer was still pending to President Raczkiewicz' message to Roosevelt of August 12 (see *Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations*, pp. 339-340). The Department of State, after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had submitted to Roosevelt a draft of a reply on August 31, but neither that draft nor the final text of the reply has been found in United States files, nor is the reply printed in *Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations*. The reply was sent by pouch to the American Embassy near the Polish Government in exile at London on September 8, 1944, for transmittal to Raczkiewicz (740.0011 E.W./8-1344).

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*TOP SECRET
C.C.S. 618/1

[WASHINGTON,] 22 August 1944.

MACHINERY FOR COORDINATION OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET-BRITISH
MILITARY EFFORTReference: C.C.S. 618¹

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff agree that additional machinery is necessary to coordinate the military efforts of the United Nations forces on the European fronts.

2. It is considered that the present relationship between the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Soviet General Staff through the medium of the United States and British Missions in Moscow on over-all strategy must be retained until the matter can be discussed further at the next United Nations Staff Conference.

3. The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the machinery for the coordination of day-to-day United States-British-Soviet operational matters be established by attaching a Soviet liaison group to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. An additional Soviet liaison group could be sent to Allied Force Headquarters if needed.

4. It is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff dispatch the enclosed directive relative to machinery for the coordination of our common military effort to the British and United States Military Missions in Moscow with information copies to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force and the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.

Enclosure

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Combined Chiefs of Staff direct that the Heads of the United States and British Military Missions in Moscow open discussions with the Soviet General Staff along the lines indicated in the following paragraph. When the Soviet views on the proposal have been obtained you will submit them to the Combined Chiefs of Staff together with your comments thereon.

The creation of machinery for the coordination of Soviet-British-American military efforts is increasingly necessary. It is therefore proposed that the machinery for coordination of day-to-day operational matters should be established by attaching a Soviet liaison

¹ *Ante*, p. 9.

group to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force and, if needed, to Allied Force Headquarters. Strategic direction would of course be retained by the Chiefs of Staff of the three nations.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 29 August 1944.

C.C.S. 618/2

MACHINERY FOR COORDINATION OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET-BRITISH
MILITARY EFFORT

References: C.C.S. 618² and 618/1³

1. In C.C.S. 618 we circulated the text of certain messages which had been exchanged between the Head of the British Military Mission in Moscow⁴ and the British Chiefs of Staff concerning a proposal put forward by Marshal Stalin to the United States Ambassador in Moscow⁵ at the end of June,⁶ to the effect that it might be desirable to create some machinery through which the efforts of our respective forces could be coordinated.

2. The British Chiefs of Staff have since discussed this matter with General Burrows and have instructed us to put forward the attached memorandum which represents their views.

3. The British Chiefs of Staff have been informed of the text of C.C.S. 618/1 and suggest that the whole matter should be discussed at the next Conference.

Enclosure

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

PROPOSED COMBINED COMMITTEE IN MOSCOW

1. We have now discussed with General Burrows, the proposal put forward by Marshal Stalin to the United States Ambassador in Moscow at the end of June, to the effect that it might be desirable to create some machinery through which the efforts of our respective forces could be co-ordinated.

¹ For the discussion of this paper by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 172d Meeting, September 12, 1944, see *post*, p. 307.

² *Ante*, p. 9.

³ *Supra*.

⁴ Lieutenant General Montagu Brocas Burrows.

⁵ W. Averell Harriman.

⁶ According to Deane, pp. 152-153, Stalin made this proposal to Harriman on June 28, 1944.

2. We get the impression that Marshal Stalin's proposal was very tentative but we conclude that he is interested in it, in view of the fact that Marshal Vassilievsky referred to the matter in conversation with General Deane during the latter's visit to the Russian front.⁷ In the course of this conversation Marshal Vassilievsky stated that the Soviet General Staff would be interested in the formation of some sort of Combined Committee in Moscow, and would like to know what are the proposals of the Chiefs of Staff in this respect. It therefore appears that nothing is likely to materialise unless we make the next move. Whether we should, or should not, do so depends upon the character and scope of the responsibilities with which the proposed combined committee is to be charged.

3. It will be recalled that the possibility of setting up a United Chiefs of Staff organisation was discussed at *SEXTANT*.⁸ On that occasion, we expressed the view that the relations of such a body to the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be very difficult, and that it might even claim to be the more representative body, and, therefore, to exercise jurisdiction over the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We emphasised that the representatives of such a body would not have the authority to make big decisions and that, in consequence, the organisation would serve no useful purpose, except as a means of improving liaison; and we added that this could be done better by improving the arrangements already existing in Washington, London and Moscow.

4. The Combined Chiefs of Staff were in general agreement with these views and agreed:—

(a) that they should not take the initiative in putting forward the proposal; and

(b) that if the U.S.S.R. should raise the question the difficulties of, and objections to, any form of standing United Chiefs of Staff Committee should be frankly explained to them.

5. We, ourselves, stand today exactly where we stood at *SEXTANT*. We are wholly opposed to the creation of a United Chiefs of Staff Committee of the character suggested at *SEXTANT*.

6. On the other hand, we think that there is much to be said for improving our liaison with the Soviet Military authorities. This might well be achieved by the creation of a Combined British, American and Soviet Committee in Moscow, provided that it is clearly understood that this Committee:—

(a) is purely consultative and advisory and has no power to make decisions;

(b) that it deals solely with operational and intelligence matters, and does not impinge upon the work that is at present being done by the European Advisory Commission, such as civil affairs, etc.

⁷ On July 22, 1944. See Deane, pp. 208–209.

⁸ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 336–337.

7. We propose that the senior members of the existing Military Mission in Moscow should be the British representatives on this Committee. Any other arrangement would inevitably detract from their prestige and usefulness.

8. If the United States Chiefs of Staff accept the above lay-out, we suggest that Generals Burrows and Deane should be instructed to take the matter up with the Soviet military authorities immediately on their return to Moscow.

A. F. BROOKE

C. PORTAL

ANDREW CUNNINGHAM

860c.01/9-244 : Telegram

*The Chargé Near the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*¹

PLAIN

LONDON, September 2, 1944.

POLES 92. From Schoenfeld.

Premier Mikołajczyk in a broadcast message yesterday to the Polish people on the fifth anniversary of the German attack on Poland made reference to the struggle in Warsaw and addressed a direct appeal for aid to Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. Defending the decision of the Polish forces in Warsaw to fight in the open Mikołajczyk said :

"You acted in the same way as your brothers did everywhere east of Warsaw from March, 1944, and as they continue to do, at the same time helping the heroic and victorious Soviet armies in their fight with the enemy . . .² you have the right to assistance. No one has the right to lower the value of your struggle, undertaken with the purest intentions, for the sake of some opportunist motive or political intrigue.

You did not receive such help as was due to you in spite of all the devotion of the British, South African, and Polish airmen. Lately the latter were the only ones who helped you. We do all we can to obtain help for you in adequate time and measure. I have not lost hope that it will be obtained. Would this help not be given I will notify you of it.

I address myself once again in public to Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt, and Mr. Churchill: leaders of great powers, commanders of powerful and victorious land and air armies, Warsaw is waiting, the whole Polish nation is waiting, public opinion throughout the world is waiting. Do all you can to provide means for further fighting and to liberate this city and the population fighting in her ruins, drenched with blood. These people fight and die for Poland, but their desire to live for Poland is equally strong."

¹ Sent over the signature of Winant.

² Ellipsis in the source text.

740.0011 E.W./9-444

The Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1944.

S—MR. SECRETARY The Polish Ambassador called on me today and left with me the attached memorandum reporting an urgent appeal from Prime Minister Mikołajczyk and Foreign Minister Romer for additional help to the Polish Underground fighting in Warsaw. The Ambassador said that he had just come from seeing Admiral Leahy, who has promised to take the matter up tomorrow with the President and Joint Chiefs of Staff and endeavor to ascertain whether there was any possibility of sending, by American military effort, additional help to Warsaw.¹

The Ambassador said he had come to see Admiral Leahy because the President had told him during Mikołajczyk's visit² that if any particularly urgent question involving the Polish Underground on military questions came up, he could go direct to Admiral Leahy. The Ambassador said, however, he wished to make sure that the Department of State was fully informed and therefore had brought in the attached memorandum. I told the Ambassador that I assumed there was little the Department could do since the matter was under active consideration by American military authorities to which he fully agreed.

C[HARLES] E. B[OHLEN]³

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Polish Ambassador (Ciechanowski)

SECRET

The Polish Ambassador received an urgent secret telegram from Minister Romer dated London, September 3rd, concerning the situation of Warsaw and the most urgent necessity of help in the form of food, arms, munitions and medical supplies to the fighting garrison of the Polish Home Army. Foreign Minister Romer informs the Ambassador that Premier Mikołajczyk personally submitted to Prime Minister Churchill on September 1st the desperate situation in Warsaw, which the Germans have now threatened to burn down entirely.

¹ For Ciechanowski's report to his government on his conversation with Leahy, see *Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations*, pp. 383-384.

² Mikołajczyk had visited Washington in June 1944. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, pp. 1274 ff.

³ Bohlen's initials were written on his behalf by a secretary.

The simultaneous evacuation of German forces from the eastern bank of the Vistula westwards appears to prove that the liberation of the town may be close. It is therefore of the utmost importance that the Polish Home Army fighting in Warsaw should be able to continue its fight and be helped at this moment by substantial aid from the air of arms, munitions, food and medical supplies. It is likewise urgent that the objectives held by the Germans be bombed.

In view of the decreasing effectiveness of the nightly very reduced flights of the Polish air crews from Bari, Prime Minister Churchill promised Premier Mikołajczyk once more to investigate the possibilities of one large-scale operation which would be undertaken by the British R.A.F. from British and Italian bases and would not exclude even the risk of forced landings on Russian air bases. Unfortunately, the technical investigation carried out on September 2nd showed that this intention could not be carried out from bases accessible to the British forces.

The Polish Ambassador is instructed by Minister Romer confidentially to inform the competent authorities of the United States Government about the opinion of Prime Minister Churchill that there appears to exist the possibility for American Air Forces, at present closer to Warsaw than the British, to carry out such an operation.

The latest reports received by the Polish Government from the High Command of the Polish Home Army, dated September 2nd, are to the effect that the Germans succeeded in taking from the Home Army the district of "Old Town" (*Stare Miasto*), which has created a very serious breach in the defense system of Warsaw. General Bór communicates that munitions are almost exhausted. The spirit of the soldiers is good. The population is suffering from lack of food, which has been rationed up to September 7th only, of water, of shelter, of clothing, and is in very bad sanitary conditions. The morale is still good, but it must be regarded as dependent on hope that the end of the fighting will come soon or that aid will really be forthcoming.

Minister Romer stresses the need for utmost urgency.

WASHINGTON, September 4th, 1944.

740.0011 E.W./9-444 : Telegram

The Acting Political Adviser in Italy (Office) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CASERTA, September 4, 1944.

282. General Sosnkowski informed SAC¹ that he received yesterday a message from General Bór, Polish commanding general Warsaw, stating loss of old town has opened a serious breach in defenses

¹ General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.

of Polish home army. Now increased pressure from enemy is to be expected against remaining portions of old town aiming at annihilation of Polish resistance. Bór added he had decided to defend Warsaw to limit of his means. Bór's message went on to state food supply would hold out till September 7, bread till September 5. Ammunition supply is being exhausted. Polish morale is good. Civilian population suffering from lack of food water housing clothing and health, a degree of hope for rapid end of fight or on amount of assistance obtained. Holding out possibilities do not depend on Polish endurance only but on material help and on rapidity of successful Red Army operations in that locality.

Sosnkowski appeals to General Wilson for large scale air operations from Italian bases with participation of British crews as an indispensable measure to save situation and concludes with statement that he feels he would have failed in his duty if he did not bring foregoing to attention of General Wilson.

OFFIE

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 4th September 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and top secret. Number 779.

1. The War Cabinet are deeply disturbed at the position in Warsaw and at the far-reaching effect on future relations with Russia of Stalin's refusal of airfield facilities.

2. Moreover as you know Mikołajczyk has sent his proposals to the Polish Committee of Liberation for a political settlement.² I am afraid that the fall of Warsaw will not only destroy any hope of progress but will fatally undermine the position of Mikołajczyk himself.

3. My immediately following telegram[s] contain the text of a telegram which the War Cabinet in their collective capacity have sent to our Ambassador in Moscow and also of a message which the women of Warsaw have communicated to the Pope³ and which has been handed by the Vatican to our Minister.⁴

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Hyde Park, as telegram No. RED 369.

² For the text of the proposals referred to, which were transmitted to the Soviet authorities on August 30, 1944, and forwarded to the Lublin Committee, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, pp. 1315-1317.

³ Not printed herein. For the text of Churchill's telegram No. 781, forwarding this appeal to Roosevelt, see Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 143.

⁴ Sir D'Arcy Osborne.

4. The only way of bringing material help quickly to the Poles fighting in Warsaw would be for United States aircraft to drop supplies using Russian airfields for the purpose. Seeing how much is in jeopardy we beg that you will again consider the big stakes involved. Could you not authorize your Air Forces to carry out this operation, landing if necessary on Russian airfields without their formal consent? In view of our great successes in the west, I cannot think that the Russians could reject this *fait accompli*. They might even welcome it as getting them out of an awkward situation. We would of course share full responsibility with you for any action taken by your Air Force.⁵

PRIME

⁵ Roosevelt, by telegram No. BLUE 139, directed Leahy to take the subject matter of this telegram up with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with Hull and to prepare a reply. A draft reply, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State, was forwarded to the President at Hyde Park on September 5 in telegram No. RED 374, and was approved by Roosevelt without change (telegram No. BLUE 140). For the text of the reply, see *post*, p. 190.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 4th September 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and top secret. Number 780.

Following is text of telegram sent to Moscow this evening mentioned in my immediately preceding telegram:—

"1. The War Cabinet at their meeting today considered the latest reports of the situation in Warsaw which show that the Poles fighting against the Germans there are in desperate straits.

2. The War Cabinet wish the Soviet Government to know that public opinion in this country is deeply moved by the events in Warsaw and by the terrible sufferings of the Poles there. Whatever the rights and wrongs about the beginnings of the Warsaw rising, the people of Warsaw themselves cannot be held responsible for the decision taken. Our people cannot understand why no material help has been sent from outside to the Poles in Warsaw. The fact that such help could not be sent on account of your Government's refusal to allow United States aircraft to land on aerodromes in Russian hands is now becoming publicly known. If on top of all this the Poles in Warsaw should now be overwhelmed by the Germans, as we are told they must be within two or three days, the shock to public opinion here will be incalculable. The War Cabinet themselves find it hard to understand your Government's refusal to take account of the obligations of the British and American Governments to help the Poles in Warsaw. Your Government's action in preventing this help being sent seems

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Hyde Park, as telegram No. RED 370.

to us at variance with the spirit of Allied cooperation to which you and we attach so much importance both for the present and the future.”²

PRIME

² The text of this message as printed in Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 142–143, has the following additional paragraph:

“Out of regard for Marshal Stalin and for the Soviet peoples, with whom it is our earnest desire to work in future years, the War Cabinet have asked me to make this further appeal to the Soviet Government to give whatever help may be in their power, and above all to provide facilities for United States aircraft to land on your airfields for this purpose.”

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

SECRET

[HYDE PARK,] 5 September 1944.

PRIORITY

Number 619, personal and secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.

Replying to your 779,² 780³ and 781,⁴ I am informed by my Office of Military Intelligence that the fighting Poles have departed from Warsaw and that the Germans are now in full control.

The problem of relief for the Poles in Warsaw has therefore unfortunately been solved by delay and by German action and there now appears to be nothing we can do to assist them.

I have long been deeply distressed by our inability to give adequate assistance to the heroic defenders of Warsaw and I hope that we may together still be able to help Poland be among the victors in this war with the Nazis.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels, after Roosevelt had approved the text. See *ante*, p. 189, fn. 5.

² *Ante*, p. 188.

³ *Supra*.

⁴ Not printed herein. See *ante*, p. 188, fn. 3.

Roosevelt Papers

*Department of State Briefing Paper*¹

TOP SECRET

[Undated.]

ANGLO-AMERICAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Great Britain has long profited from her ability to shift the balance of power in Europe and has traditionally sought the role of the

¹ Annex 1 to Hull's memorandum to Roosevelt dated September 6, 1944, which was sent to the White House under cover of a further memorandum of September 8. See *ante*, p. 120.

"honest broker" between other nations. The present preponderance of Russia outweighs the rest of Europe and Great Britain combined. It is accordingly natural that the British should seek to maintain a balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and to play the role of "honest broker" between them.

The absence of any conflict of vital interest between the United States and the U.S.S.R., however, and the number of points at which British and Soviet interests impinge make it appear probable that we, whether we choose it or not, may be forced to play such a role. The vital importance which the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff attach to solidarity between the three great powers is concisely stated in the following excerpt from a letter of May 16, 1944 from Admiral Leahy:²

"From the point of view of national and world-wide security, our basic national policy in post-war settlements of this kind should seek to maintain the solidarity of the three great powers and in all other respects to establish conditions calculated to assure a long period of peace, during which, it may be hoped, arrangements will be perfected for the prevention of future world conflicts. The cardinal importance of this national policy is emphasized by a consideration of the fundamental and revolutionary changes in relative national military strengths that are being brought about in Europe as a result of the war.

"It would seem clear that there cannot be a world war, or even a great war, which does not find one or more of the great military powers on each side. At the conclusion of the present war, there will be, for the foreseeable future, only three such powers—the United States, Britain, and Russia. Since it would seem in the highest degree unlikely that Britain and Russia, or Russia alone, would be aligned against the United States, it is apparent that any future world conflict in the foreseeable future will find Britain and Russia in opposite camps.

"In appraising possibilities of this nature, the outstanding fact to be noted is the recent phenomenal development of the heretofore latent Russian military and economic strength—a development which seems certain to prove epochal in its bearing on future politico-military international relationships, and which has yet to reach the full scope attainable with Russian resources. In contrast, as regards Britain several developments have combined to lessen her relative military and economic strength and gravely to impair, if not preclude, her ability to offer effective military opposition to Russia on the continent except possibly in defensive operations in the Atlantic coastal areas. In a conflict between these two powers the disparity in the military strengths that they could dispose upon that continent would, under present conditions, be far too great to be overcome by our intervention on the side of Britain. Having due regard to the military factors involved—resources, manpower, geography and particularly our ability to project our strength across the ocean and exert it de-

² For the paragraphs of Leahy's letter of May 16, 1944, not included in this briefing paper, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 106-107, fn. 4.

cisively upon the continent—we might be able to successfully defend Britain, but we could not, under existing conditions, defeat Russia. In other words, we would find ourselves engaged in a war which we could not win even though the United States would be in no danger of defeat and occupation.

"It is apparent that the United States should, now and in the future, exert its utmost efforts and utilize all its influence to prevent such a situation arising and to promote a spirit of mutual cooperation between Britain, Russia and ourselves. So long as Britain and Russia cooperate and collaborate in the interests of peace, there can be no great war in the foreseeable future.

"The greatest likelihood of eventual conflict between Britain and Russia would seem to grow out of either nation initiating attempts to build up its strength, by seeking to attach to herself parts of Europe to the disadvantage and possible danger of her potential adversary. Having regard to the inherent suspicions of the Russians, to present Russia with any agreement on such matters as between the British and ourselves, prior to consultation with Russia, might well result in starting a train of events that would lead eventually to the situation we most wish to avoid."

It seems probable that solidarity can best be attained if none of the three powers seeks the role of intermediary between the other two and each of the three works directly with the other two. We should, however, make every effort to prevent discord developing between the other two.

In particular we should :

1. Endeavor to prevent the development in Europe or elsewhere of British and Soviet spheres of influence, with the inevitable potentialities of friction and conflict which that would entail; and
2. Make every effort to secure the full participation of the Soviet Union in the General International Organization and to induce the Soviet Government to settle its international problems through the Organization.

Roosevelt Papers

*Department of State Briefing Paper*¹

SECRET

[Undated.]

U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Our overall objective in our relations with the Soviet Union is the establishment of the closest, most cooperative relationship on the basis of the mutual acceptance and observance of the essential principles of good international conduct.

¹ Annex 2 to Hull's memorandum to Roosevelt dated September 6, 1944, which was sent to the White House under cover of a further memorandum of September 8. See *ante*, p. 120.

Because of the over-riding wartime necessity of avoiding friction which might jeopardize military cooperation, more emphasis has hitherto been placed on cooperating with the Soviet Union *per se* than on finding an agreed basis upon which the cooperation must be established if it is to endure and form one of the foundations of a secure and peaceful world order.

An excellent start was made at the Moscow and Tehran Conferences² toward establishing a common agreement in regard to the broad principles of international cooperation. Recent Soviet policy with regard to Poland, however, its adamant attitude on the Baltic States, and [the policy?] indicated in other areas have been far from encouraging in this respect.

There is a danger that the Soviet Government may mistake friendliness for weakness and continue to operate in the belief that it can obtain all the benefits of cooperation with the United States and Great Britain no matter what policies it pursues in regard to its neighbors unless the British and ourselves demonstrate more forcefully that observation by the Soviet Union of accepted principles of international conduct is both to its own ultimate advantage and essential to lasting cooperation with the Western Powers.

Nothing should be done along political lines which might jeopardize Soviet military cooperation against Germany but, as and when the military situation in Europe permits, increased emphasis should be placed on the principles upon which enduring cooperation must be based. This would require greater willingness on our part to risk Soviet displeasure and franker and more realistic discussions with the Soviet Union in regard to its policies in Europe. It would, of course, be against our interest to seek (or to follow the British in seeking) points of friction or to obstruct or deny legitimate Soviet interests.

It is nevertheless important that the Soviet Government realize that, while we desire its cooperation in world affairs as much as it desires ours, we do not intend to acquiesce in Soviet policies which we consider internationally destructive merely for the sake of avoiding unpleasant issues. Cooperation on that basis is perilously close to collusion. A greater degree of firmness in our attitude and policy toward the Soviet Union would avoid more serious difficulties in the future and would place our relations with it on a firmer foundation.

² For the records of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 558 ff. For the records of the Tehran Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 475 ff.

Roosevelt Papers

*Department of State Briefing Paper*¹

SECRET

[Undated.]

THE POLISH PROBLEM

Recent developments regarding Warsaw make it appear that Stalin may have decided that the Polish Government forces in Poland must be destroyed, despite possible unfortunate repercussions inside Poland and abroad and the inevitable lessening of the chances of an arrangement with Mikołajczyk, in order that the Soviet-sponsored Committee² can gain the upper hand. This thesis is borne out by his persistent refusal to assist the British or ourselves in efforts to strengthen the Warsaw garrison.

He may have come to believe that the strength of the Polish Government forces both in Warsaw and elsewhere in Poland was such as to make it unlikely that his Polish Committee could control the situation if Mikołajczyk and a few of his ministers were allowed to form a government in Warsaw. The reversal of his decision to aid the insurgents may have been made in the thought that it would undermine the position and prestige of Mikołajczyk and minimize the possibility of the latter's return to Warsaw.

In any event, the decision was clearly political and appears to indicate Stalin's determination that the Soviet-sponsored Committee gain as full control as possible of the country.

Possible Results of These Developments

1. The possibility of Mikołajczyk's forming a coalition government in Warsaw is very small. He might be acceptable to the Soviet Government if he came as an individual to join the Committee, which he probably would be reluctant to do.

2. When the refusal of the Red Army to give aid to Warsaw becomes known, it may cause many pro-Soviet Poles to change their attitude and force the Soviet Government to rule Poland more severely than it otherwise planned.

3. Reactions abroad to the Russian methods used in settling the Polish problem may seriously affect United Nations conversations, including those on security.

4. When the Red Army captures Warsaw, the Soviet propaganda machine will be turned on in full to convince the world that the Warsaw uprising was brought about by a small group of reactionaries and

¹ Annex 3 to Hull's memorandum to Roosevelt dated September 6, 1944, which was sent to the White House under cover of a further memorandum of September 8. See *ante*, p. 120.

² A Polish Committee of National Liberation had been formed at Lublin on July 23, 1944.

that the rest of the population is one hundred percent behind the Soviet-sponsored Committee.

5. The Committee will be assisted by the Soviet authorities to hold elections and set up a Government as soon as practicable.

Possible American Policy

Until Stalin has definitely closed the door to any compromise solution with the Polish Government in London we should continue to urge upon him in every possible manner the necessity of some solution of the Polish question which would be acceptable to world opinion. We should at the same time support Mikołajczyk and his supporters in their efforts to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement with Moscow. While any possibility remains of an agreement between the Polish Government and the Soviet-sponsored Committee, any indication on our part of a change of attitude toward the London Polish Government would lessen the already slim chances of agreement.

Should Stalin proceed, despite all our efforts and those of the British, to a unilateral and arbitrary solution of setting up his own group as the government of Poland, we will have to consider our policy in the light of developments as they occur. In any event we should move very slowly in extending any form of recognition to such a group.

J.C.S. Files

*The Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)
to the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (McFarland)*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1944.

MY DEAR GENERAL MCFARLAND: With reference to our telephone conversation, I enclose a copy of a telegram which a member of the British Embassy handed me last evening. That telegram embodies the instructions sent by the British Foreign Office to the British Ambassador at Moscow with regard to a joint Anglo-American approach to the Russians with respect to Norway.

You will note that paragraph 5 of the enclosure suggests that the State Department might send similar instructions to Ambassador Harriman for the purpose of giving some political background to General Deane.

Since the State Department is not informed as to the nature of the instructions sent to General Deane, we are not in position to judge how much of the background and suggestions contained in the British telegram is already in Deane's possession. I presume you have briefed General Deane on the three points contained in numbered paragraph 3. We do believe it advisable to give General Deane, either

through Ambassador Harriman or otherwise, some indication of the importance of communicating to the Russians the fact that the planning question was conceived some time ago in order to dispel possible Russian suspicions that it is something improvised overnight, so to speak, as a counterweight to possible entry of Russian troops into northern Norway.

If you will let me know your views¹ on reading the attached, I will be glad to see that immediate action, if desirable, is taken.

Sincerely yours,

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS
Deputy Director
Office of European Affairs

[Enclosure—Telegram]

The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the British Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Clark Kerr)

TOP SECRET

[LONDON, September 5, 1944.]

2874. As you may know, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have recently instructed the American and British Military missions in Moscow to discuss with the Russians the question of our plans for the occupation of Norway.² No conversations were to be initiated prior to the return of General Burrows with whom we had discussed the political background. Burrows does not expect to be back for ten days, however, and United States Chiefs of Staff are anxious to begin these discussions without further delay in view of development of the Finnish situation. Chiefs of Staff are agreeing that it is undesirable to postpone matters any longer and have approved our suggestion that you should explain to Brinckman political background which is as follows:

2. S.H.A.E.F. have for some time past been under strong political pressure from the Norwegians to send troops to northern Norway in the event of German withdrawal because of their fears of a possible Russian permanent occupation of that area. Such fears are, in the Foreign Office view, exaggerated since we have no evidence to support this idea and since the Soviet Government have signed a Civil Affairs agreement with the Norwegian Government similar to the Anglo-Norwegian and American-Norwegian agreements.³ In point of fact

¹ For McFarland's reply, see *post*, p. 399.

² See *post*, p. 399.

³ For text of the Norwegian-American agreement referred to, signed May 16, 1944, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1514; 60 Stat. (2) 1581. Similar arrangements were signed on the same day between Norway and the United Kingdom and between Norway and the Soviet Union.

it may be that the Russians will be assisting the Finns in capture and disarmament of German forces in northern Finland and the course of events may make it more natural and easy for the Russians to follow up German withdrawal from northern Norway than that an expedition should be despatched from this country. In these circumstances S.H.A.E.F.'s proposal to send such an expedition might well appear to the Russians as designed mainly to forestall their own forces. It was clearly important that this impression should be avoided.

3. Chiefs of Staff suggested therefore to Combined Chiefs of Staff that plans should be concerted with the Russians and that it should be emphasized that S.C.A.E.F.'s proposal was purely provisional and based on:—

(1) Military necessity of harassing the enemy during his withdrawal.

(2) Advantage of stimulating Norwegian resistance by sending in Norwegian forces as soon as possible and,

(3) Desirability of establishing a naval base for escorts protecting convoys to Russia.

We assume that instructions sent by Combined Chiefs of Staff to heads of military missions have been drawn up accordingly since United States Chiefs of Staff agreed. It was felt that for the matter to be handled through military channels as a purely military problem would assist in avoiding appearance of political motives.

4. The Russians may suspect that it is the Soviet-Finnish armistice negotiations and consequent possible proximity of the Russians to northern Norway that have made us propose plan for occupation of Northern Norway by Anglo-American-Norwegian forces at this juncture. In order to dispel such a suspicion it might be well to emphasize that plans have been ready for some time and that it is (?precisely) (?the possibility)⁴ that owing to the capitulation of Finland the Russians may have forces in the neighbourhood of the Norwegian frontier when the Germans start to withdraw that has made it desirable to discuss plans with the Russians now.

5. Please discuss the handling of the matter with Brinckman. His Majesty's Ambassador in Washington is being instructed to suggest to the State Department that your United States colleague might be sent similar instructions.

⁴ These two parenthetical suggestions for correcting a garble in the message as received in Washington appear in the source text.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*¹

TOP SECRET

Moscow, [September 9, 1944.]

ROUTINE

Personal and top secret for Harry Hopkins from Harriman.

I feel that I should report to the President at the earliest convenient time and place. Now that the end of the war is in sight our relations with the Soviets have taken a startling turn evident during the last two months. They have held up our requests with complete indifference to our interests and have shown an unwillingness even to discuss pressing problems.

We started the proposal for winter program for FRANTIC at the end of June and formally presented it to the Foreign Office in early July. No acknowledgement even of my letters or numerous talks has been received. All requests for PR unit have been unacted upon for the last several weeks. Prior to that time they were operating several a day. No answer or permission to transport trucks to our air forces in China has been received. There has been no reply to our request presented a week ago followed by urgent conversation with Molotov to allow General Eaker's bombing appraisal party to visit Ploesti. The Soviets' indifference to world opinion regarding their unbending policy toward Poland and ruthless attitude toward the uprising in Warsaw are best described by Molotov's statement that the Soviets would judge their friends by those that accept the Soviet position.² In spite of Stalin's promises no action has been taken on major future planning. These are only a few examples.

I have been conscious since early in the year of a division among Stalin's advisors on the question of cooperation with us. It is now my feeling that those who oppose the kind of cooperation we expect have recently been getting their way and the policy appears to be crystalizing to force us and the British to accept all Soviet policies backed by the strength and prestige of Red Army.

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. The White House Map Room sent the text of the message to Roosevelt, at Quebec, on September 11, 1944, and at the President's direction a paraphrase was given to Churchill at Quebec. Hopkins discussed the message with the Department of State on September 10 or 11, and a paraphrase was sent to Hull on September 14.

² Molotov had made this statement in a conversation with Harriman and Clark Kerr reported in Harriman's telegram No. 3049 of August 17, 1944, not printed (740.0011 E.W./8-1744).

Demands on us are becoming insistent. You have seen a part of it in the negotiations over financial terms of the Protocol ³ in Washington. We have other examples here. The general attitude seems to be that it is our obligation to help Russia and accept her policies because she has won the war for us.

I am convinced that we can divert this trend but only if we materially change our policy toward the Soviet Government. I have evidence that they have misinterpreted our generous attitude toward them as a sign of weakness, and acceptance of their policies.

Time has come when we must make clear what we expect of them as the price of our good will. Unless we take issue with the present policy there is every indication the Soviet Union will become a world bully wherever their interests are involved. This policy will reach into China and the Pacific as well when they can turn their attention in that direction. No written agreement[s] can be of any value unless they are carried out in a spirit of give and take and recognition of the interests of other people.

I am disappointed but not discouraged. The job of getting the Soviet Government to play a decent role in international affairs is however going to be more difficult than we had hoped. The favorable factors are still the same. Ninety percent of the Russian people want friendship with us and it is much to the interest of the Soviet Government to develop it. It is our problem to strengthen the hand of those around Stalin who want to play the game along our lines and to show Stalin that the advice of the counselors of a tough policy is leading him into difficulties.

I realize I cannot in a cable convey to you a fully comprehensible picture of the perplexing developments. However, what I say is fully endorsed by General Deane, the air officers here and the Embassy officers.

The relation[s] of Deane and our other officers with the Red Air Force are good. The Soviet officers have shown embarrassment at the attitude expressed through the Foreign Office. The influences that I speak of are as unpopular with this group as with us. When it comes to the question of what we should do in dealing with the situation I am not going to propose any drastic action but a firm but friendly *quid pro quo* attitude. In some cases where it has been possible for us to show a firm hand we have been making definite progress.

³ The reference is to the "Soviet supply protocols". Concerning the 1944 negotiations with the Soviet Union about assistance from the United States, see *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. iv, pp. 1032 ff.

I feel that I should urgently report personally to the President these recent developments and my recommendations. I would appreciate your discussing this message with the President and advising me.⁴

⁴ Hopkins sent Roosevelt the following telegram (MR-OUT-384) on September 11, 1944:

"Have talked to Chip Bohlen and he tells me Secretary Hull feels very strongly that Harriman should not come back immediately.

"We are in the critical stage of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and Gromyko may not get his instructions for a few days and we cannot take any chance of having that bitched up. Furthermore, a cable which you now have in your hands [presumably Harriman's telegram of September 9] indicates Harriman's immediate point of view and I doubt if he could tell you much more than is indicated in that message.

"Unless you disagree I propose to wire Harriman today that you do not wish him to come home at this moment but will expect to see him later." (Hopkins Papers)

Roosevelt replied later on September 11 that Hopkins' proposed message to Harriman was approved (MR-IN-142). Hopkins thereupon sent Harriman a telegram, also dated September 11, informing him that Roosevelt "thinks it best, therefore, that you delay your departure until he gives you the green light which I assure you will be soon as he wants to go over with you personally all the problems which you raised in your cable." (Hopkins Papers)

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 10th September 1944.

1005. Winant to President Roosevelt.

The following three messages have been received from Clark Kerr of the British Embassy Moscow today, the first two this morning and third this noon. They have been forwarded to the Prime Minister and have just been given to me by Eden. The British Chiefs of Staff have met and telegraphed General Eisenhower explaining the situation and asking that he plan an air mission to carry supplies to the people of Warsaw.² I understand that copies of this cable have been forwarded to General Spaatz, to the British Military Mission in Moscow and to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The three messages follow in the order of their receipt.

Number 1 begins:

My immediately preceding telegram.³

In his covering letter M. Molotov goes on to refer to letter which I sent him after discussion with head of air section of Military Mission on receipt of your telegram No. 2743.⁴ He repeats that there has been no occasion on which Soviet Government refused to give assist-

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then en route from Hyde Park to Quebec, as telegram No. MR-OUT-379.

² See *post*, p. 205.

³ The reference is presumably to message No. 2, quoted below.

⁴ Not found in United States files.

ance to damaged British or American aircraft. "It could not have been otherwise in view of the friendly relations between our two countries. It should however be borne in mind so far as the Warsaw area is concerned that uninterrupted fighting is going on with the Germans on land and in the air and that the unexpected appearance on that front of aircraft which do not belong to the Soviet Air Forces might cause sad misunderstanding to which I draw your attention."

Message number 2 begins :

Your telegram No. 2855.⁵

Mr. Molotov has asked me to convey the following reply to His Majesty's Government. (*Begins*) :

Message of Soviet Government in reply to message of British Government of September 5th, 1944.

The Soviet Government on September 5th received a message from British Government on the question of Warsaw.

The Soviet Government has already informed the British Government of their opinion that members of Polish *Émigré* Government in London are responsible for Warsaw adventure undertaken without the knowledge of Soviet Military Command, and in violation of the latter's operational plans.

The Soviet Government would like an unprejudiced commission to be organized with the object of ascertaining exactly by whose order the rising in Warsaw was undertaken and who was to blame for the fact that Soviet Military Command was not informed thereof in advance. No command in the world, neither British nor American, can tolerate the fact that a rising is organized in a large city opposite the front line of its troops without the knowledge of that command and contrary to its operational plans. Of course Soviet Command cannot be an exception. Undoubtedly if before the Warsaw rising Soviet Command had been asked about the desirability of organizing a rising in Warsaw at the beginning of August, the Soviet Command would have advised against such an attempt because the Soviet troops who had advanced fighting for over 500 kilometres and were in a state of fatigue were not at that time prepared to take Warsaw by storm bearing in mind that the Germans had at that time transferred their tank reserves from the west to the Warsaw area.

Nobody will be able to reproach Soviet Government with the allegation that they rendered inadequate aid to the Polish people including Warsaw. The most practical form of help is active military operations of the Soviet troops against the German invaders of Poland and the liberation of more than one fourth of Poland. All this is the work of the Soviet troops and of the Soviet troops only who are shedding their blood for the liberation of Poland. There is again the hardly effective form of help to Warsaw people namely the dropping of weapons, medical stores and food from aircraft. We have several times dropped both weapons and food for Warsaw insurgents but we have each time re-

⁵ No message bearing this number has been found in United States files, but it was probably the telegram containing the message of the British War Cabinet to the Soviet Government quoted in Churchill's telegram No. 780 to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 189.

ceived information that the load dropped had fallen into the hands of the Germans. However, if you are so firmly convinced of the efficacy of this form of assistance and insist upon Soviet command organizing jointly with British and Americans such aid, the Soviet Government are prepared to agree to it. However it is necessary to render this aid in accordance with a pre-arranged plan.

As regards your attempt to make Soviet Government in any degree responsible for Warsaw adventure and for the sacrifices of the Warsaw people, the Soviet Government cannot regard this otherwise than as a wish to shift responsibility "from a sick head to a clear one". The same must be said on the point that the Soviet Government's position in the Warsaw question is apparently contrary to the spirit of Allied co-operation. There can be no doubt that if the British Government had taken steps to see that the Soviet Command had been warned of proposed Warsaw rising in good time, then events in Warsaw would have taken a totally different turn. Why did the British Government not find it necessary to warn the Soviet Government of this? Was it not a repetition of what happened in April 1943 when Polish *Émigré* Government, in the absence of resistance on the part of the British Government, came out with their slanderous statement hostile to USSR about Katyn? ⁶ It seems to us that the spirit of Allied collaboration should have indicated to the British Government a different course of action.

As regards public opinion in various countries the Soviet Government express their complete confidence in the fact that true statement of the facts regarding events in Warsaw will give public opinion every reason unconditionally to condemn the authors of Warsaw adventure and correctly to understand the position of the Soviet Government. It would only be necessary to try to enlighten public opinion thoroughly about the truth of the events in Warsaw.⁷

Message number 3 begins :

My telegram No. 2379.⁸

Following for Secretary of State.

Personal.

This is an unexpected and remarkable climb down. That it is tucked away in the middle of a preposterous Pi-Jaw is true to Kremlin form. They are still not grown up enough to come clean when they know they have made a bad mistake. It would I think be imprudent in us to let any natural inclination to counter all verbiage divert us from this most important if belated surrender. I suggest that in the belief that there may be still in Warsaw something to save, that most immediate instructions be sent to British and American Military Missions to arrange co-operation that is now offered. The whole thing seems to me to give fresh hopes of a settlement with Poland.

I am in touch with United States Ambassador.

⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 374 ff.

⁷ Gromyko forwarded the Russian text of this communication to Hull on September 13, 1944 (740.0011 EW/9-1344).

⁸ Presumably message No. 2, quoted above.

740.0011 E.W./9-1044 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President
and the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

Moscow, September 10, 1944.

US URGENT

3413. Secret for the President and the Secretary from Harriman.

The British Ambassador has shown me a message from the Soviet Government² which he has been asked to transmit to his Government in answer to the War Cabinet's message regarding aid to Warsaw.³ You will undoubtedly receive this in full. Briefly, however, after a lengthy recital of the circumstances and a statement that the really effective aid will come from the advance of the Red Army, the message states in paraphrase as follows :

"In addition there is the form of assistance to the people in Warsaw which can hardly be considered effective; namely, the dropping by airplane of weapons, food and medical supplies. We have dropped both weapons and food for the insurgents in Warsaw on several occasions, but each time we have received information that these supplies have fallen into German hands. If you are so firmly convinced, however, of the efficacy of this form of assistance and if you insist that the Soviet Command organize jointly with the Americans and British such aid, the Soviet Government is prepared to agree to it. It will be necessary, however, to render this aid in accordance with a prearranged plan."

The message ends by implying that the British were partly to blame for the fact that the Soviet Command was not informed in advance of the Warsaw uprising. Reference is also made to British failure to prevent the Poles from their action in connection with the Katyn incident.

This message is obviously an extremely shrewd statement for the record, and places the responsibility now on the British and us for the decision whether the dropping of supplies should be attempted at this late date. I have no recent information as to the size of the area still held by the Insurgents in Warsaw and whether it is practicable to parachute supplies from a sufficiently high altitude to avoid unconscionable losses to our flyers. I assume urgent instructions will be given General Deane or myself on what our position now is and whether or not negotiations with the Red Army staff are to be entered into to render aid.

HARRIMAN

¹ Sent to the Department of State via Army channels.

² The text of the message referred to is contained in Winant's telegram of September 10, 1944, to Roosevelt, *supra*.

³ *Ante*, p. 189.

740.0011 E.W./9-1044: Telegram

*The Polish Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) to President Roosevelt*¹

LONDON, September 10, 1944.

MR. PRESIDENT, The reports which the Polish Government receive from Warsaw show that the situation is desperate and that the fight against the overwhelming German power may cease at any moment, unless sustained from outside.

Our urgent appeals for a large scale operation which would combine the bombing of German concentrations with the dropping of supplies at [to?] the home Army in Warsaw are still under consideration by the British Government and no decision has been taken so far. This decision if favorable may come too late.

I therefore beseech you Mr. President and you Mr. Prime Minister to take a bold and immediate decision which could save Warsaw and its inhabitants from total destruction and at the same time give new hope to millions of Poles to whom the fight in Warsaw is a symbol of Poland's will to live.

I also feel obliged to stress that should the Warsaw rising be crushed by the Germans without a last minute attempt at succour from Poland's mighty western allies, the tragedy of Warsaw may cast a deep and lasting shadow on the Polish nation's attitude towards its traditional friends. I beg you to weigh this in your minds, Mr. President and Mr. Prime Minister, when taking your decision at this fateful hour.

ST. MIKOŁAJCZYK

¹ Transmitted in telegram No. 97 from the Chargé to the Polish Government in exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State, and forwarded to Roosevelt at Quebec. Schoenfeld reported that Mikołajczyk had requested him to transmit this "urgent message" and that an identical message was being given to the British Foreign Office for transmittal to Churchill. As received at Quebec, the message appeared to be from the President of Poland. For Roosevelt's reply, dated September 11, 1944, see *post*, p. 397.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*The Polish Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk) to President Roosevelt*¹[LONDON, September 10, 1944.²]

The Soviet Government, having now agreed to collaboration in the so urgent matter of aid to Warsaw,³ I appeal to you, Mr. President, to issue a directive to General Dwight D. Eisenhower for immediate air operations in support of the defenders of Warsaw.

Should the Soviet Government begin to discuss the plan of aid and raise reservations, so much time would elapse that it might be too late to save Warsaw.

STANISŁAW MIKOŁAJCZYK

¹ Sent to the Polish Ambassador at Washington (Ciechanowski), who incorporated it into a memorandum of September 11, 1944, with the request that it be transmitted immediately to Roosevelt. Bohlen forwarded Ciechanowski's memorandum to Hopkins with the following comment: "It is obvious that the British have informed the Polish Government of the change in attitude of the Soviet Government. While it does not add anything to what the President already knows, it probably should go on to him." Hopkins forwarded Mikołajczyk's message to Roosevelt at Quebec in telegram No. MR-out-388, September 11, 1944. (Hopkins Papers)

² The date of Mikołajczyk's message is not indicated in the source text, but a different translation of the message printed in *Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations*, p. 389, is dated September 10.

³ See *ante*, p. 202, regarding the Soviet action referred to.

J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The British Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Eisenhower)*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 10 September 1944.

URGENT

OZ 5157. Following for General Eisenhower from Chiefs of Staff. Reference AGWar telegram W 80785 of 15th August.²

British Ambassador to Moscow reports Russians state that if we remain firmly convinced that dropping of supplies to Warsaw will be of real assistance to Poles and we insist that Russians cooperate with British and Americans in organizing such assistance, Soviet Government is prepared to agree provided this aid is rendered in accordance with prearranged plan. His Majesty's Government earnestly desire that no opportunity of aiding Poles in Warsaw be missed.

¹ Repeated to other addressees, including the United States Military Mission, Moscow, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Quebec. The message was relayed to Quebec by the War Department as telegram No. 29923 and was received at Quebec on September 14, 1944, as telegram No. OCTAGON-IN-95.

² Not printed.

Request you consider possibility of mounting operation to drop supplies on Warsaw at earliest possible date. Our representatives in Moscow are aware of Russian decision, and we have requested them to do all possible to make necessary arrangement with Russians.

Presume you will inform General Deane of your decision and of your requirements from Russians through your usual channels.

D. ITALY

865.48/9-144 : Telegram

The President's Personal Representative at Vatican City (Taylor) to the President and the Secretary of State

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

VATICAN CITY, September 1, 1944.

This message is urgent and strictly confidential for the President and the Secretary.

It is extremely important before your reported conference with the Prime Minister that you have a frank talk with General O'Dwyer regarding Italy, its relief needs, and plans to meet the situation. To accomplish this will you request Secretary Hull or Leo Crowley to telegraph O'Dwyer personally to report to Washington for consultation without delay.

TAYLOR

865.48/9-144 : Telegram

*The President to the President's Personal Representative at Vatican City (Taylor)*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 3 September 1944.

Please ask General O'Dwyer to report to me as soon as possible, preferably Washington by Friday morning,² or if he cannot make this then in Quebec on Monday morning the eleventh.³

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent to the Commanding General, Allied Force Headquarters, Italy, via Army channels, with instructions to pass to Taylor at Vatican City.

² September 8.

³ O'Dwyer reached Washington in time to see the President at 11:15 a.m., September 8. See *post*, p. 210.

Roosevelt Papers

*Department of State Briefing Paper*¹

SECRET

[Undated.]

THE ITALIAN SITUATION

Bonomi's Government has successfully weathered its first two months. Its position, however, will remain precarious without tangible proof of Allied sympathy, especially as the industrial north is liberated.

The British last May proposed the conclusion of a "preliminary peace treaty".² They felt that this would end the anomalous situation whereby Italy is both defeated enemy and co-belligerent, clear the way for normal relationships, and yet not prejudice the ultimate peace settlement. We agreed to discuss possible terms but differed from the British thesis that no concessions should meanwhile be made to Italy. The more urgent problems should be solved wherever possible without delay. Mr. Churchill has now told Ambassador Kirk in Rome that he disapproved of a preliminary treaty and preferred UNRRA participation in Italian relief and "a recognition of the present government along the lines already accorded by the Soviet."³ Press reports portraying the Prime Minister as sympathetic to the Bonomi Government and convinced that the Italian[s] have "worked their passage" foreshadow a more favorable British policy toward Italy. We should welcome such a change in attitude, having felt for some time that it is to the general interest to strengthen Italian confidence in democratic government and in the democratic powers.

The most urgent problems are those of civilian relief and rehabilitation. The physical obstacles to their solution have been augmented by divergences in British and American views.

Economic Problems. The civilian supply program thus far has been entirely a military responsibility, of which the U.S. Army now wishes to be relieved. It is proposed to finance United States supplies, except such limited supplies as the Army may temporarily continue to provide, by making available to the Italians under appropriate Allied controls the equivalent in dollars of lire paid to our troops in Italy. Though willing for us to finance our own share in this way, the British have questioned extending the present limited military scope of the supply program and appear sensitive about the reaction of our European Allies to any appreciable aid to Italy. We believe the most essen-

¹ Annex 6 to Hull's memorandum to Roosevelt dated September 6, 1944, which was sent to the White House under cover of a further memorandum of September 8. See *ante*, p. 120.

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, p. 1117.

³ This passage is quoted from Kirk's telegram No. 231 to Hull, dated August 24, 1944, not printed (865.01/8-2444).

tial items of rehabilitation should be included to help the Italian economy to begin functioning and are seeking British agreement.

We have intended proposing at the UNRRA Council meeting in September limited UNRRA participation in relief activities in Italy, involving care and repatriation of displaced persons and public health activities including the furnishing of needed medical supplies and technical assistance. The total estimated cost would be between 35 and 50 million dollars. There has been some indication of British reluctance to support such a program.

The present food supply in Italy would suffice for bare subsistence rations if means of transportation from one region to another were available. Additional trucks and coal to operate local railroads are needed.

Other major questions now in the foreground are:

Allied Control Machinery. Military interest in the Allied Control Commission is decreasing. It will be necessary to determine its future status, particularly whether its control functions should continue after they are no longer needed to protect military operations. This will depend on (a) the status to be accorded Italy, (b) Italy's relations with bordering states pending a final peace settlement, and (c) the internal situation. Such of its economic functions as must continue after termination of military control can be handled either through a control organization as at present or an economic mission to the Italian Government.

Ambassador Kirk believes that the Commission should now be headed by a civilian, who would continue for the present to be responsible to the Theater Commander. Kirk also recommends appointment of an American, who should be an expert on economic matters. The British might agree. It is expected that the Commission's Economic Section will shortly be staffed by civilian experts, continuing, however, under military command. Many other functions of the Commission can soon be abandoned or turned over to the Italians.

The Moscow Declaration⁴ provided that the Theater Commander would in time turn over his presidency of the Commission to the Advisory Council. We have recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the Advisory Council be tied in more closely with the day to day problems of the Commission both to improve its present advisory role and to prepare it to assume the above functions if this course proves desirable.⁵

⁴ The provision referred to is contained in paragraph 7 of annex 3 to the secret protocol signed November 1, 1943, at the conclusion of the Tripartite Conference held at Moscow. See *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. 1, pp. 758-759; Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949*, vol. 3, p. 824.

⁵ Recommendation not printed.

The Armistice Terms. The severe long terms of surrender⁶ are a source of weakness to any Italian government. They are unquestionably out of date, and many of them have never been applied. In reply to the Bonomi memorandum of July 22,⁷ we agreed to study any specific suggestions for their revision.⁸ We have not pursued this question in view of the British proposal for a preliminary peace to replace the armistice regime.

We did not wish to publish the long terms until some step to offset the reaction could be announced. Pressure in Italy for publication is growing, however, and we have advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that if this becomes advisable the Italian government itself should take the responsibility for publication.⁹

Italian Armed Forces. The Italians continue to press for fuller military participation. It has finally been decided to furnish combat equipment for three divisions of the Corps of Liberation. General Wilson also recommends increasing the Italian armed forces from 444,300 to 470,000 men.

Prisoners of War. Italian troops captured before the surrender continue to be prisoners of war, even those now employed in combat zones as service units. It should be possible to remove that stigma without prejudice to any military interest. In June we recommended this course to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,¹⁰ who referred it to the British Chiefs of Staff and AFHQ.

Italian Participation in International Affairs. The Italians should not be precluded from all international contacts. We proposed inviting an Italian observer to the Bretton Woods Conference.¹¹ The British, French and Yugoslavs were opposed, while the Russians and Greeks agreed. We also favor Italy's participation in such bodies as the International Labor Office.

Some form of Italian representation with the Allied Governments besides the U.S.S.R.¹² seems advisable. We have informed Bonomi of our willingness to receive in an unofficial capacity an Italian technical representation to discuss financial and economic questions and report

⁶ Signed at Malta, September 29, 1943; terms modified by a protocol signed at Brindisi, November 9, 1943. For texts, see Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604*; Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949*, vol. 3, pp. 775, 854; 61 Stat. (3) 2742, 2761.

⁷ See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, p. 1142.

⁸ See *ibid.*, p. 1145.

⁹ The communication referred to is not printed (740.00119 Control (Italy)/8-1944).

¹⁰ Recommendation not printed.

¹¹ i.e., the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944.

¹² The Soviet Union had established relations with the Italian Government in March 1944, without prior notice to the United States and British Governments. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, pp. 1048 ff.

directly to the Italian Government on such matters as the treatment of Italian prisoners of war here.¹³

Territorial Problems. Our preliminary studies have been based on the criteria: (1) territory should not be taken from Italy merely to punish a defeated enemy or reward an ally; (2) ethnic considerations should predominate, though economic and strategic factors would be kept in mind; (3) as to colonies, native welfare is the first concern; other colonial empires should not be aggrandized by the addition of Italian colonies; and, if Italian colonies are placed under international trusteeship, efforts might be made to place under similar trusteeship at least some other colonial possessions.

In order not to prejudice final settlements, we have advised the extension of Allied Military Government to all metropolitan territory within the 1939 frontiers as liberated; administration thereof by Anglo-American military forces exclusively; and in disputed areas the employment of more Allied and fewer local Italian officials than elsewhere in Italy.

¹³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, p. 1146.

Hopkins Papers

*The Chief of the Economic Section of the Allied Control Commission for Italy (O'Dwyer) to the President*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1944.

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE ITALIAN SITUATION

I. HEALTH, SUPPLY AND SHIPPING SITUATION

The plight of the Italian people is serious as a result of Nazi and Fascist rule and the battle destruction on its soil. The accumulated result of years of undernourishment and the destruction caused by the fighting has already begun to show up and is likely to show up in accelerated form in the near future. From available information, including the official Allied government medical opinion, the general health of the people seems to be bad. Serious outbreaks of illness are to be expected beginning with winter conditions. The low resistance of the people is said to be the result of continued low consumption under Fascist occupation. The dangerous period is said to be from January to July, 1945. Increased food supply is prescribed by the Allied Con-

¹ The source text is filed with the following undated handwritten chit: "MR. HOPKINS:—This is the memo of which I spoke to you last evening. BILL O'DWYER". It is not known whether O'Dwyer actually gave a copy to Roosevelt, but, if not, he presumably gave the President the gist of the memorandum during a meeting which he and Crowley had with Roosevelt at 11:15 a.m., September 8 (Roosevelt Papers).

trol Commission Health Subcommittee. Any added quantities of food needed will obviously require more shipping space than presently allocated shipping. In view of the responsibility of the Allied governments, present policy should be amended to include adequate shipping allocation immediately.

II. ITALIAN UNEMPLOYMENT

Universal unemployment is foreseen for the coming winter, mainly due to the thoroughness of the demolition of power plants by the enemy forces. Next in importance to an increased food supply will be a partial restoration of power. Without adequate food supply and partial restoration of manufacturing the result may well be rioting, bloodshed and anarchy. Without these two basic aids the Italian people and the government will be in a desperate plight. A relatively slight change in present policies may help to correct this situation.

III. INLAND TRANSPORTATION

The present condition of transportation is haphazard and grossly inadequate. Any plan to maintain a food supply and to put the Italian people in a position where they can help themselves must include adequate transportation. Adequate transportation should be made available following relief of the strain caused by military necessity. Food, medical and other vital supplies landed in Italy are of no use unless they are gotten to the people who vitally need them. To do this adequate transportation is essential.

IV. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION AND THE ITALIANS' CO-BELLIGERENT STATUS TO THE SUPPLY AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN ITALY

It is desirable to take every step necessary to develop the initiative of the Italian people.

The Italian mind is friendly toward the Allies but confused. The difficulties arise from an inability to understand the distinction between the status of a defeated enemy as against the status of a co-belligerent. Despite the fact that there are Italian divisions fighting side by side with the Allies, and despite the fact that there is unrestricted use of Italian resources to serve Allied military needs, there are still Italians held as prisoners of war.

It is generally believed that government responsibility in liberated Italy might well be placed without any major restrictions in the hands of the Italian government, that the formal state of war between the Allies and Italy should be discontinued, and that the Allied Control Commission in liberated Italy should be abolished and its functions placed in the hands of civilian experts.

Department of the Army Files

The President to the Secretary of War (Stimson)

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

As a result of years of Fascist and Nazi rule and the destruction resulting from the battles on its soil, I understand that the supply situation in Italy is critical.

This situation should be corrected as effectively and as quickly as possible.

The War Department should, therefore, take immediate action to make available the additional essential civilian supplies and shipping necessary to remedy this condition.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

E. AUSTRIA AND THE BALKANS

Roosevelt Papers

*Department of State Briefing Paper*¹

SECRET

[Undated.]

CIVIL AFFAIRS IN THE BALKANS

American planning for civil affairs in the Balkans is restricted to Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania on the theory that these will be liberated territory. No American participation in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary is contemplated in present plans, unless it is found that these countries have surpluses of foodstuffs or products useful in the war, for the handling of which American personnel in Allied missions might be desirable.

The U.S. Army has set up, under authorization of the President, a combined Anglo-American Military Headquarters for relief and rehabilitation in Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia, the American participation being limited to sixty-three, all officers, while British personnel will number several thousand. On our initiative an agreement has been made between UNRRA and the military authorities whereby UNRRA will serve as the agency of the combined military headquarters for the distribution of the supplies during the military period.² In view of the American origin of the bulk of the supplies and

¹ Annex 7 to Hull's memorandum to Roosevelt dated September 6, 1944, which was sent to the White House under cover of a further memorandum of September 8. See *ante*, p. 120.

² For the text of the agreement referred to, signed at Cairo, April 3, 1944, see George Woodbridge, *UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), vol. III, pp. 210-211.

the limited American military participation, this arrangement may serve to prevent the distribution from being controlled solely by [the] British military and for British political ends. Since these territories would be supplied by UNRRA after the military period, it also seems desirable to have UNRRA on the ground at once.

There has been some difference of opinion between the British and Americans as to the extent of UNRRA's responsibility during the military period. The American position is that UNRRA should be given the maximum possible responsibility under the direction of the military headquarters. The British would prefer to limit UNRRA's role principally to the furnishing of certain personnel who would, as individuals, advise and assist the military. The Combined Civil Affairs Committee is now trying to reach agreement on this point. The British plan for the distribution of supplies in Albania and Yugoslavia has contemplated delivery of supplies at ports, to the local authorities, with practically no control to assure their distribution in accordance with our policy of non-discrimination because of race, creed or political affiliation. The American plan urges agreements with local authorities providing for such non-discriminatory distribution, and sufficient personnel, either of UNRRA or the military, within the countries to make sure of compliance with this policy. We feel strongly that relief and supplies should not be used as a political weapon to help any one faction. Particularly in the case of Yugoslavia the scheme of delivery to the people easiest at hand would be sure to give to that faction a powerful implement in the civil strife within the country. It is to the American long-range interest that we should not become a party to such a program. A clear understanding with the British on this point is essential.

The British plan for Greece envisages a rather elaborate military organization to supervise distribution, restore port facilities, railroads and other utilities. This work will also be facilitated by the organizations already familiar with the problem and the trained personnel available.

We think the Russians should be fully informed of all these activities, through a representative who would be in close touch with the *combined* military headquarters. Suspicions would be allayed and a precedent established which might advantageously be used in reverse in other areas where Russia is primarily concerned. There has been a reluctance on the part of a number of British officials to agree to keeping the Russians fully informed.

One of the major problems is the lack of contact with the military authorities of the Governments in question. Agreements providing for their cooperation would be desirable with a view to securing both information and the utilization of the services, personnel and admin-

istration which will be under their control. In the case of Greece it has now been proposed that the Theater Commander be authorized to discuss these problems with the Greek authorities.

The Yugoslav Government presents a particular problem in this connection, since the reported unity established between the Government-in-exile and the Tito organization is of a very dubious nature, with the additional complication that neither of them has control or more than a claim to authority in Serbia, the heart of the country. It may, therefore, be necessary to continue the planning without much consultation with Yugoslav officials until there is some clarification of the authority and popular support of the respective groups. Unfortunately, the Yugoslav officials have been so preoccupied with their political troubles that they seem to have made no serious plans of their own. Actual relief operations may in fact have to be postponed while the civil strife continues.

In Albania there is no government with which to deal. Civil affairs operations will of necessity require considerable improvisation, but should present no major problems.

Roosevelt Papers

*Department of State Briefing Paper*¹

SECRET

[Undated.]

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS HUNGARY

The Hungarians have failed to take any realistic action to withdraw from the war, though they have repeatedly avowed their desire to do so. The difficulty has been their hope that the "Anglo-Americans" would protect them against Soviet Russia, and their unwillingness to part with territories acquired with German aid. The country is now in ferment, however, and events may move rapidly.

Draft armistice terms for Hungary, having the approval of the Joint Chiefs, were sent to the European Advisory Commission several months ago.² Subsequently revised terms, including certain inducements to the Hungarians while maintaining the principle of unconditional surrender, were sent forward.³

The United States does not contemplate participation in military operations in Hungary or in the occupation of that country. American troops in that area could probably be used more effectively, in the

¹ Annex 8 to Hull's memorandum to Roosevelt dated September 6, 1944, which was sent to the White House under cover of a further memorandum of September 8. See *ante*, p. 120.

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, pp. 883-887.

³ Not printed.

political sense, than either British or Soviet armies, but such participation would inevitably involve this Government as an active agent in the political questions of Southeastern Europe. Although planning for civil affairs administration in Hungary after surrender is under the jurisdiction of AFHQ in the Mediterranean Theater, American representatives have taken no part in whatever planning has been done. The United States will, however, desire political representatives in Hungary in the period after surrender. Such representation is desirable for the execution of the political terms of the armistice, for supporting our general objectives of promoting a just and stable political and territorial settlement, as well as for securing accurate first-hand political and economic information, and protecting American interests.

As a long-term objective the United States favors the establishment of a broadly-based provisional government, designed to carry through by democratic means the transition to a permanent regime. There are revolutionary forces in Hungary working for land reform, electoral reform and the overthrow of the present ruling group. We acknowledge the need and the strong public demand for changes in the Hungarian system, and must expect that these reforms will not be accomplished without some violence.

In regard to the territorial settlement, the United States favors, as a matter of principle, the restoration of the pre-Munich frontiers, and any consideration of the boundary disputes between Hungary and its neighbors should start from that point. However, we do not regard the pre-Munich boundaries as unchangeable and believe certain changes to be desirable in the interest of a stable settlement.

Thus, in the case of the frontier with Czechoslovakia, if an opportunity arises for revision by agreement which would leave to Hungary certain overwhelmingly Magyar-inhabited districts, the United States would favor such a solution. In the case of the frontier with Yugoslavia, the United States sees some merit in a compromise solution which would leave to Hungary the northern part of the Vojvodina, although this Government should not, we feel, press for such a solution. In the case of the frontier with Rumania, the American position will be more or less frozen by our agreement to the armistice terms for Rumania which provide for the restoration to that country of "all or the major part of Transylvania, subject to confirmation at the peace settlement."⁴ In the final settlement the United States would favor, at the least, a revision of the pre-war frontier on ethnic grounds, transferring to Hungary a small strip of territory given to Rumania at the end of the last war.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. IV, pp. 170, 173.

Roosevelt Papers

*Memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (Elsey)*¹

[Undated.]

OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA AND THE BALKANS

Decisions concerning post-surrender occupation of Austria and the Balkans were made easily in contrast with decisions concerning Germany and France. In May, General Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff for a directive to allow him to plan for the occupation of southeastern Europe, an area which had not been covered by COSSAC's planning as it was out of his sphere. The British Chiefs prepared a draft directive for General Wilson and sent it to the U.S. Chiefs for concurrence.*

They approved the draft but felt that a statement of U.S. policy should be included, a paper which should of course be approved by the President since it involved major political and economic considerations. The statement of our Balkan policy which the Chiefs prepared for Presidential study was based on the two letters of the President to the Secretary of State of February 21² ("I do not want the United States to have the post-war burden of reconstituting France, Italy and the Balkans") and April 30³ ("This Government is of the opinion that the southern zone and Austria should be occupied by British Forces"). The President approved the following statement on May 27 and the Joint Chiefs then sent it to the British Chiefs of Staff: †

"With regard to the occupation of southeast Europe the policy of the United States may be summarized as follows:

"A. No United States forces will be employed as occupational forces in southern Europe, including Austria, or southeast Europe, including the Balkans. Such United States forces as may be present in these areas due to military operations will be withdrawn as soon as practicable after the cessation of hostilities.

¹ This paper was an appendix to Elsey's memorandum on zones of occupation in Europe, *ante*, p. 145. Elsey informed the Historical Office of the Department of State on January 12, 1955, that he had prepared the memorandum "immediately prior to" the Second Quebec Conference at the request of the President's Naval Aide (Brown). "Knowing that the subject of zones of occupation would have a prominent place on the agenda of that conference, Admiral Brown directed me to write a briefing paper on the issues between the United Kingdom and the United States on zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, the paper to be based on the Map Room files and the files of Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy and the President." (Historical Office Files)

* C.C.S. 320/14, 10 May 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. 1, p. 184, fn. 12. Roosevelt's memorandum to Stettinius of February 21, 1944, is not printed (740.00119 Control (Germany)/2-2144).

³ Not printed (740.00119 EAC/172c).

† J.C.S. 577/12, 18 May 1944. J.C.S. 577/13, 20 May 1944. J.C.S. 577/14, 28 May 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

"B. United States participation in civil affairs in southern and southeast Europe will be limited to procurement and shipment of supplies to Albania, Yugoslavia, and Greece, and to the employment of a small number of officers in connection with distribution until such time as U.N.R.R.A. can take over these duties."

These paragraphs were incorporated into the British directive to General Wilson and it was sent to him on June 9.† The problems with respect to Austria and the Balkans which seemed to have been so quickly solved was [were] suddenly confused, however, by twin inquiries from the Foreign Office and the British Chiefs of Staff requesting clarification of our position. The British commented that the June 9 directive to General Wilson stated that we would not occupy Austria, whereas on May 31 Ambassador Winant had informed the European Advisory Commission that "he was authorized to accept the proposal for the tripartite occupation of Austria."⁴ The State Department was taken by surprise and telegraphed Winant on June 15⁵ that, so far as it knew, our policy on Austria had not changed; we still believed that "Austria should be occupied by British forces."§

Mr. Winant replied two days later. He explained that, although Russia and Great Britain had agreed on tripartite occupation of Austria, he had had no instructions on the subject. "On the last day I was in Washington [May 26],"⁶ he wrote, "I accordingly took this matter up with the President and obtained his permission to agree to the tripartite control of Austria on the understanding that I would in no way commit us respecting the size of the contingent that we might be willing to contribute for this occupation. In working on the drafts concerning the subject of occupation of Austria, I rejected, for example, the phrase 'will be occupied by the forces of three countries' and have used the less concise phrase 'tripartite control.' When General Marshall was here I discussed this question with him and explained our limited position."||

Ambassador Winant's belated account of his discussion with the President clarified the situation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the British Chiefs on 12 July, in answer to their query, that "there is no change in the policy of the United States Government as regards occupational forces for Austria except that a token force similar to the

†C.C.S. 320/18, 11 June 1944. [Footnote in the source text. For a portion of the text of the directive to Wilson dated June 9, 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. 1, p. 434.]

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. 1, pp. 231, 435.

⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 435.

§J.C.S. 577/15, 3 July 1944. C.C.S. 320/20, 7 July 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

||The bracketed date appears in the source text.

¶J.C.S. 577/15, 3 July 1944. [Footnote in the source text. For the full text of Winant's telegram No. 4844 to Hull, dated June 17, 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. 1, p. 436.]

force planned for Berlin may be sent to Austria in connection with a tripartite control of Austria that may be agreed upon." ¶ The State Department made a similar reply to the Foreign Office.**

Meanwhile General Wilson had continued his planning for the occupation of Austria and at the end of July he reported that he plans, with General Eisenhower's approval, to occupy Austria with four British divisions.††

¶ C.C.S. 320/21, 12 July 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

**J.C.S. 577/16, 19 July 1944. [Footnote in the source text. For Hull's telegram No. 5537 to Winant on this subject, dated July 15, 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, p. 451.]

††Message for the Combined Chiefs of Staff from General Wilson (NAF 749), 29 July 1944. [Footnote in the source text.]

F. BASIC STRATEGY AND POLICIES FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 22 August 1944.

C.C.S. 654

BASIC POLICIES FOR THE NEXT UNITED STATES-BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE

Reference: C.C.S. 426/1¹

The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve these basic policies for the next United States-British staff conference:

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff agree that the following statement of basic strategy and policies will be used as a basis for the next United States-British staff conference.

I. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE

2. In conjunction with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

II. OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

3. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan

¹"Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister", December 6, 1943. For text, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 810.

with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

5. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the over-all strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation:

a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication.

d. Continue the disruption of Axis sea communications.

e. Continue the offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

f. Continue to aid the war effort of Russia.

g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

h. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers.

i. Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as a matter of highest priority as soon as the German situation allows.

j. Continue operations leading to the earliest practicable invasion of Japan.

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 2 September 1944.

C.C.S. 654/1

BASIC POLICIES FOR THE NEXT UNITED STATES-BRITISH STAFF CONFERENCE

References: *a.* C.C.S. 654¹

b. C.C.S. 426/1²

1. The British Chiefs of Staff recommend acceptance of the following amendments to the proposals put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 654.

¹ *Supra.*

² See *ante*, p. 218, fn. 1.

(a) Paragraph 6 f

f. Continue to aid the war effort of Russia.³ Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia including the coordinated action of our forces.⁴

This wording was used in C.C.S. 426/1, paragraph 6 g, and the British Chiefs of Staff feel that the coordination of action of our forces with the Russians will be of increasing importance as they converge.

(b) Paragraph 6 h

h. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces, and be prepared to assist other co-belligerents, to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers.

This amendment is designed to cover, for example, supplies to Turkey and Axis satellites turning over to our side.

(c) Paragraph 6 i

i. Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as a matter of highest priority having regard to other inescapable commitments as soon as the German situation allows.

2. In all other respects the proposals put forward are acceptable to the British Chiefs of Staff.

³ Canceled type in the source text represented a proposed deletion.

⁴ The words printed in italics throughout this document, except for paragraph headings, were underscored in the source text to represent proposed additions.

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 8 September 1944.

C.C.S. 654/5

BASIC POLICIES FOR THE NEXT UNITED STATES-BRITISH STAFF
CONFERENCE

References: a. C.C.S. 654¹

b. C.C.S. 654/1²

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered the amendments to the basic policies for the next United States-British Staff Conference as proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 654/1. They agree with the amendments proposed in paragraphs 6 f and 6 i, subject to the rewording set forth below. As to the change suggested in paragraph 6 h, the United States Chiefs of Staff prefer to consider these matters separately as they arise.

¹ Ante, p. 218.

² Supra.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that paragraphs 6 *f*, 6 *h* and 6 *i* should read as follows:

a. Paragraph 6 f.

"*f*. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia to include coordinating the action of forces."

b. Paragraph 6 h.

"*h*. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers. Within the limits of our available resources, to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able effectively to employ this assistance against the Axis Powers in the present war."

c. Paragraph 6 i.

"*i*. Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as a matter of highest priority having regard to other agreed commitments as soon as the German situation allows."

G. THE WAR IN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 29 August 1944.²

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt, Personal and Top Secret, number 772.

General Alexander received a telegram from SHAEF asking for efforts to be made to prevent the withdrawal of more divisions from the Italian Front. This of course was the consequence of the great weakening of our Armies in Italy and has taken place entirely since the attack on the Riviera.³ In all, four divisions have left including a very strong *Panzer* en route for Chalon. However, in spite of the weakening process Alexander began about three weeks ago to plan with Clark to turn or pierce the Apennines. For this purpose the British 13 Corps of four divisions has been placed under General Clark's orders and we have been able to supply him with the necessary artillery of which his army had been deprived. This army of eight divisions—four American and four British—is now grouped around Florence in a northerly axis.

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² According to Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 122–124, he sent this message from Naples on August 28; it was relayed via London.

³ i.e., the Allied landings which took place on the southern coast of France on August 15, 1944 (Operation DRAGOON).

By skinning the whole front and holding long stretches with nothing but anti-aircraft gunners converted to a kind of artillery-infantry and supported by a few armoured brigades, Alexander has also been able to concentrate ten British or British controlled divisions representative of the whole British Empire on the Adriatic flank. The leading elements of these attacked before midnight on the 25th and a general barrage opened and an advance began at dawn on the 26th. An advance of about nine miles was made over a large area but the main position, the Gothic Line, has still to be encountered. I had the good fortune to go forward with this advance and was consequently able to form a much clearer impression of the modern battlefield than is possible from the kinds of pinnacles and perches to which I have hitherto been confined.

The plan is that the Eighth Army of ten divisions very heavily weighted in depth will endeavour to pierce the Gothic Line and turn the whole enemy's position entering the Po Valley on the level of Rimini but at the right moment depending on the reactions of the enemy Mark Clark will strike with his eight divisions and the elements of both armies will converge to Bologna. If all goes well I hope that the advance will be much more rapid after that and that the continued heavy fighting will prevent further harm being done to Eisenhower by the withdrawal of divisions from Italy.

I have never forgotten your talks to me at Teheran about Istria⁴ and I am sure that the arrival of a powerful army in Trieste and Istria in four or five weeks would have an effect far outside purely military values. Tito's people will be awaiting us in Istria. What the condition of Hungary will be then I cannot imagine but we shall at any rate be in a position to take full advantage of any great new situation.

⁴ See Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 63, and *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 493.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] 30 August 1944.

Number 611, personal and top secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.

Your 772.² I was very glad to receive your account of the way in which General Wilson has concentrated his forces in Italy and has now renewed the offensive. My Chiefs of Staff feel that a vigorous attack,

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

² *Supra*.

using all the forces available, should force the enemy into the Po Valley. The enemy may then choose to withdraw entirely from northern Italy. Since such action on his part might enable the enemy to release divisions for other fronts, we must do our best to destroy his forces while we have them in our grasp. I am confident that General Wilson has this as his objective.

With an offensive under way and being pressed full strength in Italy, I am sure that General Eisenhower will be satisfied that everything possible is being done in the Mediterranean to assist him by mauling German divisions which might otherwise be moved against his forces in the near future. I understand all available British resources in the Mediterranean are being put into Italy. We are pressing into France all reinforcements and resources we can in order to guarantee that General Eisenhower will be able to maintain the impetus of the joint victories our forces have already won. With the smashing success of our invasion of southern France and the Russians now crumbling the enemy flank in the Balkans, I have great hopes that complete and final victory will not be long delayed.

It is my thought that we should press the German Army in Italy vigorously with every facility we have available and suspend decision on the future use of General Wilson's armies until the results of his campaign are better known and we have better information as to what the Germans may do.

We can renew our Teheran talk about Trieste and Istria at OCTAGON.

ROOSEVELT

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*¹

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 31 August 1944.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and top secret. Number 774.

Your No. 611² SOP.

Now all operations in Italy are conceived and executed by General Alexander in accordance with his general directives from the Supreme Commander. You will see that he is now in contact for twenty miles on the Adriatic flank with the Gothic line, and a severe battle will be fought by the Eighth Army. Also General Clark with the Fifth Army has made an advance from the direction of Florence. I have impressed most strongly upon General Alexander the importance of pressing with his utmost strength to destroy the enemy's armed forces as well

¹ Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

² *Supra*.

as turn his line. It will not be easy for the Germans to effect a general retreat from the Gothic line over the Alps especially if we can arrive in the neighbourhood of Bologna. The western passes and tunnels into France are already blocked by your advance into the Rhone Valley. Only the direct route to Germany is open. We shall do our utmost to engage, harry and destroy the enemy. The decisive battle has yet, however, to be fought.

2. In view of the fact that the enemy on the Italian front has been weakened by four of his best divisions, we no longer ask for further American reinforcements beyond the 92nd Division, which I understand will shortly reach us. On the other hand, I take it for granted that no more will be withdrawn from Italy, i.e., that the four divisions of Clark's army and the elements remaining with them will continue there: and that General Alexander should make his plans on that basis. So much for the present.

3. As to the future: continuous employment against the enemy will have to be found for the Eighth and Fifth Armies once the German armies in Italy have been destroyed or unluckily made their escape. This employment can only take the form of a movement first to Istria and Trieste and ultimately upon Vienna. Should the war come to an end in a few months, as may well be possible, none of these questions will arise. Anyhow, we can talk this over fully at OCTAGON.

4. I congratulate you upon the brilliant success of the landings in Southern France. I earnestly hope the retreating Germans may be nipped at Valence or Lyons and rounded up. Another mob of about 90,000 is apparently streaming back from the south via Poitiers.

J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Wilson)
to the British and United States Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

AFHQ, 2 September 1944.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FX 91375, MEDCOS 181. Following is a review of the situation in the Mediterranean Theatre.

I. Operation "DRAGOON"

1. Thanks to the skill with which it was mounted and carried through by all three services Operation DRAGOON has been an outstanding success. Once ashore the skill of the commanders combined with the determination and speed of manoeuvre of all forces coupled

¹This message was sent separately to the British Chiefs of Staff, to the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington for the United States Chiefs of Staff, and to Eisenhower's headquarters. For the discussion of this report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 172d Meeting, September 12, 1944, see *post*, p. 302.

with effective assistance from the French Forces of the Interior have produced a situation in which the whole of southeastern France east of the Rhone and south of Lyons as far east as Nice is under the control of the Allied armies. Some 50,000 prisoners have been captured and very heavy losses have been inflicted on the enemy though some 11½ divisions have escaped to the north after having suffered heavy losses in men and material. The capture ahead of schedule of the ports of Toulon and Marseilles coupled with our unexpected success in securing control of the Port de Bouc practically undamaged have resulted in a situation in which by the middle of September the ports of Southern France will be able to handle any foreseeable demands which may be placed upon them. Subsequently the logistical bottleneck will be the capacity of the railway leading north through the Rhone Valley, but thanks to the speed of our advance and the consequent reduction in the expected scale of demolitions, Seventh Army expect to be able to maintain a force of one armoured division and four infantry divisions north of Lyons by 15th September at earliest. By 1st October it is estimated that a double line of railway will be working as far as Lyons which will by that date place the supply facilities for Allied armies operating in southeastern France on a satisfactory basis. A preliminary estimate, taking into account facilities offered by the use of the Rhone Canal, some 10,000 tons per day might be delivered in the Lyons area from that date. The general tactical plan of Commander Seventh Army² which I have approved is that after the capture of Lyons the general grouping of his forces will be that the French Armée "B" will undertake the protection of the right flank facing the Franco-Italian frontier and will operate east of the Rhone with an axis of advance Bourg-Besançon. In the execution of its security mission along the Franco-Italian frontier it will be assisted by the United States Divisional Airborne Division, and First Special Service Force. At the same time the VI American Corps will be regrouped so as to operate west of the Rhone on the line Autun-Dijon-Langres with the object of making contact with the American Third Army. I would propose that at this stage of the operations the command of the forces in France should be transferred to General Eisenhower. While the forces at present employed under the command of the Seventh Army might not appear to be of sufficient magnitude to warrant the formation of 6th Army Group, I consider that in view of the length of communications, the very heavy responsibilities for port maintenance and civil affairs and matters connected with the French resistance movement together with the possibility that forces from the right wing of American armies already in France might either be placed under its command or main-

² Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch.

tained from Mediterranean ports, it is desirable that the 6th Army Group should take over command of southern France. Anticipating that this will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff I am sending General Devers to consider plans with General Eisenhower. As regards administration, I have sent a planning representative to SHAEF to discuss the time when SHAEF should assume administrative responsibility. I would suggest that this matter be left for final settlement between SHAEF and my Headquarters. As regards the large areas in France west of the Rhone, I consider that no military action is required to deal with such small German forces as are still in this area and which are being rapidly rounded up by the French Forces of the Interior, and I feel that any divergence of regular troops would be a waste of effort.

2. *Air*. I have recently discussed with General Eaker and General Spaatz proposals for the disposition of United States tactical air forces between Italy and southern France which have my full approval and which are now being discussed with General Eisenhower. Their general effect would be that continued offensive operations in the autumn and winter by the Allied armies in Italy would continue to receive very powerful air support from United States Army Air Force fighter-bombers as well as by medium bombers. The detailed deployment and distribution of the tactical air forces cannot and need not be decided until we see the outcome of the present offensive in the Po Valley. Meanwhile I am satisfied that that offensive as well as the operations in the DRAGOON area are receiving most adequate and effective support. At the same time certain administrative measures such as holding up the shipping to France of aviation engineers and steel planking have been taken to facilitate any redeployment of the tactical air forces that may be decided upon.

II. *Italy*

In the Italian Theatre the enemy now has a total of some 26 divisions which are estimated to be the equivalent of some 16 to 17. As a result of the deterioration in the situation in northern France the Germans have withdrawn two *Panzer* Grenadier Divisions from this theatre which have now been identified in central France. On the other hand the success of our cover plans which have been designed to make the enemy think that one of our objects was to secure Genoa and the Ligurian Coast together with the enemy's fear that the landings in southern France might be the prelude to an invasion of Italy from the west, have resulted in the enemy disposing some five divisions, including three Italian divisions to meet this threat. As a result his forces holding the Gothic Line have been considerably weakened, and until the last few days the enemy did not apparently appreciate the threat

to his left flank. He has, however, now realised to some extent the seriousness of this threat and has moved two divisions into the line northwest of Pesaro and further movements to this flank may well be expected. With the reduction in the number of divisions available to him consequent upon the decision to launch Operation DRAGOON, General Alexander changed the plan for the major offensive in Italy, which was to be launched at the end of August. Whereas in the original plan the main blow was to be launched on the general axis Florence-Bologna with the object of breaking the enemy's centre and pinning the eastern portion of his forces back against the sea, the new plan is to launch the main blow along the Adriatic Coast north of Ancona where the Apennines present the least obstacle to movement. This main offensive was started on 26th August and is being conducted by the Eighth Army with a force of nine divisions. Good progress is being made and considerable penetration[s] of the Gothic Line have been made on a front extending some 20 miles westwards from Pesaro. As soon as the enemy starts to move reserves to this area, General Alexander plans to start a second offensive to be launched by the Fifth U.S. Army which now commands the XIII British Corps northeast of Florence in the direction of Bologna. I have every hope that as a result of these two offensives the Allied armies will secure control of the line Padua-Verona-Brescia within a few weeks and thus secure the destruction of Kesselring's Army by preventing its withdrawal through the Alpine passes. To complete this task it will be necessary to have available the full resources now at General Alexander's disposal. Further the limited communication facilities which are available to the enemy in northern Italy point to the fact that the use of the air will be a major factor in completing his destruction and facilitating our advance. There will therefore be ample scope for the employment of medium bomber forces throughout the whole operation and it is also to be noted that if medium bombers are established in the Florence-Ancona area, heavy and sustained attacks can be delivered by such air forces well into Austria. In view of the developments which are daily occurring in the general war situation it does not appear to me possible to undertake any further definite commitments. Should, however, the war be further prolonged and the enemy endeavour to withdraw from Greece and the Balkans with the object of holding a line from Trieste through Zagreb and Belgrade to Turnu Severin and the Transylvanian Mountains, the best course would be to regroup our forces and to move northeastwards with the object of securing control of the Ljubljana Gap. Such an operation would require the maximum co-operation with Tito's forces and the occupation of the port of Trieste. Amphibious resources in this theatre are not available to mount a seaborne attack on Trieste this

year and consequently unless German resistance collapses it is unlikely that another major offensive could be mounted until the spring of 1945. Concurrently with an advance northeastwards it will be well to clear the enemy completely from northwestern Italy and this should be completed as rapidly as possible with the minimum forces required to establish control and law and order. Provided that demolitions through the Maritime Alps are not too severe it might well be possible to establish land communication with the forces in France.

III. *Balkans*

1. All information goes to show that the enemy is faced with an increasingly difficult situation throughout the Balkans and the Islands of the Aegean. This situation is likely to be further accentuated by the situation in Roumania and the probable defection of Bulgaria. Though it is estimated that a proportion of the troops are suitable from the training and equipment point of view for use elsewhere, there is little evidence at the moment that any substantial withdrawal is taking place. However, I anticipate that the Germans now faced with the necessity of finding some reserves in the Balkan area will be forced to regroup and make available four or five divisions if they are to hold either the Bulgarian frontier or the Zagreb-Belgrade line later.

2. *Balkan Air Force.* Since its formation, the Balkan Air Force has been successful in maintaining pressure against the enemy forces in Yugoslavia and Albania and inflicting continuing losses upon him. On 1st September as a result of consultations with Marshal Tito a concentrated attack on enemy communications in the Balkans began with the object of further embarrassing him and preventing the regrouping of forces. This operation has the code name RATWEEK and appears suitably timed. Stimulation of Partisan activity in Greece and Albania is also in hand.

3. *Greece.* Arrangements are in hand in the event of German withdrawal or surrender for the rapid occupation of Athens with its ports and airfields with a view of ensuring order and stability and the commencement of relief measures.

4. *RANKIN "C."* I wish to draw the attention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the unsatisfactory situation in which I am placed with regard to the policy to be pursued in the event of a German collapse. If prompt and effective action is to be taken it is essential that I should receive immediate direction as to the extent of my commitments in regard to occupational forces and as to the formation which I am permitted to employ to carry out the tasks assigned to me.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*¹TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

[HYDE PARK,] 3 September 1944.

Number 616. Personal and top secret. From the President for the Prime Minister.

Your Number 774.²

I share your confidence that the Allied divisions we have in Italy are sufficient to do the task before them and that the battle commanders will press the battle unrelentingly with the objective of shattering the enemy forces. After breaking the German forces on the Gothic Line, we must go on to use our divisions in the way which best aids General Eisenhower's decisive drive into the enemy homeland.

As to the exact employment of our forces in Italy in the future, this is a matter we can discuss at OCTAGON. It seems to me that American forces should be used to the westward but I am completely open-minded on this and, in any event, this depends on the progress of the present battle in Italy and also in France where I strongly feel that we must not stint in any way the forces needed to break quickly through the western defenses of Germany.

The credit for the great Allied success in southern France must go impartially to the combined Allied force, and the perfection of execution of the operation from its beginning to the present belong[s] to General Wilson and his Allied staff and to Patch and his subordinate commanders. With the present chaotic conditions of the Germans in southern France, I hope that a junction of the north and south forces may be obtained at a much earlier date than was first anticipated.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent via the White House Map Room to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels. This message was based on a draft which Leahy had sent to Hyde Park in telegram No. RED 357 of September 3, 1944, which had been approved by Roosevelt with the insertion of the words "but I am completely open-minded on this and" in the second substantive paragraph.

² *Ante*, p. 223.

Roosevelt Papers

*Department of State Briefing Paper*¹

SECRET

[Undated.]

SANTA MARIA AIRFIELD

Mr. Churchill probably will not raise the question of the second Azores airfield our Army Air Corps is anxious to operate on Santa

¹ Annex 9 to Hull's memorandum to Roosevelt dated September 6, 1944, which was sent to the White House under cover of a further memorandum of September 8. See *ante*, p. 120.

Maria. The British are in agreement with us that this is a matter for direct negotiation as between us and the Portuguese. The British Ambassador in Lisbon ² did not mention Santa Maria in communicating to Dr. Salazar the Combined Chiefs of Staff decision respecting Portuguese participation in a Timor expedition.³

It would appear unnecessary, and perhaps unwise, for us to take the initiative in reopening with the British any discussion of the airfield now under construction by us in the Island of Santa Maria, or of American use and control of the airfield when constructed.

Should Mr. Churchill raise the question ⁴ it would be well to make clear to him that the negotiations leading up to the granting of this facility by the Portuguese Government have been conducted directly between the American and Portuguese Governments and have not been related in any way to the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement of August 17, 1943 ⁵ or to the alliance of 1373; ⁶ and that our Air Corps expects to operate the field directly. In these negotiations it has been agreed that the guise of an American commercial enterprise, namely Pan-American Airways, would be employed to cover the interest of the American Government in the project. No question of control or utilization of the field for post-war civil aviation purposes is involved.

² Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell.

³ For correspondence on Portuguese interest in the liberation of Timor and on negotiations for the construction of facilities on the island of Santa Maria in the Azores, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. iv, pp. 1 ff.

⁴ No evidence has been found that Churchill raised this question with Roosevelt at the Second Quebec Conference.

⁵ For text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxlvi, p. 447; *Documentos relativos aos acordos entre Portugal, Inglaterra e Estados Unidos da América para a concessão de facilidades nos Açores durante a guerra de 1939-1945* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional de Lisboa, 1946), p. 19.

⁶ The reference is to the Treaty of London of June 16, 1373. See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. i, p. 462.

J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Wilson) to the War Department*¹

TOP SECRET

CASERTA, 8 September 1944.

URGENT

FX 93838, NAF 774. The general situation in this theatre has already been reported to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in MEDCOS 181.² The following is an amplification of this telegram, taking into account the developments which have occurred since it was written.

¹ Sent also to the Headquarters, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, and to Eisenhower's headquarters in London. For the discussion of this message by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 172d Meeting, September 12, 1944, see *post*, p. 302.

² *Ante*, p. 224.

I. Operation "DRAGOON"

This is developing most satisfactorily. All arrangements for transfer of control to SHAEF are in hand and I have nothing further to add.

II. Italy

I am confident from the progress of General Alexander's offensive from 26th August until the present date that the enemy will be driven completely from the Gothic Line. On the other hand, he is fighting very hard behind its eastern sector and I am not yet in a position to guarantee that this offensive will achieve decisive results. Considering, however, that the enemy has been forced to engage the bulk of his reserves to meet the thrust of the Eighth Army, I feel confident that as a result of the second offensive to be launched very soon by the Fifth Army the destruction of Kesselring's Army may yet be achieved.

Should Kesselring's Army be so hammered that it is unable to carry out an orderly withdrawal, I consider that with our great superiority in armour there is every chance of achieving really decisive results similar to those which have been secured in France. On the other hand, if he has time and opportunity to carry out a coordinated demolition programme, and particularly if bad weather should restrict the movement of armoured vehicles off the roads and limit operations of the air force as it may well do, then he may well be able to withdraw a considerable proportion of his forces intact and we may find them facing us behind the Po. Bearing in mind however that he is unlikely to have sufficient troops to hold the Po indefinitely, the course of operations would probably be a gradual withdrawal behind the line of the Alps and the Piave.

To sum up, it appears therefore that operations will develop in one of two ways:

a. Either Kesselring's forces will be routed, in which case it should be possible to undertake a rapid regrouping and a pursuit towards the Ljubljana Gap and across the Alps through the Brenner Pass, leaving a small force to clear up northwest Italy, or,

b. Kesselring's Army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal, in which event it does not seem possible that we can do more than clear the Lombardy Plains this year. Difficult terrain and severe weather in the Alps during winter would prevent another major offensive until spring of 1945.

III. The Balkans

Up to date information goes to show that the enemy is engaged in a large scale withdrawal from the Aegean Islands and from southern Greece with the object of finding mobile forces to hold the Bulgarian frontier and Yugoslavia.

At the same time, I anticipate that the enemy will retain static garrisons at important points and airfields with the object of preventing unopposed entry into the Balkans.

It would appear however that owing to the rapid advance of the Russian Army to Turnu Severin, and according to latest reports, the success of air and Partisan attacks on his Balkan communications (mentioned as RATWEEK in part III of MEDCOS 181) it seems to be probable that the enemy will be unable to achieve his purpose, nor will he be able to withdraw any substantial forces to assist him in his battles in Italy or in Central Europe.

I therefore consider that we can anticipate a situation in which the bulk of the German forces south of a line Trieste-Ljubljana-Zagreb and the Danube is immobilized and will so remain until their supplies are exhausted in which case they would be ready to surrender to us or will be liquidated by Partisan or Russian forces.

As long as the battle in Italy continues, I have no forces to employ in the Balkans except:

- a. The small force consisting of two paratroop brigades and an improvised brigade group from Alexandria which is being held ready to occupy the Athens area and so pave the way for the commencement of relief and the establishment of law and order and the Greek Government in the first of the countries which is likely to be liberated, and,
- b. The small land forces Adriatic which are being actively used primarily for commando type operations.

Further, to intensify the enemy's difficulties in the Aegean, a force of four carriers with cruisers and destroyers is now on its way under the command of Admiral Troubridge to the Aegean to carry out attacks on all enemy seaborne movement.

J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Eisenhower)
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

SHAEF, 9 September 1944.

Fwd 14276, SCAF 77. 1. Following are my recommendations relative to assumption of command of DRAGOON forces.

2. It is estimated that by 15 September the DRAGOON forces will be located in strength in the Dijon area, that Seventh Army Headquarters will be north of Lyons and that an advance echelon of General Devers' Army Group Headquarters will be near Lyons. At that time, therefore, operational control should pass to me and I will transmit

¹ Circulated as the enclosure to the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 674, "Assumption of Command of 'DRAGOON' Forces by Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force", September 11, 1944): "The enclosed message (SCAF 77) from the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force is submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff." For the discussion of this message by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 172d Meeting, September 12, 1944, see *post*, p. 305.

operational directives direct to General Devers with copies to SACMed and the Commanding General, Seventh Army.²

3. Coincident with my taking operational control of the DRAGOON forces, the Commanding General, Ninth Air Force³ will assume operational control of the XII Tactical Air Command of 1st Fighter Group and auxiliary units which is actually with the Seventh Army. The Ninth Air Force will augment the XII Tactical Air Command as now constituted as necessary in order to support the Army Group adequately. The Twelfth Air Force in support of the Allied Armies in Italy will continue to support the DRAGOON forces until the Ninth Air Force can assume this responsibility.

Subsequently when General Devers' Army Group comprises the French Army and at least 1 United States Army and provided the Twelfth Air Force can be spared from Italy, it should be transferred to DRAGOON. Alternately should existing conditions in Italy make such a transfer undesirable, in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Twelfth Air Force will furnish a command and staff echelon to General Devers' Army Group for the necessary coordination of air operations and for complete air liaison with SHAEF. Under this alternative it may be that we shall have to obtain at least 1 more fighter-bomber group from the Twelfth Air Force.

4. The exact date when administrative control should pass to me cannot be stated at the present time. Logistical support and maintenance for the DRAGOON forces should continue from the Mediterranean Theater so long as United States supplies are in excess of reserves needed for other United States units in that theater. Thereafter maintenance may continue through southern France ports or be shipped to other routes if the latter prove more advantageous. Close coordination with the Mediterranean Command will be essential while resources are being shipped through the ports of southern France, whether from the United States or from North Africa or a combination of the two. I recommend that the terminating date of this responsibility be arranged by mutual agreement between Generals Wilson and Devers.

5. It is suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive to General Wilson and me regarding my assumption of command of the DRAGOON forces be based upon the recommendations presented in the foregoing paragraphs.

² Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch.

³ Major General Hoyt Vandenberg.

J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Eisenhower)
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

SHAEF, 9 September 1944.

PRIORITY

FWD 14376, SCAF 78. Progress of the battles on the Continent has been thoroughly covered in my daily and periodic reports. Consequently I am transmitting a brief outline only of the present situation together with a more complete statement of my intentions in response to the request of the Combined Chiefs of Staff contained in reference cable (WX 26682 7 September 1944).²

PART I. SITUATION AS OF 9TH SEPTEMBER 1944

Today, on D plus 95, almost the whole of northern France has been liberated as have substantial parts of Belgium. Our forces have entered Holland and are close to the German Frontier at more than one point. In Brittany only the Channel Islands, Brest, Lorient and St. Nazaire hold out, and on the channel coast only Le Havre, Boulogne and Calais. The hostile occupation in force of the Dutch Islands at the mouth of the Schelde is certain to delay the utilization of Antwerp as a port and thus will vitally influence the full development of our strategy.

In the south of France the Seventh Army in its rapid advance to the north has already reached Besançon and will shortly join forces with the central group of armies.

Enemy resistance, which has shown signs of collapse during the past few weeks, is stiffening somewhat as we approach the German Frontier. Nevertheless my belief is that the only way he can effectively oppose our advance into Germany will be by reinforcing his retreating forces by divisions from Germany and other fronts and manning the more important sectors of the Siegfried Line with those forces. It is doubtful whether he can do this in time and in sufficient strength but, were he to succeed, he will be likely to concentrate on blocking the two main approaches to Germany, i.e., by way of the Ruhr and the Saar. Of these he will probably regard the approach to the Ruhr as the more important, but in any event he will employ his forces to oppose a deep penetration.

¹ Sent also to the War Department, the London headquarters of the European Theater of Operations, Allied Force Headquarters at Caserta, and SHAEF Main. The message was relayed by the War Department to Quebec as telegram No. 28393 and was received there September 10 as telegram No. OCTAGON-IN-11. For the discussion of this message by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 172d Meeting, September 12, 1944, see *post*, p. 301.

² See *ante*, p. 32, fn. 5, concerning the message to which Eisenhower was replying.

Naval operations have in general proceeded according to plan, and attempts by the enemy to interfere with our sea lines of communications have been countered effectively. Consequently our losses due to enemy action have been light. However, the unexpected small losses in the assault were largely counterbalanced by the effects of a northeasterly gale in June and by the longer shipping turn-round time than had been anticipated. The scale of enemy minelaying and his use of new types of mines have strained our minesweeping resources to the utmost. These factors and systematic demolitions have retarded the development of ports.

Air operations have also proceeded as planned. The POINTBLANK program has been and is being pressed very successfully. Current priorities being as follows: Oil, production of aircraft parts, armored fighting vehicle parts industries, automobile plants.

The advance of the ground forces have [has] largely removed the flying bomb and rocket threats and necessity for substantial air effort against CROSSBOW.

PART II. INTENTIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE

General. My intention is to press on with all speed to destroy the German armed forces and occupy the heart of Germany. I consider our best opportunity of defeating the enemy in the west lies in striking at the Ruhr and Saar confident that he will concentrate the remainder of his available forces in the defense of these essential areas. The first operation is one to break the Siegfried Line and seize crossings over the Rhine. In doing this the main effort will be on the left. Then we will prepare logistically and otherwise for a deep thrust into Germany. The immediate missions assigned the army groups are set forth below.

Northern Group of Armies. Antwerp having been seized, the northern group of armies and that part of the central group of armies operating northwest of the Ardennes will breach the sector of the Siegfried Line covering the Ruhr and seize the Ruhr.

The First Allied Airborne Army supports the northern group of armies in the attainment of first objectives. An operation to seize the crossings over the Rhine and in the area Arnhem-Nijmegen has been twice postponed on account of weather and only awaits favorable weather conditions. Plans for other airborne operations in support of both groups of armies have been prepared.

Central Group of Armies. The central group of armies less that portion operating northwest of the Ardennes will:

- a. Capture Brest.
- b. Protect the southern flank of the Allied Expeditionary Force.
- c. Occupy the sector of the Siegfried Line covering the Saar and then seize Frankfurt. This operation is to start as soon as possible in

order to forestall the enemy in this sector but troops of the central group of armies operating against the Ruhr northwest of the Ardennes must first be adequately supported.

d. Take advantage of any opportunity to destroy enemy forces withdrawing from southwest and southern France.

The ports of Lorient, St. Nazaire, Nantes and the area of Quiberon Bay are no longer essential for maintenance of United States forces. Central group of armies have therefore been instructed that it is unnecessary to reduce St. Nazaire and Lorient by force of arms and that the German garrisons isolated in these areas may for the present merely be contained.

Link up with DRAGOON Forces. Recommendations have been transmitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that operational control of DRAGOON Forces will pass to this headquarters on the 15th September 1944.³ At present the DRAGOON Forces have been directed on the area Dijon-Besançon-Vesoul in preparation for further advance on Mulhouse and Strassburg.

Future Intentions. Once we have the Ruhr and the Saar, we have a strangle hold on two of Germany's main industrial areas, and will have largely destroyed her capacity to wage war whatever course events may take. During the advance to the Ruhr and the Saar we will be opening the deep water ports of Le Havre and Antwerp or Rotterdam which are essential to sustain a power thrust deep into Germany. I wish to retain freedom of action to strike in any direction so far as the logistical situation permits. At the moment and until we have developed the channel ports and the rail lines therefrom, our supply situation is stretched to the breaking point, and from this standpoint the advance across the Siegfried Line involves a gamble which I am prepared to take in order to take full advantage of the present disorganized state of the German armies in the west. The possibilities for further advance, depending on the situation at the time, are :

a. The Ruhr via Hanover on Hamburg or Berlin.

b. Frankfurt via Leipzig or Magdeburg on Berlin.

c. A combination of both.

Secondary operations such as the occupation of the Nuremberg-Munich area will depend on the logistical situation at the time.

The stage at which TALISMAN conditions will obtain cannot be forecast. Operation TALISMAN will be conducted as an extension of the military operations in progress when and if TALISMAN conditions arise. The necessary instructions to all concerned for the disarmament of the enemy forces, the occupation of specific targets in the Allied spheres and for the care and repatriation of prisoners of war are ready for issue and some are being issued.

³ See Eisenhower's telegram No. SCAF 77, September 9, 1944, *supra*.

Logistical Developments. Lines of communications are strained to keep up with present advances, and every effort is being made to develop railroads and ports to support rapid exploitation. Our main requirement is deep water ports east of the Seine. Brest and Le Havre will probably be opened initially for the central group of armies and Low Countries port[s] initially for the northern group of armies. When the full capacity of rail lines operation from the original lodgement area to Paris, the Valenciennes coal field and north Belgium has been developed, considerably augmented forces can be supported in the advance into Germany. Air supply and special supply arrangements are being utilized to the maximum to support our rapid advance.

Operation Other Than OVERLORD Operation Against the Channel Islands. A force formed from sources outside the OVERLORD troop basis and consisting of 1 infantry brigade, reinforced, is being held in readiness in the United Kingdom to occupy the Channel Islands in the event of surrender by the garrison. Steps are being taken to induce surrender by means of psychological warfare, and I do not intend to take the Islands by force of arms.

Operation Into Norway. In the event the enemy withdraws from Norway or surrenders I propose to send to Norway an Allied force of the order of 1 British division and 1 United States regimental combat team, together with certain Norwegian troops.

Operation POINTBLANK. Strategic air forces will continue POINTBLANK operations to a successful conclusion. Priorities may change from time to time in accordance with the situation.

J.C.S. Files

Report by the Combined Intelligence Committee¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, September 9, 1944.]

Enclosure to C.C.S. 660/1

PROSPECTS OF A GERMAN COLLAPSE OR SURRENDER
(AS OF 8 SEPTEMBER 1944)

THE PROBLEM

1. To review the principal factors bearing on German surrender or the collapse of German resistance and to estimate the form which such an event is likely to take and the time when it is likely to occur.

DISCUSSION

2. See Appendix.

¹ Submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff under cover of a note (not printed) by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 660/1) dated September 9, 1944. This report was noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 172d Meeting, September 12, 1944. See *post*, p. 305.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

3. The German strategic situation has deteriorated to such a degree that no recovery is now possible. In addition to the disintegration of the German front in the West, the crumbling of the German position in the Balkans, and the penetration of German defenses in Italy, the general decline in Germany's war potential brought about mainly by Allied bombing and by German losses of manpower has contributed largely to this situation.

4. The present German Government, or any Nazi successor, is unlikely to surrender. Control by the Party appears strong enough to prevent governmental overthrow or internal disintegration prior to an extensive collapse of military resistance.

5. Although causes for collapse are undoubtedly present, the lack of visible symptoms indicates that German national life is still mobilized behind the war effort. This support is not likely to break down until the final military debacle has reached its final stage.

6. The collapse will probably take the form of piecemeal surrenders by field commanders, who will be influenced both by the tactical pressure on them and by their individual appreciation of the hopeless strategic situation, and possibly by their disagreement with the policy of the Central Government.

7. Unmistakable signs of the imminence of collapse are unlikely to be apparent until the end of resistance is close at hand, but collapse, once begun, is likely to spread rapidly. We consider that organized resistance under the effective control of the German High Command (*Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*) is unlikely to continue beyond 1 December 1944, and that it may end even sooner.

Appendix

1. *Strategic Situation*

a. Ground. Prior to the opening of the summer offensives, German strategy had as its primary goal the crushing of any Allied attempt to establish a front in western Europe. In order to accomplish this, Germany was prepared to yield ground elsewhere under pressure in the hope that, after defeating Allied operations in the West, she might be able to retrieve such situations as had worsened in the meantime.

This strategy failed to produce the desired results. In France the German front has virtually ceased to exist. Since the break through in Normandy, the Germans have been unable to hold any line and the Allies are advancing against very light resistance to the German Frontier. In Italy, the German defenses based on the Gothic position have been penetrated. In the Balkans, the whole German position is crumbling. In the East, although the Germans have, at the moment, an

organized front between the Russian and the German Frontier, they cannot be confident of holding their present line in Poland against a renewal of the Russian offensive.

The aim of German strategy must be to prolong the war and to prevent, for as long as possible, the invasion of the Reich itself; but the speed of recent events has taken Germany completely by surprise and has left her without the resources and apparently without any coordinated plan to meet her radically altered strategic position.

Sound military strategy would long ago have seemed to dictate territorial retrenchment in order to concentrate additional forces in the decisive areas. This, however, would have involved grave political dangers, the very weakness of Germany's position making it imperative for her to disguise the true state of affairs as long as possible, not only from her enemies, but from the wavering satellites and neutrals, the restive populations in occupied territories, and her own people.

We believe that Hitler may now have realized that his only hope of using some of his troops, now in outlying parts of Europe, for the prolongation of the war and the defense of the Reich, lies in withdrawing them immediately. There is evidence that this process has already started from the most outlying areas. Even so, he has waited too long. During September he might be able to make available for the defense of the West Wall, in addition to the divisions he is able to extricate from France, the equivalent of 10-15 full divisions from elsewhere, excluding the Eastern Front. These would include some ten low category divisions at present forming in Germany, but they are generally under strength, inadequately trained, short of artillery, and fitted only for static defense, and are considered equivalent to about five full-strength divisions. We are also unable to exclude the possibility that some divisions might even be transferred from the Eastern to the Western Front. Any divisions which Germany can make available will be sent to the West so long as this front presents the most immediate threat. However, if these transfers do take place, they will not be sufficient to hold the Allied attack in the West.

b. Air. The offensive strength of the German Air Force has declined to negligible proportions. In view of Germany's increasing shortage of oil and air crews no revival of effort on an intensive or sustained scale is possible.

In order to provide for the defense of vital strategic objectives in the Reich against Allied bombing operations, the Germans have already found it necessary to curtail drastically air support of their military operations on all fronts and the air defense of occupied territories. Nevertheless, the German Air Force is unable to prevent heavy and systematic destruction of high priority objectives by Allied

bombing attacks, nor will it be able to prevent the invasion of the Reich or exert any important influence on the final outcome of that invasion. Although some temporary increase in fighter strength may be achieved by the avoidance of combat, the shortages of fuel and of trained pilots probably preclude any substantial improvement in defensive capabilities.

Jet propelled aircraft have now appeared operationally in relatively small numbers. Although this may necessitate some slight revision of Allied air tactics, it is highly unlikely that a sufficient number of this type will become operational before the end of the war to change substantially the present over-all ineffectiveness of the German Air Force.

c. Sea. The German operations against Allied shipping and against Allied supply lines to the Continent have degenerated into harassing activities owing principally to the success of Allied anti-submarine measures and, to some extent, to the impotence of the German Air Force.

The enemy still disposes of a large U-boat fleet and is now constructing improved types. An increase of activity may be expected in the autumn. When these new types become operational, it is likely that these operations may temporarily meet with more success than has been the case for some months past. Operations will, however, be seriously hampered by the loss of bases in the Biscay and consequently by the disadvantages of being forced to use Norwegian ports. Such operations are, therefore, unlikely to achieve a sufficient degree of success to exert any important influence on the course of the war.

The German surface forces may still be able to delay further deterioration of the situation in the Baltic, where all the major units except the *Tirpitz* are now concentrated, but it is very unlikely that they will be able to influence appreciably developments in any other theater. No forces remain in areas south of the Straits of Dover.

New technical developments in U-boat equipment and in such weapons as torpedoes, bombs and mines may, as in the past, prove of material value to the enemy. The operation of "Small Battle Units," comprising one-man torpedoes, explosive motor boats, and such weapons, may be intensified. It is very unlikely, however, that the enemy will be able by these means to exert any important influence on the course of the war.

d. Manpower. Lack of combat-fit manpower constitutes one of the most critical over-all weaknesses in the German situation. The number of physically fit young men remaining in the entire German population is already substantially less than the minimum requirements of the armed forces. German losses in manpower have already been enormous. These can no longer be replaced nor can the fighting effective-

ness of her combat units be maintained in the face of this heavy attrition. Mobilization of the civilian labor forces is already virtually complete and the importation of more foreign workers is not now possible on any substantial scale and would increase the already grave potential source of danger they represent. Announced German measures for "full mobilization" of the home front therefore cannot have any substantial effect in alleviating the manpower crisis.

e. Political and Psychological Factors. The strongest elements in the German strategic situation are the political and psychological forces which maintain the German will to resist in spite of the overwhelming pressure exerted by the adverse military situation. Nazi controls governing every aspect of German life continue to be outwardly effective. As a result of the attempted *coup d'état* of 20 July, Nazi control has been further extended into the *Wehrmacht*. Undoubtedly, the extent of the plot, which came to light on 20 July after brewing for months, indicates serious discontent in the armed forces, especially in the officer corps. This discontent is being kept in check only at the expense of further weakening the fighting power of the army through the replacement of disaffected officers by Nazi officers of less ability and experience.

The attitude of the civilian population continues to oscillate between apathy and hopes for a negotiated peace. The complete Party control of the home front, in any case, renders the likelihood of purely civilian revolt extremely remote.

f. Economic. There is evidence that the Allied attacks on Germany's oil production, stocks, etc., are now confronting her with disaster. This is the most serious shortage of material with which Germany is at present faced, and seriously reduces her capacity to deal with the catastrophic developments in her strategic situation. Other shortages, especially in ferro-alloys, will become increasingly acute.

The German war economy is now clearly unable to meet Germany's military requirements. Shortage of tanks, military vehicles, and even ammunition is now seriously affecting operations on the fighting fronts. Losses in equipment have been enormous and cannot possibly be replaced.

The civilian supply position, although increasingly tight, is unlikely directly to cause military difficulties or to precipitate a civil revolt. Lack of civilian goods may cause some political difficulties and may reduce labor efficiency.

g. Occupied and Satellite Countries. The satellite states are increasingly concerned to save themselves from the effects of a German defeat. Rumania has already proclaimed her surrender and declared war on Germany. Bulgaria has asked for an armistice and is reported to have declared war on Germany. Finland has accepted Soviet conditions for

the opening of armistice negotiations and claims to have received Germany's agreement to the withdrawal of German forces from her territory. Hungary still remains in the war because she is unwilling to restore to Rumania the ceded territories in Transylvania and because she fears the U.S.S.R.²

The Germans are reported to be already withdrawing from Finland, but it is unlikely that more than one-half of the total force can be withdrawn sufficiently rapid[ly] to be effective as reinforcements. German withdrawal from southern Greece and the Aegean Islands may have begun already. The only area from which German withdrawal is unlikely is Norway which now provides the only bases from which German U-boats can hope to operate in the Atlantic.

h. Relations With Neutrals. The remaining European neutrals may be expected to cling to their neutrality; they will nevertheless give greater assistance to the United States and Great Britain at Germany's expense despite the apprehensions of some of these neutrals over the increase of Soviet influence on the Continent. As her position deteriorates, Germany will get less and less economic aid from the neutrals.

i. German Hopes. For many months the only bases for German hopes of avoiding unconditional surrender have been the possibility of division among the United Nations, the possibility of new weapons that would affect fundamentally the course of the war, and the possibility of war weariness or discouragement in one or more of the United Nations. At present the relations of the three major United Nations are more harmonious than ever. Secret weapons cannot, of course, be evaluated precisely in advance, but the overwhelming weight of scientific and military conjecture holds that the Germans are not likely to produce a new weapon that can fundamentally alter the course of the war. The Allied advance in the West has already occupied or cut off all the main areas from which ground-launched flying bombs or long-range rockets can be operated against England and has thus destroyed German hopes of influencing the course of the war by the use of these weapons. War weariness among the United Nations can scarcely be expected to become critical at a time when their military progress is more rapid than in any former period. Thus, the virtual hopelessness of the German situation is driven home more forcefully week by week as the hope of being able to prolong the war recedes.

2. *Explanation of Continued German Resistance*

The preceding paragraphs indicate that the factors which should produce a collapse or surrender are already present in the German

² For documentation on these developments, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vols. III and IV.

situation. Continued German resistance is chiefly due to the fanatical determination of the Nazi Party leaders to fight to the end and to their possession of the necessary political and psychological control within Germany. This determination is based on the doctrine held by the Nazis that Germany surrendered too quickly in 1918; their fear for their own safety; a fanatical belief in their own capabilities which prevents them from accurately appraising the situation; and the lack of any alternative to continued resistance which would seem to offer opportunities for a later revival of their power. It is possible that preparations are being perfected to maintain, even after defeat, an underground organization. The failure of the *coup d'état* of 20 July has given the Party still more complete control of both the home front and the *Wehrmacht*. The civilian population alone has neither the courage nor the capacity to risk revolt, even if it is beginning to appreciate the hopelessness of continued resistance. In the Army, discipline remains reasonably firm although the confidence of the rank and file is being undermined by the shortage of men, munitions, motor transport, and liquid fuels and by the inescapable contrast between German and Allied artillery and air power. Therefore although the strategic situation indicates certain defeat, German resistance is likely to continue beyond the time when any rational objectives within the immediate or distant future seem to be served by doing so.

3. *Symptoms of German Collapse or Surrender*

There are still no certain indications that German groups are acting as though collapse or surrender is imminent. Despite the plot of 20 July and the fact that the promotion of SS officers had a bad effect on the morale of officers of the Army proper, there is no evidence that the officer corps or the rank and file of the Army has been generally and seriously demoralized. Although surrenders are occurring more readily than formerly, large scale mutinies or desertions have not yet developed. In certain areas German soldiers continue to fight tenaciously but elsewhere they have lost the will to resist and only discipline prevents a complete collapse of morale. On the home front, strikes and demonstrations have apparently not yet assumed dangerous proportions. Serious peace feelers have not been put forth by the Germans, but the satellite states, which might be expected to break away from a defeated Germany before final collapse, have already begun to do so.

4. *Form of Surrender*

Since it is unlikely that the present German Government or any Nazi successor will surrender, the end of German resistance is most likely to come through a series of piecemeal surrenders by German armed forces in the field. Individual commanders who find themselves

in difficult situations will be influenced to surrender by their own appraisal of the general strategic situation and possibly by their disagreement with the policy of the Central Government. Once the tendency toward piecemeal surrender gathers momentum, elements of the *Wehrmacht* which have retreated into Germany under arms may even carry out the actual final expulsion of the Nazi regime. But this possibility cannot be envisaged until one or more of the main fighting fronts has collapsed.

5. *Time of Surrender*

We believe that organized German resistance under the effective control of the German High Command (*Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*) is unlikely to continue beyond 1 December 1944. In reaching this conclusion we consider the collapse of the German front in the West, the rapid deterioration of the position in the East, especially in the Balkans, the impotence of the German Air Force, and increasing shortages of oil and weapons of war which will have become most critical by that date. The military situation therefore is ripe for a collapse. It is impossible to forecast the date at which this collapse might begin, but once begun it is likely to spread rapidly. We therefore believe that organized resistance may end even sooner than 1 December.

H. THE WAR IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[LONDON, undated.]

Enclosure to C.C.S. 452/18

1. As agreed at the SEXTANT Conference we have devoted prolonged study to the strategy for the war against Japan. We have considered how best our forces can be disposed and what operations they should carry out, taking into account the undertaking given by His Majesty's Government at the Casablanca Conference that on the defeat of Germany we should assist the United States to the utmost of our power in defeating Japan.

2. Several important developments have taken place since the SEXTANT Conference.

¹ Circulated under cover of a memorandum (not printed) by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff at Washington (C.C.S. 452/18, "British Participation in Far Eastern Strategy", August 15, 1944). The text here printed has been amended in accordance with corrigenda circulated on August 22 and 23, 1944. For the discussion of the subject of this memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 174th Meeting, September 14, 1944, see *post*, p. 331. For information on the discussions within the British Government leading to the proposal contained in this memorandum, see Ehrman, pp. 493-500.

(i) The advance of the United States Forces across the Pacific has been accelerated.

(ii) The Japanese have strongly reinforced Burma and their strength in that country has risen from four and a half to 10 Divisions.

(iii) The capture of Myitkyina rules out as was always foreseen any purely defensive policy in North Burma.

(iv) The likelihood of aggressive action by the Japanese Fleet in the Bay of Bengal is now remote.

(v) Progress of the war against Germany on all fronts has been such as to render possible the partial or total collapse of Germany which might free forces from the European Theatre in the coming months.

(vi) We now have overwhelming air superiority in the South East Asia Theatre.

The following paragraphs contain our proposals in the light of the above developments.

OPERATIONS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA THEATRE

3. The present directive to South East Asia Command prescribes as a first task the protection of the air link to China and so far as is possible the support of the further construction of the Burma Road (which cannot be completely opened until 1946) and of the pipelines to Yunnan (which are also progressing slowly), in addition we have of course to defend the frontiers of India. We are thus committed to a long drawn out struggle in the jungles and swamps against an enemy who has superior lines of communication to those which we possess. The wastage from sickness and disease amounted during the Campaign of 1944 up to 30th June alone to 282,000 in addition to a loss in killed, wounded and missing of approximately 40,000. Clearly therefore we should make every effort to liquidate this highly undesirable commitment if it can by any means be done.

4. Admiral Mountbatten has put forward two plans. The first plan (*CHAMPION*) is to continue to engage the Japanese in North Burma. This, in our opinion, will merely lead to a continuation of the present unsatisfactory state of affairs and we feel bound to reject it.

5. The second plan (*VANGUARD*) put forward by Admiral Mountbatten is to capture Rangoon by an airborne operation to be followed by the opening of the port of Rangoon and the maintenance of the expedition by sea. This plan is now rendered practicable by the large measure of air superiority which we enjoy in this theatre and by the Japanese inability any longer to dispute our sea lines of communication to Rangoon.

6. The capture of Rangoon and Pegu (20 miles distant) will at a stroke sever the enemy's main lines of communication to the interior of Burma by road, river and rail. This will give us the opportunity of liquidating once and for all under the most favourable Military

conditions our commitments in Burma by the destruction of the Japanese Forces.

7. Until such time as the Rangoon operation can be launched it will be essential to contain the Japanese by offensive action South of Myitkyina.

8. The bulk of the necessary resources for Rangoon are already available and we now ask the Combined Chiefs of Staff to agree to the above plan in principle and that every effort should be made to provide from our combined resources the balance of the Forces required. We propose that General Wedemeyer should proceed to Washington as soon as possible to expound the outline plan to the United States Chiefs of Staff and to provide them with any local information they may require.

9. We are now building up a strong fleet in the Bay of Bengal the bulk of which including our newest battleships will not be required for the operations outlined above in the South East Asia Theatre. It is our desire in accordance with His Majesty's Government's policy that this fleet should play its full part at the earliest possible moment in the main operations against Japan wherever the greatest Naval strength is required, and thereafter its strength should be built up as rapidly as possible. This fleet by mid-1945 could probably comprise 4 battle-ships of the *King George V* class, 6 Fleet carriers, 4 Light Fleet carriers, 15 Escort carriers, 20 cruisers, 40-50 Fleet destroyers, 100 escorts and a considerable Fleet Train, the whole constituting a force which could make a valuable contribution in the crucial operations leading to the assault on Japan. This fleet built up as fast as possible would operate under United States Command.

10. If for any reason United States Chiefs of Staff are unable to accept the support of a British Fleet in the main operations (which is our distinct preference), we should be willing to discuss an alternative. The suggestion that we would make in this event is the formation of a British Empire Task Force under a British Commander consisting of British, Australian and New Zealand land, sea and air forces to operate in the South West Pacific Theatre under General MacArthur's Supreme Command. This alternative if decided upon would still enable the British Fleet to be well placed to reinforce the U.S. Pacific Fleet if this should later be desired.

11. We ask for an early expression of the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on all the above proposals. The urgency is dictated by the need to work out as soon as possible the logistic problems involved including the development of the necessary base facilities.

740.0011 PW/8-2544

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 26, 1944.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Lord Halifax
Mr. Matthews

Lord Halifax called on me this morning at his request and left with me the attached *Aide-Mémoire* raising certain questions with regard to the French role in military operations in the Far East, with particular reference to French Indochina. The Ambassador stated that the question has become one of considerable urgency since Mr. Eden is anxious to give M. Massigli an answer to two definite points before the latter leaves London on August 29. The two specific questions on which Mr. Eden desires to give M. Massigli an affirmative answer are: (1) the attachment to the South East Asia Command headquarters of a French Military Mission under General Blaizot, and (2) the establishment in India of a "*Corps Léger d'Intervention*" (apparently already set up at Algiers). Lord Halifax said that the British Chiefs of Staff had informed him that our military people are in complete accord.

I told Lord Halifax that I would endeavor to obtain some rapid decision on the question, but that as he knew the matter was one which would involve a decision at a very high level. He said that he was aware of this fact but hoped that a favorable answer can be obtained sometime Monday.¹

H F[REEMAN] M[ATTHEWS]

[Attachment]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government have given consideration to a request by the French Committee of National Liberation that the French should take a more active part in the war against Japan.

2. In brief, their proposals are:—

(i) That a French Military Mission should be attached to the headquarters of South East Asia Command.

(ii) That French Forces should take a more active part in the war in the Far East.

¹ August 28.

(iii) That they should participate in the planning of the war against Japan.

(iv) They should participate in the planning of political warfare in the Far East.

3. His Majesty's Government's views on the above proposals are as follows:—

(i) The establishment of a French Military Mission with South East Asia Command would facilitate the work of SOE/OSS and would serve as the nucleus of the operational headquarters which may be required later. If the Mission is not accepted the French will probably concentrate on Chungking, where it would be harder to control them. The function of the Mission would be confined mainly to matters concerning Indo-China and it would not participate in questions of general strategy. It would therefore be much on the same basis as the Dutch and Chinese Missions attached to South East Asia Command.

(ii) The use of French land and air forces would stimulate resistance to the enemy among the French officials still in Indo-China, but with the administrative difficulties that would be involved now, His Majesty's Government think that the offer of these forces should only be accepted in the later stages of the war and on the understanding that they are made up of good and experienced fighting men. The French have also proposed the establishment in India of a "*Corps Léger d'Intervention*" composed at the start of 500 men, and designed to operate exclusively in Indo-China on Japanese lines of communication. His Majesty's Government understand that the *Corps Léger* is in being at Algiers and they think that it should be accepted, provided it is properly handled and kept apart from regular military information [*formations?*].

(iii) His Majesty's Government feel strongly that the French should take no part in military planning for the war against Japan until the detailed preparation of plans for the liberation of Indo-China is undertaken.

(iv) There would seem to be no objection in principle to French participation in political warfare in the areas in which the French are interested. This should be a matter for arrangement between South East Asia Command and the French Military Mission.

4. Lord Louis Mountbatten is prepared to accept the French Mission providing it is a small one consisting of a General and, say, three other officers. He is also prepared to accept the *Corps Léger* and foresees considerable advantage in its employment.

5. The French are very keen to take their share in the war against Japan, and the Far East is the only area in which they are now not represented. The presence of *Richelieu* in Far Eastern waters means that they are already participating in fact if not in name.

6. The Combined Chiefs of Staff were invited by the British members to concur in paragraph 3 in the early part of this month.² No

² In C.C.S. 644, "French Participation in the War Against Japan", August 5, 1944, not printed. Paragraphs 2-5 of C.C.S. 644 are substantively identical to paragraphs 2-5 of the *aide-mémoire* of August 25.

reply has, however, yet been received from the American members. Monsieur Massigli is pressing His Majesty's Government for a decision regarding the attachment to South East Asia Command headquarters of a French Military Mission under General Blaizot, and the establishment in India of a "*Corps Léger d'Intervention*" (see paragraph 3 (i) and (ii) above). It is suggested that a decision could be taken regarding the "*Corps Léger d'Intervention*", whose numbers are small and whose activities correspond to those of American and British secret operations organisations, without prejudice to the wider question of from what source French forces operating in the Far East should be equipped. His Majesty's Government are particularly anxious to be able to give him an answer on these two points before he leaves London on August 29th.

WASHINGTON, August 25th, 1944.

851g.00/8-2644

The Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached herewith a copy of an *aide-mémoire*¹ left with the Department of State this morning by Lord Halifax in which the latter raises certain questions with regard to the French role in military operations in the Far East, with particular reference to French Indo-China.

The Ambassador stated that the question is of considerable urgency owing to Mr. Eden's desire to give an answer on two definite points before the latter leaves London on Tuesday, August 29. The two specific questions on which Mr. Eden desires to give an affirmative answer are:

- (1) The attachment to the South East Asia Command Headquarters of a French Military Mission under General Blaizot, and
- (2) The establishment in India of a "*Corps Léger d'Intervention*" which apparently has already been established at Algiers.

Although these suggestions are ostensibly military in character, they have wide political implications and for this reason they are being referred to you for decision. If more time is needed for decision we can so inform Lord Halifax.²

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

¹ Attachment to Matthews' memorandum of conversation, *supra*.

² Matthews sent a copy of this memorandum and of the enclosed *aide-mémoire* to Leahy on August 26, 1944 (851g.00/8-2644).

740.0011 P.W./8-2544

*The Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Grew) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 28, 1944.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

S—MR. SECRETARY Reference is made to the *aide-mémoire* left on August 26 by Lord Halifax . . .

[Here follows a summary of the *aide-mémoire* of August 25, 1944, printed *ante*, p. 247.]

I believe it desirable to call to your attention that the French request to the British Government was submitted in a note from the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to the representative of the British Government in Algiers on May 24, an English translation of which was transmitted by the American Ambassador, Mr. Murphy, under date of June 10. The French note does not include the two last mentioned proposals but it does point out that the British S.O.E. in the Indies "are already carrying out the instructing and training of a large number of French officers with a view to officering of the light intervention force".

It is, also, to be noted from the attached cable no. 231 from Colombo of July 25¹ that some weeks ago the British dropped a de Gaullist agent in Indochina utilizing American facilities in China for the purpose and making efforts to prevent General Chennault from learning the exact nature of the operation; that at a recent staff meeting, S.E.A.C., presided over by Lord [Louis] Mountbatten, it was decided to proceed with two additional operations proposed by the British S.O.E. to drop de Gaullist agents in Indochina by parachute, one of whom is said to carry a holographic letter from de Gaulle; that the American staff officer responsible for coordination of S.O.E. and O.S.S. was not present having been told the meeting was cancelled; that he had been asked his approval in advance but declined as these operations are apt to be of far more political than military importance, and he was unwilling to assume responsibility of approving as an American officer British political policies and programs for Indochina which might not coincide with American policies and programs; that because of the political implications of the operations and the reluctance of American officers to give approval it was decided to seek approval of the American Government through regular diplomatic channels via London; that the British intended, however, to proceed with the first operation planned at the recent meeting even though clearance with the Department could not have been obtained

¹ Not printed (740.0011 PW/7-2644).

through London by then. It is to be noted that American facilities have to be used in all of these operations. To date, there has been no approach to the American Government through diplomatic channels for approval of these operations.

A memorandum to you with a proposed memorandum to the President was approved by me on July 27, but was withdrawn when I was advised that the issue raised by the use of American facilities in this manner was being taken up directly with the President by the American military authorities. I have now been informed that the military authorities have decided not to raise the question with the President and this matter presumably has not been brought to his attention.

Attention is further called to cable no. 146 of August 16² stating that the American Ambassador has been "informed by usual reliable source that British have approved immediately the sending of a French military mission with limited personnel who would be accredited to Lord Mountbatten's command to discuss questions relating to Indo-China and control use of the light intervention force"; that "agreement has supposedly been reached also" between French and the British on the sending of a light intervention force; and that the "question of sending later on a French expeditionary force has not yet been worked out but it is expected that some progress will be made during Massigli's present trip to London".

You will recall that on July 7 you sent a memorandum to the President³ advising him of the French request for British approval of the proposed military mission to Lord Mountbatten; of the sending of the light intervention force to India; and, at a later date, of a French expeditionary force to participate in the liberation of Indochina.

The foregoing is submitted for your information in connection with the pending decision of the President on the proposals for which the British *aide-mémoire* requests approval.

J[OSEPH] C. G[REW]

² From Murphy at Caserta; not printed (740.0011 PW/8-1644).

³ Not printed (740.0011 PW/7-744).

851g.01/8-2844

The President to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In regard to your memorandum of August 26th¹ on the subject of questions raised by Lord Halifax in reference to French Indo-China,

¹ *Ante*, p. 249.

I suggest this matter be deferred until after my meeting with the Prime Minister in Quebec.²

The same thing applies to the *Aide-Mémoire* covering the French Committee's proposals.³ It should be remembered that in relation to (iv) participation in the planning of political warfare in the Far East involves one of the principal partners i.e. China.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

² Roosevelt also told Hull orally that he planned to discuss the French proposals with Churchill at Quebec. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, p. 776.

³ *Ante*, p. 247.

740.0011 P.W./8-2944

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 29 August 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the views of the British Chiefs of Staff regarding a request by the French Committee of National Liberation that the French should take a more active part in the war against Japan as set out in the enclosure.¹

Indo-China is in the China theater of war, and therefore is an area of United States strategic responsibility. The question of the boundaries of the Southeast Asia Command were discussed at SEXTANT and while no affirmative action was taken, the discussion indicated that the President and the United States Chiefs of Staff were in general agreement with the views expressed by the Generalissimo,² as follows:

"a. When the time comes for two theaters to launch assaults upon the enemy in Thailand and Indo-China, the Chinese troops will attack from the north, and the troops under the command of the Southeast Asia Theater, Mountbatten, are expected to make full use of facilities afforded by the ports and air bases under its control and attack from the south. If the troops are landed in those countries, the boundaries between the two theaters are to be decided at the time in accordance with the progress of advances the respective forces made.

"b. All matters of a political nature that arise during operations will be dealt with at a Chinese-British-American Committee which is to be located in the headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the China theater."³

Admiral Mountbatten was willing to accept the suggestion of the Generalissimo in so far as the boundaries were concerned but objected to the political commissions.

It would seem that in view of our arrangements with the Dutch relative to the Dutch East Indies, and of our impending conversations with the Portuguese concerning Timor, we should recognize, in so far

¹ Concerning the enclosure, C.C.S. 644, see *ante*, p. 248, fn. 2.

² Chiang Kai-shek.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 392.

as they are consistent with our national policies, the French desires concerning Indo-China. The extent and timing of such arrangements should be under continuing examination with the view of best serving our over-all interests.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from a military point of view, concur with the British views set forth in the enclosure except that they believe French participation in the planning of political warfare (paragraph 2 (iv) of the enclosure) should be restricted to the area of the Southeast Asia Command.⁴

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D LEAHY
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

⁴ The text of this letter was communicated to the British authorities in C.C.S. 644/1, August 30, 1944. There was no further action on the C.C.S. 644 series until after the Second Quebec Conference.

740.0011 Pacific War/8-2944

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 29, 1944.

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Michael Wright, Mr. D. D. Maclean, British Embassy,
Mr. Matthews.

I telephoned Mr. Michael Wright of the British Embassy and referred to Lord Halifax's call upon me on August 26th¹ with regard to the British desire to agree with M. Massigli to the attachment to the South East Asia Command headquarters of a French Military Mission under General Blaizot and the establishment in India of a "*Corps Léger d'Intervention*". I told Mr. Wright that we had now received an indication from the President that the matter was one which should be deferred until the forthcoming meeting between high British and American authorities.² Mr. Wright said he understood.

Mr. Maclean of the British Embassy called me back later in the day to say that he had a copy of the attached letter dated August 29, 1944,³ (he did not say where it had been obtained) in which our Joint Chiefs of Staff gave some indication that there was no military objec-

¹ See *ante*, p. 247.

² See *ante*, p. 251.

³ *Supra*.

tion to acceding to the British request. I informed Mr. Maclean that I had not yet seen the letter; that when I did I would get in touch with Admiral Leahy, but that I did not see how the letter could in any way modify the President's reply. Upon receiving the Joint Chiefs of Staff letter shortly thereafter, I telephoned Admiral Leahy and then informed Mr. Maclean that the Joint Chiefs of Staff letter to the Secretary of State was merely intended to convey their views on the military aspect of the questions posed and could in no way of course be considered as modifying the position which the President had taken of which I had informed Mr. Wright, namely, that consideration of the question must be deferred until the meeting in question.⁴

H F[REEMAN] M[ATTHEWS]

⁴ No record has been found of a discussion of this specific matter at the Second Quebec Conference, and an *aide-mémoire* from the British Embassy dated November 22, 1944, stated: "It was anticipated that this discussion would take place at the Quebec Conference, but in fact the subject was never raised." See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, p. 782. Cf. *post*, p. 298.

Hopkins Papers

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President's
Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

LONDON, September 1, 1944.

DEAR HARRY: You do not know how greatly your decision not to go on to the Conference has been regretted by our friend ¹ here. His message to the President ² will have told you of his illness on arrival which is only known to a dozen people here. Tonight his temperature is back to normal and he seems on the way to a quick recovery. But each journey has taken its toll and the interval between illnesses has been constantly shortened. There is no one that I have known here who cares so much about friendly relationships between Great Britain and the United States, and few people anywhere who have been more loyal in their friendship to the President.

The Conference will undoubtedly consider the planning [of] the war against Japan. No thoughtful person can approach the problem without remembering that Great Britain has been fighting for five years and that they are at the bottom of the barrel as regards manpower. Men from 16 to 65 are conscripted, and women from 18 to 50. The country has been on short rations for this entire period. I live on them and know what this means. The British Army is older than our Army. The British Navy is older than our Navy. The British merchant seamen are older than our merchant seamen. Only the Royal Air Force

¹ Churchill.

² *Ante*, p. 26.

has been able to continue to recruit the youth of the country. In the Battle of Britain it saved Britain. In the intervening years its continuous operation has done much to save life in the other services, but it has taken a frightful toll of the youth of the country.

When the war with Germany is over the war with Japan will begin for Great Britain, in spite of the early defeats at Hong Kong and Singapore, and the fighting in Burma. I have talked about this with many soldiers and sailors and airmen. I knew General Wingate well, and had something to do with his assignment to the Far East. He told me once that out of every 100 men they sent him, sixty had to carry forty. That means that you have to have a selective army if you are to fight the Japanese successfully in tropical areas. I have talked with Admiral Cunningham, and he told me that special arrangements should be made for Navy personnel who move to the Far East. Men should have better wages than at present and both soldiers' and sailors' families should be given larger family allowances if the wanted men are to continue in active service. The Royal Air Force is better positioned to move eastward but adjustments would also have to be made in that service.

The careful planning that General Marshall has made to prepare our armies for the transition period as we move from the western theater eastward, by educational films and in other ways, has no counterpart in the present British thinking. The whole field of psychological preparation for what for them will be the second war has been largely neglected.

It has always interested me that the plans for demobilization following the defeat of Germany have been treated with the utmost secrecy for fear of creating misunderstandings in the United States in relation to the serious intentions of Great Britain to fight a war against Japan. And yet there are many people who are now mobilized in the war against Germany who would be utterly useless in fighting a war against Japan. I have never questioned this policy since the President is a friend of Great Britain, and even a sensible demobilization in a presidential campaign might be used against him.

All that is one side of the picture. The really gallant people of Great Britain are as anxious to join us in the fight against Japan as we are ourselves to defeat Japan, and yet for all that there has seeped into this country through military channels a belief that the British Navy is not wanted in the Pacific. I know the practical side that many of our Navy men feel that the British Navy was built for short hauls with available ports that ringed the world, and that conversion would mean clogging our navy yards and strengthening the British Navy in the postwar years. There is some truth to it all, and yet if we allow the British to limit their active participation to recapture areas that are

to their selfish interests alone and not participate in smashing the war machine of Japan, if British soldiers don't cross the Atlantic to our ports and entrain for our Pacific ports in order to move against Japan, and if we shuck the British air force in order to prove our own dominance in the air, we will create in the United States a hatred for Great Britain that will make for schisms in the postwar years that will defeat everything that men have died for in this war. Repetition of the tragedy of 1918 will be unforgivable.

I have not found more than a dozen Englishmen interested in this problem, and no one from the United States in any way concerned about it.

What are you doing about it? I hope the President is interested.
Sincerely, JOHN GILBERT WINANT

Hopkins Papers

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1944.

DEAR GIL: I hasten to reply to your letter¹ relative to the implications of the British participation in the war against Japan. First of all I want to assure you that a number of us are greatly concerned about it and I am very hopeful that the President will land up on the right side of this problem.

I am well aware of the attitude in certain circles here, but I am convinced that they are not, in any sense, representative of public opinion. The difficulty, in matters of this kind, is that public opinion gets no opportunity to express itself and, indeed, can know nothing about it until the damage is irrevocable.

There, obviously, must be some demobilization of the British Armed Forces after the collapse of Germany, just as I have no doubt there will be some of our own. Ours will be less dramatic and, therefore, will receive far less attention. It will, no doubt, take the form, first, for practical purposes, of stopping of enlistments and inductions in the Armed Forces, but I have no doubt that hundreds of thousands of men will be quietly separated from the Armed Forces for good and sufficient reasons. It is quite easy to accelerate the discharges either simply by raising the standards as to physical fitness or age. The same will not be true in England. There is no possibility of her transferring the whole of her Armed Force[s] either to the occupation of Germany or for the war against Japan. Such a force as England now has under arms will not be required, but I hope the British will continue their

¹ *Supra.*

policy of playing this down for nothing could be worse than to have any public announcement of British plans for demobilization.

We simply must find a way to have Great Britain take her full and proper place in the war against Japan. This, with the best goodwill in the world, is full of many difficulties—transportation, supply, etc.

You know as well as I that we do not have a chance to get a genuinely good peace unless Russia, Great Britain and the United States can see eye to eye and this means far more than the narrow confines of government in the Foreign Offices. It means, so far as Great Britain and the United States are concerned, that great masses of people must approve our policies. The more I see of the problems and conflicts engendered by the kind of thing that you have written me about, the more I realize how essential it is for us to have men managing our affairs who have a deep and profound conviction not only about world peace and the harnessing of Japan and Germany, but about the bold moves which must be made if a world economy is to be developed which can provide the environment without which our goals can never be attained.

In saying all this, I would say that I hope very much that you, personally, are going to remain close to this thing in some capacity or other for the next few years. Needless to say, I believe the President is essential to it and there is little hope of accomplishing much without his re-election. This, I should tell you, I believe will take place, but I am the world's worst political guesser.

As ever, with this note I send my warmest and affectionate regards.
Cordially yours,

HARRY L. HOPKINS

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET
C.C.S. 452/25

[WASHINGTON,] 8 September 1944.

BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Reference: C.C.S. 452/18²

The United States Chiefs of Staff accept the British proposal in C.C.S. 452/18 for the formation of a British Empire task force under a British commander, consisting of British, Australian, and New Zealand land, sea and air forces to operate in the Southwest Pacific Theater under General MacArthur's supreme command. It is noted that this will enable the British Fleet to be well placed to reenforce the U.S. Pacific Fleet if this should later be desired.

¹ For the discussion of the subject of this paper by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 174th Meeting, September 14, 1944, see *post*, p. 331.

² *Ante*, p. 244.

J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command (Mountbatten) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

KANDY, 8 September 1944.

266. Reference WARX 26742.² Top secret for Combined Chiefs of Staff information British Chiefs of Staff cite 273.

PART I. PROGRESS OF OPERATIONS

1. *11th Army Group*

a. *XV Ind. Corps.* Operations in Arakan largely confined to active and offensive patrolling much hampered by monsoon conditions and thick jungle. No major changes in dispositions, though units of 81st (WA) Division have been moved to counter possible Japanese threat to our Chittagong-Dehazari line of communications from the Moythe-Labawa area.

b. *XXXIII Ind. Corps*

(1) *Enemy.* No reports yet of any strong Japanese defensive position capable of holding up our advance for any appreciable period either in the Dabaw Valley or on the Tiddim Road. In the former there are reports of small numbers of Japanese at Yazagyo and Yedok, and on the Tiddim Road there may be an attempt to hold us up in the area just north of Tonnang. The Japanese on the Chindwin and Tiddim front show every sign of complete disorganization and lack of coordinated control. There are signs, however, of an attempt to gather together the remnants of 15th and 31st Divisions east of the Chindwin.

(2) *Own troops.* Operations to clear the enemy from west of the Chindwin have proceeded satisfactorily and there are now no enemy on this side of the river north of Sittaung. The latter was occupied by our troops on 4th September and active patrolling is taking place northwards and southwards on the west bank of the Chindwin down the Tiddim Road, has progressed speedily and has now reached MS114, 48 miles north of Tiddim.

Japanese opposition has not been strong and the rate of progress has been largely dictated by the state of the road.

In the Rabaw Valley, our rate of advance has been satisfactory though hampered by swollen streams. Leading troops have now reached a point approximately half way between Memu and Kalembo, without encountering any serious opposition.

¹ Sent also to the War Department and to Eisenhower's headquarters at London. The message was relayed by the War Department to Quebec as telegram No. 28363 and was received there September 10 as telegram No. OCTAGON-IN-9. It was noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 174th Meeting, September 14, 1944. See *post*, p. 335.

² See *ante*, p. 32, fn. 5, concerning the message to which Mountbatten was replying.

2. *Northern Combat Area Command and Yunnan Force*

a. 36th Division has reached Pinbaw in the Mogaung-Katha railway corridor. Patrols have entered Hopin without encountering enemy resistance. 29th Brigade has reached Pinbaw. 72nd Brigade is based in the area of Namana.

b. On the Myitkyina-Bhamo Road Chinese forces have reached Kazu. Patrols are operating five miles south of Kazu without making enemy contact. It is reported that there are no Japanese troops north of Nalong.

c. The Japanese are withdrawing from the Hopin area, and a Prisoner of War report gave Mawhun as the next area of strong resistance in the Hopin-Indaw corridor. There are indications of a build-up along the Katha-Shwebo-Bhamo line.

d. Present directive to Northern Combat Area Command remains to secure the Myitkyina-Mogaung area. In pursuance of this directive the line Pinbaw-Kazu has been occupied.

e. Offensive operations by Yunnan force are in progress in the areas of Tengchung, Lungling and Sungshan.

3. *Air*

Allied air forces have now gained almost complete air superiority in this theater. The following air activities are now in progress:

a. A strategic air offensive against enemy lines of communication and supply bases by bombers and long range fighters. These operations include the bombing of the Burman-Siam railway, and minelaying in the main rivers and harbours of Burma.

b. Direct support by Third Tactical Air Force of our land forces pursuing the enemy towards the river Chindwin and Tiddim, and XV Corps in the Arakan.

c. Direct support by Tenth U.S. Army Air Force of the Northern Combat Area Command Forces advancing from Mogaung and Myitkyina, and of the Chinese forces west of the Salween.

d. Transport of troops and supplies to forward areas.

PART II. IMMEDIATE INTENTIONS

4. *Enemy Situation in Burma*

a. *Ground.* Japanese have at present nine divisions in Burma and 10th division expected shortly. Three divisions on the Chindwin and two in north Burma are estimated as 30 percent to 40 percent effective, two in northeast Burma probably 60 percent effective, remaining two in Arakan 100 percent effective. Continued arrival of replacements at recent rates would enable Japanese forces to be brought up to 80 percent effectiveness by end of year.

Present indications Japanese may try and carry out offensives in Arakan and Salween early in dry season, probably with primary

object of causing diversion and thus gaining time to reform their forces.

b. Air. Current first line strength in SEAC is estimated at 450 aircraft with 165 in Burma-Siam/South FIC of which 70 (all fighters) are in Burma. By the end of the monsoon there may be a total of 410 first line aircraft in SEAC of which Burma-Siam/South FIC would have an estimated 200 (of which half are fighters).

5. Intentions

a. The intention is to take advantage of the enemy disorganization by pressing as far as possible down the Tiddim Road and the Kabaw Valley and if opportunity offers to secure Kalewa and Kalemyo.

The Japanese are unlikely to resist us in strength north of the areas Yazagyo (in the Kabaw Valley) and Tonzang (at Milestone 133 on the Tiddim Road), but may do so there or further south. It is too early to say whether they will. If they do not the present operations should result in the capture of Kalemyo by about mid-November.

If, on the other hand, they do, then an airborne operation will be necessary. Conditions in the Kabaw Valley prohibit movement of medium artillery and tanks until the roads are sufficiently dry, and Mawlaik must be secured in due course to remove any threat from that area. Having secured Kalemyo the intervening ground is of such a difficult nature that there may be some delay before we can capture Kalewa. Preparations must therefore be continued for an airborne operation.

b. In the Arakan, 3rd SS Brigade will be used to carry out minor amphibious operations to threaten the enemy line of communications and possibly divert his strength from the Kaladan Valley. 3rd SS Brigade would be released from these operations as necessary for DRACULA.

c. In northeast Burma I intend to continue operations to secure the Mogaung-Myitkyina area.

d. Air operations on existing scale will continue with intention to harass enemy land and water lines of communication and continue tactical support of land forces.

851g.01/9-844

The Chief of the Division of Southwest Pacific Affairs (Moffat) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1944.

S—MR. SECRETARY: At the conclusion of a conference with Mr. Dunn and Mr. Grew on the policies suggested in the attached memorandum

for the President,¹ I was requested to indicate to you that these are included in the memorandum so as to emphasize the need for correlating policies towards Indochina with policies towards the other regions in Southeast Asia; so as to have before the President, should the subject be raised in his conversations with Mr. Churchill, the objectives which EUR, FE and NEA agree to be the most desirable for the United States; and so as to secure, if possible, basic guidance for the development within the Department of necessary policies and procedures relating to the regions of Southeast Asia.

¹ *Infra.*

851g.01/9-844

The Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1944.¹

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

[Subject:] Indochina and Southeast Asia

The French seek restoration of Indochina and have promised some reforms to offset the independence sentiment which exists among the Indochinese and to enlist American support which they presently consider vital. They are fearful of Chinese ambitions. The French and British believe that French participation in the liberation of Indochina will stimulate Free French resistance within the country and thus aid military operations, but the extent and value of such aid is open to question. It is thought that the Japanese may shortly disarm all French troops and take over the country, possibly establishing an independent puppet regime. It seems doubtful if outside assistance could prevent such Japanese action. . . . There is much mutual distrust among the French with whom our people have come in contact. The French divisions in Indochina are considered ineffective.

Despite Mr. Eden's apparent approval in March 1943 of placing Indochina under trusteeship,² British policy has swung behind restoration of French authority. It is believed that an important factor in the British position is a desire to strengthen their claim for restoration of Hong Kong. In May the French, it is thought at British instigation, requested the British, with Lord [Louis] Mountbatten's approval, for permission to send a military mission to SEAC, a light intervention force to India for subsequent use in Indochina, and, later on, an expeditionary force to Indochina. They have also asked to participate

¹ The source text bears the following manuscript endorsement by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Coordination and Review: "Actually delivered to White House Sept 9. S[ARAH] D M[OORE.]"

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 37, 39; *ibid.*, 1944, vol. III, pp. 777-778.

in planning political warfare in the east and in planning military operations against Japan. The British have indicated they approve of all but the last.³

Although Indochina is not at present in the SEAC theater, it is to be noted the British desire that the details of the proposed French political warfare be worked out between SEAC and the proposed French military mission. Even prior to May the British SOE was training a large number of French officers for officering the light intervention force. Recently, using American facilities and misleading Chennault as to the purpose, the British dropped a de Gaullist agent in Indochina and agreed on two such further operations (one agent carrying a letter of credentials from de Gaulle) despite insistence by American officers attached to SEAC that the purpose was primarily political and not military and must be approved in Washington.

Reports indicate a British hope to extend the SEAC theater so as to include Indochina, most of the Dutch East Indies, Borneo and Hong Kong.

The Chinese are actively backing the Annamite Revolutionary party which seeks Indochinese independence. There are persistent reports that the Chinese hope for political ascendancy in northern Indochina, or at least creation of a free port and release from the economic stranglehold on southeast China which the French formerly exercised through the Yunnan railroad. They are particularly concerned over the danger to Chinese security inherent in French control of the railroad and their inability to defend it. The Chinese have indicated interest regarding the military government to be established in Indochina.

It would seem of substantial military importance to secure for the United Nations the good will of the native peoples of southeast Asia among whom, for some years, there has been increasing nationalistic sentiment, and who, for the past three years, have been subjected to intense Japanese propaganda exploiting the old slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics". In this objective Indochina cannot be considered apart from other countries of southeast Asia.

It is suggested that early, dramatic and concerted announcements by the nations concerned making definite commitments as to the future of the regions of southeast Asia would save many American and Allied lives and facilitate military operations. It would be especially helpful if such concerted announcements could include (1) specific dates when independence or complete (dominion) self-government will be accorded, (2) specified steps to be taken to develop native capacity for self-rule, and (3) a pledge of economic autonomy and equality of economic treatment towards other nations. Such announcements might

³ See *ante*, p. 248.

well be accompanied by a reaffirmation of American determination to grant Philippine independence, a joint commitment to restore the independence of Thailand, and a pledge to establish a regional commission for consultation on social and economic problems in the region, on which all countries and peoples concerned would be invited to have membership. The value of such concerted announcements would be still further enhanced if each of the colonial powers concerned would pledge a formal declaration of trusteeship under an international organization for the period of tutelage, but it might be unwise for the United States to attempt to insist upon such a declaration of trusteeship by one country if similar declarations could not be secured from the others.

In addition to their great value as psychological warfare, such announcements would appear to be directly in line with American post-war interests. These areas are sources of products essential to both our wartime and peacetime economy. They are potentially important markets for American exports. They lie athwart the southwestern approaches to the Pacific Ocean and have important bearing on our security and the security of the Philippines. Their economic and political stability will be an important factor in the maintenance of peace in Asia. Emergence of these regions as self-governing countries would appear desirable as soon as they are capable of self-rule, either as independent nations or in close voluntary association with western powers, for example as dominions. Such association might indeed lend them political and economic strength (the weakness of Asiatic powers has long been a cause of war) and help prevent future cleavage along regional or racial lines.

Failure of the western powers to recognize the new conditions and forces in southeast Asia and an attempt to reestablish pre-war conditions will almost surely lead to serious social and political conflict, and may lead to ultimate unifying of oriental opposition to the west.

A memorandum on British attitudes towards southeast Asia, generally, is attached.

Will you advise me if you wish the Department to develop details of policy along the lines indicated in the above suggestions.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Attachment]

The Secretary of State to the President

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Southeast Asia: British Attitudes. There are persistent reports of a British desire to create a Southeast Asia federation of Burma,

Malaya, Thailand and Indochina under British aegis, if not direct control. This apparently develops from a report prepared last year by five officers of the Burma government. It is strongly denied in London which points to the expectation of eventual dominion status for Burma and British support of French restoration in Indochina. However, the British anticipate a fairly extended military occupation of Thailand and anticipate the need of strong economic control of all these regions to assure revival of sound industrial and agricultural practices. It seems clear that the British envisage economic ascendancy in these areas.

It is significant that the British government has refused to make a public statement in line with yours and the Generalissimo's on the restoration of the independence of Thailand.⁴ They have suggested that security questions may be involved in the Kra Peninsula (rich rubber area of Thailand) and have raised the question of boundary adjustments. Winant has been instructed to secure, if possible, at least a confidential statement of the position of the British government. There is strong evidence that the British hope to gain predominant influence over the post-war government of Thailand.

Desire for dominion status for Burma has received public British affirmations but is apparently distant. Military government is believed planned for a considerable period and various liberal reforms reportedly urged by the Burmese government-in-exile are believed to have been rejected by London.

In Malaya also it is understood that military government is planned for a period of at least two years. Reform in administration has been urged by business interests and elimination of special treatment and "protection" of racial groups.

Despite rumors of British desire to secure Sumatra, it is believed that the British are in favor of restoring Dutch authority in the Netherlands Indies. A desire to strengthen the restoration of British prestige and controls in Southeast Asia is believed to be an important factor in this position.

All reports indicate that the military operations of SEAC are aimed primarily at the resurgence of British political and economic ascendancy in Southeastern Asia and the restoration of British prestige. To minimize American association in the public eye with restoration of British imperialism which is admittedly highly unpopular in Asia,

⁴ The reference is to a broadcast made by Chiang on February 26, 1943, and to a subsequent comment thereon by Roosevelt at his press conference of March 12, 1943. See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, China, pp. 13, 24n, 36-37.

no American civil affairs officer is to serve in any area in the SEAC theater unless under independent American command, and no American officer may collaborate in SEAC political warfare.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 9 September 1944.

C.C.S. 417/8

OPERATIONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN, 1944-45

References: a. C.C.S. 417 Series²
b. C.C.S. 426 Series³

1. The agreed over-all objective in the war against Japan has been expressed as follows:

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:

(1) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockade, conducting intensive air bombardment and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.

(2) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.

¹ For the discussion of this paper by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 173d Meeting, September 13, 1944, see *post*, p. 321. Although the schedule of operations defined in this paper was accepted as a basis for planning, certain of the target dates were overtaken by events during the Quebec Conference and the Combined Chiefs of Staff therefore omitted the schedule from their report to Roosevelt and Churchill (J.C.S. Files).

² For C.C.S. 417, "Over-All Plan for the Defeat of Japan", December 2, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 765. Concerning C.C.S. 417/1, see *ibid.*, p. 736n. C.C.S. 417/2, December 23, 1943, circulated the text of C.C.S. 417 as amended by C.C.S. 417/1. In C.C.S. 417/3, July 11, 1944, the United States Chiefs of Staff proposed a redefinition of the over-all objective in the war against Japan (this proposed redefinition is quoted in paragraph 1 of C.C.S. 417/8, printed here). Marshall explained privately that this new definition was designed to allow for an invasion of the Japanese home islands (see Ehrman, p. 498). In C.C.S. 417/4, July 29, 1944, the British Chiefs of Staff agreed to the proposed redefinition, subject to certain assurances. These assurances were given by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 417/5, August 4, 1944, in the following terms: "The proposed amendment to the over-all objective in the war against Japan is in consonance with the Over-all Objective and with the Over-all Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of the War, as expressed by C.C.S. 426/1 [see fn. 3, below]. The United States Chiefs of Staff reaffirm the existing agreements relative to the priority of operations OVERLORD and DRAGOON. They also reaffirm existing agreements relative to the effect on the over-all objective of extension of operations in the Pacific." C.C.S. 417/6 and 417/7 are not printed. For the action taken at the Second Quebec Conference on the proposed redefinition, see C.C.S. 417/9, *post*, p. 440.

³ For C.C.S. 426/1, "Report to the President and Prime Minister" on the conclusions of the Second Cairo Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 810.

2. Pursuant to the above, the United States Chiefs of Staff have evolved a course of action for planning purposes. The schedule of major operations comprising this course of action follows:

<i>Target Date</i>	<i>Objective</i>
15 October 1944	Talaud
15 November 1944	Sarangani Bay
20 December 1944	Leyte-Surigao Area
1 March 1945	Formosa-Amoy Area
or	
20 February 1945	Luzon

If the Formosa operation is undertaken, the following operations have been approved for planning purposes:

April 1945	Bonins
May 1945	Ryukyus
March to June 1945	China coast (Foochow-Wenchow Area)
October 1945	Southern Kyushu
December 1945	Tokyo Plain

A course of action to follow the Luzon operation, if undertaken, is under study.

3. It is believed that operations should be devised to accomplish the defeat of Japan at the earliest possible date and to that end plans will retain flexibility and provision will be made to take full advantage of favorable developments in the strategic situation which may permit taking all manner of short cuts. It is proposed to exploit to the fullest the Allied superiority of naval and air power and to avoid, wherever possible, commitment to costly land campaigns. Unremitting submarine warfare against enemy shipping will be continued. Very long range bomber operations against Japan proper will be continued from China bases and will be instituted from bases being established in the Marianas and from bases to be seized in the future. The air forces in China will continue to support operations of the Chinese ground forces and will also provide the maximum practicable support for the campaign in the Pacific.

4. It is agreed that every effort should be made to bring the U.S.S.R. into the war against Japan at the earliest practicable date and planning for such contingency is continuing.

5. The views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on British participation in the war against Japan and operations in the Southeast Asia Command are contained in C.C.S. 452/21⁴ and C.C.S. 452/25.⁵

6. It is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff note the foregoing.

⁴ "Plans for Operations in Burma", August 31, 1944, not printed.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 257.

J.C.S. Files

*Report by the Combined Intelligence Committee*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, September 9, 1944.]

Enclosure to C.C.S. 643/1

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, PACIFIC-FAR EAST

THE PROBLEM

1. To estimate the enemy situation and intentions in the Pacific and Far East.

SUMMARY

2. *Political and psychological.* (See Appendix "A.") Japan has sought to enlist the support of her most populous conquered areas by powerful propaganda and by grants of specious independence. For the present, Japan desires to avoid war with the U.S.S.R. in order to be free to direct all her energy against her enemies.

As a result of their fundamental beliefs, the morale of the Japanese populace, and especially of the armed forces, has remained relatively high, but a continuing series of sharp defeats will tend further to confuse and bewilder the Japanese. Such defeats, combined with a collapse of Germany, might conceivably cause a reshuffling of the ruling clique followed by an attempt to secure a negotiated peace. Japanese propaganda has already shifted from self-assured offensive to defensive.

3. *Economic factors.* (See Appendix "B.") Production of high-priority armament items such as aircraft may continue to expand for some time, even though the rapid growth of Japan's basic industry has been levelling off since the beginning of 1944. Further substantial growth of the Japanese steel and other basic industries is believed impossible in the light of the present Japanese shipping position. Shipping is now barely adequate to sustain current production rates in the basic industries, and sinkings exceed launchings. The largest and most essential economic commitment for shipping is within the Inner Zone.* Japan is continuing to develop raw material sources in the Inner Zone in an attempt to achieve self-sufficiency there, but is unlikely to achieve this goal. She is particularly dependent on the Outer Zone for oil. Inner Zone production and stockpiles of fuel oil are at best estimated as sufficient for about nine months but may be much less. In other essential raw materials not available in sufficient

¹ Submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff under cover of a note (not printed) by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 643/1) dated September 9, 1944. This report was noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 173d Meeting, September 13, 1944. See *post*, p. 320.

*Japan Proper, Korea, Manchuria, North China, Formosa, and Karafuto (Japanese Sakhalin). [Footnote in the source text.]

quantity in the Inner Zone, Japan is believed to have stockpiles to carry her for longer periods.

Japan's civilian supply position is stringent but not yet critical with respect to food and is generally bad and deteriorating with respect to other commodities, e.g., clothing.

4. *Military factors.* (See Appendix "C.") Realizing that the war potential of her enemies is increasing much more rapidly than her own, Japan has been compelled to adopt the strategic defensive. She hopes that tenacious resistance along successive lines of defense may eventually result in war weariness and possible division among the United Nations, which would enable her to conclude a satisfactory peace. In the past year her air force has deteriorated in quality of personnel and has operated less aggressively; her navy has suffered serious losses; only her ground forces have maintained their strength and fighting qualities.

Although Japan will continue to use caution in the employment of her air power and especially her battle fleet, we believe, nevertheless, that Japan now intends to make vigorous efforts to resist any Allied penetration of her inner defense line Japan-Formosa-Luzon-Mindanao. Her ground forces will offer maximum resistance at all points with little regard for losses; her air power will be committed to a scale of defense proportionate to the strategic importance of each area, and her battle fleet will attack should local circumstances develop which seem to offer opportunity for an effective blow.

In the Bonins, at Palau, and at Halmahera local Japanese ground forces will resist to the maximum extent of their capabilities, but without strong naval and air support.

5. *Intentions in specific areas.* (See Appendix "D.")

a. *Japan Proper.* As the war draws nearer to Japan we may expect to find an increasingly large percentage of her naval and air forces based nearby and all home defenses considerably strengthened.

b. *Northern Pacific.* Japan will continue her present policy of gradually strengthening her garrisons and other defenses in the Kuriles and Japanese Sakhalin.

c. *Manchuria.* In view of the Soviet threat, Japan is unlikely to release any appreciable ground forces from Manchuria unless they can be quickly restored. She will continue to maintain a strong defensive position there, but is unlikely to undertake any offensive action unless she becomes convinced that the U.S.S.R. is about to enter the war against her.

d. *China.* We believe that the Japanese are now conducting operations with the intentions of neutralizing Allied air forces in China and also of establishing overland communication from Manchuria to south China. Japan hopes, by such moves, to improve her strategic position in central and south China.

e. Burma. The Japanese will continue to attempt to deny the Allies a land route to China and to maintain their position in Burma as an anchor for their western perimeter defenses. They will only undertake limited offensive action for the purpose of breaking up Allied operations.

f. Malaya-Sumatra. Although this area is of great importance to the Japanese, both for its own resources and as a barrier on the approaches to the South China Sea from the west and south, we anticipate no substantial reinforcement of it until a major threat is more clearly apparent.

g. East Indies. We believe that Japan will maintain her hold on the East Indies as long as possible, even though her sea communications should be severed.

h. Formosa-Luzon-Mindanao. The Japanese are busily engaged in strenuous efforts to reinforce this line. They will resist fiercely any penetration of this line, particularly the Luzon-Formosa area. They will accelerate the rate of reinforcement should the Allies occupy the western Carolines.

i. Central Pacific. In the Bonins, at Palau, and at Halmahera local Japanese ground forces will resist to the maximum extent of their capabilities, but without strong naval and air support.

6. A detailed estimate of enemy order of battle and deployment will be available as Annex "A" when required.²

Appendix "A"

POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

1. *External politics.*

a. General. Japan has propounded two powerful propaganda themes: "Asia for the Asiatics" and "The Co-Prosperity Sphere;" and has adopted such relations with neighboring peoples as she believes will contribute to the fulfillment of her plans. Following are the steps which have been taken, but they represent changes in form rather than in substance.

(1) *Relations with China.* Japan has recognized the "independence" of China, as represented by the Nanking puppet government, and has sought to enlist Chinese nationalism in support of that regime by surrendering to it various foreign concessions, notably those at Shanghai.

(2) *Relations with subject peoples.* Japan has granted "independence" to Burma and the Philippines, seeking to enlist the relatively developed nationalism of those countries in her favor; she has hinted that other occupied areas (e.g., Java) may receive similar grants of "independence;" and she has rewarded Thailand for cooperation by

² Not printed.

the cession of certain neighboring territory to which Thailand had some pretensions.

b. Relations with the U.S.S.R. There exists between Japan and the U.S.S.R. a basic conflict of interest. Japan's concept of strategic security cannot be satisfied without gaining control of the eastern region of Siberia. For the present, however, Japan desires to avoid war with the U.S.S.R. in order to be free to direct all her efforts against her enemies.

c. Relations with the Axis. Japan's connection with the Axis is a matter of expediency only. Her action will be coordinated with that of Germany only insofar as she believes that such coordination will contribute to the realization of her basic aims.

2. Psychology and morale. The Japanese, traditionally, are an intensely nationalistic and close knit family whose broad characteristics are a toughness of fiber and a fatalistic singleness of purpose. They have been taught that they are of divine origin, that the Emperor is directly descended from the god-founder of the nation and that the Japanese are divinely and infallibly guided towards the establishment of a new world order. The Japanese soldier is taught to give blind obedience and to regard death in the service of the Emperor as an honor. He is told that he is invincible and that to show weakness or to surrender is to accept disgrace.

As a result of these teachings, the morale of the Japanese populace, and especially of the armed forces, has remained high, but the unfavorable course of the war has caused some disillusionment. Moreover, since much of popular morale is based upon the theory of invincibility, a series of sharp defeats, as they are brought home to them, will tend further to confuse and bewilder the people as a whole.

Real power in Japan rests in the hands of small groups of leaders capable of exploiting the position of the Emperor. The collapse of Germany will have a tremendously depressing effect upon such leaders. This, combined with ever increasing United Nations pressure and approach to the homeland, might conceivably bring about a reshuffle of the ruling cliques followed by an attempt to secure a negotiated peace.

Official propaganda on the home front has lost its self-assured tone and determination to fight for existence is replacing exaltation in victory. The potential of the United Nations is admitted to be high, and the government has announced its intention to prepare for the defense of the homeland. Japanese withdrawals are admitted. It is implied that the Japanese have finished winning independence for other Asiatic countries and now must prepare to defend their own islands from frontal attack. The government is also preparing the Japanese people for more serious German reverses in Europe.

Appendix "B"

ECONOMIC FACTORS

1. *General.* Though Japan may still be able to increase production of certain high priority armament items, e.g., aircraft, the expansion of her basic industry, which had ceased by the end of 1943, almost certainly cannot be resumed during this war. Lack of shipping is the most important limiting factor on the expansion of basic industry. Japan still depends on the Outer Zone for certain essential raw materials, especially oil. The Japanese have partially succeeded in reducing this dependence by stockpiling materials in the Inner Zone where nearly all Japanese industry is concentrated. The stockpiling program has fallen short because of lack of shipping.

2. *Shipping.* Japan's shipping position is her most critical weakness and is deteriorating rapidly. We estimate that Japan now has much less shipping than she needs to carry out military commitments and at the same time to utilize her industrial capacity to the full. This condition will grow progressively worse. We believe, however, that Japan will not voluntarily abandon any strategic outpost because of a shipping stringency alone, but will accept a curtailment in her basic over-all industrial production by reducing the import of raw materials. Should the sinking rate increase, as it has increased in recent months, the Japanese would be forced to accept this import reduction proportionately sooner. Sufficient shipping should be available, if necessary, by diversion from trade, for essential troop movements.

We estimate that Japan will be unable to build more than 800,000 gross tons of steel merchant vessels in 1944, which is far behind the rate required to replace losses, and that her ship repair facilities are heavily overburdened. Great emphasis has been placed on wooden shipbuilding, but this program is not believed to be progressing as well as planned and could not, in any event, offset the discrepancy between losses and construction of steel ships. Japan's shipping position would be relatively easier were she cut off from the Outer Zone.

3. *Petroleum and other raw materials.* In general, Japan's industrial machine is dependent upon raw materials which must come from outside Japan Proper and thus the continuance of supply depends upon transportation. The most essential raw material contribution from the Outer Zone is oil. Other critical materials which Japan obtains from the Outer Zone include nickel, chrome, iron ore, manganese, lead, copper, zinc, bauxite and phosphates. Her dependence on the Outer Zone for these materials is however less than in the case of oil either because of the existence of relatively large stockpiles or the possibility in some cases of increasing Inner Zone supplies or of substituting other materials.

Among *petroleum products*, Japan's position is weakest in fuel oil. Inner Zone production and stocks are believed sufficient for about nine months and estimated present over-all production roughly balances consumption at the present calculated scale. Furthermore, about 75 per cent of production is in the East Indies. Japan is developing new synthetic facilities in the Inner Zone, but present fuel oil output there would, we estimate, operate her naval fleet and merchant marine at less than one-third their present rate of activity, if stocks are not drawn upon. In aviation gasoline, Japan is similarly dependent upon the East Indies, 80 per cent coming from there, but stocks, chiefly in the Inner Zone, are believed sufficient for somewhat more than a year at the present rate of consumption.

Japan's *tanker fleet* has been reduced far below the minimum tonnage required to move fuel oil and aviation gas out of the East Indies to all consumption centers, and the deficit has been only partially offset by diversion of dry cargo vessels to oil-carrying. We believe that Japan will continue this diversion at the expense of other cargoes in order to keep the oil line full and moving.

Although about 20 per cent of Japan's *iron ore* is now derived from Outer Zone areas, we believe that Inner Zone production, most of which is outside Japan Proper, could fill all essential needs. Nearly all of Japan's *coal* supply is in the Inner Zone, but more than 50 per cent of it lies outside of Japan Proper. Thus iron ore and coal constitute the greatest burden of Japanese shipping. Japan is almost completely dependent on north China and Manchuria for coking coal since the supplies available to her elsewhere are generally of too poor quality to make high grade coke without the admixture of the coal from north China.

Stockpiles of *bauxite* and the possibility of producing alumina from inferior ores in the Inner Zone reduce Japan's dependence on bauxite supplies from Bintan Island (Malaya) and Indochina. Though Japan's *copper* stockpile is relatively small, she produces more than half her requirements at home. The *lead* stockpile, supplemented by Inner Zone production, would last at least a year. Japan's *zinc* position is more stringent; the Inner Zone produces not more than two-thirds of Japan's requirements and stocks are believed to be low.

Japan's major source of *nickel* is Celebes and if this source were cut off her position would be difficult. A conservative use pattern probably has been observed, however, and we believe that the full effects would not be felt in less than a year. The first results of a sharp reduction in use of nickel would be impairment of the quality of war material.

In *chromium* and *manganese*, Japan's position is believed to be somewhat better. For both, Inner Zone production, plus stocks, is believed sufficient for more than a year's consumption. The Philippines

are the major source of both, contributing a large portion of new chromium and nearly 40 percent of the new manganese.

The comparative dependence of Japan on specific Outer Zone areas is in the following order:

Sumatra:	Fuel oil and aviation gasoline.
Borneo:	Fuel oil.
Philippine Islands:	Chrome, manganese, copper.
Celebes:	Nickel.
Bintan Island:	Bauxite.

4. *Industry.* Japanese industrial production expanded generally up to the beginning of 1944, when it levelled off because of basically restrictive factors (e.g., lack of shipping) which the Japanese are not expected to overcome during this war. However, production of certain high priority finished products, such as aircraft, continues to increase. Japan will attempt to increase the production of such instruments as fire control gear, radar, and other types of precision electrical equipment, but because of technical and organizational difficulties, we believe that she will not be able to accomplish any great expansion in this field. There is still a slight cushion in consumer and civilian goods which can be sacrificed in all out efforts to increase the production of military armaments. Japanese industry is almost wholly concentrated in Inner Zone areas (southern Hokkaido, central Honshu, northern Kyushu, northern Korea, southern Manchuria and Formosa). Finished munitions production is heavily concentrated in Honshu, although Manchurian industry, with help from Japan Proper, largely supports the Japanese Army in Manchuria.

5. *Food.* The 1944 rice consumption in the Inner Zone is higher than anticipated because of reduced wheat and barley crops. For this and other reasons, we now believe that Japanese rice reserves are uncomfortably low and that Japan must next year depend upon shipments from Indochina and Thailand for an essential portion of rice supplies. Food rations can be reduced without causing actual starvation or serious political consequences, but any reduction will result in decreased industrial efficiency and further deterioration of public health.

Appendix "C"

MILITARY FACTORS

1. *General.* The rapid build-up and advance of Allied forces in the Central and South Pacific have brought home to Japan the realization that she must prepare to meet steadily increasing Allied strength. In addition, Japan's relations with the U.S.S.R. are uneasy because of the ever present fear that one day that country may join the forces arrayed against her. Forced to accept the strategic defensive, Japan

is attempting to consolidate and make secure her greatly expanded empire. She is developing successive defense lines to hold off her enemies in the hope that they, wearied by the war in Europe and perhaps divided among themselves, will attack her ineffectively or compromise to her advantage.

2. *Air forces.* The Japanese Air Force finds itself totally unable to match the constantly growing strength of our opposing air forces and is irrevocably committed to a strategic defensive role. Strictly offensive operations have become progressively more limited in scope and less frequent. Meanwhile, the highest priority is being given to aircraft production, and latest estimates suggest that at least 1200 combat aircraft are now being produced each month. A strenuous effort is being made to overcome qualitative inferiority by better protective armament, greater fire power, self-sealing fuel tanks, and engines of increased power. Already there has been a marked improvement in the quality of Japanese fighter aircraft. All available indications show that the combat efficiency of the Japanese Air Force is at present suffering seriously from a shortage of fully trained and experienced pilots and crews. Currently expanded facilities for individual and group training are being completed, but in periods of high attrition the Japanese will find it difficult to provide replacement of effectively trained personnel. We believe that a combination of difficulties will make it impossible for Japan's air forces to improve materially their present qualitative inferiority so long as continued and heavy pressure is brought against her.

Although the Allies will probably meet increasingly strong numerical air resistance as they attack successive lines of defense, the scale and duration encountered at each point of attack is likely to be conditioned by Japan's intention to preserve air strength for the final defense of those areas which she considers vital to the defense of the homeland and its critical supply lines.

3. *Naval forces.* Japan's naval strength is inadequate for the defense of her outer perimeter. She is only able to concentrate portions of her fleet at a few strategic bases to parry thrusts at key points of her defense line. Allied strength is denying the Japanese Fleet the use of all but a small part of the Pacific Ocean. With her present relatively small operational fleet, Japan does not dare risk possible heavy attrition by launching any major offensives. Although she is striving to increase her fleet strength by new units, the appearance of such new ships has been so rare as to suggest difficulties in the outfitting of such forces. We believe that Japan is primarily engaged in building small escort vessels to counter the heavy toll of merchant ships taken by our submarines.

We believe that in the future the Japanese will deploy their fleet so as to be able better to meet readily the next estimated Allied blow.

With their fleet concentrated in the Celebes Sea the Japanese had hoped to counter vigorously Allied thrusts at the Philippines. Subsequent to the battle of the eastern Philippines the main elements of the fleet were obliged to retire for reequipping and reorganization. As a result of the threat to the Bonins and the homeland, developed by our advance to the Marianas, the Japanese are likely to dispose their heavy surface units along the Kyushu-Formosa line. However, the fuel oil situation, the shipping stringency and Allied air power will have a bearing on ultimate fleet deployment.

While the Japanese Fleet suffered a heavy loss of aircraft and some carrier units in the recent battle of the eastern Philippines, Japan still retains a battle fleet of considerable power. Despite recent actions we believe that while the Japanese High Command will be cautious in the use of their battle fleet, they will continue to make vigorous efforts to oppose any Allied penetrations of the line Japan-Formosa-Luzon-Mindanao. The main considerations governing the strength, disposition, and employment of Japanese naval units opposing our advance are: local control of the air, strength of Allied forces, and the time factor. If, at any time, the Japanese should gain local control of the air, which is unlikely, we must expect heavy attacks upon our units by task forces composed of carriers, battleships, cruisers, etc. Lacking such air control or strong land-based air cover, the Japanese would use some carriers to attempt attacks on our flanks, and also light task forces might attempt night surface torpedo attacks. We can expect the Japanese to be cautious in all-out attacks on a vastly superior force, such attacks only materializing if local control of the air has been established. The element of timing will be affected by the rapidity with which the High Command reaches the conclusion that an actual occupation is threatened. In any event, our carriers will be the primary target for enemy aircraft, with our transports as secondary. Our transports will be the primary target for enemy surface forces, with our own striking forces as secondary.

4. *Ground forces.* Japan's greatest armed strength lies in her large, fairly equipped and very well trained army. Because of the nature of the war in the Pacific to date, the United Nations have been unable to inflict any serious attrition on the over-all strength of the Japanese ground forces, which are as strong or stronger than in 1941.

At the present time the Japanese army ground forces total approximately 3,500,000 men. These troops are organized into about 85 divisions plus many independent units and garrisons, which have been so deployed that Japan now maintains a strong strategically defensive position. In addition, Japan has organized in Manchuria and China puppet units totaling approximately 300,000 and 400,000 men respectively. The strongest concentrations of forces are in Japan Proper, Manchuria and China. Since United Nations forces have

begun to threaten seriously Japan's position in the Central and South-western Pacific areas, Japan has accelerated her preparations for the defense of the vital East Indies and has reinforced her southern forces, particularly in the Philippines area.

The formation of puppet units has been general throughout Japanese occupied territory, but only on a large scale in Manchuria and China. Puppet troops in other areas have been formed primarily for purposes of political propaganda, and their military value to Japan has been negligible. The actual value of the Manchurian and Chinese puppet troops to Japan cannot be accurately assessed. They are only lightly equipped and, although some have been used in combat against the Chinese, the majority of them have had relatively little training. They are at present being used mainly as garrison units and for the maintenance of order in Japanese occupied territory. Because their loyalty is doubtful, it is unlikely that the Japanese would use them in a major engagement against well trained and equipped troops.

We believe that Japan intends to maintain generally the present strategic disposition of her ground forces after further substantial reinforcement of Formosa and the Philippines.

Appendix "D"

MILITARY INTENTIONS IN SPECIFIC AREAS

1. *Japan Proper.* As the war draws nearer to Japan, we may expect to find an increasingly large percentage of Japan's heavy naval forces based in contiguous waters to protect the home islands and the essential transport routes between the home islands and the rest of the Inner Zone. Similarly, a large percentage of Japan's total combat aircraft, particularly fighters, will be kept at bases in the homeland to protect against bombing of the concentrations of Japanese armaments production there. Also the formation of new divisions will be expedited and Japanese home defenses strengthened.

2. *Northern Pacific.* In view of the American position in the Aleutian Islands and the possibility of eventual Allied air and naval action from Soviet bases in Kamchatka and Soviet Sakhalin, Japan will continue her present policy of strengthening her defenses in the Kuriles and Japanese Sakhalin.

3. *Manchuria.* Japan has built up in Manchuria a large and highly developed army. It is largely sustained by Manchurian agricultural and industrial production, which is developing more rapidly than any other section of the Japanese Empire. The purpose of this army is to provide a force of sufficient strength to protect Manchuria from any Soviet threat and also to provide a striking force powerful enough to attack Siberia and the Maritime Provinces should Japan consider the

latter course to be necessary. The Japanese High Command has abandoned hope of any German victory. Japan must appreciate that following peace with Germany, Soviet military capabilities in the Far East will increase progressively and, in fact, the initiative along the Manchurian border will eventually pass to the U.S.S.R. In view of the Soviet threat, Japan is unlikely to release any appreciable forces from Manchuria unless they can be quickly restored. She will continue to maintain a strong defensive position there, but is unlikely to undertake any offensive action unless she becomes convinced that the U.S.S.R. is about to enter the war against her.

4. *China*. Allied air action from China is increasingly menacing Japan's present economic and defensive position, and the Japanese are taking stronger counter measures by the occupation and neutralization of some of the more accessible Allied bases.

The Japanese have now completed military operations between the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers and are in process of consolidating their position in this newly captured territory while reconstructing the railroad line linking Hankow with Peking. The primary objective of current operations south of the Yangtze is to deny to the Allies air bases in southeastern China. In order to accomplish this we believe that they intend to occupy the railway line between Hengyang and Kweilin and also eventually to establish overland communications between their forces in central and south China by occupation of the railroad line between Hengyang and Canton.

The Japanese have the capability of successfully carrying out these intentions. Whether or not they will commit sufficient forces for the final completion of such operations may however be influenced by the rapidly increasing threat from the Pacific. We believe that the Japanese do not intend to weaken the ground forces they now have based in China unless in due course some of these divisions are urgently required for the defense of Japan Proper or Formosa.

5. *Burma*. The main object of Japanese operations in Burma will be to contain large Allied forces in terrain favorable to the Japanese and to prevent the reopening of the land route to China. The Japanese will, when possible, continue to undertake limited offensive action designed to break up Allied offensive preparations and to divert as large a part as possible of the forces of the Southeast Asia Command.

6. *Malaya-Sumatra*. This area is of great importance to the Japanese, both for its own resources and as a barrier on the approaches to the South China Sea from the west and south. The Japanese, however, presumably consider their present strength there adequate to meet any threat likely to arise during 1944. In view of their preoccupation with more immediate threats to Japan Proper, Formosa, and the Philippines from the Pacific and by air from China, as well as the

potential threat from Siberia, we anticipate no substantial reinforcement of Malaya-Sumatra until a threat to that area is more clearly apparent, and then only as may be warranted by the then existing over-all situation.

7. *East Indies.* We believe that Japan will not in any circumstances voluntarily relinquish her hold upon the East Indies, but will continue to maintain in the area the strong ground forces which already have been deployed for their defense. Although the Japanese in due time will appreciate that their sea communications to the Indies may be severed, they will consider the continued denial of the area to the United Nations forces as of such strategic importance as to warrant the sacrifice of forces stationed there.

8. *Formosa-Luzon-Mindanao.* Currently the Japanese are engaged in strenuous efforts to reinforce and build up ground, air and naval defenses in these areas. Allied attack upon any part of the line will be fiercely resisted by all forces immediately available, the scale and intensity of such resistance progressively increasing from the southern to the northern part of this strong eastern defense to the vital line of sea communications with the East Indies. Although Allied occupation of Mindanao would greatly increase the threat to Japan's position, the occupation of Luzon would make the passage of shipping through the South China Sea highly precarious, while the capture of Formosa would substantially sever all sea communications to the south and in addition offer a strong base for direct assault upon Japan Proper. We believe that the Japanese intend to have deployed in the immediate future all forces which they consider can be spared for the defense of the southern Philippines, whereas land and air strength in Luzon and Formosa will continue to build up at an accelerated rate should the Allies occupy the Palaus.

9. *Central Pacific.* In the Bonins, at Palau, and at Halmahera local Japanese ground forces will resist to the maximum extent of their capabilities, but without strong naval and air support. The scale of naval resistance will be governed by the number of their own land-based aircraft immediately available, the strength and dispositions of our own forces, and the time at which they determine that further occupation is threatened.

3. LOG OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CANADA

Editorial Note

The document referred to as the President's Log is a booklet entitled "The President's Log for the 1944 Quebec Conference (OCTAGON), September 9–21, 1944" (14 regularly numbered pages of text, seven pages at the front bearing roman numerals, an unnumbered page designated Appendix A containing the text of the Communiqué, and 20 unnumbered pages of illustrations). This booklet, which was prepared by Lieutenant (jg) William M. Rigdon and approved by Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, contains a table of contents (not printed), a list of the President's party,¹ the President's itinerary (not printed), a foreword by Lieutenant George M. Elsey, the main body of the Log, and the text of the Conference Communiqué.²

¹ Not printed. A substantially similar list of the party is given (although not in the same order) in William M. Rigdon, with James Derieux, *White House Sailor* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1962), pp. 280–281. That source includes three names which do not appear in the list of the President's party in the Log: Colonel Richard Park, Jr., Captain Boyce Price, and Lieutenant Ogden S. Collins, Jr. The Log list, on the other hand, includes seven names not mentioned on the pages cited in *White House Sailor*: Henry Morgenthau, Jr., D. L. Moorman, Herbert Harwood, Leo DeWaard, Merriman Smith, Douglas Cornell, and Robert G. Nixon. Morgenthau was included in the Log list of the President's party because he accompanied Roosevelt from Washington to Hyde Park; for the message in which Roosevelt later asked Morgenthau to come to Quebec, see *ante*, p. 43.

² See *post*, p. 477.

Roosevelt Papers

The President's Log

FOREWORD

The Quebec Conference in September 1944 marked the eleventh wartime meeting of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. They first met at Argentia, Newfoundland, in August 1941,¹ when they proclaimed to the world in the Atlantic Charter² the war aims in which their democracies believed. The second meeting was in Washington two weeks after Pearl Harbor³ when the fortunes of the United States were at low ebb as she prepared for war in the

¹ See *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 341 ff.

² Released August 14, 1941. For text see Department of State, Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1603; *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 368–369.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943, pp. 61 ff.

midst of war. At that time the President and the Prime Minister made the most crucial decision of the war—to throw the main bulk of our force against Germany first and to defeat Japan later. The third meeting in June 1942⁴ marked the Allied low point of the war. The Prime Minister's mood was as grim as the President's had been in December and the fall of Tobruk on 21 June cast a pall over the conference which was seeking the means to open a second front in Europe. The fourth conference at Casablanca in January 1943,⁵ held in territory seized by American troops barely two months before and with a battle raging 750 miles away, symbolized in dramatic fashion the beginning of a great Allied offensive which by the year's end knocked Italy out and entrenched our armies firmly on the continent of Europe.

Bolder and greater attacks on the Axis citadel were planned at later conferences in Washington and in Quebec.⁶ Meetings at Cairo and Teheran in November and December 1943⁷ brought China and Russia into close military alliance with Great Britain and the United States for the first time and gave to President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister the opportunity to talk with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Marshal Stalin and to synchronize Anglo-American drives with those of our other allies.

As the plans of Cairo and Teheran were ripening and as great forces were massing for the final assault on Germany in the spring of 1944, Mr. Churchill proposed another conference. He suggested an Easter meeting in Bermuda⁸ but the President did not believe a meeting was essential at that time.⁹ Soon thereafter the Prime Minister pressed for a meeting in England just after "D-Day". The President could not accept.¹⁰ In July Mr. Churchill begged for an early meeting either in Bermuda or in Scotland. The President liked the idea of Scotland and he cabled Marshal Stalin inviting him to an August conference in Scotland similar to the one at Teheran but unfortunately Stalin replied that military duties would prevent his attendance.¹¹ The President's Pacific inspection trip and the Prime Minister's visit to Italy in August both delayed the meeting and it was not until late August that a September date was chosen¹² and Quebec was agreed upon as the meeting place.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943, pp. 422 ff.

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 536 ff.

⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943.

⁷ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.

⁸ See *ante*, p. 3.

⁹ Cf. *ante*, p. 4.

¹⁰ See *ante*, p. 5.

¹¹ See *ante*, pp. 10 ff.; *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 3-5.

¹² See *ante*, p. 17.

From 18 August, when the President told his press conference that he expected to see the Prime Minister soon, the press speculated on a place and time for the conference. Although one "usually reliable" source on 23 August expected the President to view an Allied military parade in Paris, most correspondents were more cautious in their predictions and by the first of September they had agreed that the meeting would take place in Canada. Speculation then turned to the agenda; correspondents wrote that control of Germany and defeat of Japan—obvious topics—would be the principal items of discussion. The fog of public ignorance was cleared on 11 September when the President and Prime Minister Churchill arrived in Quebec and their spokesmen announced that they were there to plan the knockout blow against Japan.

When the President and the Prime Minister joined with their staffs in discussion at Quebec, Allied fortunes of war were favorable in all theatres except the Chinese. American, British and Canadian armies had made a lightning sweep across northern France; on the first day of the conference elements of the Third U.S. Army driving east were joined by units of the Seventh U.S. Army pushing north and General Eisenhower then had an unbroken front from Holland to the Mediterranean. On the same day troops of the First U.S. Army entered Germany in force at three points. German strategy in the West had been a strategy of delay, buying time to strengthen the West Wall. The German High Command had made the grave mistake of leaving 200,000 men in the ports of Brest, Le Havre, Boulogne, Calais and Dunkerque. By denying those ports to the Allied Expeditionary Force the Germans had sought to restrict the Allies to the coast but they had greatly underestimated Allied logistic ability and Herr Hitler now found the AEF probing the West Wall long before his army was sheltered behind it.

In Italy General Alexander's armies were cracking the eastern end of the Gothic Line, from Pisa to Rimini, which the Germans had been striving to hold. Foul weather and tough resistance had made Allied advances slow and expensive for several weeks but by mid-September there was promise of better progress.

In the East, Soviet armies had launched a great drive in June on their central front which had carried them to the gates of Warsaw before they were halted by bitter German opposition. Now the Soviets were clearing their southern flank. Rumania dropped out of the war on 23 August, the Red Army was driving into Transylvania, and in the week preceding the Quebec Conference Soviet forces over-ran Bulgaria which capitulated promptly and declared war on its old ally Germany. The rest of the Balkan Peninsula was in turmoil as Partisans, Chetniks, Bulgars and Germans fought each other in Yugo-

slavia and the Germans began withdrawing from Greece and the Aegean Islands.

In the Pacific the United States Navy launched its first carrier strike against Mindanao in the Philippines on 9 September as a promise of heavier attacks soon to follow, and simultaneous land-based attacks throughout the Philippine Area encountered amazingly little opposition and revealed unsuspected weakness in the Japanese garrisons. In Burma the Japanese were withdrawing southward, a move which gave promise of an early opening of the Ledo Road, but in China the situation was grave as new enemy drives forced the U.S. Fourteenth Air Force to retreat from its forward bases and threatened to cut off the last stretch of coast from the interior. Japanese drives also endangered the new Very Long Range Bomber bases; the largest strike ever made by B-29's when 100 of them attacked steel mills at Anshan, Manchuria, on 8 September was followed immediately by the first enemy offensive effort against their bases in the Chengtu area.

With China the only dark spot in a worldwide scene of successful Allied drives, with great victories to their credit and the promise of greater ones to come, the President and the Prime Minister convened their Eleventh War Conference to discuss two great problems: post-war control of Germany and the final defeat of Japan.

THE LOG OF THE TRIP

Saturday, September 9th

The President left the White House at 10:10 p.m. for his special train which was awaiting him at the Bureau of Engraving and Printing "station". Accompanying the President were the Honorable Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury; Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S.N., Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy; Vice Admiral Ross T. McIntire, Medical Corps, U.S.N., the Surgeon General of the Navy and the President's Personal Physician; Miss Grace Tully, the President's Private Secretary; and Mrs. D. J. Brady, Miss Tully's assistant. The President and accompanying party arrived at the train at 10:25 p.m. and entrained at once. At 10:27 p.m. this section of the train departed from the Bureau of Engraving and Printing and joined up with the first section of the train at 10:47 p.m. The first section had departed from the railroad yards outside the "Bureau" at 10:15 p.m., so as to be in the proper position on time. The combined special train, operating as "Main 38205", departed from the Virginia Avenue Station, Washington, at 10:50 p.m. for Highland, N.Y., and our ultimate destination of Quebec, Province of Quebec, Canada. At Quebec the President was scheduled to begin a series of conferences on Monday, September 11th,

1944, with the Right Honorable Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain.

Already on board the train when the President arrived were Presidential Secretary Stephen T. Early; Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U.S.N., the President's Naval Aide; and Major General Edwin M. Watson, U.S.A., the President's Military Aide, who were to accompany the President to Quebec. Also accompanying the President were the following:

White House Staffs:

Lt-Commander George A. Fox (Hospital Corps), U.S.N., Assistant to Admiral McIntire.

Major DeWitt Greer, Signal Corps, U.S.A., Communications Officer.

Lieut. (jg) William M. Rigdon, U.S.N., Assistant to Admiral Brown.

Warrant Officer Horace Caldwell, U.S.A., Cryptographer.

Chief Yeoman Edwin L. Hoying, U.S.N.R., White House Map Room.

Master Sergeant Montford L. Snyder, U.S.A., Personal Chauffeur to the President.

Chief Steward Arthur S. Prettyman, U.S.N. (Retired), Personal Valet to the President.

Mr. Dewey E. Long, White House Transportation Officer.

Mr. Michael F. Reilly, Supervising Agent, White House Secret Service Detail.

Mr. Guy H. Spaman, Assistant Supervising Agent, White House Secret Service Detail.

Mr. Charles W. Fredericks, Secret Service Agent; and various other Secret Service Agents as listed in roster of the party.

Mrs. Ruthjane Rumelt, Secretary to Mr. Early.

Mr. Jack Romagna, White House Press Conference Reporter.

Miss Louise Hachmeister, White House Chief Telephone Operator.

Miss Grace Earle, White House Telephone Operator.

Railroad Representatives:

Mr. Dan L. Moorman, General Passenger Agent, Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

Mr. Herbert Harwood, Special Passenger Agent, New York Central Railroad.

Post Office Department Representative:

Mr. Leo J. DeWaard, Post Office Inspector.

Representatives of the Press:

Mr. Merriman Smith, The United Press.

Mr. Douglas Cornell, The Associated Press.

Mr. Robert G. Nixon, The International News Service.

Our route to Highland was via the Baltimore and Ohio to Claremont, N.J., and thence to Highland by way of the New York Central Lines (West Shore Division).

Sunday, September 10th

We arrived at Highland at 7:30 a.m., after an uneventful trip up from Washington. The weather at Highland was sunny and cool. Mrs. Roosevelt had driven down from Hyde Park to meet the President and came aboard the President's private car at 8:15 a.m. At 8:30 a.m., the President, Mrs. Roosevelt, Admiral Leahy, Admiral McIntire, Admiral Brown, General Watson and Secretary Early left the train by motor car for the President's home at Hyde Park where they spent the day. Secretary Morgenthau left the train at the same time for his estate also nearby. He did not accompany us beyond Highland. Miss Tully and Mrs. Brady remained aboard the train during the day.

The President and Mrs. Roosevelt and their party had breakfast at the "Big House" at Hyde Park. After breakfast the President spent the greater part of the morning in his study. Later he, Mrs. Roosevelt, Admirals Leahy, McIntire, Brown, General Watson, Secretary Early, Miss Malvina Thompson (Mrs. Roosevelt's Personal Secretary) and Miss Margaret Suckley (Librarian at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library) motored to "Hilltop Cottage" where they enjoyed a picnic lunch. After lunch the party returned to Hyde Park and the President spent most of the afternoon at the Library while the others of the party relaxed and rested about the house.

At 4:00 p.m., the President, Mrs. Roosevelt, Admiral Leahy, Admiral McIntire, Admiral Brown, General Watson, Secretary Early and Miss Thompson left Hyde Park by automobile for Highland to entrain for Quebec. The party arrived at the train which had been returned from Kingston where it was serviced, at 4:30 p.m., entrained at once, and at 4:37 p.m. we departed Highland for Albany and Quebec. Mrs. Roosevelt and Miss Thompson joined our party at Hyde Park and accompanied the President to Quebec.

Our departure from Highland was two and one-half hours earlier than had been planned. It was moved up in order to ensure the President's arrival at Quebec before Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill arrived there. We received word this afternoon that the Prime Minister and his party had arrived in Halifax this forenoon in the S.S. *Queen Mary* and were proceeding to Quebec by rail. The President desired to be in Quebec to welcome them on their arrival.

Our route to Quebec was via the New York Central (West Shore Division) to Albany; the Delaware and Hudson Railroad to Montreal; and the Canadian Pacific Railway from Montreal to Quebec.

Monday, September 11th

The trip north was uneventful. We crossed the International Border into Canada at Rouse's Point at 12:30 a.m. An hour later, at Delson, Quebec, we were joined by a detail of four Royal Canadian Mounted

Police who were to accompany us to Quebec and later accompany us from Quebec back to the Canadian Border at Rouse's Point. These Mounties were Inspector Savoi, Corporal Hudon and Constables Bradley and McArthur.

Our train arrived at Quebec—at the Wolfe's Cove station which is on the banks of the St. Lawrence River just below the Plains of Abraham—at 9:00 a.m. Our train was placed in position for our detraining at once but our arrival was not immediately announced as the President desired to wait here until the arrival of the Prime Minister's train.

The weather at Quebec, as described by the local press, was "typically fall sunny weather"—clear, cool and most invigorating.

The Governor-General of Canada (The Earl of Athlone), Her Royal Highness Princess Alice (The Countess of Athlone) and the Right Honorable Mackenzie King (The Prime Minister of Canada) called on the President on his train at 9:45 a.m. to welcome him and Mrs. Roosevelt to Canada and Quebec.¹³

The President had left his train at 9:50 a.m. and was seated in his automobile, with the Governor-General, Princess Alice and Prime Minister King standing nearby, when Prime Minister Churchill's train pulled up alongside our train at Wolfe's Cove at exactly 10:00 a.m. Prime Minister King went aboard the train to welcome Prime Minister Churchill and a few minutes later, at 10:05 a.m., Prime Minister Churchill and his party left their train, and together with Mr. King, walked over to the President's automobile where most enthusiastic greetings were exchanged and the cheers of the crowd gathered at the station acknowledged in their typical manners. By now the official welcoming committee had been swelled by the arrival of Major General Sir Eugene Fiset, the Lieutenant Governor of Quebec, and Lady Fiset; the Honorable Maurice Duplessis, the Premier of Quebec; the Honorable C. G. Power, Canadian Minister of Air; Mr. St. Laurent, Minister of Justice for the Province of Quebec;¹⁴ Mr. Borne, Mayor of the City of Quebec; and Lieutenant General J. C. Murchie, Chief of Canadian General Staff.

In the Prime Minister's party were Mrs. Churchill; Lord Moran, the Prime Minister's Private Physician; Lord Leathers, British Minister of [War] Transport; Lord Cherwell, British Paymaster General; Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, First Sea Lord;

¹³ Mackenzie King in fact arrived at the station first and had a conversation with Roosevelt before the Governor General and Princess Alice arrived. For further details of the arrangements from Roosevelt's arrival to the inspection of the guard of honor at the Citadel, including Mackenzie King's discussion with Roosevelt of elections in the United States and Canada, see Pickersgill and Forster, pp. 64-66.

¹⁴ St. Laurent was Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, not an official of the Quebec provincial government.

Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke, Chief of Imperial General Staff; Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief of Air Staff; General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister as Minister of Defense; and Major General R. E. Laycock, Chief of Combined Operations. The Prime Minister was wearing a blue uniform—the uniform of an Elder Brother of Trinity House, ancient London pilotage corporation.

After the exchange of greetings at the train, the combined groups motored to the Citadel. The President and the Governor-General were in the first automobile; Her Royal Highness Princess Alice, Mrs. Roosevelt and Mrs. Churchill in the second; and Prime Ministers Churchill and King were riding in the third car. Their parties followed in a long procession that wound up the steep hill to and across the Plains of Abraham above Wolfe's Cove and on to the Citadel.

The President and Prime Minister Churchill arrived at the Citadel at 10:25 a.m. Here the President was officially received in Canada. A composite guard of honor of approximately one hundred and fifty men, made up of equal detachments of Royal Canadian Navy, Army and Air Force personnel, was drawn up on the parade ground. This guard was under the command of Lieutenant J. C. Eastman, R.C.N.V.R., of the H.M.C.S. *Montcalm*. On the President's arrival on the parade ground, the Royal Twenty-Second Regiment Band, under the direction of Lieutenant Edwin Belanger, played our national anthem, the guard of honor presented arms and our colors were hoisted at the Citadel alongside the British and Canadian colors. No honors were rendered the Prime Minister at this time. On completion of honors for the President, the Prime Minister got out of his car, walked over to the President's car and the officer in charge of the guard—Lieutenant Eastman—was called up and presented to the President and to the Prime Minister. News photographers and members of the press—some one hundred strong—were present for the ceremonies at the Citadel.

From the parade ground the President went directly to the Governor-General's summer residence within the Citadel grounds. Here he left his automobile and entered the house. The Prime Minister, Mrs. Churchill, Mrs. Roosevelt, and various other members of the official groups who were remaining at the Citadel left their cars at the parade ground and walked to the nearby residence of the Governor-General. Other members of the combined party left the Citadel at this time for the Château Frontenac Hotel where they were quartered during our visit to Quebec.

The President, Mrs. Roosevelt and Admiral Leahy were guests of the Governor-General and Princess Alice at their summer home within the Citadel during our stay at Quebec. The same quarters occupied

last year¹⁵ were again assigned the President's party. The Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill were likewise guests of the Governor-General and Princess Alice. The Citadel was guarded by its regular garrison augmented by Royal Canadian Mounted Police and our Secret Service men. The special anti-aircraft protection afforded last year was not provided as it was not considered necessary this year.

The President had been preceded to Quebec by the other members of our Joint Chiefs of Staff—General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army; Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations; General Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces; Brigadier General Andrew J. McFarland, Secretary; and Captain Edwin D. Graves, Jr., U.S.N., Deputy Secretary—and their staffs of planners.

On our arrival at the Citadel we found Colonel Richard Park, Jr., U.S.A., Captain Boyce Price, U.S.A., and Lieutenant Ogden S. Collins, Jr., U.S.N.R., who had come to Quebec in advance of us and had set up a map room for the President at the Citadel. The same room was used as was used for this purpose during the 1943 Quebec Conference. The Prime Minister had his own map room at the Citadel, with Captain Pim, R.N.V.R., in charge and assisted by Lieutenant Colonel Hughes-Reckett, Lieutenant Commander Murray, R.N.V.R., and Flight Officer Lyttleton.

Major DeWitt Greer's Signal Corps crew had the communications set-up functioning on our arrival at the Citadel, so that the President was never out of instantaneous touch with the White House. War and governmental reports for the President had come to him by radio while on the train en route from Washington to Quebec. At the Citadel we had our own telephone exchange, called "Amco". At the Château the U.S. Army maintained a private telephone exchange, called "Victor." Both exchanges had direct wire service to Washington and the White House. Direct telegraph wire service was also available between the Citadel and the White House.

The Château Frontenac Hotel had been requisitioned by the Canadian Government for the duration of the conference, as it was in 1943, and all conference representatives of the three nations—Canada, Great Britain and the United States—were quartered and subsisted there as guests of the Canadian Government. The hotel was closed to the general public and was policed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. A part of the hotel opening on the Terrace was closed off from the remainder of the hotel and was used as Conference Press Headquarters and telegraph room.

The Official Conference Headquarters and conference rooms were in the Château Frontenac and it was there that the various Staffs met

¹⁵ During the First Quebec Conference, August 17-24, 1943.

daily for conferences. Plenary reports by the Combined British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff were made to the President and the Prime Minister at the Citadel.

Secretary Early, Mr. A. D. Dunton, of the Canadian Press Bureau, and Mr. R. J. Cruikshank of the British Ministry of Information held a joint press conference at Conference Press Headquarters at 11:30 a.m. More than 150 newsmen, representing the world's press, were present. Daily press conferences were held here by these spokesmen of the Canadian, British and United States governments.

The President, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Roosevelt, Mrs. Churchill and Prime Minister Mackenzie King were luncheon guests of the Governor-General and Princess Alice at the Citadel at 1:30 p.m.¹⁶

After lunch the President visited his map room in the Citadel. He was joined there by Prime Minister Churchill for a review of the latest war news. Before leaving Washington the President had directed the map room to prepare charts, organization tables and graphs in order to demonstrate quickly the tremendous size of our naval force now stationed in the Western Pacific, with statistics giving an outline of the enormity of the logistics problem. This preparation was made in order that from the very beginning of discussions at Quebec there should be a common understanding of the naval problems and the difficulties of supply. With the help of the charts the President outlined the problem to the Prime Minister.¹⁷

During the afternoon the Honorable Ray Atherton, United States Ambassador to Canada, called on the President.¹⁸

At 8:30 p.m., the President and Mrs. Roosevelt attended a viceregal dinner at the Citadel as guests of the Governor-General and Her Royal Highness Princess Alice. The guest list also included Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill; Prime Minister Mackenzie King; Cardinal Villeneuve; Right Reverend Philip Carrington, Anglican Archbishop [*Bishop*] of Quebec; Premier Duplessis of Quebec; Honorable Ray Atherton and Mrs. Atherton; Admiral William D. Leahy; Admiral E. J. King; General George C. Marshall; General H. H. Arnold; Honorable Stephen T. Early; Lieutenant General B. B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces; Rear Admiral Wilson Brown; Vice Admiral Ross T. McIntire; Major General Edwin M. Watson; Miss Malvina Thompson; Right Honorable Malcolm MacDonald, United Kingdom High Commissioner to Canada; Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham; Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke; Marshal of the Royal Air [Force] Sir Charles Portal; Major General R. Laycock; General Sir Hastings L. Ismay; Field Marshal

¹⁶ See *post*, p. 299.

¹⁷ No further information has been found relating to this meeting in the map room.

¹⁸ No record of Roosevelt's discussion with Atherton has been found.

Sir John Dill, Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission to the United States; Admiral Sir Percy Noble; Lieutenant General G. N. Macready; Air Marshal Sir William Welsh; Lord Cherwell; Commander C. R. Thompson, Naval Aide to the Prime Minister; Mr. John Martin, Secretary to the Prime Minister; Sir Eugene Fiset, Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec, and Lady Fiset; Dr. E. H. Coleman, Canadian Under-Secretary of State; the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Air Marshal R. Leckie, Lieutenant General J. C. Murchie, and Vice Admiral G. C. Jones; Major General Maurice Pope, Military Aide to Prime Minister King; and Colonel D. B. Papineau, Aide to Prime Minister King.¹⁹

After the dinner the President turned in.

Tuesday, September 12th

At 11:30 a.m., the President, Prime Minister Churchill, Prime Minister King, the Governor-General, Princess Alice, Mrs. Roosevelt and Mrs. Churchill went to the "sun-deck" of the Citadel where a large group of news and service photographers took pictures of the party. The battlements of the ancient Citadel, the harbor and distant views of the city served as background for the pictures taken.

At 1:00 p.m., the President, Prime Minister Churchill, Prime Minister King, Mrs. Roosevelt and Mrs. Churchill had lunch with the Governor-General and Princess Alice at the Citadel.²⁰ After lunch the party assembled in the conference room at the Citadel where the Prime Minister demonstrated some of the harbor models—ships and equipment used to form artificial harbors for the invasion of France—that he had brought with him from London. After the demonstration he presented the models to the President for eventual display at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, N.Y.

At 8:00 p.m., the Governor-General and Princess Alice entertained at dinner at the Citadel.²¹ Their guests included the President, Prime Minister Churchill, Mrs. Roosevelt, Mrs. Churchill, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold, Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham, Field Marshal Brooke, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal and Field Marshal Dill.

The Governor-General and Princess Alice left Quebec City by train after the dinner for an inspection trip to Arvida, Quebec.

Wednesday, September 13th

At 11:45 a.m., the Combined British and American Chiefs of Staff (Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold,

¹⁹ The Leahy Diary indicates that Moran, Leathers, and Mrs. Philip Carrington were also present at this dinner. No evidence has been found that matters of substance were discussed. For an account of the dinner conversation based on Mackenzie King's notes, see Pickersgill and Forster, pp. 68–69.

²⁰ See *post*, p. 306.

²¹ See *post*, p. 311.

Brigadier General A. J. McFarland, Captain E. D. Graves, Field Marshal Brooke, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal, Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham, Field Marshal Dill, General Ismay, Major General Hollis, Major General Laycock) came to the Citadel for a plenary meeting with the President and Prime Minister Churchill.²² The President's Naval Aide, Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, was also in attendance. The Combined Chiefs of Staff reported the results of their conferences to date and their schedule for further meetings. The President and the Prime Minister made informal comments about some of the decisions reached by the Combined Chiefs and outlined various measures that they wished to have studied and made the subject of further reports.

The President and Prime Minister Churchill lunched together at the Citadel at 1:00 p.m.²³ Mrs. Roosevelt and Mrs. Churchill had lunch at Spencerwood as guests of Lady Fiset.

Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, Construction Corps, U.S.N. (Retired), Chairman of the War Shipping Administration, arrived in Quebec during the afternoon. Admiral Land was accompanied by Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Mr. John Maclay, Mr. Granville Conway and Mr. Richard Bissen [*Bissell?*]. Secretary Morgenthau was accompanied by Mr. Harry D. White. The President conferred with Secretary Morgenthau at length after his arrival.²⁴

The President, Mrs. Roosevelt, Miss Tully and Miss Thompson had tea together in the President's quarters at 5:00 p.m.

At 7:00 p.m., speaking from the Château Frontenac, Mrs. Roosevelt and Mrs. Churchill made a broadcast to the people of Canada.

8:00 p.m.: Dinner at the Citadel—The President, Prime Minister Churchill, Lord Cherwell, Lord Moran, Lord Leathers, Admiral Land, Admiral Leahy, Secretary Morgenthau and Admiral McIntire.²⁵ Conference discussions followed dinner and lasted until 11:15 p.m. The President retired shortly afterwards.

Prime Minister Mackenzie King held a reception at the Château Frontenac this evening for members of the Conference delegations. Mrs. Roosevelt, Mrs. Churchill, the Lieutenant-Governor and Lady Fiset were also in the receiving line.

Thursday, September 14th

The President's personal flag was hoisted at the Citadel this morning. It had been intended to hoist his flag when that of the Governor-General was hauled down yesterday morning following his departure

²² See *post*, p. 312.

²³ See *post*, p. 319.

²⁴ See *post*, p. 323.

²⁵ See *post*, p. 324.

from Quebec but it was found that we had no President's flag on hand and that one would have to sent up from Washington.

The President attended two separate conferences this forenoon. The first one, at 11:00 a.m., was with Prime Minister Churchill and Mr. Richard Law, the British Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.²⁶ The second, at 11:30 a.m., was with the Prime Minister, Secretary Morgenthau and Mr. H. D. White, an Assistant [to the] Secretary of the Treasury.²⁷

The President lunched at the Citadel at 1:00 p.m. with the Prime Minister, Mrs. Roosevelt, Mrs. Churchill, Secretary Morgenthau, Mr. White, Mr. Law and Commander Thompson.²⁸

During the afternoon Mrs. Roosevelt and Mrs. Churchill visited the Canadian Women's Army Corps barracks at Quebec.

The Right Honorable Sir Anthony Eden, British Minister for Foreign Affairs, arrived in Quebec from London this afternoon. The Honorable Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs and British Representative at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference,²⁹ arrived in Quebec from Washington this afternoon. Both Mr. Eden and Mr. [*Sir Alexander*] Cadogan came for conference discussions.

The President, Mrs. Roosevelt, Miss Tully, Mrs. Brady and Miss Thompson had tea in his quarters at 4:45 p.m. Mrs. Roosevelt and Miss Thompson left Quebec, by train, for Hyde Park after the tea.

At 5:30 p.m., the President met with Prime Minister Churchill, Secretary Morgenthau and Lord Cherwell for discussions.³⁰

Dinner at the Citadel was at 8:00 p.m., with the President, Prime Minister Churchill, Secretary Morgenthau, Mr. Law, Lord Cherwell, Mr. Eden, and Mr. Cadogan attending.³¹ After dinner a motion picture, "Hail the Conquering Hero", was shown at the Citadel for the party.

The President retired immediately after the movies.

Friday, September 15th

At 12:00 o'clock, Noon, the President met in conference with Prime Minister Churchill, Secretary Morgenthau, Lord Cherwell, Mr. Eden and Mr. Cadogan.³²

²⁶ See *post*, p. 342.

²⁷ See *post*, p. 342. It was Cherwell rather than White who attended this meeting. See *post*, p. 342, fn. 1.

²⁸ No record of the discussion during luncheon has been found.

²⁹ i.e., the discussions on postwar world organization which were then taking place at Dumbarton Oaks, an estate in Washington, D.C., among representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 713 ff.

³⁰ See *post*, p. 348.

³¹ See *post*, p. 349.

³² See *post*, p. 360.

At 1:00 p.m., the President lunched at the Citadel together with the Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Mr. Cadogan, Mrs. Churchill and Mr. Law.³³ Prime Minister King dropped in on the group after lunch and joined in conference discussions that lasted until 3:00 p.m.³⁴

The President had tea with Empress Zita of Austria, her sons Archduke Otto and Archduke Felix and her Lady in Waiting, Countess Kerssenbroek, and Miss Tully in his quarters at the Citadel at 5:00 p.m.³⁵

At 6:00 p.m., Secretary Morgenthau called on the President and was in conference with him until 7:15 p.m.³⁶

Dinner at the Citadel was at 8:00 p.m. The President dined with Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill, Mr. Eden and Mr. Cadogan.³⁷ After dinner the motion picture "Wilson" and a Navy film of the recent air fighting at Saipan were shown at the Citadel. Mrs. Churchill attended with the President but Prime Minister Churchill could not attend because of a scheduled British conference. This was a lengthy motion picture program and was not concluded until past midnight. The President retired immediately after the movies.

Saturday, September 16th

The Governor-General and Princess Alice returned to the Citadel this morning from their inspection trip to Arvida.

At 12 o'clock Noon the second plenary meeting of the conference was held at the Citadel with the President, the Prime Minister and the British and American Chiefs of Staffs attending.³⁸ This meeting marked the close of the 1944 Quebec Conference (OCTAGON). The plenary meeting adjourned at 1:30 p.m., when the President, the Prime Minister and the British and American Chiefs of Staff adjourned to the "sundeck" of the Citadel where they posed for pictures by news and service photographers.

The President lunched at the Citadel at 1:45 p.m. in company with the Prime Minister, Mrs. Churchill and Mr. Eden with and as guests of the Governor-General and Princess Alice.³⁹

Admiral Brown returned to Washington this afternoon by air, traveling in the "Executive Plane" with General Marshall. Mr. Early and Mrs. Rumelt also returned by air.

At 3:15 p.m., at a very colorful ceremony on the "sundeck" of the Citadel, Chancellor Morris W. Wilson and a party from the faculty of McGill University, Montreal, conferred honorary LL.D. degrees on

³³ No record of the discussion during luncheon has been found.

³⁴ See *post*, p. 364.

³⁵ See *post*, p. 367.

³⁶ See *post*, p. 370.

³⁷ No record of the discussion during dinner has been found.

³⁸ See *post*, p. 377.

³⁹ See *post*, p. 383.

the President and Prime Minister Churchill. Members of the Press and news and service photographers were present.

At 3:45 p.m., the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Prime Minister King held a joint press conference on the "sundeck" of the Citadel for the more than 150 press correspondents gathered in Quebec from all over the world to cover the Quebec Conference.⁴⁰ Prime Minister King presided and spoke first; the President spoke next; and finally the Prime Minister of Great Britain. A prepared communiqué concerning the results and purpose of the conference, issued jointly by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, was handed to the press at this time. A copy of this communiqué is appended, marked "A".⁴¹

After the completion of the press conference the President returned to his quarters in the Citadel. Later during the afternoon Princess Alice, Prime Minister Churchill and Mrs. Churchill came to his quarters to bid the President goodbye.

The President left the Citadel at 5:30 p.m., together with Admiral Leahy, for his train which had now been moved from the Quebec railroad station back to Wolfe's Cove. He was accompanied to the train by the Governor-General and Prime Minister King who remained at the station to see him off.

Our train departed Quebec (Wolfe's Cove) at 6:00 p.m., for the return trip to Hyde Park and Washington. We traveled over the lines of the Canadian National Railway, crossing the St. Lawrence just below Quebec and coming via the Provincial towns of Cadorna, Val Alain, St. Leonard Junction, St. Hyacinthe and Southward East to Rouse's Point.

Except for one day (Wednesday) when it rained most of the day, the weather at Quebec during our stay was most pleasant. However, his attendance at the numerous conferences and other engagements prevented the President from leaving the Citadel even once during his six days stay at Quebec.

Sunday, September 17th

We crossed the International Border at Rouse's Point, N.Y., at 12:15 a.m. At Rouse's Point we dropped off our Royal Canadian Mounted Police escort, and also transferred over to the lines and facilities of the Delaware and Hudson Railroad for the continuation of our journey to Hyde Park.

We arrived in Albany, N.Y., at 6:45 a.m., where our train was turned over to the New York Central Railroad (West Shore Division).

⁴⁰ See *post*, p. 384.

⁴¹ For the text of the Communiqué of the Second Quebec Conference, see *post*, p. 477.

We arrived at Highland, N.Y., at 9:15 a.m. Mrs. Roosevelt met the President on his arrival here. The President detrained at 9:20 a.m. and motored to Hyde Park. He was accompanied to Hyde Park by Mrs. Roosevelt, Admiral Leahy, Lieutenant Commander H. G. Bruenn, Medical Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve—who had joined our party at Quebec—, Miss Tully and Mrs. Brady. Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill were to join the President and Mrs. Roosevelt at Hyde Park on Monday, September 18th, for a brief visit.⁴²

Admiral McIntire, General Watson, Lieutenant Rigdon, Chief Yeoman Hoying, Mr. Jack Romagna and Mr. Dan L. Moorman proceeded on to Jersey City with the President's train. The others of the party remained at Poughkeepsie. At Jersey City one car of the special train was detached and hitched on to the Baltimore and Ohio's "Capitol Limited", so that Admiral McIntire, General Watson, Lieutenant Rigdon, Chief Yeoman Hoying, Mr. Romagna and Mr. Moorman arrived in Washington at 5:10 p.m.

The President, Admiral Leahy, Lieutenant Commander Bruenn, Miss Tully, Mrs. Brady and all other members of the party stopping off at Poughkeepsie and Hyde Park returned to Washington at 8:00 a.m., Thursday, September 21st.

⁴² See *post*, p. 481.

PLATE 1

Prime Minister Churchill leaves his train on arrival at Quebec. Behind Mr. Churchill are Prime Minister Mackenzie King and Mrs. Churchill.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library



PLATE 2

Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt at Wolfe's Cove Station, Quebec, after their arrival for the Second Quebec Conference.

U.S. Army photograph






PLATE 3

The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Second Quebec Conference. *At the table, left to right:* Lieutenant General Somervell, General Arnold, General Marshall, Admiral Leahy, and Admiral King.

U.S. Army photographs




PLATE 4

The British Chiefs of Staff at the Second Quebec Conference. *Left to right:* Field Marshal Dill, Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham, Field Marshal Brooke, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal, and General Ismay.

PLATE 5

The Heads of Government and the Governor General of Canada on the sundeck of the Citadel at Quebec. *Left to right:* The Earl of Athlone, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Prime Minister Mackenzie King. The Château Frontenac is in the background.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library



PLATE 6

The Heads of Government and the Governor General of Canada and their wives on the sundeck of the Citadel at Quebec. *Left to right:* Mrs. Churchill; the Earl of Athlone; President Roosevelt; Princess Alice, Countess of Athlone; Prime Minister Churchill; Mrs. Roosevelt; and Prime Minister Mackenzie King.

U.S. Army photograph





PLATE 7

The Heads of Government and the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Second Quebec Conference. *Seated, left to right:* General Marshall, Admiral Leahy, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, Field Marshal Brooke, and Field Marshal Dill. *Standing, left to right:* Major General Hollis, General Ismay, Admiral King, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal, General Arnold, and Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham.

U.S. Army photograph

PLATE 8

The Heads of Government at the press conference held at the conclusion of the Second Quebec Conference. *Seated, left to right:* Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Mackenzie King.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library



4. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE

Editorial Note

It was not Roosevelt's practice to make a record of his private conversations with Churchill or to have minutes prepared by subordinates who were present on some of these occasions. There are therefore no American minutes or memoranda of conversation pertaining to most of the Roosevelt-Churchill meetings during the Second Quebec Conference. It is known, however, that at various times during the Conference the two Heads of Government discussed the following subjects in addition to those noted later in this volume with reference to specific meetings:

1. *Tripartite meeting.* For correspondence before the Second Quebec Conference with respect to arranging a Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin meeting, see *ante*, pp. 10-12; *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 3-5. Woodward, p. 307, states: "During the Quebec Conference the Prime Minister and the President had been considering another meeting of heads of governments but the President could not leave the United States until after the election." It may have been at Quebec that Roosevelt suggested The Hague as a possible site for a tripartite meeting. See Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 215; *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 257. The meeting of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin eventually took place at Yalta in February 1945.

2. *Recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation as the Provisional Government of France.* For the minute on this subject which Roosevelt and Churchill initialed at Quebec on September 15, 1944, see *post*, p. 469. Eden, p. 553, prints the following diary entry with respect to one of the Roosevelt-Churchill meetings on that date: "Incidentally I also tried today to get President and P.M. to recognise French as Provisional Government. A pretty hopeless discussion, each going off in turn on a tirade against de Gaulle. W[inston] did however go so far as to say that he would rather have a de Gaulle France than a Communist France, a distinct advance!"

3. *Lend-lease for France.* For the recommendations on this subject which Hull and Hopkins sent to Roosevelt at Quebec, see *post*, pp. 419, 420. For Roosevelt's decision at Quebec to postpone action on the matter, see *post*, p. 423. According to the account of the Quebec Conference which Morgenthau later gave to Hull and Stimson on September 20, 1944, Churchill was present at a discussion in Quebec of this subject. A memorandum on the September 20 meeting prepared by Harry Dexter White recorded that Morgenthau said that Churchill "was also strongly opposed to giving lend-lease aid to the French."

(See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 139.) A memorandum on the same meeting prepared by Assistant Secretary of War McCloy recorded: "Mr. Morgenthau said it was quite apparent that Mr. Churchill was violently opposed to the United States making any Lend-Lease arrangements with France, and the President seemed to fall in with this." (Stimson Papers)

4. *Cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom in the field of atomic energy research.* Although no memoranda have been found of conversations held at Quebec on this subject, the following information is recorded in a memorandum of September 22, 1944, by Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, concerning a meeting held at the White House that day:

"The President then started discussing the subject [atomic energy] quite generally. . . . The President was very much in favor of complete interchange with the British on this subject after the war in all phases, and apparently on a basis where it would be used jointly or not at all. He told of some of his discussions with Mr. Churchill at Quebec along these lines. . . . The President's own statements in regard to post-war collaboration with Britain on the subject were very general indeed, but went very far. He pointed out his belief of the necessity for maintaining the British Empire strong, and went into some of the methods by which this could be brought about, which are not pertinent to this subject. As usual there were a number of other non-pertinent matters such as statements in regard to the discussions at Quebec." (A.E.C. Files, Historical Document No. 185)

In a memorandum of September 23, 1944, Bush stated that Lord Cherwell, who had been present at the meeting described above, "had made remarks which showed that he had been present at at least some" of the Roosevelt-Churchill conversations at Quebec on atomic energy. (A.E.C. Files, Historical Document No. 186)

5. *Aid to the Warsaw resistance.* For documentation originating at the Quebec Conference on this subject, see *post*, pp. 396 ff. Eden, p. 552, records that "Poles" constituted one of the subjects of discussion between Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec on September 14, 1944. According to a Polish report of an Eden-Mikołajczyk conversation held at London on September 19, 1944, "Mr. Eden said further that at Quebec both Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt had considered that the change in Stalin's position on the matter of assistance to Warsaw [see *ante*, pp. 202, 203] was a good omen; in their opinion it was due to their own resolute stand against him on that matter."¹ (*Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations*, p. 390) According to a Polish report of a Churchill-Mikołajczyk conversation held at London on September 29, 1944, "Churchill explained that the question of further support for Warsaw had been one of the items discussed by him with President Roosevelt at Quebec and that it had eventually been decided to do everything feasible so far as the Anglo-Saxon Powers were concerned." (*Ibid.*, p. 396)

¹ According to a record by Stettinius of a conversation with Cadogan at Washington on September 16, 1944, "Cadogan stated that the Prime Minister had bragged [at Quebec] about softening Uncle Joe on Poland." (Notter File, Box 165, Stettinius Diary)

6. *Draft of a joint message to Stalin regarding the Polish Government.* According to a Polish report of an Eden-Mikołajczyk meeting held at London on September 19, 1944, Eden "read a draft joint telegram from Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin, which was to be sent from Quebec. This telegram contained a strong appeal to Stalin not to allow a very unwelcome disparity of views and conduct between the Principal United Nations on the Polish question to arise from the recognition of and support to various governments, and also asked him to facilitate an understanding with Premier Mikołajczyk, whose government was enjoying the full support of the Anglo-Saxon governments. Mr. Eden did not know whether this text had been actually sent to Moscow, or what the final draft of this telegram was, but it was anyway couched in warm and sympathetic words for Poland. He added that, according to the provisions made at Quebec, M. Mikołajczyk should again go to Moscow, accompanied by some members of his Government, in order to come to a final agreement with the Soviet Government on his further plans, and from there go direct to liberated Warsaw, in order to set up a new government." (*Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations*, p. 390) According to a Polish report of a Churchill-Mikołajczyk meeting held at London on September 29, 1944, Mikołajczyk asked whether Polish problems had been discussed at Quebec, and "Churchill replied that, apart from the joint telegram from Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin, laying stress on the Polish-Soviet agreement, and apart from the question of support for Warsaw, other questions had not been discussed in view of the full concurrence of views." (*Ibid.*, p. 398) The message to Stalin which Eden read to Mikołajczyk on September 19 was presumably a draft telegram provisionally agreed to by Roosevelt and Churchill at Hyde Park on September 18 (*post*, p. 491), but never actually sent.

7. *Appointment of Harold Macmillan as Acting President of the Allied Control Commission for Italy.* For the letter of September 14, 1944, in which Churchill proposed this appointment to Roosevelt, see *post*, p. 417; cf. *ante*, p. 42. Although the fact that Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed on the Macmillan appointment was not announced until November 10, 1944, a telegram from Churchill to Roosevelt dated October 22 referred to the agreement reached at Quebec that Macmillan would be given this appointment. See *post*, p. 418, fn. 2.

8. *Disposition of Italian overseas territories.* For the text of a memorandum by Hull on this subject which Roosevelt gave to Churchill at Quebec, see *post*, p. 408. According to a note attached to this memorandum after Churchill returned it, Roosevelt told Churchill that the latter might keep copies of the memorandum and that Roosevelt "wanted an answer from the British on it." See *post*, p. 418, fn. 2.

9. *War criminals.* For a minute on this subject which Roosevelt and Churchill agreed upon at Quebec on September 15, 1944, see *post*, p. 467. Morgenthau told a group of his colleagues in the Treasury Department on September 19 that the "question of war criminals" had come up in his hearing at Quebec, but that he had said nothing on the subject. (*Morgenthau Diary*, vol. 772)

10. *Convening of an international conference on world organization in late October 1944.* It appears from Morgenthau's diary entry for September 15, 1944 (*post*, p. 370) and from Mackenzie King's notes on a tripartite luncheon meeting on September 16 (see *post*, p. 383) that

Roosevelt and Churchill had considered the convening of an international conference on world organization, as a sequel to the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, late in October. The state of preparation for such a conference, however, was not sufficiently advanced, and it was only at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that agreement was reached to convene such a conference in April 1945. See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 971.

11. *Territorial settlements in central and southeastern Europe*. For a memorandum prepared by the Archduke Otto of Austria on a conversation which he had with Roosevelt at Quebec on September 15, 1944, see *post*, p. 367. According to this memorandum, Roosevelt told the Archduke that the President and Churchill had noted, in working on their papers at the Quebec Conference, that Austria and Hungary "would of all countries undergo the least territorial changes". Transylvania seems to have been discussed specifically by Roosevelt and Churchill, and also the importance of keeping the Communists out of Hungary and Austria. The discussion of these questions presumably took place in the light of the armistice with Rumania, which was signed at Moscow early on September 13, 1944, while Roosevelt and Churchill were at Quebec.

12. *British meat purchases from Argentina*. For two memoranda by Hull on this subject which Roosevelt gave to Churchill at Quebec, see *post*, pp. 393, 394. Roosevelt's representations to Churchill on this matter, presumably at Quebec, are also mentioned in post-Conference correspondence relating to a contract for the purchase of Argentine meat by the United Kingdom. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. VII, pp. 362-363. Morgenthau told a group of his colleagues in the Treasury Department on September 19, 1944, that "the question of the Argentine" had come up in his hearing at Quebec, but that he had said nothing on the subject. (Morgenthau Diary, vol. 772)

13. *Publication of the Phillips report on India*. On July 25, 1944, the British Minister at Washington (Campbell) had protested the publication, in Drew Pearson's "The Washington Merry-Go-Round" column of that date, of a large part of the text of a confidential report of May 14, 1943, from Ambassador William Phillips to Roosevelt, and the "leak" of this report had been a matter of continued discussion between United States and British officials in the period before the Second Quebec Conference. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. V, pp. 239-247. Phillips called on Roosevelt in Washington on September 30, 1944, at which time Roosevelt told him that he had taken the matter up at Quebec and considered it finished. (Memorandum, Gray to Hull, September 30, 1944, 851.00/9-3044)

14. *Indochina and the French role in Far Eastern military operations*. For pre-Conference memoranda which Hull submitted to Roosevelt on these subjects, see *ante*, pp. 249, 261. On January 1, 1945, Roosevelt informed Hull that he still did "not want to get mixed up in any Indochina decision" or "in any military effort toward the liberation of Indochina from the Japanese"; that he had "made this very clear to Mr. Churchill", presumably at the Quebec Conference; and that action was premature from both military and civil points of view. See *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VI, p. 293.

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1944

TRIPARTITE LUNCHEON MEETING, SEPTEMBER 11, 1944, 1:30 P.M.,
THE CITADEL¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	CANADA
President Roosevelt Mrs. Roosevelt	The Earl of Athlone Princess Alice, Countess of Athlone Prime Minister Churchill Mrs. Churchill	Prime Minister Mackenzie King

Editorial Note

No official memoranda relating to the conversation at this luncheon meeting have been found. According to Mackenzie King's notes printed in Pickersgill and Forster, pp. 67 and 69, the conversation "turned largely on discussion of personalities", including General de Gaulle, Madame Chiang, and Marshal Stalin. The same source indicates that the conversation also touched upon the feelings of Roosevelt as head of the strongest military power in the world, on what might have happened if Hitler "had got into Britain", on Roosevelt's chances of reelection, and on the length of Mackenzie King's prime ministership.

¹ The time of the luncheon and the list of those present is from the *Log, ante*, p. 288. This list of persons present is confirmed by Pickersgill and Forster, pp. 66-67.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, SEPTEMBER 11, 1944, EARLY AFTER-
NOON, THE PRESIDENT'S MAP ROOM, THE CITADEL

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

The only information found on this meeting is that contained in the *Log, ante*, p. 288, which indicates that Churchill joined Roosevelt in the latter's map room at the Citadel "for a review of the latest war news". The discussion also included naval problems in the Pacific and the difficulties of supply there.

LEAHY-CHURCHILL CONVERSATION, SEPTEMBER 11, 1944

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Admiral Leahy

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

According to Ehrman, p. 517, Churchill, on the day of his arrival at Quebec, spoke to Leahy about the participation of the British fleet in the Pacific war and "was told that its offer had been accepted". For further discussion of this subject at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill on September 13, 1944, see *post*, p. 315.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1944

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, SEPTEMBER 12, 1944,
NOON, MAIN CONFERENCE ROOM, CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Willson
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral McCormick
Major General Handy
Major General Fairchild
Major General Kuter

UNITED KINGDOM

Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
General Ismay
Admiral Noble
Lieutenant General Macready
Air Marshal Welsh
Major General Laycock

Secretariat

Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves

Major General Hollis
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Commander Coleridge

J.C.S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

1. CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would be glad if Sir Alan Brooke would take the Chair at the forthcoming series of meetings.

¹ C.C.S. 172d Meeting. The meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff were numbered consecutively from the establishment of that organization, which held its first meeting in Washington on January 23, 1942. The 172d Meeting was the first held in connection with the Second Quebec Conference.

SIR ALAN BROOKE thanked Admiral Leahy for this proposal which he would be glad to accept.

2. PERSONNEL SHIPPING

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that the problem of the use of personnel shipping after the defeat of Germany should be examined during the Conference. There would be heavy calls for personnel shipping both for the transfer of U.S. troops other than occupational troops from Europe to the United States or the Pacific, as well as for the reorientation of British forces to the Far East. In addition the New Zealand and South African divisions and certain Canadian forces now in Europe would have to be returned to their homelands. He suggested that the experts should be instructed to examine this problem to see how best it could be met.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he could see no objection to this review but it would be impossible to reach any decisions during the Conference.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL, in agreeing with Admiral Leahy, said that he felt that the scope of the problem should be examined.

GENERAL SOMERVELL stated that he had only one shipping expert at present at OCTAGON but agreed with a proposal made by Sir Alan Brooke that he should discuss this matter with Lord Leathers.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Invited General Somervell to confer with Lord Leathers on this matter.²

3. AGENDA AND HOUR OF MEETING

At the suggestion of Admiral Leahy

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Agreed to meet daily from 1000 to 1300.³

b. Approved the program for the Conference as set out in C.C.S. 654/6,⁴ subject to the transfer of the items for Saturday, 16 September, to Tuesday, 12 September. (Approved program subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 654/7.)⁵

4. SITUATION REPORT FROM SCAEF (SCAF 78⁶)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that, while agreeing in general with General Eisenhower's appreciation (SCAF 78), the British Chiefs of Staff felt that sufficient emphasis had not been laid on two points: firstly, the

² For a report on this subject, see C.C.S. 675/1, *post*, p. 448.

³ i.e., from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 40.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 41.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 234.

importance of securing sea communications and the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam, and secondly, the importance of a strong attack being launched on the northern flank. General Eisenhower in his telegram had spoken of three possible routes of advance into Germany. In his (Sir Alan Brooke's) view the most important was the northern route of attack which should be strengthened as much as possible, the remaining two routes being retained as alternatives. The most energetic efforts should be made to secure and open the port of Antwerp as a valuable base for future operations on the northern flank. In order to open the sea approaches to Antwerp, it seemed desirable to stage an airborne operation to capture the islands at the mouth of the Schelde.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in view of the apparent massing of German forces on the islands guarding the port of Antwerp, and the lack of cover which existed on the ground, it appeared that a more profitable operation would be the bombing of enemy positions rather than an airborne operation.

SIR ALAN BROOKE felt that bombing alone would not achieve the required results and occupying forces would have to be introduced.

SIR ALAN BROOKE presented a draft reply to SCAF 78 approving General Eisenhower's proposals and pointing out the advantages of the northern line of approach into Germany as opposed to the southern and the necessity for opening up the northwest ports, particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam.

After further discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the dispatch to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force of the draft telegram proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently dispatched as FACS 78⁷).

5. SITUATION REPORT FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN (MEDCOS 181⁸ AND NAF 774⁹)

ADMIRAL LEAHY presented a statement of the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff with reference to the future role of the Fifth Army and of the Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Forces (C.C.S. 677).¹⁰

GENERAL MARSHALL said that a message¹¹ had just been received from the U.S. Military Attaché in Switzerland¹² to the effect that a German withdrawal of forces in northern Italy had already begun. If this was so, it would seem that, of the two situations envisaged by General Wilson in Part II of NAF 774, situation "a" would be ruled out unless the Allied armies could drive ahead with great speed, and

⁷ *Post*, p. 428.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 224.

⁹ *Ante*, p. 230.

¹⁰ *Post*, p. 429.

¹¹ Not printed.

¹² Brigadier General Barnwell R. Legge.

situation "b" would exist, that is, there would be no possibility of another major offensive till the spring.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that as he visualized it, if the Allied armies could break through to the Plains the enemy forces remaining in northwest Italy would be badly placed. A threat to Verona would cut off these forces and might result in their retirement to the westward and later the retirement of the German forces in northeast Italy back to the Alps. It was to be hoped that a large number of these eastern forces could be broken up. The attack by the Fifth Army was planned to take place on 13 September and a successful advance north of Florence might well result in driving the enemy forces back to the Po and Piave.

The indications were that the enemy was attempting to withdraw forces from Greece and Yugoslavia, though there was some doubt whether he could succeed in getting them out through bad lines of communications threatened by the Bulgarians, Marshal Tito's army and the Greeks. The enemy might, however, get some forces out and it appeared that he was likely to endeavor to hold a line running through Yugoslavia. In such an event the enemy might be reduced to covering the Ljubljana Gap and endeavoring to hold a line through Yugoslavia and Istria. In these circumstances any withdrawal of forces from the Fifth Army would be most regrettable.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was not the intention to weaken the Fifth Army at the present time.

Continuing, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the forces to be maintained in Italy might later be limited by logistics and terrain. He saw, however, great advantages in a right swing at Trieste and an advance from there to Vienna. However, if German resistance was strong, he did not visualize the possibility of our forces getting through to Vienna during the winter. Even so, the seizure of the Istrian Peninsula would be valuable as a base for the spring campaign or as a base from which our forces could be introduced into Austria in the event of Germany crumbling. It had not only a military value but also political value in view of the Russian advances in the Balkans.

In view of the possibility of amphibious thrusts on the Istrian Peninsula Sir Alan Brooke asked the United States Chiefs of Staff their intention with regard to the U.S. landing craft now operating in support of DRAGOON.

ADMIRAL KING said that these craft were earmarked for other operations but no orders had been issued for their withdrawal. He too had in mind the possibility of amphibious operations in Istria. Naval forces on the other hand were in course of withdrawal for rehabilitation.

Unless a decision to mount an amphibious operation were taken soon the landing craft would lie idle, though required for operations in other parts of the world, for instance, against Rangoon.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that General Wilson was planning now for an amphibious operation and the picture should be much clearer in a short time, particularly if the German forces withdrew from north Italy.

There was general agreement that a decision with regard to the launching of an amphibious operation should be made by 15 October.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that if operations in the Alps were undertaken in winter there was available the PLOUGH Force now in south France and the necessary sleds are obtainable.

Referring to the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on the future role of the Fifth Army, SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he felt that primary emphasis should be laid on the securing of a victory in Italy. As he saw it, the possible withdrawal of units of the Fifth Army to France would be dependent on the successful outcome of the campaign in Italy.

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked if it was Sir Charles Portal's thought that these forces should be retained in Italy if General Eisenhower was in need of them in France.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that it was a question of short-term as opposed to long-term advantages. The important point as he saw it was to prevent the German troops getting away in north Italy if it could be avoided.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said it was not the intention to withdraw troops from the Fifth Army unless the German troops withdrew.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he would point out that the withdrawal of forces from an army had a greater effect on that army than the actual number of formations withdrawn, since such withdrawals had a discouraging effect on the morale of the command and of the army itself.

ADMIRAL LEAHY re-emphasized that the United States proposal was contingent on the destruction or withdrawal of a large part of the German Army.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that there was no intention in the mind of the United States Chiefs of Staff to effect the withdrawal of forces from Italy at the present time.

ADMIRAL KING confirmed that an option on the U.S. landing craft now in the Mediterranean could be retained provided a decision was reached by 15 October.

In reply to a question by Sir Alan Brooke, GENERAL MARSHALL confirmed that while there was no intention of moving major units of the Fifth Army at the present time, small individual units (i.e., the Japanese battalion) might be withdrawn.

After further discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

a. Agreed that no forces should be withdrawn from Italy until the outcome of General Alexander's present offensive is known.

b. Agreed that the desirability of withdrawing formations of the United States Fifth Army should be reconsidered in the light of the results of General Alexander's present offensive and of a German withdrawal in northern Italy and in the light of the views of General Eisenhower.

c. Agreed to inform General Wilson that if he wishes to retain for use in the Istrian Peninsula the amphibious lift at present in the Mediterranean, he should submit his plan therefor to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible, and not later than 15 October; and took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would prepare a suitable message for consideration.¹³

6. COMBINED INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN EUROPE (C.C.S. 660/1¹⁴)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

Took note of the estimate contained in C.C.S. 660/1.

7. COMMAND OF "DRAGOON" FORCES (C.C.S. 674¹⁵)

ADMIRAL LEAHY presented a draft telegram to General Eisenhower approving his proposals in SCAF 77 (C.C.S. 674/1).¹⁶

SIR CHARLES PORTAL drew attention to a telegram (FX 28818)¹⁷ from General Wilson to General Devers, inquiring as to how soon General Devers' communications with General Eisenhower would be sufficient to permit General Eisenhower to assume command.

It was generally agreed that this matter must be left to the commanders concerned and that General Eisenhower's proposal to assume command of DRAGOON forces on 15 September would have taken account of this factor.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that while General Eisenhower had been anxious that General Devers should set up his headquarters and be able to take over the lines of communications, logistic problems and civil affairs, he also wished General Patch to continue in charge of the present battle. Undoubtedly additional U.S. troops would be transferred at a later date to General Patch from the center group of armies and further American divisions would join him through the port of

¹³ See enclosure A to C.C.S. 667/1, *post*, p. 430.

¹⁴ *Ante*, p. 237.

¹⁵ See *ante*, p. 232, fn. 1.

¹⁶ For the text of telegram No. SCAF 77, see *ante*, p. 232. For the text of C.C.S. 674/1, see *post*, p. 428.

¹⁷ Not printed.

Marseilles. At that time the 6th Army Group could be conveniently split, General Patch assuming command of the United States forces and the French forces forming an army of their own.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there was one point he would like to make. He hoped the setting up of a large headquarters by General Devers would not unduly deplete General Clark's staff organization.

GENERAL MARSHALL reassured Sir Alan Brooke on this point. General Devers' staff had been formed for some time in Corsica and General Clark's forces would not be affected.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to dispatch to General Eisenhower and General Wilson the message proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 674/1. (Subsequently dispatched as FACS 76 and FAN 413, respectively.)

At this point the Combined Chiefs of Staff recessed until 1430.¹⁸

¹⁸ i.e., 2:30 p.m. During the recess Leahy and Marshall lunched with Brooke and Dill. See Alanbrooke, p. 204. For the minutes of the second part of the C.C.S. 172d Meeting, following the recess, see *post*, p. 307.

TRIPARTITE LUNCHEON MEETING, SEPTEMBER 12, 1944, 1 P.M.,
THE CITADEL¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	CANADA
President Roosevelt Mrs. Roosevelt	The Earl of Athlone Princess Alice, Countess of Athlone Prime Minister Churchill Mrs. Churchill	Prime Minister Mackenzie King

Editorial Note

No official memoranda relating to the conversation at this luncheon meeting have been found. According to Mackenzie King's notes printed in Pickersgill and Forster, pp. 69-71, the topics of discussion included the Soviet position vis-à-vis Japan after the end of the war in Europe, conditions in India, Japan, the instability of French governments, the United States Constitution, the negro problem in the Union of South Africa, entry of troops into Berlin and Vienna, de Gaulle, the possibility of civil war in France, and China.

The Log states that the party assembled after luncheon in the conference room at the Citadel, where Churchill demonstrated some models of ships and equipment used to form artificial harbors for the invasion of France.

¹ The time of the luncheon and the names of those present are from the Log, *ante*, p. 289. This list of persons present is confirmed by Pickersgill and Forster, p. 69.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, SEPTEMBER 12, 1944,
2:30 P.M., MAIN CONFERENCE ROOM, CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Willson
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral McCormick
Major General Handy
Major General Fairchild
Major General Kuter

UNITED KINGDOM

Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
General Ismay
Admiral Noble
Lieutenant General Macready
Air Marshal Welsh
Major General Laycock

Secretariat

Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves

Major General Hollis
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Commander Coleridge

J.C.S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

8. MACHINERY FOR COORDINATION OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET-BRITISH
MILITARY EFFORT
(C.C.S. 618/3²)

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the proposals for improvement of liaison with the Soviets originated from a suggestion put to Mr. Harriman by Marshal Stalin some two months ago.³

ADMIRAL KING said that the U.S. Planners had examined the previous British proposal (C.C.S. 618/2)⁴ and were of the opinion that while there were advantages in the establishment of a combined committee at Moscow, this would not expedite rapid coordination of operations in the field which would require separate liaison arrangements.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stressed the value of improved liaison with the Russians.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he felt Marshal Stalin's offer should be dropped. In Moscow there were already United States and British missions and all that was required was that the Russians should appoint a suitable high-ranking officer.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he felt the proposal to exchange missions between field commanders would not work. It would not be

¹ Continuation of the C.C.S. 172d Meeting, following a recess. The minutes for this part of the meeting begin with item 8.

² *Post*, p. 401.

³ According to Deane, pp. 152-153, Stalin's suggestion was made during a meeting with Harriman on June 28, 1944.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 183.

right for the Russian High Command to be represented at a field headquarters. All our own plans would flow back to Moscow and we, in turn, would gain nothing. A committee in Moscow would be a better arrangement if, indeed, the Russians could be induced to appoint a really responsible high-ranking officer. Missions in the field, he felt, would be useless and even dangerous.

ADMIRAL KING said he felt that liaison between field commanders might follow from the achievement of successful cooperation in Moscow.

After further discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Approved the recommendations of the British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 618/3.

b. Instructed the Secretaries to draft and circulate for approval a message to the Heads of the United States and British Military Missions ⁵ in Moscow based on C.C.S. 618/3.⁶

9. ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the Prime Minister and the President might be invited to give consideration to the outstanding problem of the zones to be occupied by United States and British forces in Germany and to give instructions to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.⁷

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed. He had already mentioned this matter to the President but would do so again. He would take the line that in view of the political aspects of the problem, guidance from the heads of State was necessary.

In reply to a question by Sir John Dill, ADMIRAL LEAHY said that from a United States point of view there were, he felt, no military considerations. There was, however, the problem of transportation and supply of United States troops if they went into the southern zone.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that from the British point of view there were very considerable military implications involved and there were strong reasons why, militarily, the British Chiefs of Staff would want to occupy the northwest zone.

ADMIRAL LEAHY explained that the utilization of United States troops for occupation was politically difficult and in fact would be politically impossible with regard to France, Italy, and southern Eu-

⁵ Major General John R. Deane and Lieutenant General Montagu Brocas Burrows, respectively.

⁶ The messages prepared in accordance with this instruction were circulated as enclosures to C.C.S. 618/4, *post*, p. 403. Deane was also instructed on September 12, 1944, following approval by the British Chiefs of Staff at Quebec, to proceed with consultations with the Soviet authorities concerning Norway. See *post*, p. 401.

⁷ Concerning the differences of opinion over the allocation of the northwestern and southwestern zones of occupation in Germany as between the United States and the United Kingdom, see *ante*, pp. 81, 145, and the sources cited there.

rope. Whereas the occupation of Germany could be justified, that of France would meet with enormous difficulty.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said there was, of course, no question of occupying France.

ADMIRAL KING said that he felt it would be easier for the United States to occupy the southwest zone if it could be arranged that the evacuation of American troops and supplies for the occupational troops could be undertaken through north German ports.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Agreed that the question of zones of occupation in Germany had such serious political implications that they were unable to make any recommendation without guidance from their respective governments.

b. Decided to report in this sense to the President and Prime Minister and, in doing so, to invite their attention to the need for an early decision on this matter.

10. CONTROL OF STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCES IN EUROPE (C.C.S. 520/3^s)

GENERAL ARNOLD, during consideration of the British memorandum in C.C.S. 520/3, asked why the present method of control was stated to be unsatisfactory as a long-term arrangement.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that in the opening stages of OVERLORD the present system of control had been necessary and effective. However, with the move of General Eisenhower and Air Chief Marshal Tedder to France, they were divorced from General Spaatz' headquarters and from the Air Ministry, and strategic control by General Eisenhower became almost a formality. Air Marshal Tedder had only a small air staff and the large staffs of the Air Ministry, Bomber Command and the U.S. Strategic Air Force in Europe had, of necessity, to exercise control over the actual strategic bombing operations.

^s "Control of Strategic Bomber Forces in Europe", September 13, 1944; not printed. Portal summarized the principal points in this memorandum during the discussion recorded here. Cf. Ehrman, p. 513; Webster and Frankland, pp. 57-60. For a possible explanation of the British desire to change the control of the strategic bomber forces which did not come out in the discussion, see Craven and Cate, pp. 320-321.

At some time on September 11 or 12, before this meeting, Arnold had had a discussion with Portal which is summarized as follows in Arnold, p. 524:

"... Portal and I had a session in which he asked for more C-54's—two per month—to put on a run between Ceylon and Australia. He wanted the command of the Strategic Air Forces changed to provide for a Committee of the R.A.F. and A.A.F., operating under Portal and Arnold for the Combined Chiefs of Staff; he also wanted a British commanding officer for the American forces under Mountbatten; and he wanted Lancasters to operate against Japan. He said the new Lancasters had had additional tanks put on them which would give them a much longer range and would make the missions possible. Since most of these items would influence, or interfere with, our global operations, I could not agree to any of them at that time, but said I would talk them over with my fellow Joint Chiefs of Staff members."

GENERAL ARNOLD asked why large staffs were necessary to control strategic bombing.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that full knowledge of all available enemy intelligence and adequate and rapid methods of interpreting the results of bombing attacks were essential to the effective control of strategic bombing. In addition, it was essential to keep in close touch with the degree of enemy air opposition to be expected.

GENERAL ARNOLD asked why no mention was made of communications in the priority of targets.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that communications had largely become targets for medium and fighter bombers rather than strategic forces. The proposed directive on priorities was, of course susceptible to alteration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff or at the request of General Eisenhower. In fact, the priority list set forth was, he understood, that now enforced by General Eisenhower himself.

GENERAL ARNOLD asked what would occur if General Spaatz and the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff^a should disagree with regard to the control of the strategic bombing forces.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that in this unlikely eventuality they would refer respectively to General Arnold and himself who, if they could not give a ruling, would refer the matter to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for decision.

With regard to the declaration of an emergency by a supreme commander, SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that this same procedure had been in force for approximately a year in the Mediterranean where it had worked satisfactorily. An emergency could be declared either for offense or for defense.

GENERAL ARNOLD said he was particularly interested in the full utilization of the strategic bombing force since the United States had in the United Kingdom 2970 heavy bombers and in the Mediterranean 1512 heavy bombers, making a total of 4482. Of these, 2980 were operational and each aircraft had two crews available and therefore could be used every day. Was the proposed chain of command the best setup to obtain the maximum use from this very large force?

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he felt that it was. The Supreme Commander's role in the chain of command, which had been valuable in the first phases of OVERLORD was, in his opinion, no longer useful and better results would be obtained from the proposed command arrangements.

ADMIRAL LEAHY questioned the proposed directive with regard to the right of a commander in the field to get from the strategic air forces the air support which he requested. This, he felt, was essential.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the system was exactly the same as had been used in the Mediterranean where the Supreme Commander

^a Air Marshal Sir Norman Bottomley.

had declared an emergency on only one occasion. This, as he remembered, was on the fifth day of the battle at Salerno. The declaration of an emergency by a supreme commander was in effect a direct order from the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the use of the strategic air forces as directed by the supreme commander. He said he could guarantee on the British side that the supreme commanders would always get what they needed when they needed it. The use of the emergency procedure should be regarded only as "the big stick" which could be used but probably would never have to be.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested an alternative arrangement whereby a small assignment of strategic air might be made to supreme commanders, the remainder being controlled as suggested in the British paper.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL agreed that this was a possible solution. He felt, however, that in a real emergency the supreme commander must have all the bombers that he needed. Divided control might result in the supreme commander's allotment not being fully used on all occasions.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

Agreed to consider this matter further at their meeting the following morning.

TRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING, SEPTEMBER 12, 1944, 8 P.M., THE CITADEL

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	CANADA
President Roosevelt	The Earl of Athlone	Prime Minister Mackenzie
Mrs. Roosevelt	Princess Alice,	King ¹
Admiral Leahy	Countess of Athlone	
General Marshall	Prime Minister Churchill	
Admiral King	Mrs. Churchill	
General Arnold	Field Marshal Brooke	
	Marshal of the Royal	
	Air Force Portal	
	Admiral of the Fleet	
	Cunningham	
	Field Marshal Dill	

Editorial Note

No official accounts of the conversation at this dinner meeting have been found. Arnold, pp. 524-526, gives the following information which apparently pertains to the dinner meeting on September 12:

"That night, at a dinner with the Governor General, the question of aid to Poland came up. Several messages [had] arrived from the

¹ Cunningham, p. 611, mentions the presence of Mackenzie King "and other Canadian Ministers". The presence of other persons listed here is recorded in the Log, *ante*, p. 289. Cf. Pickersgill and Forster, p. 71, which indicates that Mackenzie King dined alone with Dill on September 12.

Russians and from Harriman relating to Polish patriots in Warsaw.² General Marshall and I talked this over at length. For some time it had been apparent that if some help was not given to the Polish patriots in Warsaw they would be exterminated. . . .

"It gave the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Churchill, and the President something serious to think about. Could we help the Poles in Warsaw, even though we wanted to? That rather large problem was never completely solved. . . .³

"During that dinner the Prime Minister came out with new ideas about winning the war. At that particular moment he thought it a matter of vital British interest that we (including the R.A.F.) get more planes, ships, and soldiers into the final battle of Japan as soon as we could. I told him the question of putting planes in there wasn't quite that simple. There were not enough land masses in the Pacific Ocean to use the heavy bombers we would have available from Europe when that phase of the war was over. As a matter of fact, if we could use 1500 out of the 3500 we had in the E.T.O., we would be very, very lucky. Certainly, we would much rather have the B-29's, with their longer range and their heavier bomb load than we would the B-17, the B-24, the Lancaster, or the Halifax. . . ."

² See *ante*, p. 198, for Harriman's telegram of September 9, 1944, which dealt in part with this subject and a paraphrase of which was given to Churchill at Quebec.

³ For the orders on this subject which were dispatched from Quebec, see *post*, p. 397.

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1944

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL, SEPTEMBER 13, 1944, 11:45 A.M., THE CITADEL

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Rear Admiral Brown¹

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
General Ismay
Major General Laycock

Secretariat

Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves¹

Major General Hollis

J.C.S. Files

McFarland Minutes

TOP SECRET

THE PRIME MINISTER, at the President's request, opened the discussion. He said that since SEXTANT the affairs of the United Nations

¹ The presence of Brown and Graves is mentioned in the Log, *ante*, p. 290, but not noted on the cover sheet of the McFarland minutes.

had taken a revolutionary turn for the good. Everything we had touched had turned to gold, and during the last seven weeks there had been an unbroken run of military successes. The manner in which the situation had developed since the Teheran Conference gave the impression of remarkable design and precision of execution. First there had been the Anzio landing, and then, on the same day as the launching of the great Operation OVERLORD, we had captured Rome, which had seemed the most perfect timing. He wished to congratulate the United States Chiefs of Staff on the success of DRAGOON, which had produced the most gratifying results. It was already probable that eight or nine thousand prisoners had been captured, and the south and western parts of France were now being systematically cleared of the enemy. He was firmly convinced that future historians would give a great account of the period since Teheran.²

THE PRESIDENT said that no little of the credit for the conception of DRAGOON should be attributed to Marshal Stalin. It was close to being his suggestion rather than ours.

THE PRIME MINISTER, continuing, said that he was glad to be able to record that, although the British Empire had now entered the sixth year of the war it was still keeping its end up with an over-all population, including the overseas Dominions and Colonies, of only 70,000,000 white people. The British Empire effort in Europe, counted in terms of divisions in the field, was about equal to that of the United States. This was as it should be. He was proud that the British Empire could claim equal partnership with their great ally, the United States, whom he regarded as the greatest military power in the world. The British Empire effort had now reached its peak, whereas that of their ally was ever-increasing. There was complete confidence in General Eisenhower and his relations with General Montgomery were of the best, as were those between General Montgomery and General Bradley. The part played by General W. B. Smith in directing and cementing the staffs was of the highest order. The control of operations in France was in capable hands. An efficient integrated American-British staff machine had been built up, and the battle was being brilliantly exploited.

Turning to Italy, THE PRIME MINISTER said that General Alexander had resumed the offensive at the end of August. Since then the Eighth Army had suffered about 8,000 and the Fifth Army about 1,000 casualties. The Fifth Army had hitherto not been so heavily engaged, but they were expected to make a thrust that very day. The British have a great stake in Italy. The army in this theater was the largest

² According to the British minutes of this meeting, Churchill said "that future historians would say that the period since Teheran had shown the successful working of an extraordinarily efficient inter-Allied war machine." See Ehrman, p. 509.

representative British Empire Army in existence. There were in all sixteen British Empire divisions, consisting of eight British, two Canadian, one New Zealand, one South African and four British Indian divisions. He, the Prime Minister, had been anxious lest General Alexander might be shorn of certain essentials for the vigorous prosecution of his campaign. He now understood that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed that there should be no withdrawals from General Alexander's Army until either Kesselring's Army had been beaten, or was on the run out of Italy.³

GENERAL MARSHALL said there was no thought of withdrawing any forces until the outcome of General Alexander's present operations was known.

THE PRIME MINISTER emphasized that if the Germans were run out of Italy we should have to look for fresh fields and pastures new. It would never do for our armies to remain idle. He had always been attracted by a right-handed movement, with the purpose of giving Germany a stab in the armpit. Our objective should be Vienna. If German resistance collapsed, we should, of course, be able to reach Vienna more quickly and more easily. If not, to assist this movement, he had given considerable thought to an operation for the capture of Istria, which would include the occupation of Trieste and Fiume. He had been relieved to learn that the United States Chiefs of Staff were willing to leave in the Mediterranean certain LST's now engaged in DRAGOON, to provide an amphibious lift for the Adriatic operation, if this was found desirable and necessary. An added reason for this right-handed movement was the rapid encroachment of the Russians into the Balkans and the consequent dangerous spread of Russian influence in this area. He preferred to get into Vienna before the Russians did as he did not know what Russia's policy would be after she took it.

THE PRIME MINISTER then reviewed the campaign in Burma. This had been on a considerable scale. 250,000 men had been engaged, and the fighting for Imphal and Kohima had been extremely bitter. General Stilwell was to be congratulated on his brilliant operation, resulting in the capture of Myitkyina. There had been 40,000 battle casualties and 288,000 sick of which latter, happily, the great proportion recovered and returned to duty. As a result of this campaign, the air line to China had been kept open and India rendered secure from attack. It was estimated that the Japanese had lost 100,000 men in this, the largest land engagement of Japanese forces.

In spite of these successes, it was, however, most undesirable that the fighting in the jungles of Burma should go on indefinitely. For this

³ See the minutes of the 172d Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, *ante*, p. 305.

reason, the British Chiefs of Staff had put forward Plan DRACULA, which would be preceded by Plan CAPITAL Phase I and as much as was necessary of Phase II. Difficulties were being experienced in making available the necessary forces and transporting them to the Southeast Asia Theater in time to carry out DRACULA before the monsoon of 1945. The present situation in Europe, favorable as it was, did not permit a decision being taken now to withdraw forces. What was wanted was to keep an option open for as long as possible, and every effort was being directed to this end.

There were certain elements inimical to Anglo-American good relations which were putting it about that Great Britain would take no share in the war against Japan once Germany had been defeated. Far from shirking this task, the British Empire was eager to play the greatest possible part.⁴ They had every reason for doing so. Japan was as much the bitter enemy of the British Empire as of the United States. British territory had been captured in battle and grievous losses had been suffered. The offer he, the Prime Minister, now wished to make, was for the British Main Fleet to take part in the main operations against Japan under United States Supreme Command.

THE PRESIDENT said that the offer was accepted on the largest possible scale.⁵

THE PRIME MINISTER, continuing, said there would be available a powerful and well-balanced force, including, it was hoped, at the end of next year, their newest 15-inch battleship. A fleet train of ample proportions had been built up, which would render the fleet independent for a considerable time of shore base resources. He said that the placing of a British fleet in the Central Pacific would not prevent a detachment being made to work with General MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific if this was desired. This would include air forces. There was, of course, no intention to interfere in any way with General MacArthur's command.

As a further contribution to the defeat of the enemy, the Royal Air Force would like to take a part in the heavy bombardment of Japan. A bomber force of 1500 planes could be made available for this purpose and would like a proportionate share with the four or five thousand American planes in striking at the heart of the enemy. As regards land forces, when Germany had been beaten, it would probably be possible to move six divisions from the European Theater to the East, to be followed perhaps by a further six at a later date. In Burma there were 15 divisions which might ultimately be drawn

⁴ For the British minutes of the discussion at this meeting of participation of British forces in the Pacific war, see Ehrman, pp. 518-519. They quote Churchill as saying that the British Empire was "ardent to play the greatest possible part".

⁵ In the British minutes referred to in fn. 4, above, Roosevelt's statement is placed two sentences later and is recorded as follows: "The President intervened to say that the British fleet was no sooner offered than accepted."

upon. He had always advocated an advance across the Bay of Bengal and operations to recover Singapore, the loss of which had been a grievous and shameful blow to British prestige which must be avenged. It would not be good enough for Singapore to be returned to us at the peace table. We should recover it in battle. These operations would not debar the employment of small British Empire components with United States forces in the Pacific.

There was nothing cast iron in these ideas. First we should do DRACULA, and then survey the situation. If a better plan could be evolved, it should certainly not be ruled out in advance. Our key-word should be to engage the largest number of our own forces against the largest number of the enemy at the earliest possible moment.

THE PRESIDENT thanked the Prime Minister for his lucid and comprehensive review of the situation. It was a matter of profound satisfaction that at each succeeding conference between the American and British representatives there had been ever-increasing solidarity of outlook and identity of basic thought. Added to this there had always been an atmosphere of cordiality and friendship. Our fortunes had prospered but it was still not quite possible to forecast the date of the end of the war with Germany.

It seemed clear that the Germans were withdrawing from the Balkans and appeared likely that in Italy they would retire to the line of the Alps. The Russians were on the edge of Hungary. The Germans had shown themselves good at staging withdrawals and had been able to save large numbers of personnel although much material had been lost. If the battle went well with General Alexander, we should reach the Piave reasonably soon. All forces in Italy should be engaged to the maximum intensity.

In the west it seemed probable that the Germans would retire behind the Rhine. In his view the "West Wall" was the right bank of the Rhine which would present a formidable obstacle. He thought we should plan to force the barrier of the Rhine and then consider the situation. We should have to turn the line either from the east or from the west. For this purpose our plans must be flexible. The Germans could not yet be counted out and one more big battle would have to be fought. The operations in the East would to some extent depend on how the situation developed in Europe. He agreed that we should not remain in Burma any longer than it was necessary to clean up the Japanese in that theater. The American plan was to regain the Philippines and to dominate the mainland of Japan from the Philippines or Formosa and from bridgeheads which would be seized in China. If forces could be established on the mainland of China, China could be saved. American experience had been that the "end run" method paid a handsome dividend. Rabaul was an example of this by-passing technique which had been employed with considerable suc-

cess at small cost of life. Would it not be equally possible to by-pass Singapore by seizing an area to the north or east of it, for example, Bangkok? Singapore may be very strong and he was opposed to going up against strong positions.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that the seizure of localities such as Penang and the Kra Isthmus or Moulmein should be studied. As far as Singapore was concerned he did not favor the by-passing method. There would undoubtedly be a large force of Japanese in the Malay Peninsula and it would help the American operations in the Pacific if we could bring these forces to action and destroy them in addition to achieving the great prize of the recapture of Singapore. If Formosa were captured, would the Japanese garrisons to the south be completely cut off?

ADMIRAL KING replied that these garrisons would be strangled and must ultimately perish.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that all these projects were being examined and would be put in order. No decision could be taken until after Rangoon had been captured. It should not be overlooked that Marshal Stalin had volunteered a solemn undertaking at Teheran that Russia would enter the war against Japan the day that Hitler was beaten.⁶ There was no reason to doubt that Stalin would be as good as his word. The Russians undoubtedly had great ambitions in the East. If Hitler was beaten, say, by January, and Japan was confronted with the three most powerful nations in the world, they would undoubtedly have cause for reflection as to whether they could continue the fight.

THE PRESIDENT referred to the almost fanatical Japanese tenacity. In Saipan not only the soldiers but also the civilians had committed suicide rather than be taken.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he hoped to have available between 600 and 800 heavy bombers for operations against the mainland of Japan. These could be supplemented by a considerable number of medium bomber squadrons.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked about the employment to be made of the British Fleet.

THE PRESIDENT said his thought was to use it in any way possible.

ADMIRAL KING said that a paper on this subject had been prepared for reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.⁷ The question was being actively studied.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked if it would not be better to employ the new British ships in place of battle-worn vessels of the United States.

⁶ Concerning Stalin's statement on this subject at the Tehran Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 489, 499-500.

⁷ The paper referred to was circulated as C.C.S. 452/27, September 13, 1944, post, p. 447.

ADMIRAL KING replied that speaking for himself, he could only say that the matter was under examination.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the offer had been made and asked if it was accepted.

THE PRESIDENT replied in the affirmative.

THE PRIME MINISTER enquired whether an undertaking could be given for the British Air Force to participate in the main operations.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he and General Arnold were trying to see how best to fit in the maximum number of aircraft for these operations. It was not so long ago that we were crying out for airplanes—now we had a surplus. He suggested that if the British were heavily engaged in Southeast Asia and in Malaya they would require a large proportion of their air forces for these operations. Was there a distinction between these latter operations and the operations envisaged by Sir Charles Portal for heavy bombardment of Japan?

SIR CHARLES PORTAL replied that there was a distinction. The Lancaster bomber, if refuelled in the air, had a range nearly approaching that of the B-29. Without refuelling in the air these aircraft had a range of 800 or 900 miles.⁸

THE PRESIDENT observed that there were certain groups in the United States, and he had no doubt that similar groups existed in Great Britain, who evinced a kindly attitude towards the Germans. Their theory was that evil could be eradicated from the German make-up and the nation could be rejuvenated by kindness.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that such sentiments would hardly be tolerated in Great Britain. The British people would demand a strong policy against the Germans. The German working man should be allowed sufficient food for his bare need, and work, but no more. The more virulent elements such as the Gestapo and the young fanatics should be deported to work in rehabilitating the devastated areas of Europe. Plans for the partition of Germany were now in the course of preparation but no final decisions had been taken.

In conclusion, THE PRIME MINISTER said that it was clear that a very great measure of agreement existed between the American and British Staffs.

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed that this was so. He did not foresee any insuperable difficulties in reaching agreement on all points at issue.

⁸ The British minutes referred to in fn. 4, above, have the following additional statement by Churchill at this point:

"The Prime Minister remarked that for the future good relations of the two countries, on which so much depended, it was of vital importance that the British should be given their fair share in the main operations against Japan. The United States had given the most handsome assistance to the British Empire, in the fight against Germany. It could only be expected that the British Empire in return should give the United States all assistance in their power towards the defeat of Japan." See Ehrman, p. 519.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, SEPTEMBER 13, 1944,
1 P.M., THE CITADEL

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

This meeting is mentioned in the Log, *ante*, p. 290. The only information on the substance of the conversation which has been found is that contained in a memorandum by the Secretary of the Treasury's Assistant (White), *post*, p. 323, where it is indicated that later on September 13 Roosevelt told Morgenthau about his conversation with Churchill, presumably during luncheon. According to this source, Roosevelt had asked Churchill, who had been very glum, how he would like to have the steel business of Europe for twenty or thirty years, and Churchill had "seemed much excited over the possibility".

At one of the Roosevelt-Churchill meetings on September 13, a suggestion was made that Fiorello La Guardia should go to Italy as the President's representative and that while there he should be invited to attend the meetings of the Allied Control Commission. See Churchill's allusion to this suggestion in a letter to Roosevelt dated September 14, 1944, *post*, p. 418; cf. *ante*, p. 42.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, SEPTEMBER 13, 1944,
2:30 P.M., MAIN CONFERENCE ROOM, CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Willson
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral McCormick
Major General Handy
Major General Fairchild
Major General Kuter

UNITED KINGDOM

Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
General Ismay
Admiral Noble
Lieutenant General Macready
Air Marshal Welsh
Major General Laycock

Secretariat

Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves

Major General Hollis
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Commander Coleridge

¹ C.C.S. 173d Meeting.

J.C.S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE 172D MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

GENERAL MARSHALL drew attention to his statement recorded in the penultimate paragraph on page 3 of the minutes.² He requested that this should be amended to read:

"... the PLOUGH Force now in south France and the necessary sleds are obtainable."

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the conclusions of the 172d Meeting. The detailed record was amended as proposed by General Marshall and approved subject to later minor amendments.³

2. CONTROL OF THE STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCES IN EUROPE
(C.C.S. 520/4⁴)

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he had not had time fully to study the proposed directive. It appeared, however, to be acceptable except with regard to certain small details.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to consider C.C.S. 520/4 at their meeting to be held on the following day.

3. MACHINERY FOR COORDINATION OF U.S.-SOVIET-BRITISH MILITARY EFFORT
(C.C.S. 618/4⁵)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to the dispatch of the messages in Enclosures "A" and "B" to C.C.S. 618/4 to Generals Burrows and Deane respectively.

4. REPORT ON THE ENEMY SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC
(C.C.S. 643/1⁶)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of the report by the Combined Intelligence Committee on the enemy situation in the Pacific-Far East (C.C.S. 643/1).

² i.e., in item 5, paragraph 12, of the minutes of the 172d Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. See *ante*, p. 304.

³ The amendments referred to have been incorporated in the minutes of the 172d Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as printed *ante*, p. 300.

⁴ *Post*, p. 431.

⁵ *Post*, p. 403.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 267.

5. GENERAL PROGRESS REPORT ON RECENT OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC
(C.C.S. 676⁷)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of the progress report by the United States Chiefs of Staff on recent operations in the Pacific (C.C.S. 676).

6. STRATEGY FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN
(C.C.S. 417/8⁸)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff were in agreement with the course of action for planning purposes outlined by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 417/8. There was, however, one point he would like to make. In addition to the operations outlined in the paper there would, of course, be certain British operations which the British Chiefs of Staff had not yet had an opportunity to put forward. For instance, the British Fleet participating in the Pacific operations, the British Task Force in the Southwest Pacific and Operation DRACULA. In making provision, therefore, for the U.S. operations it should be borne in mind that there would also be certain British operations, the forces for which will require allocation of certain items of equipment for which provision should be made and a margin of requirements allowed.

SIR JOHN DILL explained that supplies would be required for British forces for the war against Japan which could not yet be requested since the operations were not yet fully approved.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he quite appreciated the points made by Sir Alan Brooke, but he was not clear how they could be incorporated in the existing paper.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that all that was required was that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take note that certain British operations against Japan were not included in the program outlined in C.C.S. 417/8 and that requirements with regard to provision of equipment and the logistic support of these forces would be put forward at a later date.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

- a. Accepted the proposals in C.C.S. 417/8 as a basis for planning.
- b. Took note that British operations against Japan, not yet approved, would require the allocation of resources and that in planning production therefor these requirements should be borne in mind.
- c. Took note that the size of the British forces to be employed against Japan would be notified as soon as possible.

⁷ *Post*, p. 442.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 265.

7. BASIC POLICIES FOR THE "OCTAGON" CONFERENCE (C.C.S. 654/8⁹)

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that it seemed to him that the U.S. and British proposals as to the wording of paragraph 6 *i* of C.C.S. 654¹⁰ were very similar.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the British wording "inescapable commitments" was aimed to cover such points as the return of Dominion forces to their homelands which was a commitment which could not be avoided.

ADMIRAL KING suggested that the two proposals should be incorporated and that the wording should read: "having regard to other agreed and/or inescapable commitments."

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that this proposal was entirely acceptable.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the following wording for paragraph 6 *i* of C.C.S. 654:

"Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East, as a matter of highest priority, having regard to other agreed and/or inescapable commitments, as soon as the German situation allows."

8. FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN (C.C.S. 677/1¹¹)

ADMIRAL LEAHY explained that with regard to paragraph 2 *b* of the U.S. draft of the message to General Wilson, it was felt that the wording "for planning the capture of the Istrian Peninsula" was more appropriate than "for the capture of the Istrian Peninsula" since the operation was not yet approved and might, in fact, never take place.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that the words "major units" in paragraph 1*a* had been inserted at his suggestion to cover such possible withdrawals as that of the Japanese battalion which he had mentioned the previous day.

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that in the U.S. draft the date on which General Wilson was to submit his plan had been altered to 10 October. Since a decision had to be reached by the 15th it would be safer to call for the report on the 10th.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the U.S. draft was acceptable to the British Chiefs of Staff.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to dispatch to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean the draft message in Enclosure "B" to C.C.S. 677/1. (Subsequently dispatched as FAN 415.)

⁹ *Post*, p. 441.

¹⁰ *Ante*, p. 219.

¹¹ *Post*, p. 429.

9. NEXT MEETING, COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to meet at 1000 on Thursday, 14 September, and to permit photographs to be taken at that time.

ROOSEVELT-MORGENTHAU CONVERSATION, SEPTEMBER 13, 1944,
4 P.M., THE CITADEL

PRESENT

President Roosevelt
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau
Miss Tully

Editorial Note

No record of the discussion at this meeting has been found which was prepared by one of the participants listed above. The memorandum printed below was prepared by Harry Dexter White, who accompanied Morgenthau to Quebec. Since this memorandum does not indicate that White himself was present, it seems probable that White was summarizing what Morgenthau had told him, or told others in his presence, between September 13 and the date on which White's memorandum was prepared. Following is the text of the memorandum, which bears the date "9/25/44" at the end (presumably the date of typing):

"Mrs. Roosevelt asked the Secretary to tea. As soon as he arrived he was ushered in to the President.¹ Miss Tully was also present. (When he came in, the President turned to Fala, his dog, and said, 'Say hello to your Uncle Henry.')

"The President said that in his conversation with Churchill,² Churchill had been very glum. The President said that he had asked Churchill: 'How would you like to have the steel business of Europe for 20 or 30 years?' The President said that Churchill seemed much excited over the possibility.

"The President said to the Secretary: 'I have asked you to come up here so that you could talk to the Prof. [Lord Cherwell].'³ He said that they were doing shipping that night and therefore were to have Admiral Land but added, 'You might as well come too.' The Secretary asked how freely he could talk with the Professor and the President replied, 'You can talk about anything you want.' The Secretary inquired: 'Anything?', and the President said, 'Well, let me look at that book.' [The book he referred to was the collection of memoranda on

¹ According to the Log, *ante*, p. 290, Roosevelt conferred with Morgenthau "at length" after the latter's arrival, following which Roosevelt had tea with Mrs. Roosevelt, Miss Tully, and Miss Thompson in the President's quarters at 5 p.m.

² Presumably during luncheon earlier on September 13. See the editorial note, *ante*, p. 319.

³ The brackets throughout this memorandum appear in the source text.

Germany prepared in the Treasury which the Secretary had given to him in Washington.⁴] The President went over the whole section and said, 'I wouldn't discuss with him the question of the zones to be occupied by our armies. That's a military question. Nor would I discuss the question of partitioning as that's a political question. But you can talk about the fact that we are thinking of internationalizing the Ruhr and the Saar, including the Kiel Canal. If Holland has a lot of land inundated by Germany we can give her a piece of Western Germany as compensation.'

"The President went over the whole of the first section of the book, item by item, and then said: 'I have sent for Eden. Churchill, Eden, yourself and I will sit down to discuss the matter.' (The Secretary expressed the view that the President gave him the impression that he was bringing Eden to Quebec largely because of the report he (the Secretary) gave him upon his return from England about Eden being tough on the question of a policy toward Germany.)⁵

"The President said, 'Don't worry about Churchill. He is going to be tough too.' As the Secretary was leaving, the President said to Miss Tully, 'Put that book right next to my bed. I want to read it tonight.' [The book he referred to was the book I described above.]" (Treasury Files)

⁴ *Ante*, p. 128.

⁵ Cf. Blum, pp. 338, 342.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, SEPTEMBER 13, 1944,
8 P.M., THE CITADEL

PRESENT ¹

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Secretary of the Treasury
Morgenthau
Admiral Leahy
Vice Admiral Land
Vice Admiral McIntire

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Lord Cherwell
Minister of War Transport Leathers
Lord Moran

Editorial Note

No official memorandum on the discussion at this dinner meeting by one of the participants listed above has been found, but Leahy noted in his diary: "The subjects discussed at dinner were generally international politics, economics and shipping; and the peace terms that should be imposed upon Germany when that country surrenders to the Allies." (Leahy Diary)

Moran's diary account is considerably fuller:

"... How to prevent another war with Germany was the only subject of conversation. The Americans were all for drastic action,

¹ The Log (*ante*, p. 290), the Leahy Diary, and the White memorandum quoted in the editorial note below all list the same nine participants in this dinner meeting. Moran, p. 190, notes the presence of all of them except Land. According to the Log, "Conference discussions followed dinner and lasted until 11:15 p.m."

maintaining that Germany should not be allowed ships or the yards in which to build them; what they needed could be carried in our ships. Morgenthau wanted to close down the Ruhr to help British exports, especially steel. The P.M. was against this. He did not seem happy about all this toughness.

"'I'm all for disarming Germany,' he said, 'but we ought not to prevent her living decently. There are bonds between the working classes of all countries, and the English people will not stand for the policy you are advocating.'

"I thought he had done when he growled :

"I agree with Burke. You cannot indict a whole nation.'

"If the P.M. was vague about what ought to be done with Germany, he was at least quite clear what should *not* be done. He kept saying :

"'At any rate, what is to be done should be done quickly. Kill the criminals, but don't carry on the business for years.'

"Morgenthau asked the P.M. how he could prevent Britain starving when her exports had fallen so low that she would be unable to pay for imports. The P.M. had no satisfactory answer. His thoughts seemed to go back to the House of Commons and what he knew of the English people. In five years' time, when passions would have died down, people, he said, would not stand for repressive measures. He harped on the necessity for disarmament. At that point one of the Americans intervened: he thought that Germany should be made to return to a pastoral state, she ought to have a lower standard of living. During all this wild talk only the P.M. seemed to have his feet on the ground. The President mostly listened; once he remarked that a factory which made steel furniture could be turned overnight to war production.²

"After three hours' discussion there seemed to be an absolute cleavage between the American point of view and that of the Prime Minister. The Prof.,³ however, sided with the Americans. At last Roosevelt said: 'Let the Prof. go into our plans with Morgenthau.' " (Moran, pp. 190-191)

On September 20, 1944, Morgenthau told Hull and Stimson that at this dinner meeting Churchill was violently opposed to the policy on Germany which was presented to him. He quoted Churchill as inquiring with annoyance whether he had been brought to Quebec to discuss such a scheme and as stating that it would mean that England would be chained to a dead body, i.e., Germany. See a memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews), September 20, 1944, *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 134.

Morgenthau, writing of the September 13 dinner meeting three years later, recalled that Churchill had been irascible and vitriolic when, at Roosevelt's request, Morgenthau had explained the Treasury proposal. Churchill, he said, turned loose "the full flood of his rhetoric, sarcasm and violence", stating that he looked on the Treasury plan "as he

² Cf. the White memorandum, *post*, p. 327, which indicates correctly that Roosevelt was quoting Stalin on this point.

³ Lord Cherwell.

would on chaining himself to a dead German". Roosevelt, Morgenthau recalled, sat by, saying very little. See Henry Morgenthau, Jr., "Our Policy Toward Germany: Morgenthau's Inside Story", *New York Post*, November 28, 1947, p. 18.

The most detailed description of the dinner conversation which has been found was written by Harry Dexter White, who accompanied Morgenthau to Quebec. No source on the meeting (including White's memorandum itself) states that White was present, and it seems probable that White was summarizing what Morgenthau had told him, or told others in his presence, in the period between September 13 and the date on which White's memorandum was prepared. Following is the text of the memorandum, which bears the date "9/25/44" at the end (presumably the date of typing) :

"Though shipping was supposed to have been the subject for discussion the subject of shipping was not mentioned the entire evening except briefly when the question was raised as to the advisability of taking away all of Germany's shipping.

"The discussion quickly turned to Germany. Churchill (apparently without reference to anything said previously) said something along the line of 'What are my Cabinet members doing discussing plans for Germany without first discussing them with me? I intend to get into the matter myself.'

"The President said he had asked Secretary Morgenthau to come up for the purpose of discussing Germany and that he (Morgenthau) was to talk to Cherwell the following day.

"Churchill asked: 'Why don't we discuss Germany now?' The President then asked the Secretary to explain the program he had in mind for Germany. The Secretary described that part of the Treasury proposal dealing with the Ruhr.⁴ Churchill indicated that he was strongly opposed to such a program. He said that all that was necessary was to eliminate the production of armament. To do what the Treasury suggested was 'unnatural, unchristian and unnecessary.' Churchill didn't believe that it would be very much of an aid to the United Kingdom even if the United Kingdom did get the steel business that formerly went to Germany.

"Admiral Land, on the other hand, wholly supported Secretary Morgenthau's proposal, thumping vigorously on the table to emphasize his remark. Admiral Land told the Secretary after the dinner that the President had been talking with him more or less along those lines for a long time but this was the first time that he (Admiral Land) had a chance to say what he felt. He had long been waiting for the opportunity and, encouraged by the Secretary's statement, he had vigorously expressed himself.

"When the question arose about taking away German ships, Churchill was opposed. Admiral Land said, 'Why not? It is no more cruel to take away ships than their steel plants.'

"Churchill said at one point: 'If you [the United States] ⁵ do not do something for Britain then the British simply will have to destroy

⁴ See *ante*, pp. 129, 135.

⁵ Brackets appear in the source text.

gold and do business largely within the Empire.' Lord Cherwell pool poohed this idea of the Prime Minister's.

"Admiral Leahy seemed on the whole to be unsympathetic to the Treasury's program and to side with Churchill. Admiral Leahy thought the only way to assure peace in the future was for the United States, the United Kingdom and possibly Russia 'if she behaves herself' to 'crack down' on any country which stepped over the boundary line of any other country.

"The President said very little in reply to Churchill's views. Secretary Morgenthau several times interjected into Churchill's comments that his program did not recommend that Germany be permitted to starve as seemed to be the implication in Churchill's remark.

"At another point when discussing the need for an international police air force Churchill said that the United States, United Kingdom and Russia would have to rotate the job 'as our air people get dirty when they associate with the Russians.'

"At one point in the discussion Churchill said to the President: 'Is this what you asked me to come all the way over here to discuss?'

"The conversation then got on to India and stayed on India for about an hour. Churchill talked rather angrily at length about the difficulties the British were confronted with in administering India and on the lack of understanding in the United States about the Indian problem. He spoke of the high birth rate, the high death rate, the ignorance and the carelessness of the Indian people to poverty, disease, etc. Churchill said, 'I will give the United States half of India to administer and we will take the other half and we will see who does better with each other's half.'

"However, the President came back to the German problem several times very nicely and did not recede from his position. He reminded Churchill that Stalin at Teheran had said: 'Are you going to let Germany produce modern metal furniture? The manufacture of metal furniture can be quickly turned into the manufacture of armament.'⁶

"Lord Cherwell seemed to be in sympathy with the Secretary's point of view. Later when talking it over with him he said that he didn't think that Churchill at all got the major point the Secretary was trying to make. The Secretary asked him if he didn't think the real difficulty with Churchill was that he wanted a strong Germany to stand between 'the white cliffs of Dover' and Communist Russia. Cherwell agreed that that was it. Lord Leathers of the Shipping Board apparently disagreed with the Secretary's point of view.

"On leaving, Lord Cherwell said that he expected to talk with the Secretary about lend-lease assistance for the period between the defeat of Germany and the defeat of Japan. The Secretary told him that he had been asked by the President to come to talk about Germany but after [that?] he would be glad to discuss lend-lease aid the following morning after they had had their conversation about Germany.

"The Secretary had an opportunity to tell the President that he believed the Russians were holding back on their cooperation with the United States because they were suspicious of the American and British attitude toward Germany. Russia feared we and the British were going to try to make a soft peace with Germany and build her

⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 511, 880.

up as a possible future counter-weight against Russia. The President replied, 'You are right, and I want you to read a telegram I just received from Harriman.' Admiral Leahy later gave the Secretary the telegram which Harriman sent to Harry Hopkins urging the President to call him (Harriman) home to report on the trend in Russia on non-cooperation with the United States.⁷ (Treasury Files)

⁷ *Ante*, p. 198.

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1944

MORGENTHAU-CHERWELL MEETING, SEPTEMBER 14, 1944, 10 A.M.,
SECRETARY MORGENTHAU'S SUITE, CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Secretary of the Treasury
Morgenthau
Mr. White

UNITED KINGDOM
Lord Cherwell
Mr. MacDougall

Treasury Files

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Treasury's Assistant (White)

[Undated.¹]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY'S FILES

This was the meeting which the President had suggested the Secretary have with Lord Cherwell.² Lord Cherwell had asked to bring along Mr. MacDougall.

The Secretary asked Cherwell which of the two subjects before them for discussion would he like to take up first. Cherwell replied that he would like to take up the lend-lease program first since he thought that would be simpler to dispose of than the question of policy toward Germany. Cherwell went into some detail on the need for getting to work quickly on a lend-lease program for England during the period after the defeat of Germany and before the defeat of Japan. He outlined British views of what would be appropriate for England to receive in the way of lend-lease aid. He described England's need for increasing her exports and relaxing on the home working front. He expressed the view that a cut of 27 percent in our lend-lease to the British Empire would appear reasonable to the British.³ In general, he repeated the gist of what was in the memorandum of the State Department to the President.⁴

¹ The date "9/25/44", which appears at the end of the memorandum, is presumably the date of typing.

² See *ante*, pp. 323, 325.

³ It was probably at this meeting that Cherwell gave Morgenthau a copy of the British Treasury memorandum of September 4, 1944, *ante*, p. 169.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 177.

When he got through, the Secretary said that he had heard all that before from the Exchequer and others when he was in England. He then told Cherwell about his conversation with the Exchequer and with the President⁵ and said that it was now up to Churchill. If Churchill thought that the idea of forming a committee to handle the whole problem was a good one, it was up to Churchill to suggest it to the President.

The Secretary also said that he didn't like the approach of determining the amount of lend-lease aid that Britain was to get that Cherwell presented. In his (the Secretary's) opinion, the question should be approached from the point of view of just how much munitions the British need in the role that they are to play in the Pacific. The Secretary thought that food shipments could be handled all right but he felt that commercial goods could not appropriately go into exports.

In any case, the Secretary stressed the need for its being handled by a joint committee of British and Americans. Cherwell liked the idea of the committee and asked whether the Secretary would head it up. The Secretary replied that he didn't know; that that was up to the President. The Secretary told Cherwell that the President had given him (Morgenthau) for his comment a memorandum prepared by the State Department⁶ and that the President might want somebody from State Department or possibly the Treasury to head up the committee. Cherwell suggested that White and MacDougall attempt to draft a directive setting up such a committee so that if the Prime Minister and the President did agree on the idea they might get it out then and there. The Secretary agreed.

The Secretary then took up the question of Germany. He handed Cherwell the book on Germany⁷ to read and explained that it was compiled on a day's notice. Cherwell read hurriedly through the first part and expressed skepticism as to whether Organized Labor in the United States would approve a program so drastic in character. Secretary Morgenthau thought that it would. Cherwell commented that he didn't understand why Churchill had taken so contrary a position on the program the evening before. He (Cherwell) was surprised at Churchill's attitude and thought possibly that it was due to the fact that Churchill did not wholly understand what the Secretary was driving at.

The Secretary told Cherwell that Secretary Hull was in general agreement with the views expressed by the Treasury⁸ and that he

⁵ See Blum, pp. 307-309.

⁶ The reference is presumably to Hull's memorandum to Roosevelt of September 8, 1944, *ante*, p. 177.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 128.

⁸ For Hull's own account of his attitude toward the views of the Treasury Department, see Hull, pp. 1602-1611.

was of the opinion that Eden would be likewise. He said that the question came down to a choice of: "Do you want a strong Germany and a weak England or a weak Germany and a strong England?" The Secretary said that he preferred to rely on a strong England and a weak Germany.

Cherwell thought that the proposal could be dressed up in a way to be more attractive to the Prime Minister and the Secretary said that he would be very glad to have Cherwell try it.

After the Secretary and Cherwell left to see the President and Churchill to report on the morning's conversation, I talked at length with MacDougall on the merits of the Treasury's proposed program and MacDougall appeared to be in agreement. Later MacDougall, a Mr. Weeks of the British Government, and I met to draft the directive suggested by Cherwell.⁹

When the Secretary returned with Cherwell from the President and the Prime Minister, he reported that both Churchill and the President had liked the idea of creating a committee. They wanted to set up one on an informal and *ad hoc* basis, to formalize it after the election.

The Secretary told me after the others had gone that when it came to the question of who should be the chairman of the joint committee that Churchill had said, "How about Harry Hopkins?" But the President had replied, "No, I want Morgenthau to be chairman."

H. D. WHITE

⁹ For the paper referred to, see *post*, p. 468.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, SEPTEMBER 14, 1944, 10 A.M., MAIN CONFERENCE ROOM, CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Willson
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral McCormick
Major General Handy
Major General Fairchild
Major General Kuter

UNITED KINGDOM

Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
General Ismay
Admiral Noble
Lieutenant General Macready
Air Marshal Welsh
Major General Laycock

Secretariat

Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves

Major General Hollis
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Commander Coleridge

¹ C.C.S. 174th Meeting.

J.C.S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE 173D MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the conclusions of the 173d Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was approved, subject to later minor amendments.²

2. CONTROL OF THE STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCES IN EUROPE
(C.C.S. 520/4³)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the directive in C.C.S. 520/4 as amended in C.C.S. 520/5.⁴
(Amended directive circulated as C.C.S. 520/6.⁵)

3. BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE PACIFIC
(C.C.S. 452/26⁶ and 452/27⁷)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff were disturbed by the statement of the United States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 452/27 with regard to British participation in the war against Japan. He realized that this paper had been written before the Plenary session on the previous day. He felt that it did not entirely coincide with the proposal put forward at that conference and accepted by the President. For political reasons it was essential that the British Fleet should take part in the main operations against Japan.

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked if Sir Alan Brooke's point would be met by the elimination of the words, "They consider that the initial use of such a force should be on the western flank of the advance in the Southwest Pacific." It might be that the British Fleet would be used initially in the Bay of Bengal and thereafter as required by the existing situation.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that the main fleet would not be required in the Bay of Bengal since there were already more British forces there than required. He agreed to the deletion proposed by Admiral Leahy.

² The amendments referred to have been incorporated in the minutes of the 173d Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as printed *ante*, p. 320.

³ *Post*, p. 431.

⁴ "Control of Strategic Bomber Forces in Europe Following the Establishment of Allied Forces on the Continent", September 14, 1944. This memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff is not printed as such, but the amendments to the enclosure to C.C.S. 520/4 suggested therein can be reconstructed from C.C.S. 520/6, *post*, p. 432, and the footnotes thereto.

⁵ *Post*, p. 432.

⁶ *Post*, p. 441.

⁷ *Post*, p. 447. See also the discussion of this subject on September 13, 1944, *ante*, pp. 315, 317-318.

ADMIRAL KING also agreed to the deletion of these words which he felt were not relevant to the general case.

Continuing, SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM asked the U.S. views as to the meaning of the term "balanced forces" in the final sentence of paragraph 1 of C.C.S. 452/27. He said that the British Chiefs of Staff had in mind a force of some 4 battleships, 5 to 6 large carriers, 20 light fleet carriers and CVE's and the appropriate number of cruisers and destroyers. This he would regard as a balanced force.

ADMIRAL KING stressed that it was essential for these forces to be self-supporting.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that if these forces had their fleet train, they could operate unassisted for several months provided they had the necessary rear bases—probably in Australia. The provision of bases would be a matter for agreement.

ADMIRAL KING said that the practicability of employing these forces would be a matter for discussion from time to time.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he did not feel that the question for discussion was the practicability of employment but rather the matter of where they should be employed from time to time.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM referred to the Prime Minister's statement that he wished the British Fleet to take part in the main operations in the Pacific. Decision with regard to this was necessary since many preliminary preparations had to be made.

ADMIRAL KING suggested that the British Chiefs of Staff should put forward proposals with regard to the employment of the British Fleet.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that the British wish was that they should be employed in the Central Pacific.

ADMIRAL KING said that at the Plenary meeting no specific reference to the Central Pacific had been made.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the emphasis had been laid on the use of the British Fleet in the main effort against Japan.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that as he saw it the main effort was at present from New Guinea to the Philippines and it would later move to the northward.

ADMIRAL KING said that he was in no position now to commit himself as to where the British Fleet could be employed.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the original offer made by the British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 452/18, paragraph 9,⁸ which read:

"It is our desire in accordance with His Majesty's Government's policy, that this fleet should play its full part at the earliest possible moment in the main operations against Japan wherever the greatest naval strength is required."

⁸ *Ante*, p. 246.

When the British Chiefs of Staff spoke of the main operations against Japan they did not intend to confine this meaning to Japan itself geographically but meant rather that the fleet should take part in the main operations within the theater of war wherever they might be taking place.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM stressed that the British Chiefs of Staff did not wish the British Fleet merely to take part in mopping up operations in areas falling into our hands.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he felt that the actual operations in which the British Fleet would take part would have to be decided in the future. It might well be that the fleet would be required for the conquest of Singapore, which he would regard as a major operation.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then considered paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 452/27 referring to the use of a British Empire task force in the Southwest Pacific.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the Prime Minister had offered the British Fleet for use in the main operations against Japan. By implication this paragraph accepted a naval task force for the Southwest Pacific, and was therefore contrary to the intention he had expressed.

ADMIRAL KING said that it was of course essential to have sufficient forces for the war against Japan. He was not, however, prepared to accept a British Fleet which he could not employ or support. In principle he wished to accept the British Fleet in the Pacific but it would be entirely unacceptable for the British main fleet to be employed for political reasons in the Pacific and thus necessitate withdrawal of some of the United States Fleet.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL reminded Admiral King that the Prime Minister had suggested that certain of the newer British capital ships should be substituted for certain of the older U.S. ships.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that as he understood it the Prime Minister and President were in agreement that it was essential for British forces to take a leading part in the main operations against Japan.

ADMIRAL KING said that it was not his recollection that the President had agreed to this. He could not accept that a view expressed by the Prime Minister should be regarded as a directive to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the Prime Minister felt it essential that it should be placed on record that he wished the British Fleet to play a major role in the operations against Japan.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that, as he remembered it, the offer was no sooner made than accepted by the President.

ADMIRAL KING asked for specific British proposals.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL referred once more to the offer made in C.C.S. 452/18 which he had had previously quoted.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he could see no objection whatever to this proposal. He could not say exactly where the fleet could be employed at this moment but there would be ample opportunity for its use provided it was self-supporting.

ADMIRAL KING said that the question of the British proposal for the use [of] the main fleet would have to be referred to the President before it could be accepted.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that if Admiral King saw any objections to this proposal he should take the matter up himself with the President.⁹ It might not be wise to use the term "main fleet."

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that the British Fleet had been offered by the Prime Minister and the President had accepted it. He was prepared to agree to the deletion of the word "main" from paragraph 1 of C.C.S. 452/27.

ADMIRAL KING said that the Prime Minister had also referred to the use of British air power in the Pacific.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that a definite answer with regard to British air help in the war against Japan could not be given now. The amount which could be absorbed would depend on the development of suitable facilities.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it was, of course, impossible to be definite at the moment since the forces available would depend on the length of the war with Germany. What he would ask for was air facilities available in the bases in the Pacific so that the British could play their part. He would put forward a proposal for consideration.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the best method would be a statement of numbers of aircraft and dates at which they would be available.

GENERAL ARNOLD agreed that this would be preferable.

Referring to paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 452/27, SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that this paragraph dealt with the formation of a British Empire task force which was the second alternative put forward by the British Chiefs of Staff if for any reason the support of the British Fleet in the main operations could not be accepted. Since this support had been accepted there would be no British naval forces available for the task force and British land forces could only arrive at a later date. He suggested therefore that this paragraph should be deleted.

ADMIRAL KING asked if it was intended to use the British Fleet only in the main operations and to make no contribution to a task force in the Southwest Pacific.

GENERAL MARSHALL said there were certain objections to forming a British Empire task force under General MacArthur's command at the present time. This had been proposed by General Blamey but if it

⁹ No indication has been found that King did in fact take this matter up with Roosevelt. Cf. Cunningham, p. 612.

were carried out between now and February of next year it would cause considerable difficulties from the point of view of land forces since the grouping of formations and the sequence of their movement had already been scheduled in accordance with future operations. The position would be different after March.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that since British land forces would not be available until after Operation DRACULA it would be of no particular value to form a British task force now. The British Fleet could of course play a part in operations in the Southwest Pacific if they were required.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM confirmed that there would be no objection to the British Fleet working from time to time under General MacArthur's command.

GENERAL MARSHALL requested that, in order to safeguard his position with regard to the immediate formation of a task force, paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 452/27 be deleted.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed. General MacArthur's plans had already been made and since no British land contribution could at present be made there was no object in retaining this paragraph.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

- a. Agreed that the British Fleet should participate in the main operations against Japan in the Pacific.
- b. Took note of the assurance of the British Chiefs of Staff that this fleet would be balanced and self-supporting.
- c. Agreed that the method of the employment of the British Fleet in these main operations in the Pacific would be decided from time to time in accordance with the prevailing circumstances.
- d. Took note that in the light of a above, the British Chiefs of Staff withdraw their alternative proposal to form a British Empire task force in the Southwest Pacific.
- e. Invited the Chief of the Air Staff to put forward, for planning purposes, a paper containing an estimate in general terms of the contribution the Royal Air Force would be prepared to make in the main operations against Japan.

4. FUTURE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (C.C.S. 452/28 ¹⁰ and 452/29 ¹¹) (OCTAGON-IN-9 ¹²)

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the situation report of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia (OCTAGON-IN-9 of 8 September) should be noted.

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed.

¹⁰ *Post*, p. 447.

¹¹ *Post*, p. 452.

¹² *Ante*, p. 258.

SIR ALAN BROOKE then suggested that before considering the draft directive to Admiral Mountbatten contained in C.C.S. 452/28, he should briefly outline the British views with regard to future operations in Burma. It was the British intention to endeavor to carry out operations aimed at liquidating the Burma commitment as soon as possible. This commitment was a heavy one, particularly with regard to casualties from sickness and the large numbers of men required in view of the long and tenuous lines of communication. For instance, an ordinary division amounted to some 40,000 men, whereas one particular division in Southeast Asia required approximately 90,000. The reconquest of Burma would also eliminate the commitments for the protection of the northeast frontier of India and the air route to China.

With these objects in view, operations against Rangoon had been examined. A seaborne amphibious operation was extremely difficult due to the fact that Rangoon lay some way up a river and the surrounding terrain was extremely marshy. An airborne assault had therefore been considered. By the use of airborne forces it was thought that the airfields to the north of Rangoon could be seized and that formations could then be flown in. These formations would seize the area to the north of Rangoon, then open up the river communications through Rangoon, block the Pegu route and then eliminate the Japanese in Burma by operations both from the south and from the north. If this could be achieved we should be in far better position. Forces could be released from the theater and the protection of India would be simplified.

To sum up, we should eliminate the Burma commitment, secure the air route to China, and possibly at a later date a land route, and obtain jumping-off places for further operations against Bangkok or to the Kra Peninsula and from there to Singapore.

Admiral Mountbatten had prepared a plan. This, however, had entailed removing forces from north Burma, which was felt to be unacceptable. The possibility therefore of obtaining forces from Europe had been examined. It was estimated that a decision to remove these forces would have to be taken by the first of October and that they would include the 6th Airborne Division, the 52nd Division, and the 3rd Division, from northwest Europe and three Indian divisions from Italy. There were certain difficulties with regard to this plan. The Indian troops who had been fighting for five years would have to be taken home and given three weeks' leave. This would take some time since many of them lived in extremely inaccessible parts of India, entailing in some cases a journey of a month each way to their homes. Further, India's capacity to absorb personnel was limited and had been estimated at 50,000 a month, though it was believed that this could, in certain instances, be raised to 80,000 a month. If forces were

brought to India, it was estimated that two months must elapse between their arrival and the period when they would be ready to start. Every effort was being made to try and cut the time factor in this jig-saw puzzle, but there was no doubt that the moves ought to begin in October if the 15th of March was taken as the date for Operation DRACULA. It might be possible to postpone this date until the 1st of April, the limiting factor being the weather conditions in April rendering the airdromes north of Rangoon unserviceable.

Another possibility might be to undertake the operation with fewer forces. However, if the operation was launched and Japanese resistance was extremely strong, we should find ourselves in a difficult position since the nearest reserves would be in northwest Europe or Italy. It was felt therefore that if the operation was to be undertaken it must be undertaken with an adequate margin of strength. Operations in Europe did not permit of reaching a decision at the present time with regard to the removal of the necessary forces, i.e., three divisions from Italy and three divisions from northwest Europe. Further, there was the question of the administrative troops which would be required, particularly signal and movement personnel. These were of the utmost importance to the 21st Army Group and to General Alexander if his army advanced towards the Po. The situation was such therefore that we could not at present gamble by removing these troops. Every effort was being made to reduce the estimated time from the removal of the troops from Europe till the launching of the operation in order that a decision could be postponed and yet the operation be undertaken in the spring. Such a decision with regard to withdrawal of troops from Europe might be possible in a month's time. There were also the complications of the regulations now being instituted with regard to conditions of service for the war against Japan, the giving of leave before troops who had been fighting for many years were sent to a new theater, and the question of the release of men who had over five years of war service. Every conceivable effort was being made to find the necessary forces to carry out DRACULA in the spring. If it were carried out, then Admiral Mountbatten's advance in the north would be limited, whereas if the operation was postponed till November, he could fight his way much further south.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the air transport side of the problem was all-important. At present Admiral Mountbatten had 448 transport aircraft, and required 1200 for the Rangoon operation. Only 190 of the additional 752 required could be found from British sources, and these only from operations in Europe. The remainder would have to be provided by the United States either from Europe or from elsewhere if they were available.

At present Admiral Mountbatten had two combat cargo groups and wished to obtain the third combat cargo group by the 15th of October in order to undertake Operation CAPITAL. Further, he also required the ground echelon of the second group by that date. If Operation DRACULA were undertaken, he would require the fourth combat cargo group by mid-January and the ground echelon of the third at the same time.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that even if the fourth combat cargo group were made available to Admiral Mountbatten, he would not have enough aircraft for Operation DRACULA, and it would be necessary to divert further air forces to assist him.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he noticed in C.C.S. 452/29 that the United States Chiefs of Staff were allocating the fourth combat cargo group to the Southwest Pacific. He asked that if Operation DRACULA was approved, the effect of this proposal should be examined.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that this fourth combat cargo group was required for the Philippine operations, but it might be possible to send it back for the peak period of the DRACULA operation if the timings fitted. B-24 aircraft might also be used.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said it was hoped by then to have a suitable staging point.

There was general agreement that the provision of the necessary aircraft would depend on the conclusion of hostilities in Europe.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that if hostilities in Europe had terminated, there would be 2200 U.S. transport aircraft which would become available.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he felt that the ground echelons for these aircraft would probably have to be taken out of Europe by December.

GENERAL ARNOLD felt that the date might be postponed since a large part of the ground echelons could be flown out in the aircraft. The ground echelon for the second combat cargo group was already on its way to Southeast Asia, and the ground echelon for the third combat cargo group could sail as soon as shipping was available.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then examined the draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia contained in C.C.S. 452/28.

ADMIRAL LEAHY put forward certain amendments proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff. These included provision in paragraph 1 and paragraph 2a for the opening of land communications with China.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that this was an important factor, and was necessary in order to introduce wheeled transport into China. It might be possible to take the short northern route though this was tortuous and difficult.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that in the last month 23,000 tons of stores had been flown into China but in view of the lack of motor transport certain of these were lying on the airfields and could not be distributed.

Referring to C.C.S. 452/29, SIR CHARLES PORTAL asked that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take note that the whole feasibility of Operation DRACULA was dependent upon the provision of the necessary aircraft and, further, of the possibility of the transfer of the fourth combat cargo group from operations against the Philippines for a short period at the peak load of Operation DRACULA.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Took note of the progress report on operations in the Southeast Asia Command contained in OCTAGON-IN-9.

b. Approved the directive in C.C.S. 452/28 as amended during discussion. (Amended directive circulated as C.C.S. 452/30.¹³)

c. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff were making every effort to overcome the problems involved in moving the necessary resources from Europe for DRACULA so that the operation can be carried out before the 1945 monsoon.

d. Recognized that the ability to carry out Operation DRACULA would depend very largely on the provision of transport aircraft, and took note:

(1) That the ground echelon of the second combat cargo group was already on its way to the Southeast Asia Command.

(2) That the United States Chiefs of Staff had already assigned the third combat cargo group to Southeast Asia and that it would go out as soon as shipping was available.

(3) That the possibility of assigning to Southeast Asia Command the fourth combat cargo group and the remaining transport aircraft required would depend on the progress of operations in Europe and in the Pacific, and that, on the whole, the prospects of making the necessary provision seemed good.

5. PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN (C.C.S. 678¹⁴)

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff dealing with the proposed date for the end of the war against Japan was acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff with certain amendments. It was felt that paragraph 1a should be eliminated, since it was hoped that the redeployment of forces against Japan would not take two years. The United States Chiefs of Staff also felt that 18 months was a more appropriate time factor than two years. A fur-

¹³ "Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command", September 14, 1944. This paper is not printed as such, but the text of the revised directive can be reconstructed from C.C.S. 452/28, *post*, p. 447, and the footnotes thereto.

¹⁴ *Post*, p. 451.

ther sentence should be added to paragraph 2, to read: "This date will be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war."

GENERAL MARSHALL said that for demobilization purposes the United States Army were using a time factor of one year. This, of course, would not affect the decision with regard to the date of 18 months after the termination of hostilities with Germany for planning for production.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to recommend that the date for the end of the war against Japan, for planning production and for allocation of manpower should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany; this date to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.

6. OPERATIONS OF THE TWENTIETH AIR FORCE

GENERAL ARNOLD made the following statement with regard to operations of the Twentieth Air Force:

"The Twentieth Air Force is designed around and includes all B-29 airplanes.

"The B-29 airplane, which is the basis of the Twentieth Air Force, is a very long range, fast, heavily armed precision day bomber. At maximum combat loading its gross weight is 140,000 pounds at which weight it operates up to 30,000-foot altitudes at a top speed of 370 miles per hour and cruises at 220 miles per hour. During a normal combat mission it burns 450 gallons per hour and at high speed consumes up to 700 gallons per hour. The airplane is operated by a crew of 11 men. A notable feature is the airplane pressurization which results in providing inside pressure equivalent to altitudes of about 8,000 feet when the airplane is actually at 30,000 feet. The most notable feature, however, is probably the central fire control features whereby three centrally located gunners handle, with precision, twelve 50-caliber machine guns and one 20 mm. cannon, all remotely controlled. In spite of its weight, this airplane can be operated from 8500-foot runways at maximum gross loadings and from 7500-foot runways when loaded to 135,000 pounds.

"The Twentieth Air Force operates directly under the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is commanded by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, who acts as the executive agent of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in implementing their directive for the employment of very long range bomber forces.

"Theater commanders in which elements of the Twentieth Air Force are based are responsible for logistic support and defense of Twentieth Air Force bases.

"At this time the major units of the Twentieth Air Force are the XX, XXI and XXII Bomber Commands. Each of these Bomber Commands, as a matter of fact, is a complete self-sustaining very long range air force.

"The XX Bomber Command is now based in the Southeast Asia Command in the area just west of Calcutta and operates principally from bases in the vicinity of Chengtu, China, against targets in Japan and Manchuria. It comprises four groups and had in the theater on

September 11th, 155 B-29's, of which 120 are unit equipment aircraft.

"The XXI Bomber Command consists of three wings of four groups each with a total unit equipment strength of 360 B-29 aircraft. Its headquarters, ground echelons and service units, are now moving to the Marianas. All 12 groups will complete their training and move to bases in the Marianas as bases become available.

"The XXII Bomber Command, consisting of two 4-group wings, was activated on August 15th and ground echelons will be available for movement to bases in Formosa or Luzon as quickly as they can be made available. The first air echelons of the XXII Bomber Command will be ready to move in March 1945.

"The logistic requirements of the XX Bomber Command operating out of China were extremely heavy, and provision of the necessary gasoline had presented a major problem. It had, in fact, been necessary to divert some 20 B-29's to use in the role of tankers; these were now being relieved by B-24 tankers which were now en route."

GENERAL ARNOLD then outlined with the aid of a map the targets that were being brought within range of B-29's operating from the various bases either now available or which it was hoped would shortly be available.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note with interest of General Arnold's statement with respect to the Twentieth Air Force.

7. COMMUNICATIONS TO MARSHAL STALIN AND GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK

ADMIRAL KING suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should prepare for submission to the President and Prime Minister draft communications to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek dealing with the broad results of the Conference. This had been done on previous occasions.

It was generally agreed that, with regard to the communication to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, details of Operation DRACULA should not be entered into and that some broad statement should be used to the effect that amphibious operations against Lower Burma would be undertaken at the earliest possible date.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Directed the Secretaries to draft suitable messages to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on the results of OCTAGON.¹⁵

8. NEXT MEETING, COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to meet at 1030 Friday, 15 September.

¹⁵ For the texts of the messages sent to Stalin and Chiang on September 18, 1944, see *post*, pp. 478, 479.

**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, SEPTEMBER 14, 1944, 11 A.M.,
THE CITADEL**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Law

Editorial Note

Churchill wrote to Roosevelt on the morning of September 14, 1944, suggesting that he bring Law and perhaps Eden to call on the President at 11 a.m. to discuss the application to Italy of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (see *ante*, p. 45). The Log, *ante*, p. 291, indicates that only Law accompanied Churchill to this meeting, concerning which no further information has been found.¹

¹ Woodward, p. 405, states: "Mr. Churchill had taken great trouble to put before the President at Quebec a number of proposals for easing the situation in Italy—before the American Presidential election—and we expected consideration for our views from the State Department." See *post*, p. 494, for the text of a joint statement on Italy which Roosevelt and Churchill tentatively agreed upon during their conversations at Hyde Park following the Second Quebec Conference. For Churchill's letter to Roosevelt of September 12, 1944, asking for an opportunity to discuss Italian problems, see *ante*, p. 42.

**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, SEPTEMBER 14, 1944, 11:30 A.M.,
THE CITADEL**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Secretary of the Treasury
Morgenthau

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Lord Cherwell¹

Editorial Note

Cherwell's two memoranda, printed below, constitute the principal source on this meeting. On September 19, in a meeting with officials of the Treasury Department in Washington, Morgenthau recounted Churchill's violent opposition on the evening of September 13 to the "Morgenthau Plan" for the postwar treatment of Germany (see *ante*, p. 325) and then described the German discussion on the morning of September 14 as follows: "And then to my amazement, on presenting it the next morning through . . . Lord Cherwell—it was presented the next morning very much softened down. Mr. Churchill interrupted

¹ Although the Log, *ante*, p. 291, indicates that White was present at this meeting and that Cherwell was not, it is clear from White's memorandum printed *ante*, p. 330, that White remained in Morgenthau's suite at the Château Frontenac while Morgenthau and Cherwell went to the Citadel for this meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill.

him and said, 'I will take it.' And then we tried to set it down and we couldn't because it wasn't strong enough." (Morgenthau Diary, vol. 772) White, in recording a meeting between Morgenthau and Cherwell on the morning of September 15 (see *post*, p. 359), quoted Morgenthau as saying, with reference to the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting on September 14, that Churchill "seemed to accept the program designed to weaken German economy. . . . Churchill had already spoken of diverting Germany to an agricultural state as she was in the last quarter of the 19th Century." (Treasury Files)

See Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 156-157, for a summary of a "number of conversations" which Churchill had with Roosevelt and his advisers on the German question.

Cherwell Papers

Memorandum by the British Paymaster-General (Cherwell) ¹

QUEBEC, 14th Sept[ember] 1944.

Mr Morgenthau said he had been discussing with Lord Cherwell his proposals on the economic disarmament of Germany ² and would like him to give his impressions of these.

Lord Cherwell said he had, of course, not had time to read the papers or study the proposals in detail but he was definitely attracted by the possibilities set forth. So far as he understood it the intention was to hamstring Germany's capacity for making war by taking whatever machinery was usable from the Ruhr and other areas in which industry capable of making war-like weapons was concentrated, and handing it over to the numerous countries she had devastated. The Ruhr and perhaps the other areas in question would be then placed under an international authority which should decide whether and when and to what degree industries of this type should be allowed to be re-built there. If the Germans were deprived of the possibility of making steel on a large scale as well as certain types of chemicals and electrical machinery, she would not be in a position to produce the armaments required for modern war. She would, of course, not starve. Her exports would be reduced and she might therefore go short of certain materials. But her standard of life would still undoubtedly be higher than it had been under the Nazis—when so much national effort was put into

¹ When Cherwell discussed this memorandum with Morgenthau on the morning of September 15, 1944 (see *post*, p. 359), the latter felt that it "went too far in the wrong direction". According to Morgenthau's diary entry for September 15, Morgenthau felt that Cherwell's minutes "presented much too weak a case" and that Churchill could be prevailed upon "to go much further". Morgenthau and Cherwell, by agreement, therefore, reported that they did not have minutes on the German discussion of September 14 when Churchill asked for them on September 15. See *post*, p. 361, and Blum, p. 370.

² See *ante*, p. 128.

preparations for war—even if she was unable to establish the same high standard she enjoyed for some time before that. The consequence that her export markets would become available for the U.K. and U.S.A. did not seem a disadvantage.

The Prime Minister said that he thought there was a good deal to be said for this approach to the problem. We were entitled to make sure Germany could not commit wanton acts of aggression and the Russians would probably in any case insist on obtaining any machinery available with which to restore the factories which Germany had ruined in her advance into Russia.

Mr Morgenthau said that he could see no other way in which we could be sure of preventing the rearming of Germany. Great productive capacity was necessary for modern war and it could not be built up secretly. The removal of all the machinery and facilities should be undertaken as soon as possible, say, within the first six months of our troops entering the Ruhr. Thereafter this region should be put under international control which would see that it was not exploited again in the way Germany had used it to prepare the wanton acts of aggression she had committed.

The President said that he did not think it would be an undue hardship to require Germany to revert towards an agricultural status such as she had enjoyed up to the latter part of the last century. She had shown she could not be trusted with all these facilities for making weapons.

The Prime Minister said he was converted to the idea that we should explore this line of approach and see whether concrete suggestions could be worked out to ensure security and which it might be hoped would secure the approval of the United Nations.

Roosevelt Papers

Memorandum by the British Paymaster-General (Cherwell) ¹

TOP SECRET

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME
MINISTER AT QUEBEC ON SEPTEMBER 14, 1944

The Prime Minister said that when Germany was overcome there would be a measure of redistribution of effort in both countries. He

¹ Morgenthau handed the source text to the President's Naval Aide (Brown) at Quebec on September 15. Roosevelt telegraphed the text of this memorandum, with the final sentence omitted, to Hull and Stettinius via the White House, which transmitted Roosevelt's message to Hull on September 16. Morgenthau handed the full text to Hull on the morning of September 20, at which time it became apparent that the text received on September 16 not only omitted the final sentence but also contained an important garble—"32 billion dollars" instead of "3½ billion dollars"—in the second paragraph (740.0011 EW/8-1843).

hoped that the President would agree that during the war with Japan we should continue to get food, shipping, etc., from the United States to cover our reasonable needs. The President indicated assent.

He hoped also that the President would agree that it would be proper for Lend/Lease munitions to continue on a proportional basis even though this would enable the United Kingdom to set free labour for re-building, exports, etc., e.g., if British munitions production were cut to three-fifths, U.S. assistance should also fall to three-fifths. The President indicated assent. Mr. Morgenthau however suggested that it would be better to have definite figures. He understood that munitions assistance required had been calculated by the British at about 3½ billion dollars in the first year on the basis of the strategy envisaged before the OCTAGON Conference. The exact needs would have to be recalculated in the light of decisions on military matters reached at the Conference. The non-munitions requirements had been put at 3 billion dollars gross against which a considerable amount would be set off for reverse Lend/Lease. The President agreed that it would be better to work on figures like these than on a proportional basis.

The Prime Minister emphasized that all these supplies should be on Lease/Lend. The President said this would naturally be so.

The Prime Minister pointed out that if the United Kingdom was once more to pay its way it was essential that the export trade, which had shrunk to a very small fraction, should be re-established. Naturally no articles obtained on Lend/Lease or identical thereto would be exported;² but it was essential that the United States should not

² On the source text the words "or sold for profit" have been inserted between the word "exported" and the semicolon. The words "or sold" are clearly in Roosevelt's handwriting, and the words "for profit" may be in his handwriting also. (Morgenthau told members of his staff in Washington on September 19 that the "President wrote in his own handwriting that they couldn't export or sell for profit". See Morgenthau Diary, vol. 772.) The change is initialed in the left margin by both Roosevelt and Churchill and in the right margin by Churchill only.

It is not entirely clear exactly when the words "or sold for profit" were added to the text. From Morgenthau's diary entry for September 15 (*post*, p. 361), it would appear that Roosevelt suggested inserting all four words during his meeting with Churchill which began at noon on September 15. From an explanation which Morgenthau gave to a group of American officials in Washington on September 20, however, it would appear that the words were added in two stages and that Morgenthau "went back" to the President twice regarding them. The verbatim report of this explanation is as follows:

"[MORGENTHAU:] They added 'or sold'—that was the President. Then I had to go back the second time and say, 'for profit,' and that was the President.

"MR. CURRIE: He meant that, 'or commercially.'

"H. M. JR.: No, we told them they could sell. What they were trying to get—this was the President's contribution—he didn't want this stuff—the President said politically it would be unwise. He first said 'identical thereto would be exported.' They asked him what he meant. He said 'exported or sold.' That wasn't clear. Then he said, 'exported or sold for profit.' That wasn't clear. They wanted me to [go] back a third time and I refused to. I said we would exchange letters on it. I said we wanted them to continue as they have in the past, but I wouldn't go back a third time." (Morgenthau Diary, vol. 773)

For the letter which Cherwell wrote to Morgenthau at Quebec on September 16, 1944, to clarify this matter, see *post*, p. 395.

attach any conditions to supplies delivered to Britain on Lend/Lease which would jeopardize the recovery of her export trade. The President thought this would be proper.

To implement these decisions the Prime Minister suggested there should be a joint committee.³ It was held that it would be better to appoint an *ad hoc* committee for this purpose on an informal basis in the first instance which could be formalized in due course. Pending its report the United States departments should be instructed not to take action which would pre-judge the committee's conclusions, e.g., production should not be closed down without reference to Lend/Lease supplies which it might be held should be supplied to Britain. The President thought that the committee should be set up and suggested that Mr. Morgenthau should head it representing him, and that Mr. Stettinius, who had taken such a large part in Lend/Lease, should also be a member.⁴

³ Morgenthau told Hull and Stimson in Washington on September 20, 1944, "that the President was about to approve of the request which the British made for lend-lease aid when he [Morgenthau] interposed and recommended that a committee be appointed to consider the matter. The Secretary [Morgenthau] pointed out that he was successful in getting the matter turned over to a committee though the committee would have to act in accord with the oral conversations between Roosevelt and Churchill on the matter. The Secretary said that if he had not been there that a decision would have been made right there, without being referred to a committee." (Memorandum by White, printed in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 137)

⁴ When Roosevelt and Churchill reviewed this memorandum during their meeting at noon on September 15, 1944, the following endorsements were added at the end: "OK FDR" in Roosevelt's handwriting and "WSC 15.9" in Churchill's handwriting.

TRIPARTITE LUNCHEON MEETING, SEPTEMBER 14, 1944, 1 P.M., THE CITADEL

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	CANADA
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Prime Minister Mackenzie
Mrs. Roosevelt	Mrs. Churchill	King
Secretary of the	Mr. Law	
Treasury Morgenthau	Commander Thompson	
Mr. White		

Editorial Note

No record has been found of the substance of the discussion at this meeting. The time and the names of the American and British participants are from the Log, *ante*, p. 291. The presence of Mackenzie King is noted in the *New York Times*, September 15, 1944, p. 9.

WHITE-WEEKS MEETING, SEPTEMBER 14, 1944, AFTERNOON,
CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. White

UNITED KINGDOM

Mr. Weeks

Mr. MacDougall

Editorial Note

According to White's memorandum regarding the Morgenthau-Cherwell meeting on the morning of September 14 (*ante*, p. 330), the three officials named above met "later" to draft a directive establishing a committee on lend-lease matters. A memorandum by White relating to the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting on the afternoon of September 14 (*post*, p. 348) indicates that the "memorandum on the creation of the lend-lease committee which had been drafted by Cherwell, Weeks and White" was ready by late afternoon on September 14. For the text of the directive referred to, see *post*, p. 468.

At some time during the Second Quebec Conference White discussed with Weeks the desirability of making certain information available to the United States authorities in order to expedite a decision with respect to lend-lease to the United Kingdom. The only information found on this discussion is that contained in the verbatim minutes of a conference between British and United States officials held in Washington at 3 p.m., September 20, 1944, as follows:

"MR. WHITE: Mr. Secretary, at Quebec in the discussion I had with Mr. Weeks—I am not sure whether you were present—I indicated a number of items that the answers to which would be very helpful in expediting a decision. I don't know whether Mr. Weeks remembers the items I mentioned. I would be glad to supply them in writing. He thought that he could, given a little time, supply sufficiently rough answers—because the nature of some of the questions weren't sufficiently accurate.

"MR. WEEKS: You mean—

"MR. WHITE: The extent of your increase in peace-time goods, the extent of the increase in exports, increased employment, and things of that character.

"MR. TAFT: The net transfer of employable persons from war production to civilian production.

"MR. WHITE: There are about a dozen of those key questions." (Morgenthau Diary, vol. 773)

**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, SEPTEMBER 14, 1944, 5:30 P.M.,
THE CITADEL¹**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Secretary of the Treasury
Morgenthau

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Lord Cherwell
Foreign Secretary Eden²
Sir Alexander Cadogan²

Editorial Note

The following diary entry relating to this meeting is reprinted from Eden, pp. 551-552:

"Alec [Cadogan]³ turned up and we went round together to see Winston. He was with F.D.R. and [Mr. Henry] Morgenthau [United States Secretary of the Treasury] and Prof. [Lord Cherwell, Paymaster-General] in conference about Lend Lease. They seemed glad of interruption and we talked of many things, Russians, Poles, Dumbarton Oaks,⁴ etc. until time to dress for dinner."

White, who was not present at the meeting, recorded in an undated memorandum that Morgenthau had mentioned to him on September 15, 1944, "the following bits of conversation which had taken place at a brief meeting with the President" on the afternoon of September 14:

"In the afternoon the President delayed initialing the memorandum on the creation of the lend-lease committee⁵ which had been drafted by Cherwell, Weeks and White by interrupting with stories. Churchill was nervous and eager to have the memorandum initialed and finally he burst out: 'What do you want me to do? Get on my hind legs and beg like Fala?'" (Treasury Files)

¹ The time of this meeting and the presence of Roosevelt, Churchill, Morgenthau, and Cherwell are noted in the Log, *ante*, p. 291.

² Eden and Cadogan joined the meeting after it had begun. See Eden's diary entry quoted in the editorial note.

³ The brackets in this paragraph appear in the source text.

⁴ i.e., the international discussions on postwar world organization which were then under way at the Dumbarton Oaks estate in Washington. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 713 ff. For messages from Stalin and Stettinius to Roosevelt at Quebec, with respect to voting in the Security Council of the proposed world organization, see *post*, pp. 424, 425, 426.

⁵ *Post*, p. 468.

**ROOSEVELT-MACKENZIE KING CONVERSATION, SEPTEMBER 14, 1944,
EARLY EVENING, THE CITADEL**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt

CANADA
Prime Minister Mackenzie King

Editorial Note

No official memorandum has been found relating to this conversation, which took place immediately before dinner and before the arrival of the other guests. The following notes of the conversation by Mackenzie King are reprinted from Pickersgill and Forster, pp. 81-82:

"I told him [Roosevelt] something of the meeting we had had this afternoon¹ and that Churchill would be speaking to him about our desire to have our Chiefs of Staff confer with his Chiefs of Staff. He said: By all means. We were allies. That would be expected. I then said to him that as he knew we were prepared to participate in the war in the Pacific against Japan but that we felt it must be in the Northern or Central regions. The President said he thought we should have a token representation but indicated that nothing might be needed for some time. He spoke of some extremely Northern region and indicated that toward the end, the Japanese might have to be driven out of the northern end of China. There was a hint that our men might be useful there. The President said I think Canada should have a token force to march into Berlin. I said I thought they would appreciate that and that it would be expected; that part of our army would be associated with the American and British armies. It was in this connection that the President referred to token forces in the other connection. The President made some reference to Russia and I asked him direct what part Russia would likely play. He repeated to me what had been said the other night² and added that he could only say that Stalin had given that word himself."

¹ i.e., a British-Canadian meeting described in Pickersgill and Forster, pp. 74-79.

² Concerning Soviet entry into the war against Japan. See Pickersgill and Forster, p. 70.

TRIPARTITE DINNER MEETING, SEPTEMBER 14, 1944, 8 P.M.,
THE CITADEL¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	CANADA
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Prime Minister Mackenzie
Secretary of the	Foreign Secretary Eden	King
Treasury Morgenthau	Lord Cherwell	
	Mr. Law	
	Sir Alexander Cadogan	

Editorial Note

The only information found on the discussion at this dinner meeting is that contained in an undated memorandum by White (who was not present) recording what Morgenthau had told him on September 15,

¹ The time and the names of the American and British participants are from the Log, *ante*, p. 291. Pickersgill and Forster, p. 81, note that Mackenzie King dined with Roosevelt and Churchill on September 14. Cadogan, p. 665, notes the presence of all these participants except Law.

1944, about "bits of conversation" which had taken place on September 14. At least part of the material in the following three paragraphs of this memorandum relates to the Roosevelt-Churchill dinner on September 14, but since Leahy is not known to have been present, part of it may also relate to other conversations or meetings.

"Churchill and Eden were afraid that Russia would go into Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece and never get out so the British are planning to land troops in Greece. Secretary Morgenthau had commented: 'You have got a million troops in the Middle East.' And Eden said: 'Oh, no, we have got only a couple of brigades there.'"

"Admiral Leahy reported to the President that they couldn't move American troops across the part of the English troops in Germany² and the President replied, 'Nonsense. It could be done.'"

"England and Canada were eager to get into the war with Japan. The President said to the Secretary that he knew now why the British wanted to join in the war in the Pacific. All they want is Singapore back." (Treasury Files)

² For an explanation of the necessity of a "cross-over" of troops if the United States occupied the northwestern zone in Germany, and for expressions of divergent British and American views on the feasibility of a "cross-over", see *ante*, pp. 145 ff.

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1944

KING-CUNNINGHAM MEETING, SEPTEMBER 15, 1944

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral King
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral McCormick
Rear Admiral Duncan
Captain Fife
Captain Stroop

J.C.S. Files

UNITED KINGDOM

Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Admiral Noble
Captain Grantham
Captain Hughes Hallett

*Minutes*¹

TOP SECRET

1. NAVAL FACILITIES IN AUSTRALIA AND FORWARD AREAS

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM asked if the U.S. Navy planned on evacuating their facilities at Brisbane and Sydney. If the United States Navy has moved out he would like to make arrangements directly with the Australian Government to use evacuated facilities. It was particularly desirable to get repair facilities for fleet units and aviation facilities ashore for a fleet air arm. He pointed out that Australia would be used

¹ Authorship not indicated.

chiefly as a rear base and that the British Naval units would operate from more advanced bases depending upon the situation.

ADMIRAL KING stated that in general the U.S. Navy was moving out of Australia but that no "roll-up" plan had been received either from the Commander of the Seventh Fleet² or the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area.³ Admiral King directed that Commander, Seventh Fleet, be ordered by dispatch to prepare a "roll-up" plan and forward it to the Navy Department. He wished, particularly, to know about the plans to roll up Sydney and Brisbane. Admiral King also said that he thought the Joint Chiefs of Staff should inform the Commander, Southwest Pacific Area with regard to the situation and the tentative requirements for basing British Naval units in Australia.

THE FIRST SEA LORD requested that the U.S. Navy act as the Royal Navy's "agent" with the U.S. Army Air Force to have certain aviation facilities no longer required by them made available to the Naval Air Arm of the Royal Navy, where such facilities could be usefully employed.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that Espíritu Santo was highly developed as a U.S. base and was probably the most forward location for the British Fleet to use as a rear base. He outlined the future Pacific plans and said that no other forward base could be made readily available.

THE FIRST SEA LORD said he wanted a good rear base (probably Sydney) and that all the British Navy would require in the forward area was a suitable anchorage. The Fleet would exist on their train and supply ships.

ADMIRAL KING suggested that Majuro, which had a large anchorage, might also be useful to the British Fleet.

THE FIRST SEA LORD asked if any U.S. naval landing craft bases were available in Australia.

CAPTAIN FIFE pointed out that Milne Bay and Buna Roads had been used as our chief bases for landing craft until after the Manus landing. He stated that Brisbane had also been used as a rear base for landing craft during the early part of the New Guinea campaign.

ADMIRAL KING said that steps were being taken to clear a deep draft channel through Torres Strait. A new survey was being made and it was expected that a better and shorter channel which could accommodate a battleship would soon be available.

THE FIRST SEA LORD said that he thought the discussion up to this point would serve as a basis for detailed plans to be agreed upon by the Washington Planners.

² Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid.

³ General Douglas MacArthur.

2. USE OF AVENGER AIRCRAFT ON BRITISH CARRIERS

THE FIRST SEA LORD stated that the British Navy had found the Barracuda inadequate for carrier operations and that it was highly desirable to have additional Avengers allocated for use on British carriers.

ADMIRAL KING said that the production of Avengers was short of requirements and would continue to be so, that the details of the allocation of U.S. Navy-produced aircraft were arranged by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air),⁴ and that he, Admiral King, would make sure that the question of additional Avengers for the British Navy would be taken under the most careful consideration, particularly, in view of the British Fleet participation in Pacific operations. He was not, however, optimistic with regard to availability of additional Avengers for at least another six months.

3. RELEASE OF LST'S FROM "OVERLORD"

THE FIRST SEA LORD said that they were having difficulty getting SHAEF to release landing craft for transfer to other theaters and it was desirable to have some released soon for use in the Burma operations.

ADMIRAL KING said that this was a matter he wanted settled too, and directed that the situation be followed up with regard to release of landing craft and that Admiral Stark should be informed of the requirements of other theaters so that he can obtain releases as quickly as feasible.

ADMIRAL COOKE said that he believed SHAEF had a certain amount of "velvet" and suggested that it would be well for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to put pressure upon SHAEF to get landing craft released.

ADMIRAL KING suggested that Admiral Ramsay might also be responsible for holding landing craft in OVERLORD, but THE FIRST SEA LORD did not concur in this.

ADMIRAL KING and THE FIRST SEA LORD then directed the Combined Planning Staff to prepare a draft dispatch for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to SHAEF on release of landing craft for transfer to other theaters.

CAPTAIN HUGHES HALLETT pointed out that landing craft were originally made available in the theater for combatant operations only and were not to be kept as a convenience for incidental shipment of supplies after the assault and combatant phases were over.

⁴ Vice Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch.

4. ESCORT CARRIERS

THE FIRST SEA LORD said that the British Navy had received the U.S. Navy's request for transfer of excess escort carriers for use in connection with ferrying aircraft. He said that all of the British escort carriers would be in use constantly until at least the summer of 1945.

ADMIRAL KING said that the U.S. Navy would be glad to get CVE's whenever they could get them.

THE FIRST SEA LORD said that he would definitely try to get some released but held out small hopes. However, he would make a particular note of this point.

5. MOSQUITO AIRCRAFT ON CARRIERS—HIGHBALL

This matter was discussed previously by The First Sea Lord and Admiral King. Motion pictures of this are to be sent from London to be available to the Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

6. *BONAVENTURE* AND "X" CRAFT

THE FIRST SEA LORD described in general the use of *Bonaventure* and "X" Craft. He said that they were available and had been offered for use in the Pacific Theater if it was thought they could be used.

ADMIRAL KING said that he thought *Bonaventure* and the "X" Craft might be of some use and suggested that they be moved to the Pacific Theater with the balanced British Fleet.

THE FIRST SEA LORD said that *Bonaventure* and the "X" Craft would be moved out to the Eastern Fleet, probably to an Australian port first, where they would await an opportunity to be used from a forward base.

7. ZONES OF OCCUPATION

It was pointed out that this matter required settlement on a higher level and it was probable that a decision might be reached soon.

THE FIRST SEA LORD said he had taken exception to the scheme which proposed a German Disarmament Commission which consisted of three generals. He said he believed there should be a committee of nine: 3 generals, 3 admirals, and 3 air officers, each responsible in his own zone for disarmament but who would act as a central committee to decide general questions.

ADMIRAL KING said that the U.S. Navy would take over such ports as they were using, providing a Port Director and staff. However, he did not want any elaborate organization set up.

With regard to minesweeping, THE FIRST SEA LORD said that he expected the Germans would be required to sweep their own mines. He considered this a part of the disarmament of Germany.

Both ADMIRAL KING and THE FIRST SEA LORD agreed that further investigation is needed of the desirability of having separate organizations for naval disarmament and control of bases and ports but that this may be a logical solution. Both agreed that if the British are to control northwest Germany, the British will invite the U.S. Navy to participate in naval disarmament in this zone.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, SEPTEMBER 15, 1944,
10 A.M., MAIN CONFERENCE ROOM, CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Vice Admiral Willson
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral McCormick
Major General Handy
Major General Fairchild
Major General Kuter

UNITED KINGDOM

Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
General Ismay
Admiral Noble
Lieutenant General Macready
Air Marshal Welsh
Major General Laycock

Secretariat

Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves

Major General Hollis
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Commander Coleridge

J.C.S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE 174TH MEETING OF THE COMBINED
CHIEFS OF STAFF

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff recommend an alteration to the conclusion of Item 5 of the minutes.² It was suggested that this should read:

"Agreed to recommend that for planning production and for allocation of manpower the date for the end of the war against Japan. . . ."³

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that this proposal was entirely acceptable.

Continuing, ADMIRAL LEAHY said there was one other alteration which should be made in the final sentence to General Arnold's state-

¹ C.C.S. 175th Meeting.

² The amendments suggested in this section of the minutes of the 175th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff have been incorporated in the minutes of the 174th Meeting as printed *ante*, p. 331.

³ Ellipsis in the source text.

ment in Item 6. The number of B-29's which had been diverted to tankers should read 20 and not 40.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that on page 7 of the minutes his statement, as to the date on which the ground echelons for the aircraft from Europe for use in the war against Japan would have to be taken out, should read "by" December and not "in" December.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Agreed to amend the conclusion to Item 5 of C.C.S. 174th Meeting to read as follows: "Agreed to recommend that the date for the end of the war against Japan, for planning production and for allocation of manpower should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany; this date to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war."

b. Approved the conclusions of the 174th Meeting as amended above. The detailed record of the meeting was approved subject to the amendments agreed during discussion and to later minor amendments.

2. FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER (C.C.S. 680⁴)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed and accepted certain amendments to the report.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the final report to the President and Prime Minister, as amended in discussion. (Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 680/1.⁵)

3. COMMUNICATION OF THE RESULTS OF "OCTAGON" (C.C.S. 681; ⁶ 681/1⁷)

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested the insertion in the draft letter to Marshal Stalin in C.C.S. 681 of a final paragraph (paragraph 6) to read:

"Plans for the prompt transfer of power to the Pacific Theater after the collapse of Germany were agreed upon."

SIR ALAN BROOKE accepted this amendment.

With reference to the two draft messages to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in C.C.S. 681/1, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that on balance he preferred the shorter draft in Enclosure "B."

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had certain deletions to suggest to the longer draft in Enclosure "A" which he would like to put forward.

⁴ *Post*, pp. 434, 454.

⁵ "Report to the President and Prime Minister", September 15, 1944. This paper is not printed as such, but the text of its enclosure can be reconstructed from the enclosure to C.C.S. 680/2, *post*, p. 469, and the footnotes thereto.

⁶ "Message to Marshal Stalin To Be Sent at the Conclusion of 'OCTAGON'", September 14, 1944; not printed. For the text of the message sent to Stalin, see *post*, p. 478.

⁷ *Post*, p. 460.

ADMIRAL LEAHY read out these suggestions.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that these amendments were acceptable.

Continuing, ADMIRAL LEAHY proposed that a new sentence should be added to the draft in Enclosure "A" to read as follows:

"We have agreed on future operations to intensify the offensive against the Japanese in the Pacific Theater, including the opening of a seaway into China."

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that this amendment was acceptable.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Subject to the amendments agreed in discussion, approved draft messages to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek reporting the results of the OCTAGON Conference. (Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 681/2.⁸)

4. REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES AFTER THE END OF THE WAR IN EUROPE (C.C.S. 679⁹)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the recommendation of the United States Chiefs of Staff contained in C.C.S. 679 was acceptable. He would like the words "the combined shipping authorities" inserted after the words "Combined Military Transportation Committee" in paragraph 3.

ADMIRAL LEAHY accepted this amendment.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved C.C.S. 679 subject to insertion in the third line of paragraph 3 of the words "combined shipping authorities" after the word "Committee."

5. COMBINED PERSONNEL MOVEMENT PROBLEM ARISING THE FIRST YEAR AFTER THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY (C.C.S. 675/2¹⁰)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum by Lord Leathers and General Somervell indicating the magnitude of the combined shipping movements which might be required during the first year after the defeat of Germany.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that Lord Leathers had explained to him that the paper was designed merely to show the magnitude of the problem rather than to give entirely accurate figures.

GENERAL SOMERVELL confirmed that this was the case.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of C.C.S. 675/2.

⁸ For the messages dispatched to Stalin and Chiang, see *post*, pp. 478, 479.

⁹ *Post*, p. 453.

¹⁰ *Post*, p. 457.

6. OPERATION "HIGHBALL"
(C.C.S. 682¹¹)

SIR CHARLES PORTAL and SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM gave a description of Operation HIGHBALL. They undertook to send the United States a film on this operation.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note:

a. That Operation HIGHBALL would be available in the Eastern Theater at the end of November 1944.

b. That the British Chiefs of Staff would send an informational film and technical data to the United States Chiefs of Staff.

7. RELEASE TO THE PRESS OF INFORMATION ON "MULBERRY"
(SCAF 79¹²)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it had been suggested that information with regard to MULBERRY should be released to the press. General Eisenhower was not, however, prepared to make such a release unless he was instructed to do so by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

ADMIRAL KING said that base facilities in the Pacific were limited and it might well be that MULBERRY would be required in that theater, in which case it would be obviously disadvantageous if the Japanese were informed as to their potentialities.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM agreed with Admiral King that if there was any chance of using them in the Pacific it was far wiser to release nothing to the press on MULBERRY for the present.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that in view of the potentialities of MULBERRY for the war against Japan he agreed that security on these should be retained.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that security implications affecting other theaters precluded the release of information on MULBERRY.¹³

¹¹ *Post*, p. 462.

¹² Telegram No. SCAF 79 from SHAEF Forward to the War Department, September 11, 1944 (relayed to Quebec as telegram No. 29208 and received there as OCTAGON-IN-62, September 12), reads as follows:

"Consider time is approaching when there would be no objection on the part of this headquarters to the release of MULBERRY stories to the press, but we are aware there may be security implications affecting other theaters, and we shall not release unless so instructed by you.

"No evidence that details [of] construction, operation or capacity have been compromised and all steps have been taken to continue to safeguard security."

¹³ This decision was communicated to SHAEF in telegram No. FACS 79 (OCTAGON-OUT-41), September 16, 1944.

8. POSSIBLE STATEMENT TO BE MADE TO THE PRESS BY THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that there might be advantages in a statement being made, possibly by the President and Prime Minister, to the effect that the only difficulty encountered at the Conference was the problem of providing employment for all the Allied forces who were eager to participate in the war against Japan. The difficulty had arisen as a result of the keenness of the competition to employ the maximum possible forces for the defeat of Japan. This was a fact and issued to the press should help to undermine Japanese morale.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note that General Ismay would prepare a suitable statement for consideration.¹⁴

9. PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN IN THE PACIFIC

ADMIRAL KING outlined the extremely successful operations recently undertaken by Admiral Halsey's Task Force 38 and the Fifth Air Force against the Japanese in the Leyte area, where some 500 Japanese aircraft had been destroyed. In view of the success of these operations it had been decided, after consultation with Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur, to advance the date of subsequently planned operations by about two months.¹⁵

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt that the success of recent operations, particularly against the Japanese air, and the decision to advance the dates for future operations would have a decisive effect on what the Japanese could do in Burma.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that the Japanese Air Force was no longer fighting with the will to win. The pilots lacked determination

¹⁴ For Ismay's draft statement, dated September 15, and for his covering note to Leahy of the same date, see *post*, pp. 457 and 456, respectively.

¹⁵ Cf. the following paragraphs from a memorandum of September 18, 1944, from Marshall to the Chief Signal Officer with regard to OCTAGON communications:

"The complete communications service installed by Brigadier General F. E. Stoner for the OCTAGON Conference in Quebec facilitated to an unusual degree the transaction of business during the meeting. The direct teletype communications to all theaters were especially helpful.

"At one time it became necessary to exchange views with General MacArthur in Hollandia, New Guinea, and to issue instructions to take advantage of a favorable strategic situation which had suddenly developed. A message was received from General MacArthur at OCTAGON at 8:17 P.M. E.W.T. September 15th [14th] which was carried by hand to General Handy who drafted a reply. This was, in turn, delivered to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who were then some distance away. The reply, including time consumed by couriers, was sent an hour and a half later, at 9:47 P.M. General MacArthur's answer came through at 9:49 P.M., or two minutes later." (Department of the Army Files)

This incident is mentioned also in Arnold, pp. 527-528, and King, pp. 570-572, and is described in some detail in *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 71.

and even in the Philippines it seemed that the Japanese Air Force had neither the will nor the wherewithal to act offensively.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note with interest of Admiral King's remarks on the progress of the campaign in the Pacific.

10. HOUR OF NEXT MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed tentatively to meet at 1000 on Saturday, 16 September.

MORGENTHAU-CHERWELL MEETING, SEPTEMBER 15, 1944, 11 A.M., CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Secretary of the Treasury
Morgenthau
Mr. White

UNITED KINGDOM

Lord Cherwell

Treasury Files

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Treasury's Assistant (White)

[Undated.¹]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY'S FILES

Cherwell had a draft of a memorandum summarizing a conversation of the previous day with Churchill and the President on the subject of a policy toward Germany.² This was the memorandum which they were to give to Churchill. The Secretary felt that the memorandum went too far in the wrong direction. He said he thought it represented "two steps backwards." The Secretary said they ought to begin where Churchill left off and go forward. In the first conversation Churchill had been shocked by the proposal but on the following day he seemed to accept the program designed to weaken German economy. The memorandum ought to take that for granted. Churchill had already spoken of diverting Germany to an agricultural state as she was in the last quarter of the 19th Century. The Secretary thought that rather than present too inadequate a memorandum they ought to go back that afternoon and raise the question again with Churchill and the President and write the memorandum

¹ The date "9/25/44", which appears at the end of the memorandum, is presumably the date of typing.

² With regard to the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting on September 14, 1944, see *ante*, p. 342.

on the conversation that will have taken place that afternoon rather than on the previous day.

The Secretary then spoke to Cherwell about Brand. He told him that he hadn't wanted him to come to Washington to represent the British Treasury in the first place but that when he did come he gave him a chance, and that he was not helping England by his behavior. The Secretary mentioned Playfair and White suggested Opie or Keynes as possible Treasury representatives.

H. D. WHITE

**ROOSEVELT-MORGENTHAU CONVERSATION, SEPTEMBER 15, 1944,
ABOUT NOON, THE CITADEL**

PRESENT

President Roosevelt
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau

Editorial Note

Morgenthau had a few minutes of private conversation with Roosevelt, immediately before the latter's meeting with Churchill on September 15, on the subject of zones of occupation in Germany. For a brief reference to this conversation in Morgenthau's diary, see *post*, p. 369.

**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, SEPTEMBER 15, 1944, NOON,
THE CITADEL**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt
Secretary of the Treasury
Morgenthau

UNITED KINGDOM¹
Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Lord Cherwell
Sir Alexander Cadogan

Editorial Note

No official minutes of this meeting have been found. The fullest account is the diary record made by Morgenthau, who wrote as follows concerning the discussion during the meeting:

"I met at 12:00 today with Roosevelt, Churchill, Eden and the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. We took up the question of the Lend-Lease Agreement for Phase II. The President read the thing through

¹ One of Churchill's secretaries was also present during part of the meeting. The six participants listed here are all mentioned in the Log, *ante*, p. 291.

very carefully,² and the only suggestion he made was that where it read, 'Naturally no articles obtained on Lend-Lease or identical thereto would be exported,' he included the words, 'or sold'. Lord Cherwell said that they do sell all of their Lend-Lease; that is, all of the non-military Lend-Lease, and the President then added the words also 'for profit'.

"Churchill was quite emotional about this agreement, and at one time he had tears in his eyes. When the thing was finally signed, he told the President how grateful he was, thanked him most effusively, and said that this was something they were doing for both countries.

"Then Churchill, turning to Lord Cherwell and myself, said, 'Where are the minutes on this matter of the Ruhr?'³ and according to our agreement we said that we didn't have them. The reason we didn't have them was because I felt, when I read the minutes which Lord Cherwell had written, that it presented much too weak a case, and I thought that we could get Churchill to go much further. He seemed quite put out that we didn't have the minutes of the previous meeting, and the President said that the reason we didn't have them was because Henry interspersed the previous discussion with too many dirty stories, and that sort of broke the ice. So Churchill broke in and said, 'Well, I'll restate it,' which he did, and he did it very forcefully and very clearly. Then he suggested that Lord Cherwell and I withdraw and try to do a job on dictating it, which we did. It only took us a few minutes, and we came back up to the room where they were meeting and just calmly walked in. When Churchill read our very short memorandum,⁴ he said, 'No, this isn't what I want.' Then he started to talk and dictate to us, and I said, 'I don't know what the rules of the game are, but is there any reason why we can't have a stenographer present? Then you could dictate directly to her.' He said, 'By all means,' and Cherwell went out and got Churchill's secretary, and she came in and he began to dictate. He dictated the memorandum,⁵ which finally stood just the way he dictated it. He dictates extremely well because he is accustomed to doing it when he is writing his books.

"While Churchill was dictating, he used the memorandum which I had dictated as a sort of a text.

"Roosevelt's important contribution, while Churchill was dictating, was that when he got talking about the metallurgical, chemical and electric industries, Roosevelt had him insert the very important words 'in Germany'. What Roosevelt meant was—because it came up later—that he didn't have in mind just the Ruhr and the Saar, but he had in mind entire Germany, and that the matter we were talking about, namely, the ease with which metallurgical, chemical and electrical industries in Germany can be converted from peace to war,

² The paper referred to is Cherwell's record of the Roosevelt-Churchill discussion of lend-lease matters during their meeting at 11:30 a.m., September 14, 1944. See *ante*, p. 344.

³ Churchill was inquiring for a record of the discussion of German questions during the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting at 11:30 a.m., September 14, 1944. See *ante*, p. 343, for the record which Cherwell had prepared but which was not produced in response to Churchill's request because of Morgenthau's objections to it.

⁴ *Post*, p. 390.

⁵ *Post*, p. 466.

does not only apply to the Ruhr and the Saar, but the whole of Germany, which of course is terribly important.

"When Churchill got through, Eden seemed quite shocked at what he heard, and he turned to Churchill and said, 'You can't do this. After all, you and I publicly have said quite the opposite. Furthermore, we have a lot of things in the work[s] in London which are quite different.' Then Churchill and Eden seemed to have quite a bit of argument about it. Roosevelt took no part in it, and I took a small part and kept throwing things in. Churchill's main argument was what this meant in the way of trade; they would get the export trade of Germany. So Eden said, 'How do you know what it is or where it is?' and Churchill answered him quite testily, 'Well, we will get it wherever it is.' I was quite amazed and shocked at Eden's attitude; in fact, it was so different from the way he talked when we were in London. Finally Churchill said, 'Now I hope, Anthony, you're not going to do anything about this with the War Cabinet if you see a chance to present it.' Then he said this, 'After all, the future of my people is at stake, and when I have to choose between my people and the German people, I am going to choose my people.'⁶ Churchill got quite nasty with Eden, and I understand from the President that all the rest of the day Eden was not at all helpful. The President was quite disappointed." (Morgenthau Presidential Diary, vol. VI)

Eden, p. 552, describes his participation in the meeting as follows:

"... On the morning of September 15th I joined the Prime Minister and the President, who were by now in agreement in their approval of the [Morgenthau] plan. Cherwell had supported Morgenthau and their joint advocacy had prevailed. Large areas of the Ruhr and the Saar were to be stripped of their manufacturing industries and turned into agricultural lands. It was as if one were to take the Black Country and turn it into Devonshire. I did not like the plan, nor was I convinced that it was to our national advantage.

"I said so, and also suggested that Mr. Cordell Hull's opinion should be sought for. This was the only occasion I can remember when the Prime Minister showed impatience with my views before foreign representatives. He resented my criticism of something which he and the President had approved, not I am sure on his account, but on the President's."

Cadogan told Stettinius in Washington on September 16, 1944, that Roosevelt and Churchill had discussed the question of voting in the Security Council of the proposed world organization at midday on September 15 and again in the middle of the afternoon. For the telegrams on this subject which Stettinius sent to Roosevelt on Sep-

⁶ Cf. *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 135 and 137, where two versions are printed of Morgenthau's account of this episode given to Hull and Stimson on September 20, 1944. Morgenthau also described the meeting to a group of colleagues in the Treasury Department at a meeting held at 3:20 p.m., September 19, 1944 (Morgenthau Diary, vol. 772).

tember 14 and 15, see *post*, pp. 425, 426. Stettinius' memorandum of his conversation with Cadogan on September 16 records:

"... He⁷ said that while Eden understood these matters clearly, Churchill had not yet studied them and [he] feared that neither Churchill nor the President had a complete understanding of what was involved. I inquired if he knew whether the President had had my message before him when this was discussed, and he said that the President had had no papers before him and did not refer to any. He said the question had come up at midday yesterday and had been discussed again in the middle of the afternoon. He did not indicate which person had taken the initiative.⁸ He indicated that the President had not been definite in his views on the matter one way or the other. . . ."⁹ (Notter File, Box 168, Stettinius Diary)

Roosevelt, however, sent a message to Stettinius on September 15 stating that neither Churchill nor he was inclined to approve the compromise voting formula which Stettinius had transmitted to Quebec. See *post*, p. 427.

On September 15—and presumably at this meeting—Roosevelt and Churchill initialed two separate papers on lend-lease: (1) the summary of their discussion on September 14, mentioned above (for text, see *ante*, p. 344), and (2) a shorter paper on the establishment of a committee to deal with lend-lease questions (for text, see *post*, p. 468).

⁷ i.e., Cadogan.

⁸ According to Hull, p. 1702, Roosevelt told Stettinius in a telephone conversation on September 17 that Roosevelt "had tried to get Mr. Churchill interested in this subject, but that the Prime Minister took the position that he had not studied the papers and did not have the time to get into it."

⁹ When Stettinius told Cadogan on September 16, however, that the United States was still studying the compromise voting formula and that Stettinius "had not received firm instructions one way or the other", Cadogan seemed surprised, as he had assumed from his conversation with Roosevelt at Quebec, that Stettinius "had received rather implicit [*explicit?*] instructions". See Notter File, Box 168, Stettinius Diary. Cf. Cadogan, p. 666.

MORGENTHAU-CHERWELL LUNCHEON MEETING, SEPTEMBER 15, 1944, ABOUT 1 P.M.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
Secretary of the Treasury
Morgenthau

UNITED KINGDOM
Lord Cherwell

Editorial Note

No record of the discussion during this luncheon meeting has been found. The meeting is mentioned in the Morgenthau Presidential Diary, vol. VI.

**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, SEPTEMBER 15, 1944,
1 P.M., THE CITADEL**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Mr. Law
Sir Alexander Cadogan

Editorial Note

No record of the discussion during this luncheon meeting has been found. The time and the names of the participants are from the Log, *ante*, p. 292, confirmed by Cadogan, p. 665.

**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL-MACKENZIE KING MEETING, SEPTEMBER 15,
1944, EARLY AFTERNOON, THE CITADEL**

PRESENT ¹

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill

CANADA
Prime Minister Mackenzie
King

Editorial Note

No official memorandum has been found relating to the discussion during this meeting. Mackenzie King apparently came to the Citadel for the purpose of asking Roosevelt and Churchill to accept honorary degrees from McGill University (see Pickersgill and Forster, p. 85, and the Log, *ante*, p. 292). The rest of the conversation is described as follows in Mackenzie King's notes, reprinted from Pickersgill and Forster, pp. 85-86:

"... Churchill . . . then spoke to the President about our participation in the war in the Pacific; of our desire to be in the Northern part and have our forces to serve in North Pacific; also our wish to have our Chiefs of Staff have a talk with his. The President replied: Mackenzie and I had a talk together on that, last night.² That is all understood.

¹ It is probable that some of the other persons present at luncheon were also at this meeting, as the Log, *ante*, p. 292, states that "Mackenzie King dropped in on the group after lunch and joined in conference discussions that lasted until 3:00 p.m." Cadogan, p. 665, states that lunch "went on till 4."

² See *ante*, p. 349.

"The President then said something about the Kuriles needing a good deal of patrolling, also Northern China, probably requiring Japs to be driven out later. When he stressed that he would have his divisions leave Seattle, and that Canadian forces could leave Vancouver, Churchill referred again to naval forces coming through the Panama Canal into the Pacific. . . . I did not want to leave matters to just the North and indicated that we were prepared to operate in the central area as well. Churchill also indicated that we were prepared to go as far South as Burma.

"Churchill said it would not do to have our Canadians fighting in the Tropics. . . ."

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, SEPTEMBER 15, 1944, AFTERNOON,
THE CITADEL

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

UNITED KINGDOM

President Roosevelt

Prime Minister Churchill

Editorial Note

According to Morgenthau's diary entry for September 15, 1944 (see *post*, p. 369), Leahy told Morgenthau at about 5 p.m. on that date that Roosevelt and Churchill had reached agreement during the afternoon on the allocation of zones of occupation in Germany as between United States and British forces—a matter which had been left undecided in the protocol defining the boundaries of the three zones of occupation in Germany which had been signed at London on September 12 by the representatives on the European Advisory Commission of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union (see *post*, pp. 389–390). Leahy embodied the Roosevelt–Churchill agreement of September 15 in a memorandum which he presented to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff the following morning (see *post*, p. 373). The Roosevelt–Churchill agreement, as reflected in the Leahy memorandum, (1) assigned the southwestern zone of occupation in Germany to United States forces and the northwestern zone to British forces; (2) changed the boundary between the two zones by transferring the province of Hessen–Nassau and Oberhessen from the northwestern to the southwestern zone and by transferring an area west of the Rhine comprising Saarland, the Palatinate, and Rheinhessen from the southwestern to the northwestern zone; and (3) provided that United States forces would have access "through the western and northwestern sea-

ports" and rights of passage through the British zone of occupation.¹ Although the allocation of sectors in Berlin as between United States and British forces had also been left undecided in the protocol of September 12, no evidence has been found that this question was discussed by Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec.

The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff amended the Leahy memorandum on the morning of September 16 to provide specifically for American control of the port of Bremen (see *post*, p. 373) and presented a revised paper, designated C.C.S. 320/26, to the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff later on that day (see *post*, p. 375). For the text of the decision on zones of occupation as agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and approved by Roosevelt and Churchill on September 16, see *post*, p. 476. For a map prepared in Washington after the Second Quebec Conference to accompany the text approved on September 16, see *post*, facing p. 476.

The Quebec decision, as amended in further American-British negotiations during the autumn of 1944, was introduced in the European Advisory Commission, where a tripartite agreement with the Soviet Union was signed on November 14, 1944, amending the protocol of September 12 in line with the understandings reached by the United

¹ The following passage from the minutes of a meeting of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee on September 15, 1944, indicates that Churchill must have had at least two separate conversations with Roosevelt on the subject of zones of occupation in Germany:

"THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had discussed with the President the allocation of zones of occupation in Germany between ourselves and the Americans. The President's main anxiety was to arrange the zones so that the American area was not anywhere in direct contact with French territory and so that the American lines of communication with their zone need not pass through France. The President had roughly outlined his suggestion on a map which the Prime Minister showed to the Chiefs of Staff.

"The British were to have the zone comprising North-Western Germany and a strip stretching right up the right bank of the Rhine. The Americans were to have South-Western Germany extending Northwards roughly to a line due East of Coblenz.

"It was agreed that the President's proposal was, in principle, acceptable to us. In effect it gave us the North-West zone, as at present proposed, together with the Westmark area and the Province of the Lorraine until this was taken over by the French; and gave the Americans the South-West zone (as at present proposed) together with the Province of Hessen-Nassau. It should be possible to arrange for the lines of communication to the American zone to enter through Amsterdam and Rotterdam and pass down the Rhine. It was, however, quite likely that the Americans would ask for the use, in addition, of one of the German ports. The President's proposal would require a detailed examination from the administrative point of view, and it might later on be necessary to make some small adjustments in the boundaries.

"The Prime Minister added that the President shared his view that the appointment of Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, should terminate with the defeat of Germany.

"It was agreed—

"That the Prime Minister should inform the President that his proposal for the allocation of zones of occupation was accepted by us in principle subject to minor adjustments later to suit administrative requirements." (PR 10 Foreign Relations of U.S./8-20-71)

States and the United Kingdom. For the text of the agreement of November 14, see Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3071*; Department of State, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 5, part 2, p. 2087.

ROOSEVELT CONVERSATION WITH THE ARCHDUKE OTTO OF
AUSTRIA, SEPTEMBER 15, 1944, 5 P.M., THE CITADEL

PRESENT

President Roosevelt
Archduke Otto

Editorial Note

According to the Log, *ante*, p. 292, Roosevelt had tea at 5 p.m. with Empress Zita of Austria, her sons the Archdukes Otto and Felix, her lady in waiting, and Miss Tully. No American source has been found on the substance of the discussion. The following paper is a translation made in the Department of State of a memorandum prepared by the Archduke Otto regarding his conversation with Roosevelt on this occasion:¹

"Right at the beginning Roosevelt remarked that today they had been working over the maps and had noted (namely, he and Churchill) that Austria and Hungary would of all countries undergo the least territorial changes. The situation was unclear only where Transylvania was concerned because there were differences of opinion between the Russians and the Rumanians in that respect,² and '*we don't know much about it.*'³ Immediately following this he remarked '*that our main concern is now how to keep the Communist out of Hungary and Austria.*' This was extremely important to them, especially Hungary.

¹ The author of the following memorandum, in a letter to the Director of the Historical Office, Department of State, dated April 30, 1971, stated that the question of occupation zones in Austria was also discussed during his meeting with Roosevelt at Quebec. "Here the problem which arose was particularly the question, whether Austria's occupation should be made in several zones or only in two zones, namely a Russian and an Anglo-American. In this connection I had also talks with Mr. Churchill, who like myself favoured the establishment of a number of zones in Austria due to the fact that it would thus be possible to diminish the Soviet influence with the Central government. President Roosevelt, who at first was more in favour of a temporary occupation in two zones, which he considered as a very short and passing phase, agreed that probably in view of future Austrian independence the solution of several zones would be better." (POL 32-3 AUS/4-30-71)

² An armistice with Rumania had been signed at Moscow on September 13, 1944 (dated as of September 12). For text, see Department of State, Executive Agreement Series No. 490; 59 Stat. (2) 1712; Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949*, vol. 3, p. 901. The wording of article 19 of the armistice agreement, which related to Transylvania, was a matter of disagreement between the Soviet and Rumanian delegations to the armistice negotiations until the eve of signature. See *Foreign Relations, 1944*, vol. iv, p. 232.

³ Words and phrases printed in italics (except paragraph headings) appeared in English, without emphasis, in the German source text.

"The remainder of the conversation was rather disjointed, as is the custom with R., and each problem was touched upon repeatedly. The following is a summary of what was said on the various points:

"*Hungary.* This was evidently one of the cardinal issues of the conversation. R. kept coming back to this problem time and again. Apart from the President's personal sympathy for Hungary, the main reason for this is probably the hope of making Hungary a bulwark against Russia. He stressed that he wished Hungary would make an unconditional surrender only to the Americans and British. If this were done, Hungary could be saved from communism. Hungary would surely receive mild terms. Military operations are now being planned which are designed to make it possible for the Hungarians to establish liaison with the civilized Allies. In the course of the discussion, R. took up the idea of having the Hungarian envoys act as transmitters of his proposal for Hungary. Specific mention was made of Apor, whom he would approach through Myron Taylor. His former sympathy for Horthy had been forfeited through the latter's weakness and senility. He was very receptive to the idea that we might perhaps be helpful to him with respect to Hungary's surrender. It was also agreed that I would immediately send him a message for the Hungarian government. He also asked in detail about Béla Kun, concerning whose atrocious deeds he was well informed. Attempts had also been made to prejudice him very strongly against Mihály Károlyi, but obviously he does not know much about him.

"*Russia.* It is evident that the relationship between R. and the Russians is strained. While the President emphasized that he liked Stalin personally—although he said a little later that he was '*untrustworthy*' and deceitful (my personal impression: the praise of Stalin was merely a gesture to put a little damper on our joy, and so was not genuine)—the President was bitterly critical of the men around Stalin. All the men around Stalin were old Bolsheviks whom one could not trust. There was a general interest in keeping the Russians away as far as possible. R. seems to have been particularly disgusted by Russia's handling of the Bulgarian question. It is obvious that the Anglo-Saxons were tricked by the Russians. From all of R.'s remarks it is quite evident that he is afraid of the Communists and wants to do everything to contain Russia's power—naturally *short of war*.

"*Poland.* R. is in an ill humor about Poland. Apparently there is a disposition to yield there. Sharp criticism of the Warsaw revolt, which was launched without consulting the Allies.

"*Austria.* Austria's independence will be restored and efforts will be made to protect the country from Bolshevism. The question whether Austria would want to form a federation with South Germany was raised at the Conference, but R. said that this should be left to the Austrians themselves. He thought that the Austrians would not care for that. When he asked for my opinion, I said that Austria would primarily wish to associate with the Danube countries, especially Hungary, but if Hungary were to fall into the hands of the Russians, Austria might consider a union with Catholic South Germany on the condition that Vienna would be the capital. Germany, R. remarked at this point, would be divided into three parts, North, West, and South Germany. R. apparently had no knowledge of the Hull Declaration. He shared our opinion that an uprising would be far too pre-

mature at this time. The question of the Austrian underground did not seem to interest him greatly. He seems to think that the underground is so strong that nothing needs to be done for it except supply it with arms at the last moment. South Tyrol was discussed with him. He is sympathetic to our efforts. It is not clear, however, whether anything has been done in this respect. He has reports from Italy about the present Italian government: they are relatively unconcerned about any territorial questions regarding Austria, they are interested in only one thing: they want to keep Trieste. He has proposed, and the proposal seems to have been accepted, that Trieste, Pola, and Fiume become free ports under international guarantee and administration. (The same régime, by the way, is also planned for the German ports.)

"*Vatican*. Understanding for the power of the Holy See. An interesting item is a report by Myron Taylor that Stalin had offered Rome, as the price of an understanding, to bring about a merger of the Orthodox Church with the Catholic Church.

"*Yugoslavia*. R. stresses once more, as in previous conversations, that Yugoslavia is in his view an unnatural state. It should be transformed into a federation. Whether that would be done he did not say. Said: *Poor Peter is in a very bad shape*.

"*Miscellaneous*. Marked sympathy for Leopold of Belgium.—In view of Brazil's weakness he will propose to the United Nations the establishment of American or United Nations bases in Dakar or the Cape Verde Islands.—Is very angry at Argentina.—Beneš or Czechoslovakia was not mentioned at all.—Made the remark that Stalin had harassed Churchill constantly at Tehran." (Habsburg Papers)

MORGENTHAU-LEAHY CONVERSATION, SEPTEMBER 15, 1944,
ABOUT 5 P.M., THE CITADEL

PRESENT

Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau
Admiral Leahy
Miss Tully

Editorial Note

No official memorandum regarding this conversation has been found. Morgenthau's diary entry for September 15 reads as follows:

"While I was waiting for the President between five and six, I was sitting there talking with Grace Tully and Admiral Leahy joined us. He said that they¹ had only settled that afternoon what part of Germany the English would go into, and what part the U.S.A. should go into.² In the morning when I arrived at twelve,³ the President was sitting alone in his room with three different colored pencils and a

¹ i.e., Roosevelt and Churchill.

² See *ante*, p. 365.

³ See *ante*, p. 360.

map of Europe, and he then and there sketched out where he wanted us to go and where he wanted the English to go,⁴ and by that I mean our Armies. He had before him a map of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which he said was terrible. According to Admiral Leahy, this afternoon the President showed Churchill his map, and got what he wanted. When I let Leahy read the memorandum on the Ruhr and the Saar,⁵ he was very happy because he said that the English were going to occupy the Ruhr and the Saar and they would have to carry this thing out." (Morgenthau Presidential Diary, vol. VI)

For the action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff on September 16, 1944, to implement the Roosevelt-Churchill decision on the zones of occupation in Germany, see *post*, pp. 373, 375.

⁴ If Morgenthau was referring to a map on which Roosevelt drew the zones of occupation which he and Churchill agreed upon during the afternoon of September 15 (see *ante*, p. 365), no map fitting this description has been found. It seems probable, however, that Morgenthau saw the map printed facing p. 392, on which Roosevelt drew lines in red, blue, and green pencil to show a possible subdivision of Germany after the peace.

⁵ *Post*, p. 466.

ROOSEVELT-MORGENTHAU CONVERSATION, SEPTEMBER 15, 1944, ABOUT 6 P.M., THE CITADEL

PRESENT

President Roosevelt
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau

Editorial Note

No official memorandum regarding this conversation has been found. Morgenthau's diary entry for September 15 reads as follows:

"... I got in about six o'clock and stayed until after seven-thirty. ... He¹ was completely relaxed, and the conversation was entirely on the week's work."²

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"Late in the afternoon in my discussion with the President, to my surprise he told me that Leahy had been favorable to my plan.³ The President said that he had withheld bringing up this question of where our Armies should go⁴ because he wanted to get Churchill in a good humor and he wanted everything else settled.

"... I asked him what he meant about the suggestion of having the United Nations meet the end of October, and he said that he felt it had taken much too long to bring up the League of Nations after World War I, and he wanted to do this in October. So I said, 'Well, it makes good window dressing for the campaign,' and he said, 'Yes.' His idea is to have it about the 27th of October and run through and after election.

¹ i.e., Roosevelt.

² For the paragraph omitted here, which related to Morgenthau's conversation with Leahy immediately before his meeting with Roosevelt, see *ante*, p. 369.

³ i.e., the "Morgenthau Plan" for the postwar treatment of Germany.

⁴ In the invasion and occupation of Germany.

"During my conversation with the President—I think it was in the morning⁵—I said, 'Look, Mr. President, now that we have this Ruhr and Saar stuff straightened out, the thing should be presented to Stalin, and I think if Stalin knew how we felt you would find he would act much better.' The President said, 'Well, I will have Harriman come back and explain it to him, and let him go back and sell it to Stalin.' 'Listen,' I said, 'Harriman can't do this. You ought to send me.' I said, 'I get along very well with the Russians, and you could check with Stalin as to whether I do or whether I don't.' The President said, 'Oh, I have far too important things for you to do around Washington. I can't spare you for a thing like this.' I said, 'Well, it would only be a matter of 10 days.' He thought a minute and said, 'Well, it might take two weeks,' and he seemed to like the idea. . . ."

"The other amazing thing that happened was he turned to me, when Grace Tully brought in a telegram⁶ in the afternoon addressed to her asking her to try to find out what happened on the French Lend-Lease, and said, 'You let Harry⁷ know that we are not going to do it,' . . ."
(Morgenthau Presidential Diary, vol. VI)

⁵ Since Morgenthau apparently was referring in this paragraph to the Roosevelt-Churchill agreement on the postwar treatment of Germany (see *post*, p. 466), which was not reached until their meeting at noon on September 15, it seems probable that the discussion recorded here, about notifying Stalin, took place during Morgenthau's meeting with Roosevelt on the evening of that day.

⁶ *Post*, p. 423.

⁷ Hopkins.

MORGENTHAU-CHERWELL MEETING, SEPTEMBER 15, 1944, 7:30 P.M., CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Secretary of the Treasury
Morgenthau

UNITED KINGDOM

Lord Cherwell

Editorial Note

At this meeting Morgenthau and Cherwell discussed the words "or sold for profit" which had been inserted in the record of the Roosevelt-Churchill discussion of lend-lease on September 14, 1944 (see *ante*, p. 345, fn. 2). Morgenthau recounted the meeting as follows to a group of colleagues in the Treasury Department at a conference held at 3:20 p.m., September 19:

"H.M. JR. [Morgenthau]: And then they cornered me. They waited until half past seven Friday night and wanted me to change it. I said no, that I couldn't go back to the President again, but my understanding was—and I used gasoline as an example—that we sent a lot of gasoline over there and it was put on their books at a price plus transportation, and they sold it back to us.

"MR. WHITE: To us?

"H. M. JR.: Yes. And that would go for anything else; that wheat at a dollar a bushel would be a dollar a bushel plus transportation, storage, and handling.

.

"... Here is the thing. 'Lend-lease then would [not] be exported or sold for profit', and he wanted it, 'would be exported and sold', I think. He wanted to change it, anyway.

"I said I just wouldn't go back. I went back once and got the 'or sold,' and the President said, 'for profit.' Now, what they want is to be able to do what they are always doing, to dispose of the stuff." (Morgenthau Diary, vol. 772)

On September 20 Morgenthau told a group of American officials: "They wanted me to [go] back a third time and I refused to. I said we would exchange letters on it. I said we wanted them to continue as they have in the past, but I wouldn't go back a third time. And he [Cherwell] wrote me this letter . . ." (Morgenthau Diary, vol. 773) For Cherwell's letter to Morgenthau on this subject, dated September 16, 1944, see *post*, p. 395.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, SEPTEMBER 15, 1944,
8 P.M., THE CITADEL

PRESENT

UNITED STATES
President Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM
Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan

Editorial Note

No record has been found of the substance of the discussion at this dinner meeting. The time of the meeting and the names of those present are from the Log, *ante*, p. 292.

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1944

MEETING OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, 10:15 A.M., SEPTEMBER 16,
1944, CONFERENCE ROOM A, CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC¹

PRESENT

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Lieutenant General Handy
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral McCormick
Rear Admiral Duncan
Major General Fairchild
Major General Kuter
Major General Wood

Brigadier General Roberts
Brigadier General Bessell
Brigadier General Everest
Brigadier General Lindsay
Captain Burrough
Captain Fife
Captain McDill
Colonel Peck
Colonel Lincoln
Colonel Benner
Commander Clark
Lieutenant Colonel Pasco

Secretariat

Brigadier General McFarland

Captain Graves

¹ J.C.S. 178th Meeting.

J.C.S. Files

Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

1. ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that a decision had been reached on the allocation of zones of occupation in Germany.² He presented a memorandum³ which he had prepared for presentation to the British. He had outlined the British and United States areas and had included remarks on the necessity for access to northwestern sea ports and passage through the British controlled area.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that, in his opinion, it would be desirable to specify one port that would be controlled by the United States.

ADMIRAL KING concurred.

In response to a question by Admiral Leahy as to the sufficiency of a single port, GENERAL MARSHALL replied that one port would be enough provided the United States had complete control of it and the port had sufficient capacity to handle approximately 10,000 tons of supplies daily.

ADMIRAL KING suggested that Bremen and vicinity be proposed for United States control.

GENERAL MARSHALL proposed that an additional paragraph be included in the memorandum as follows:

"Control of the port of Bremen and the necessary staging areas in that immediate vicinity will be vested in the commander of the American zone."

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that in view of General Marshall's amendment it would be desirable to insert in the next to the last paragraph the words "in addition" after the word "have" in the first line thereof.

GENERAL ARNOLD felt that some reference to the source of the Soviet area boundaries should be included for identification.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the question of Soviet boundaries had already been settled by agreement,⁴ and mention of it would not be appropriate in this paper.

² Roosevelt and Churchill had reached agreement on this question on September 15, 1944. See *ante*, p. 365.

³ Leahy's memorandum has not been found as a separate document, but its text can be reconstructed from C.C.S. 320/27, *post*, p. 391, the footnotes thereto, and the amendments to the Leahy memorandum suggested in the Joint Chiefs of Staff minutes printed here.

⁴ The boundary between the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany, on the one hand, and the United States and British zones of occupation, on the other, had been defined in a protocol signed in the European Advisory Commission at London on September 12, 1944. For text of the draft of this protocol which Hull had sent to Roosevelt at Quebec on September 11, see *post*, p. 386. No changes were made in the body of the draft text before signature.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the memorandum proposed by Admiral Leahy, as amended during discussion, and agreed to its presentation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 320/26.⁵)

6. SITUATION OF THE CHINESE FORCES IN THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

GENERAL MARSHALL read a message from General Stilwell⁶ outlining the military situation in the Chinese areas of operation. The situation appeared to be extremely unfavorable and unless the Chinese took immediate remedial steps, there would be reverses of far-reaching proportions.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he had reported the situation to the President. He read a message which he had prepared for the President to dispatch to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek outlining the consequences if immediate steps were not taken to rectify the unfavorable military situation, and requested the comment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the message from the President to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek proposed by General Marshall.⁷

⁵ "Allocation of Zones of Occupation in Germany", September 16, 1944. This paper, a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff, is not printed as such, but its text can be reconstructed from C.C.S. 320/27, *post*, p. 391, and the footnotes thereto.

⁶ For the text of the message referred to, see Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 435-436.

⁷ For the text of the message as approved by Roosevelt and dispatched to Chiang, see *post*, p. 464.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, SEPTEMBER 16, 1944,
11 A.M., MAIN CONFERENCE ROOM, CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold
Lieutenant General Somervell
Lieutenant General Handy
Rear Admiral Cooke
Rear Admiral McCormick
Major General Fairchild
Major General Kuter

UNITED KINGDOM

Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
General Ismay
Admiral Noble
Lieutenant General Macready
Air Marshal Welsh
Major General Laycock

Secretariat

Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves

Major General Hollis
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Commander Coleridge

¹ C.C.S. 176th Meeting.

J.C.S. Files

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

TOP SECRET

1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE 175TH MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the conclusions of the 175th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also approved subject to later minor amendments.²

2. "RANKIN" PLANNING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER
(C.C.S. 684³)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved C.C.S. 684 (The directive to General Wilson was dispatched as FAN 418).⁴

3. RELEASE OF AMPHIBIOUS CRAFT FROM "OVERLORD" TO OTHER THEATERS
(C.C.S. 687⁵)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved C.C.S. 687 (The message to SCAEF was dispatched as FACS 81).⁶

4. ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY
(C.C.S. 320/26⁷)

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM suggested that any naval disarmament measures for U.S. controlled ports should be under the U.S. naval member of the Central Control Commission.

ADMIRAL KING agreed with this proposal. American control of the port of Bremen would have to include American control of a suitable area for disembarkation and staging.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM agreed. He suggested that the American area should also include Bremerhaven, some 40 or 50 miles down the river. Bremerhaven was, he understood, the port where large ships had to berth.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that the U.S. troops would probably also have to be supplied through the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam. It

² The amendments referred to have been incorporated in the minutes of the 175th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as printed *ante*, p. 354.

³ *Post*, p. 438.

⁴ For the text of the directive referred to, see the enclosure to C.C.S. 684, *post*, p. 439.

⁵ *Post*, p. 464.

⁶ For the text of the message referred to, see paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 687, *post*, p. 464.

⁷ "Allocation of Zones of Occupation in Germany", September 16, 1944. This paper is not printed as such, but its text can be reconstructed from C.C.S. 320/27, *post*, p. 391, and the footnotes thereto.

might well be desirable to set up an Inter-Allied Navigation Commission to control the Rhine.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that the Combined Administrative Committee might be instructed to work out the logistic details involved in the decision taken with regard to zones and the consequent maintenance of U.S. and British forces in the zones.

Certain minor amendments were then proposed to the statement of policy contained in C.C.S. 320/26. These were accepted.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Approved the proposals in C.C.S. 320/26, subject to the minor amendments agreed in discussion. (The amended paper, as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, circulated as C.C.S. 320/27.⁸)

b. Agreed that any naval disarmament measures for Bremen and Bremerhaven would be under the U.S. Naval Commander of the Central Control Commission.

c. Agreed to refer C.C.S. 320/27 to the Combined Administrative Committee for examination of the logistics problems involved.

5. SITUATION IN CHINA

GENERAL MARSHALL informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the contents of a telegram recently received from General Stilwell.⁹ The Japanese were advancing on Kweilin, if indeed they had not already captured it and were therefore only 460 miles from Kunming, the China end of the air route. Further, no Chinese replacements were being provided for the Salween forces and the Generalissimo¹⁰ was threatening to withdraw these forces altogether if the Ledo forces did not advance to Bhamo. The Generalissimo had not yet agreed to place all Chinese forces under the direct control of General Stilwell which he had been pressed to do for some two months.

GENERAL MARSHALL then informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the contents of a telegram which had been sent to Chiang Kai-shek by the President urging early and vigorous action.¹¹

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of a telegram read to the meeting by General Marshall, which the President had sent to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, stressing the need for action to remedy the situation in China in general and on the Salween front in particular.

⁸ *Post*, p. 391. The footnotes to this paper indicate the amendments which were made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff during their 176th Meeting.

⁹ For the text of the message referred to, see Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 435-436.

¹⁰ Chiang Kai-shek.

¹¹ For the text of Roosevelt's message to Chiang, dispatched from Quebec on September 16, 1944, see *post*, p. 464.

6. COMMUNIQUE FOR RELEASE TO THE PRESS

SIR HASTINGS ISMAY suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff might wish to propose to the President and Prime Minister a paragraph dealing with the military points of the Conference for incorporation in the final press release. He presented a draft for consideration.¹²

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the text of a short note containing suggestions as to the military substance of any communiqué that the President and the Prime Minister might wish to issue to the Press on OCTAGON.

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

SIR ALAN BROOKE, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, said he would like to express warm appreciation to the United States Chiefs of Staff for their helpful cooperation in reaching agreement on the problems which had been before them.

ADMIRAL LEAHY, in expressing thanks to Sir Alan Brooke, said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were most grateful for the helpful attitude of the British Chiefs of Staff in overcoming the minor difficulties which had initially existed.

¹² For Ismay's draft statement, dated September 15, and for his covering note to Leahy of the same date, see *post*, pp. 457 and 456, respectively.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL, SEPTEMBER 16, 1944, NOON, THE CITADEL

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt
Admiral Leahy
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Field Marshal Brooke
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Field Marshal Dill
General Ismay
Major General Laycock

Secretariat

Brigadier General McFarland

Major General Hollis

J.C.S. Files

McFarland Minutes

TOP SECRET

1. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

At the request of the President, ADMIRAL LEAHY read out the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister

(C.C.S. 680/1)¹ paragraph by paragraph. A number of amendments were proposed and agreed to. These are incorporated in the final report (C.C.S. 680/2).²

In addition to the agreed amendments, comments on the report were made as follows:

OPERATIONS IN ITALY

a. Paragraph 11

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that the alternative developments in the operations in Italy postulated by General Wilson³ were rather too rigid. There might be many shades between the rout of General Kesselring's forces and the ability of the Germans to effect an orderly withdrawal. Paragraphs 11 *a* and *b* would present a better balanced estimate if paragraph 11 *b* was amended to read "*b. Kesselring's Army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal, in which event it does not at present seem possible that we can do more than clear the Lombardy Plains this year. Unless the enemy's resistance is markedly reduced, difficult terrain and severe weather in the Alps during the winter would prevent another major offensive until spring 1945.*"

b. Paragraph 12

THE PRIME MINISTER asked that the precise implication of the statement "that no major units should be withdrawn from Italy until the outcome of General Alexander's present offensive is known" might be made perfectly clear. For example, it would be quite unacceptable if paragraph 12 *a* was intended to cover an offensive only as far, say, as the Rimini Line. He assumed that the offensive contemplated would include domination of the Valley of the Po.

GENERAL MARSHALL said it was his understanding that General Alexander's present offensive included invasion of the Valley of the Po.

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed.

c. Paragraph 12 c

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed his appreciation to Admiral King for his offer to provide an amphibious lift for possible operations against the Istrian Peninsula.⁴

ADMIRAL KING said that after taking part in operations in the Adriatic, these landing craft would be required to proceed to the Southeast Asia Theater for DRACULA. It was therefore of the greatest importance that General Wilson should submit his plan for the Istrian

¹ "Report to the President and Prime Minister", September 15, 1944. This paper is not printed as such, but the text of the enclosure can be reconstructed from the enclosure to C.C.S. 680/2, *post*, p. 469, and the footnotes thereto.

² *Post*, p. 469.

³ The alternative developments referred to are summarized in paragraph 11 of the enclosure to C.C.S. 680/2, *post*, p. 472.

⁴ See enclosure B to C.C.S. 677/1, *post*, p. 430.

operation and a decision be taken not later than 15 October. He pointed out that there were certain other craft now in the Mediterranean which were urgently required for the Pacific.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that it was of the utmost importance that the matter be settled promptly.

GENERAL LAYCOCK confirmed that the additional craft referred to by Admiral King would not be wanted for the Istrian operation.

OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE FOR THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

d. Paragraph 21

THE PRIME MINISTER said he thought it quite possible that a heavy, sustained and ever-increasing air bombardment of the Japanese cities might cause Japan to capitulate. People could stand heavy bombardment only so long as they could hope that sooner or later it would come to some enduring end. There could be no such hope for Japan and all they could look forward to was the prospect of an ever-increasing weight of explosive on their centers of population.

e. Paragraph 23

With reference to the term "the opening of a seaway to China," THE PRIME MINISTER said that he assumed this meant the seaway from the United States. He did not contemplate a sea route being opened from the south, for example, through the Sunda Strait.

ADMIRAL KING agreed with the Prime Minister's interpretation on this point.

f. Paragraph 26

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the Canadian Government was anxious for some assurance in principle that their forces would participate in the main operations against Japan. The Canadian Government would prefer that their forces should operate in the more northerly parts of the Pacific, as their troops were unused to tropical conditions.⁵

It was agreed that a paragraph accepting Canadian participation in principle should be inserted in the report. (See paragraph 27)

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that the necessity for securing suitable bases for all the forces that would be operating in the Pacific might require employment of Canadian forces in the tropics.⁶

⁵ On September 16, 1944, the Chief of the Canadian General Staff (Murchie) gave Marshall an *aide-mémoire* concerning the Canadian desire to have Canada's armed forces participate in the war against Japan not in remote areas such as Southeast Asia but in the central and northern Pacific. See Stanley W. Dziuban, *Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 268, in the series, *United States Army in World War II: Special Studies*. Cf. *ante*, p. 349.

⁶ See Arnold, p. 527, for information on a conversation during the Second Quebec Conference, in which Arnold, Marshall, Dill, and Leckie took part, at which the role of the Royal Canadian Air Force in the Pacific war and the difficulty in providing the required bases were discussed.

g. The discussion then turned to the operations in Southeast Asia, with particular reference to Operations CAPITAL and DRACULA. As regards CAPITAL, THE PRIME MINISTER said that, while he accepted the obligation of securing the air route and attaining overland communications with China, any tendency to overinsure in this operation would have the effect of ruling out DRACULA, which he and the British Chiefs of Staff were particularly set on carrying out before the monsoon of 1945.

h. At this point THE PRIME MINISTER read out a note on the provision of forces for DRACULA (see Annex I) ⁷ in amplification of which he made certain suggestions about the timing of the movements of forces from the United States. If the United States authorities could see their way to assisting the operations in Burma with one or two divisions it would be better to move two divisions from the later schedules of the United States Army transportation to Europe than to take two divisions from General Montgomery's Army which was now actually fighting. This would bring additional troops more rapidly into action against the Japanese without withdrawing any of those already fighting in Germany. He did not ask for a decision on these proposals there and then but asked if the United States Chiefs of Staff would examine his suggestion.

GENERAL MARSHALL undertook to examine the Prime Minister's proposals. He said, however, that there was only one light division available and this had been reorganized and allocated to the European Theater at the special request of General Eisenhower. Every division in the United States was already allocated either to General Eisenhower or to the Pacific. The last divisions for the European Theater of Operations were scheduled to sail either the last week in January or the first week in February. The only way of providing United States divisions for Burma was by taking them from approved allocations. In this connection he said General Stilwell was desirous of having an American division assigned him; in fact, he wanted two if he could get them.

i. Continuing, GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had recently learned of an impression that the increase in the requirements for DRACULA had been brought about by pressure from United States authorities. After a thorough inquiry he had found that this impression was groundless. No United States authorities had advocated any such increase.

At the President's request, GENERAL MARSHALL outlined certain developments with regard to the Chinese forces. The Generalissimo ⁸

⁷ i.e., annex I to these minutes. See *post*, p. 463.

⁸ Chiang Kai-shek.

contemplated withdrawing the "Y" Force across the Salween unless General Stilwell advanced on Bhamo with the Ledo Force. No replacements had been provided for the Salween Force, which had now dwindled to 14,000 men.⁹ A note had been sent by the President to the Generalissimo pointing out the consequences of the proposed action and stating that the Generalissimo must accept full responsibility therefor.¹⁰

REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES AFTER THE END OF THE WAR IN EUROPE

j. Paragraph 30

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that our shipping situation would be greatly eased after the defeat of Germany by the cessation of the convoys. Lord Leathers had said that we should be able to get an additional lift of between 40 and 50 percent. The ships would be faster on passage with a much quicker turn-round at the terminal ports.

ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

k. ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed on a provisional demarkation of zones of occupation in Germany. The details and implications would be required to be worked out by the experts. [An addition to the report which covered this matter (C.C.S. 320/27)¹¹ was read out and agreed.¹²]

ANNEX I: ¹³ DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, SOUTHEAST ASIA

l. Admiral Mountbatten's directive was agreed, subject to certain minor amendments.

THE CONFERENCE:—

Instructed the Secretaries to revise the report in the light of the amendments approved by the President and Prime Minister and to circulate it as an approved document.¹⁴

⁹ Cf. the summary of Stilwell's telegram No. CFB 22638 which Marshall had given to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the morning of September 16, 1944, *ante*, p. 376.

¹⁰ For text, see *post*, p. 464.

¹¹ *Post*, p. 391.

¹² The sentence in brackets appears thus in the source text.

¹³ i.e., annex 1 to C.C.S. 680/1, which, as amended, became annex 1 to C.C.S. 680/2, *post*, p. 469. The approved directive to Mountbatten was also circulated separately as the enclosure to C.C.S. 452/31, "Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command", September 22, 1944 (not printed in this form).

¹⁴ The revised text of the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister, as approved by Roosevelt and Churchill, was circulated as the enclosure to C.C.S. 680/2, *post*, p. 469.

2. LOCATION OF THE CENTRAL TRIPARTITE CONTROL COMMISSION IN GERMANY

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether any suggestions had been put forward for the location of the Central Tripartite Control Commission in Germany.¹⁵ Was this to be in Berlin or elsewhere?

MR. EDEN said that this question was under examination by the European Advisory Commission. From the administrative point of view Berlin seemed to be the best place.

3. COMMUNICATION OF THE RESULTS OF "OCTAGON" CONFERENCE TO MARSHAL STALIN AND GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he would like to add to the communication to Marshal Stalin a word on the political dangers of divergencies between Russia and the Western Allies in respect of Poland, Greece and Yugoslavia.¹⁶

THE PRESIDENT said that as the communication was purely military in character and purported to give the results of the OCTAGON Conference, he thought it would be better if political matters were omitted.

THE PRESIDENT and PRIME MINISTER approved the terms of the communications to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as set out in Enclosures "A" and "B" respectively of C.C.S. 681/2.¹⁷

4. RELEASE OF INFORMATION ON "MULBERRY"

THE PRIME MINISTER said that it had been suggested to him that the time had now come when information could be released to the press about MULBERRY. The development of the artificial harbors had been largely a British enterprise and he would naturally have liked to let the public know about them as soon as the information could safely be released. He had now been informed, however, that Admiral King thought that the release of information about MULBERRY might be helpful to the Japanese and might not permit full advantage being taken of these inventions in the war against Japan.¹⁸ The Prime Minister said he fully accepted Admiral King's view and there would consequently be no release of information to the public about MULBERRY at present.

¹⁵ i.e., the Allied Control Council, the establishment of which was then under negotiation in the European Advisory Commission. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 100 ff.

¹⁶ Churchill subsequently prepared a draft of a supplemental message to Stalin covering the points he had in mind, and he discussed this draft with Roosevelt at Hyde Park after the end of the Quebec Conference. For the draft provisionally agreed upon at Hyde Park, see *post*, p. 491.

¹⁷ For texts of the messages sent to Stalin and Chiang on September 18, 1944, see *post*, pp. 478, 479.

¹⁸ See the discussion of this subject by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 175th Meeting, September 15, 1944, *ante*, p. 357.

5. "OCTAGON" COMMUNIQUE

THE CONFERENCE:—

Agreed on the terms of a communiqué to be issued to the Press that same afternoon (see Annex II).¹⁹

¹⁹ *Post*, p. 477.

TRIPARTITE LUNCHEON MEETING, SEPTEMBER 16, 1944, 1:45 P.M.,
THE CITADEL¹

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	CANADA
President Roosevelt	The Earl of Athlone Princess Alice, Countess of Athlone Prime Minister Churchill Mrs. Churchill Foreign Secretary Eden	Prime Minister Mackenzie King

Editorial Note

No official memorandum has been found relating to the discussion during this luncheon meeting. Mackenzie King's notes indicate that he had a conversation at lunch with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Eden, concerning the advisability of convening the proposed international conference on world organization on October 30, just a week before the presidential elections in the United States. Mackenzie King spoke of the opposition there would be from small countries, including Canada, to any appearance that the great powers were "seeking to control the world in the organization of its affairs". Churchill referred to the disagreement with Stalin on the duties and powers of the Council of the proposed organization in settling disputes, especially with regard to a Soviet right to a veto even in disputes to which the Soviet Union was a party. For the text of Mackenzie King's notes on this discussion, see Pickersgill and Forster, pp. 86-87. Eden, p. 554, records that Churchill explained to Roosevelt at this meeting why Eden could not accept the President's invitation to visit Hyde Park.

¹ The time and the names of the American and British participants are from the Log, *ante*, p. 292. The presence of Mackenzie King is noted in Pickersgill and Forster, p. 86.

TRIPARTITE PRESS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER 16, 1944, 3:45 P.M.,
SUNDECK, THE CITADEL

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	CANADA
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Prime Minister Mackenzie King

Editorial Note

A verbatim transcript of this press conference is in the Roosevelt Papers. Roosevelt first reviewed in very general terms the work of the Second Quebec Conference, expressed hope for the surrender of Germany, and discussed joint action against Japan and logistic problems in the Pacific. He stated specifically that questions of command in the Pacific War had not been discussed, and he described the division of responsibility among Mountbatten, MacArthur, and Nimitz. Churchill then commented on the results of the Conference and on British and Canadian participation in the war against Japan. Mackenzie King made brief closing remarks. For a substantively complete text of the transcript of this press conference, see Rosenman, pp. 260-268. For the text of the Quebec Conference Communiqué released to the press at Quebec on September 16, 1944, see *post*, p. 477.

ROOSEVELT-EDEN CONVERSATION, SEPTEMBER 16, 1944, AFTERNOON,
THE CITADEL

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
President Roosevelt	Foreign Secretary Eden

Editorial Note

The only source found on this conversation is Eden, p. 554, where it is indicated that the Foreign Secretary said goodbye to Roosevelt alone after the press conference of September 16, 1944. The President told Eden that he would visit England at the end of November whether he won or lost the election.¹

¹ Cf. a message of September 27, 1944, from Churchill to Stalin, in which Churchill stated that Roosevelt intended "to visit England, and thereafter France and the Low Countries, immediately after the election, win or lose". (Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 215; *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 257)

5. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

A. OCCUPATION AND POSTWAR TREATMENT OF GERMANY

Roosevelt Papers

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1944.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

I enclose herewith a copy of a telegram from Ambassador Winant, outlining the present status of the work of the European Advisory Commission. There is likewise enclosed a copy of the draft protocol regarding the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin" which is referred to in Ambassador Winant's telegram.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Enclosure 1]

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary
and Under Secretary of State*

SECRET

LONDON, September 9, 1944.

U.S. URGENT NIACT

7430. Personal and secret to the Secretary and Under Secretary.

This morning Ambassador Gousev told me that as Chairman of the European Advisory Commission he was calling a meeting for Monday afternoon. We have already forwarded the draft surrender terms,² which have been accepted without conditions by the U.S. and USSR Governments and by the British subject to conditions which, I have been informed by Mr. Eden, will be cleared. Gousev told me that he is now in a position to agree to recommend acceptance by the EAC of the German protocol covering zones, leaving in blank the designa-

¹ Sent to Roosevelt at Quebec by pouch. The Department of State file copies of this memorandum and its two enclosures bear the file numbers 740.00119 EAC/9-1144, *id.*/9-944, and *id.*/8-3144, respectively.

² The protocol on "Unconditional Surrender of Germany" had been signed *ad referendum* in the European Advisory Commission at London, July 25, 1944. For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. 1, p. 256. Formal notification of United States approval of this instrument had been given on August 9, 1944. See *ibid.*, p. 266.

tion of the U.S. and U.K. zones with the understanding that the U.S. Government and the U.K. Government will decide on their respective zones and areas of occupation in Germany and Berlin.³ That means that this document will have received informal clearance in all other respects from the three governments and is recommended by the Commission.

We will have before us this week officially the question of control machinery, basic proclamations and orders, as well as the protocol on Austria in which I have already gotten agreement for tripartite control with U.S. participation limited to a small contingent force. We are now analyzing the recommendations of the other Allied Governments with respect to the treatment of Germany. You are also aware of our work on the Bulgarian armistice terms; we are proceeding to formulate the terms for Hungary.⁴

I would greatly appreciate your getting this message to the President together with a copy of the German protocol.

WINANT

[Enclosure 2⁵]

Draft Protocol on the Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of Greater Berlin

SECRET

[LONDON,] 3rd August, 1944.

P9/26/44

DRAFT PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ON THE ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF GREATER BERLIN (AS AMENDED AT THE MEETING HELD ON 2ND AUGUST, 1944)

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America have reached the following agreement with regard to the execution of Article 11 of the Instrument of Surrender of Germany:—

1. Germany, within her frontiers as they were on the 31st December, 1937, will, for the purposes of occupation, be divided into three

³ Roosevelt and Churchill had not come to an agreement as to the assignment of the northwestern and southwestern zones of occupation in Germany as between British and United States forces. See *ante*, pp. 145 ff. Concerning the discussion of this matter at the Quebec Conference, see *ante*, p. 365.

⁴ The work of the European Advisory Commission with respect to the subjects mentioned in this paragraph is documented in *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 39–483.

⁵ The text of this enclosure was forwarded to the Department of State under cover of Winant's despatch No. 17782, August 31, 1944, not printed (740.00119 EAC/8-3144).

zones, one of which will be allotted to each of the three Powers, and a special Berlin area, which will be under joint occupation by the three Powers.

2. The boundaries of the three zones and of the Berlin area, and the allocation of the three zones as between the U.S.S.R., the U.K. and the U.S.A. will be as follows:—

*Eastern Zone
(as shown on
the annexed
map "A")*⁶

The territory of Germany (including the province of East Prussia) situated to the East of a line drawn from the point on Lübeck Bay where the frontiers of Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg meet, along the western frontier of Mecklenburg to the frontier of the province of Hanover, thence, along the eastern frontier of Hanover, to the frontier of Brunswick; thence along the western frontier of the Prussian province of Saxony to the western frontier of Anhalt; thence along the western frontier of Anhalt; thence along the western frontier of the Prussian province of Saxony and the western frontier of Thuringia to where the latter meets the Bavarian frontier; thence eastwards along the northern frontier of Bavaria to the 1937 Czechoslovakian frontier, will be occupied by armed forces of the U.S.S.R., with the exception of the Berlin area, for which a special system of occupation is provided below.

*North-
Western
Zone
(as shown on
the annexed
map "A")*

The territory of Germany situated to the west of the line defined above, and bounded on the south by a line drawn from the point where the western frontier of Thuringia meets the frontier of Bavaria; thence westwards along the southern frontiers of the Prussian provinces of Hessen-Nassau and Rheinprovinz to where the latter meets the frontier of France will be occupied by armed forces of [blank.]

*South-
Western
Zone
(as shown on
the annexed
map "A")*

All the remaining territory of Western Germany situated to the south of the line defined in the description of the North-Western Zone will be occupied by armed forces of [blank.]

The frontiers of States (*Länder*) and Provinces within Germany, referred to in the foregoing descriptions of the zones, are those which existed after the coming into effect of the decree of 25th June, 1941 (published in the *Reichsgesetzblatt*, Part I, No. 72, 3rd July, 1941).

*Berlin Area
(as shown on
the annexed
map "B")*

The Berlin area (by which expression is understood the territory of "Greater Berlin" as defined by the Law of the 27th April, 1920) will be jointly occupied by armed forces of the U.S.S.R., U.K. and U.S.A. assigned by the respective Commanders-in-Chief. For this purpose the territory

⁶ The maps referred to in the draft protocol are not attached to the Department of State file copy, and no maps were sent to Roosevelt with Hull's memorandum of September 11, 1944. They are printed, however, with the protocol on zones of occupation in Germany signed at London on September 12, 1944, and are to be found inserted in the pocket at the back of Department of State, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 5, part 2.

of "Greater Berlin" will be divided into the following three parts:—

North-Eastern part of "Greater Berlin" (districts of Pan-kow, Prenzlauerberg, Mitte, Weissensee, Friedrichshain, Lichtenberg, Treptow, Köpenick) will be occupied by the forces of the U.S.S.R.

North-Western part of "Greater Berlin" (districts of Reinickendorf, Wedding, Tiergarten, Charlottenburg, Spandau, Wilmersdorf), will be occupied by the forces of [blank.]

Southern part of "Greater Berlin" (districts of Zehlendorf, Steglitz, Schöneberg, Kreuzberg, Tempelhof, Neukölln) will be occupied by the forces of [blank.]

The boundaries of districts within "Greater Berlin" referred to in the foregoing descriptions, are those which existed after the coming into effect of the decree published on 27th March, 1938 (*Amtsblatt der Reichshauptstadt Berlin* No. 13 of 27th March, 1938, page 215).

3. The occupying forces in each of the three zones into which Germany is divided will be under a Commander-in-Chief designated by the Government of the country whose forces occupy that zone.

4. Each of the three Powers may, at its discretion, include among the forces assigned to occupation duties under the command of its Commander-in-Chief, auxiliary contingents from the forces of any other Allied Power which has participated in military operations against Germany.

5. An Inter-Allied Governing Authority (*Komendatura*) consisting of three Commandants, appointed by their respective Commanders-in-Chief, will be established to direct jointly the administration of the "Greater Berlin" Area.

6. This Protocol has been drawn up in triplicate in the Russian and English languages. Both texts are authentic. The Protocol will come into force on the signature by Germany of the Instrument of Unconditional Surrender.

LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, S.W.1.

3rd August, 1944.

800.602/9-644

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

[WASHINGTON,] September 11, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have your letter of September 6² concerning the importance of taking whatever steps are necessary for the

¹ The full text of this letter was included in a press release issued by Roosevelt's staff at Quebec, September 13, 1944.

² For the text of Roosevelt's letter, see Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XI, September 10, 1944, p. 254.

elimination of the political activities of German cartels, and the curbing of cartel practices which may restrict the free flow of goods in foreign commerce in the post-war world.

As you say, the elimination of the restrictive practices of cartels is an objective that consistently follows from the liberal principles of international trade which this Government, under your direction, has constantly sought to implement through the trade agreement program and other aspects of commercial policy. It is also an objective which consistently follows from this country's traditional and long-standing program designed to protect the consumer against monopoly and to preserve individual enterprise on a freely competitive basis.

For more than a year the Department, together with other interested agencies, has been giving careful attention to the issues which you mention, as well as other related subjects. An interdepartmental committee was established at my suggestion, and has been giving constant and current consideration to cartel matters and the methods by which the objectives set forth in your letter may best be achieved and most appropriately be coordinated with other facets of our foreign economic policy.

I shall continue to follow closely the progress of this work on the subject of international cartels, and I am bringing your letter and my reply to the attention of the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy with the request that this Committee and its subsidiary units expedite their work so as to be ready on short notice with definitive policy proposals. In the near future, and consistent with the pressing demands of the war upon your time, I want to present to you in more detail plans for discussions with other United Nations in respect to the whole subject of commercial policy.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

[WASHINGTON,] September 13, 1944.

Ambassador Winant's telegram number 7511 sent midnight September 12th² reports that the European Advisory Commission on that date approved and signed, for submission to the three governments, the protocol on zones of occupation in Germany (State Department's

¹ Delivered to the White House Map Room ; forwarded to Roosevelt at Quebec in telegram No. MR-out-397.

² Not printed (740.00119 EAC/9-1244).

note: with British and American zones left in blank ³) and the administration of greater Berlin.⁴

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

³ This parenthetical note was in the telegram as sent.

⁴ The body of the protocol as signed on September 12, 1944, was identical with the draft which Hull forwarded to Roosevelt on September 11, *ante*, p. 386. For the formal text of the signed protocol, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 118; Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 3071*; Department of State, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 5, part 2, p. 2079.

Morgenthau Papers

*Memorandum by the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau)*¹

At a conference between the President and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill said that he would sum up the discussion that we had been having in regard to the future disposition of the Ruhr and the Saar. He said that they would permit Russia and any other of our Allies to help themselves to whatever machinery they wished, that the industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar would be shut down, and that these two districts would be put under an international body which would supervise these industries to see that they would not start up again.

This programme for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar is part of a programme looking forward to diverting Germany into largely an agricultural country.

The Prime Minister and the President were in agreement upon this programme.

[QUEBEC,] September 15, 1944.

¹ The source copy bears the following typewritten endorsement: "Draft 1. HMJr. dictated this."

Morgenthau dictated this paper in the early afternoon of September 15, 1944, when he and Cherwell withdrew from a Roosevelt-Churchill meeting for the express purpose of putting in writing an agreed position on Germany for Roosevelt and Churchill to approve. See *ante*, p. 361. Morgenthau and Cherwell then returned to the meeting of the Heads of Government and presented this paper, which was not acceptable to Churchill. For the paper which Churchill then dictated and which was initialed by Roosevelt and Churchill, see *post*, p. 466.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The President to the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 15 September 1944.

Memorandum from the President for the Secretary of State.

After many long conversations with the Prime Minister and Lord Cherwell, the general matter of post-war plans regarding industries

¹ Sent to the White House Map Room, where the message was designated MR-IN-157.

has been worked out as per the following memoranda. This seems eminently satisfactory and I think you will approve the general idea of not rehabilitating the Ruhr, Saar, etc.

[Here follows the text of the memorandum on the treatment of Germany which Roosevelt and Churchill had initialed at Quebec on September 15, 1944, *post*, p. 466.]

I think that I have also worked out the locations of the occupying forces.²

I am going to leave here Saturday evening³ and go to Hyde Park where I will be joined Monday morning by the Prime Minister and his wife for a couple of days.

² See *ante*, p. 365.

³ September 16.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 16 September 1944.

C.C.S. 320/27

ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

Upon the collapse of organized resistance by the German Army the following subdivision of that part of Germany not allocated to the Soviet Government for disarmament, policing, and the preservation of order is acceptable from a military point of view by [*to*] the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

For disarmament, policing and preservation of order:

The British forces² under a British Commander will occupy Germany west of the Rhine and east of the Rhine³ north of the line from Koblenz following the northern border of Hessen and Nassau to the border of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.

The forces of the United States under a United States Commander will occupy Germany east of the Rhine, south of the line Koblenz-northern border of Hessen-Nassau and west of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.

¹ Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 176th Meeting, September 16, 1944. See *ante*, p. 376. Following the agreement reached by Roosevelt and Churchill on September 15, 1944, on the allocation of the northwestern and southwestern zones of occupation in Germany as between British and United States forces (see *ante*, p. 365), Leahy presented a memorandum reflecting that agreement at the 178th Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 16 (see *ante*, p. 373). The Joint Chiefs of Staff amended and approved Leahy's memorandum, and the resulting paper was circulated the same day to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as C.C.S. 320/26, "Allocation of Zones of Occupation in Germany", September 16, 1944. This paper is not printed as such, but its text can be reconstructed from C.C.S. 320/27 and fns. 2-4, below.

² C.C.S. 320/26 read "The forces of Great Britain".

³ C.C.S. 320/26 had the additional word "and" at this point.

Control of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven,⁴ and the necessary staging areas in that immediate vicinity will be vested in the Commander of the American Zone.

American area to have in addition access through the western and northwestern seaports and passage through the British controlled area.

Accurate delineation of the above outlined British and American areas of control can be made at a later date.

⁴ The words "and Bremerhaven," did not appear in C.C.S. 320/26.

Editorial Note

The memorandum on zones of occupation in Germany approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on September 16, 1944, *supra*, was agreed to by Roosevelt and Churchill later on the same day (see *ante*, p. 381) and was incorporated as paragraphs 33-34 in the final agreed summary of conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the OCTAGON Conference (see *post*, p. 476). Although the allocation of sectors in Berlin was also left unsettled in the European Advisory Commission protocol of September 12, 1944 (see *ante*, p. 388), no evidence has been found that this question was discussed at Quebec. A map reflecting the Quebec decisions was prepared in Washington immediately after the Quebec Conference and was forwarded to Winant as an enclosure to the Department of State's instruction No. 4563, September 21, 1944 (740.00119 EAC/9-2044, not printed). A map showing the lines approved at Quebec was also annexed in Washington to the memorandum approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 320/27), *supra*. This map is reproduced facing p. 476. Concerning further negotiations on this subject leading to an agreement signed in the European Advisory Commission on November 14, 1944, see the editorial note, *ante*, p. 365.

Roosevelt Papers

Memorandum by the President

[WASHINGTON,] September 20, 1944.

This is a very rough suggestion made by me—among others—for a subdivision of Germany after the peace.¹

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

¹ Attached to this memorandum is a map, reproduced facing this page, on which Roosevelt had drawn lines and made notations in red, blue, and green pencil. This is probably the map on which the President was working, with three colored pencils, when Morgenthau called on Roosevelt at Quebec at noon on September 15, 1944. See *ante*, p. 369.

B. ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE
UNITED KINGDOM

Roosevelt Papers

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

[Subject:] British Economic Cooperation Toward Argentina—Meat Negotiations

It is no exaggeration to say that effective implementation of our Argentine policy depends on British cooperation in economic matters. Up to the present we have received only tentative and highly qualified promises from London to investigate the possibility of such cooperation.

As you know, we have considered that it is of the greatest importance that if the British ultimately find it necessary to sign a meat contract rather than to purchase on a month-to-month or spot basis, such contract should be for the shortest possible term. However, the rumor has persisted that the British intend to sign a four-year contract and Mr. Eden has now written to Ambassador Winant stating among other things that

"We have no desire to conclude a contract running for a longer period than is strictly necessary. . . .² But our paramount duty both to our people and to [certain of] our Allies is to ensure that, during the acutely difficult post-war years, they shall be adequately fed; and the case made out by our Ministry of Food that only a longer term contract will ensure this as regards meat is entirely convincing."³

In view of the situation developing on food surpluses as pointed out in Judge Byrnes' report to you of September 7,⁴ it would appear that longer term commitments with the Argentine could be avoided. As Judge Byrnes has indicated, "Production in the areas under Allied control with the exception of Russia is approximately one third above normal production. War reserves have been established. When peace comes the reserves in the military theatres will become surplus."

With respect to meat specifically, which the Combined Food Board may consider in relatively short supply, although it has not as yet

¹ Sent to Quebec by pouch. In the Roosevelt Papers this document and Hull's memorandum of September 13, 1944, *infra*, are attached to the following handwritten memorandum of September 16, 1944, from Churchill's Assistant Private Secretary (Colville) to Roosevelt's Naval Aide (Brown): "The President gave these to the P.M. in order that we might have copies made. This has been done and I return them herewith. J. R. COLVILLE." The Department of State record copy of Hull's memorandum of September 12 is on file 841.244/9-1244.

² Ellipsis in the source text.

³ The quoted passage is from a communication from Eden to Winant dated September 7, 1944. For the full text, see *ante*, p. 175.

⁴ Not printed (Roosevelt Papers).

analyzed or allocated the supply for the period November [1944] to November 1945, it appears that with the overall ample food situation, that some provision could be made for supplying additional meat to the United Kingdom from the United States, Canada, Australia and South American countries other than Argentina. I understand that there is a surplus of utility beef in the United States and with the current prospects of slaughter this fall that the surplus undoubtedly will be increased. It is also my understanding that there may be some surplus of commercial grades of beef. It may be possible for us to arrange to increase lend-lease of certain quantities of utility and commercial grades of beef to the United Kingdom provided a similar reduction of British purchases of beef in the Argentine is obtained.

I therefore suggest that you urge upon the Prime Minister that—

1. British purchases of meat in the Argentine be continued on a spot basis and that no agreement for a period of four, or even two, years be concluded.

2. The British Ministry of Food reduce its meat purchases in Argentina by resorting to the above-mentioned possible alternative sources of supply and by giving due weight to the promising food supply situation in Europe and elsewhere. I have been informed that our Army has terminated all purchases of Argentine canned beef through the British Ministry of Food, which, as you know, purchases meat in Latin America for us under an arrangement of the Combined Food Board.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

Roosevelt Papers

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 13, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

[Subject:] Additional Observations Relative to British-Argentine Meat Negotiations

I must again refer to the matter of the British meat contract about which I sent you my memorandum of September 12th.²

¹ Sent by pouch to Quebec, where Roosevelt gave it to Churchill to have copied. See *ante*, p. 393, fn. 1. The Department of State record copy is on file 841.244/9-1344.

On September 14 Hull sent the following telegram No. 7491 to Winant:

"Yesterday I sent the following message to the President as a basis for his discussion of the Argentine meat contract with the Prime Minister:

[Here follows the text of paragraphs 2-4 of Hull's memorandum to Roosevelt of September 13.]

"I intend to show this message to the Foreign Minister as soon as I see him. In view of the great importance which we attach to this matter you should convey substantially the same message to the Foreign Office at the earliest opportunity." (841.244/9-1344)

Winant reported in telegram No. 7661 of September 16 that the substance of the quoted telegram had been incorporated in a note handed to the Foreign Office on September 15. (841.244/9-1644)

² *Supra*.

Our Embassy in Buenos Aires reports³ that the British Ministry of Food has informed the Argentine government that the British are disposed to sign a new contract for two years at the same prices as the current contract. The contract would be on the same basis as that recently concluded with New Zealand and Australia so that Britain would buy the entire exportable surplus for four years with prices subject to re-examination at the end of two years. The Embassy adds that this word from London came as a great relief to the Colonels.

I regret to say that it has become increasingly clear that the British continue to treat the Argentine Fascist threat as a matter of minor and relatively unimportant policy. To us it is a matter of major policy. If we fail in the implementation of that policy, the Nazis will have a powerful center to renew their fight in this Hemisphere economically, politically and eventually in a military way. This would mean inevitably the destruction of all that we have been trying to build since 1933.

In view of our enormous aid to the British on supply matters, it is certainly not asking too much to request that they forego the petty commercial advantages of a long term bargain with a Fascist government. It is hard to believe that they will permit the Argentines to succeed in the "divide and conquer" tactics they are so obviously employing in the matter of the meat contract. As I have said time and again, the political implications of these meat negotiations are really tremendous. If they are concluded, as the Argentines hope they will be, their position will be greatly fortified and our own position correspondingly weakened throughout the Hemisphere.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

³ The report referred to is not printed.

Editorial Note

For a memorandum of agreement relating to lend-lease to the United Kingdom which Roosevelt and Churchill initialed at Quebec on September 15, 1944, see *post*, p. 468.

Morgenthau Diary, vol. 772

The British Paymaster-General (Cherwell) to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau)

QUEBEC, 16th September 1944.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY, As you suggested, I am sending this note so as to clarify the meaning of the phrase "or sold for profit" in the record

of the conversation between the President and the Prime Minister on September 14th.¹

According to my recollection, you explained that it merely meant that our Government should not sell Lend/Lease goods for more than the price at which they are entered in your books plus a reasonable allowance for transport and similar charges. I should be grateful if you could let me know whether this is correct.²

Though I do not know whether we are informed about the price at which Lend/Lease goods stand in your books,—thanks to your generous desire to keep the dollar sign out of Lend/Lease,—I feel sure that we habitually keep well within this limit and that we shall therefore find no difficulty in meeting the President's wishes in this respect.

May I also take this opportunity of telling you how much I enjoyed seeing you at Quebec and how very grateful I am for all the kindness you showed in your dealings with such a novice as

Yours very sincerely,

CHERWELL

¹ See *ante*, p. 345, fn. 2, and the editorial note, *ante*, p. 371.

² Morgenthau replied on September 20, 1944: "Without attempting a precise restatement, I have assumed that the agreed principles which have heretofore governed the sale or other disposition of Lend-Lease goods in the United Kingdom would be retained unless changed circumstances should make reconsideration desirable. In the latter event the subject could be reopened for discussion between our two Governments." (Treasury Files; Morgenthau Diary, vol. 776)

C. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND AID TO THE WARSAW RESISTANCE

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 11, 1944.

MR-OUT—385, Personal and top secret to the President from Harry Hopkins.

Have discussed all of the cables relative to Poland with the State Department and Marshall. On the basis of these conferences, would suggest that you send substantially the following messages—

1. To the President of Poland: ¹ "This will acknowledge your very urgent wire ² and I want to assure you that we are taking every possible step to bring Allied assistance as speedily as possible to the Warsaw garrison. I realize fully the urgent importance of this matter."

¹ At the request of Charles E. Bohlen, an unnumbered telegram was sent to Quebec by the White House Map Room correcting "President of Poland" to "Prime Minister of Poland".

² The reference is to one of the two messages of September 10, 1944, from Prime Minister Mikołajczyk to Roosevelt. See *ante*, pp. 204, 205.

2. That you send a message to General Marshall asking him to have Deane explore this matter fully and urgently with the British and Russian military people.

3. That the State Department will reply to Harriman's wire to you and the Secretary³ coordinating whatever they may say with Marshall's instructions to Deane.

HARRY⁴

³ i.e., Harriman's telegram No. 3413 of September 10, 1944, *ante*, p. 203.

⁴ The source text bears also the holograph signature "Harry L Hopkins", but only the first name was to be transmitted.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to the Polish Prime Minister (Mikołajczyk)*¹

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 11 September 1944.

PRIORITY

WH 61. For Prime Minister Mikołajczyk of Poland from President Roosevelt.

I want to assure you that we are taking every possible step to bring Allied assistance as speedily as possible to the Warsaw garrison. I realize fully the urgent importance of this matter.

ROOSEVELT

¹ Sent by the White House Map Room at Washington to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels, upon instructions from Roosevelt to Hopkins contained in telegram No. MR-IN-144 of September 11, 1944. The Map Room considered that this message replied to the two messages from Mikołajczyk printed *ante*, pp. 204, 205.

Department of the Army Files : Telegram

*The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the Chief of the Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane)*¹

TOP SECRET

OCTAGON, 12 September 1944.

PRIORITY

OCTAGON 10. For Deane from Marshall information War Department TopSec.

Condition of Polish patriots in Warsaw so critical that urgent action essential. In order to take advantage of Soviet agreement for aid desire that you in conference with representatives from Spaatz'

¹ Sent to the United States Military Attaché, Moscow, via Army channels. Leahy instructed the White House to make a paraphrase available to the Department of State (telegram No. MR-IN-145, September 12, 1944, Roosevelt Papers). Arnold repeated the message to Spaatz for his information, adding the following paragraph: "Contact Deane without delay giving him name of your representative and arranging details for above mission. RAF representative will go to Moscow with your representative. Keep this office informed as to progress." (Telegram No. OCTAGON 9, September 12, 1944, Department of the Army Files)

headquarters and from RAF prepare plan without delay and secure coordination of Soviet authorities as to arrangements and details of operation.

Plan must take into consideration present location of patriots so as to insure maximum amount of supplies being dropped to patriots rather than to Germans. Risk to airmen must be kept to minimum while endeavoring to secure maximum relief of patriots. Spaatz and Portal have been given copy of this message and will send names of representatives to you. Spaatz has been instructed to contact you re clearance for plane into Russia, details as to destination and other operational information. Present condition of Polish patriots in Warsaw such that delivery of supplies must be accomplished at earliest possible date.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman)* ¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 12 September 1944.

PRIORITY

Top secret for Ambassador Harriman from Secretary Hull. WH Number 63.

The President has directed General Marshall to send immediate instructions to Deane to explore with the appropriate Soviet military authorities in conjunction with his British military colleagues the urgent possibility of utilizing the Soviet offer to cooperate in assistance to Warsaw. (Your 3413, September 10.²) The President likewise desires that you lend every support to Deane's efforts and you should inform Molotov that this Government is prepared to do its utmost towards working out jointly with the British and the Russians the question of immediate aid to the Warsaw garrison. While it is of course possible that this Soviet decision comes too late if the physical situation of the garrison in Warsaw has been so reduced as to make the dropping of supplies impractical, that is a factual question which will emerge in the negotiations for the actual despatch of aid.

From the political point of view we feel that it is of the highest importance that there should be no hesitation on our part in initiating the implementation of the Soviet promise, in order to avoid any possibility of our being blamed in the event that the aid does not arrive in time. This is particularly important since the President today re-

¹ Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via the White House Map Room and Navy channels. The message was delivered to the Map Room on September 11, 1944, with the request by Hull that it not be sent until released by Hopkins. Hopkins instructed the Map Room to dispatch the message after he had received a copy of Marshall's telegram to Deane, *supra*.

² *Ante*, p. 203.

ceived a further urgent appeal from Premier Mikołajczyk for assistance to the Warsaw garrison.

HULL

740.0011 E.W./9-1244

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 12 September 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: With reference to your letter of 9 September regarding Norway,¹ it will be noted from the enclosed copies of messages to General Deane that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have instructed him as indicated in the third paragraph of your letter.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A J MCFARLAND

Brigadier General, U.S.A.

Secretary

[Enclosure 1—Telegram]

The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Chiefs of the United States and British Military Missions to the Soviet Union (Deane and Burrows), Temporarily at London²

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 30 August 1944.

Occupation of Norway under RANKIN conditions is subject. (TopSec to Generals Deane and Brocas Burrows for action personally on return, repeated to ETOUSA for British Chiefs of Staff for information, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.)

1. Combined Chiefs of Staff consider it advisable to open early military conversations with Soviet General Staff through you.

2. You should bear in mind that our object is to re-establish the legal Norwegian Government in full control as early as possible after the German withdrawal.

3. Plans for occupying Norway under RANKIN "B" and "C" conditions are as follows:

(1) RANKIN "B" (Organized German withdrawal from Norway). To occupy in initial stages any two of following:

- (a) Finnmark (Hammerfest and Kirkenes).
- (b) Tromsö or Narvik.
- (c) Trondheim.

Subsequently Stavanger and Bergen, Christiansand (S) and Oslo would be occupied as forces became available.

(2) RANKIN "C" (German unconditional surrender and cessation of organized resistance in northwest Europe).

¹ *Ante*, p. 195.

² Sent to the headquarters at London of the European Theater of Operations, United States Army, via Army channels, as telegram No. WARX 89077.

To occupy first southern Norway and then send, if required, a force with a Norwegian detachment to eastern Finnmark. Norwegians, however, are anxious for Finnmark to be reoccupied as soon as possible. It might therefore be desirable to send to Finnmark area Norwegian warship with some Norwegian troops immediately after RANKIN "C" conditions arise. SCAEF is being instructed to consider the possibility of this.

4. It should be made clear to Soviets that since above plans for RANKIN "B" depend on the method of German withdrawal they are provisional. Soviets should be informed that we appreciate that they may already have plans for following up a German withdrawal through Finnmark. You should therefore invite Soviets to concert their plans with ours using the following points as basis:

- (a) Necessity for harassing enemy during his withdrawal;
- (b) Advantages of stimulating Norwegian resistance by sending in Norwegian forces as early as possible;
- (c) Desirability of establishing a naval base in northern Norway for escorts protecting convoys to Russia.

5. You should ask the Soviets if they have any objection to participation by Norwegian Military Attaché in your conversations.

[Enclosure 2—Telegram]

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Chiefs of the United States and British Military Missions to the Soviet Union (Deane and Burrows), Temporarily at London*³

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 30 August 1944.

In connection with our immediately preceding signal, following is background for your personal information only. (TopSec to Generals Deane and Brocas Burrows for action personally on return, repeated to ETOUSA for British Chiefs of Staff for information, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.)

1. No agreement exists with the Russians acknowledging that Norway is a British/American sphere of operations. Although it is to our advantage for the Russians to harass a German withdrawal as we have insufficient forces to do this ourselves our long term requirement is to ensure that they should not permanently occupy Norwegian territory in view of potential threat to North Atlantic trade routes, Iceland and the northern approaches to the North Sea. Our purpose must be therefore to avoid any clash with the Russians in Norway and yet to safeguard our long term interests.

2. Combined Chiefs of Staff have no evidence that the Russians intend to establish themselves in Finnmark but it is felt that it would be

³ Sent to the headquarters at London of the European Theater of Operations, United States Army, via Army channels, as telegram No. WARX 89204.

desirable to arrange as far as possible for a joint occupation by Russian, Norwegian and British forces rather than by a purely Russian force. Nevertheless, if the Russians enter Norway during the course of operations against the Germans it is considered undesirable for us to intervene since a Russian/Norwegian civil affairs agreement has been concluded which covers this contingency.⁴

[Enclosure 3—Telegram]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Chief of the Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane) ⁵

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 12 September 1944.

British Chiefs of Staff agree that it is undesirable to postpone any longer the discussion of the occupation of Norway under RANKIN conditions and the Foreign Office has sent Ambassador ⁶ a political background to explain to Brinckman. You should now open conversations outlined in War 89077 of 30 August.⁷

It is important that you communicate to the Soviets the fact that the plans for occupying Norway under RANKIN were prepared some time ago, that you may dispel any possible Soviet suspicion that they have been recently improvised to counter possible entry of Soviet forces into northern Norway.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 196, fn. 3.

⁵ Sent as telegram No. OCTAGON 14 via Army channels.

⁶ Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

⁷ Enclosure 1, p. 399.

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff ¹

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 12 September 1944.

C.C.S. 618/3

MACHINERY FOR COORDINATION OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET-BRITISH MILITARY EFFORT

References: *a.* CCS 129th Meeting, Item 3 ²
b. CCS 618 Series ³

THE PROBLEM

1. The United States and British Chiefs of Staff agree that it is necessary to create additional machinery through which the military

¹ For the discussion of this paper by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 172d Meeting, September 12, 1944, see *ante*, p. 307.

² See *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 336.

³ See *ante*, pp. 9, 182, 183, for earlier papers in this series.

efforts of the United Nations forces on the European fronts may be coordinated. The form of this machinery is considered below.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. Close liaison is needed between the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Soviet General Staff on matters of strategy and military policy in Europe. It will, moreover, be highly desirable to open discussions with the U.S.S.R. on the war against Japan as early as politically practicable.

3. In June 1944 Marshal Stalin raised the question of improving the machinery for coordinating the military efforts of the Allies, and in July, Marshal Vassilievsky informed General Deane that the Soviet General Staff were interested in the matter and would like to know the proposals of the Chiefs of Staff in this respect.⁴

4. As agreed at SEXTANT,⁵ the creation of any form of United Chiefs of Staff Committee would be unacceptable.

DISCUSSION

5. We consider the necessary liaison between the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Soviet General Staff would be achieved by the creation of a Combined British, United States and Soviet Committee in Moscow, provided that it is clearly understood that this Committee:—

(a) Is purely consultative and advisory and has no power to make decisions without reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff or the Russian General Staff respectively.

(b) Deals solely with strategic and operational matters and does not impinge upon the work that is at present being done by the European Advisory Commission, such as civil affairs, etc.

6. On the Russian side there has been reluctance in the past to discuss matters of any importance with the British and United States Missions, owing to the fact that the latter have usually to deal with officials of no authoritative standing. This difficulty should be overcome in the future provided that the Russian representative on the Committee is a senior member of the Russian General Staff. The Heads of the United States and British Missions already represent their own Chiefs of Staff and so might well serve as members of the Committee. Their rank should be similar to that of the Russian Member.

CONCLUSION

7. We conclude:

(a) That it would be to the advantage of the United Nations war effort to set up a Combined Military Committee in Moscow as a con-

⁴ See *ante*, p. 183, fn. 6, and p. 184, fn. 7.

⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 336-337.

sultative and advisory body dealing only with strategic and operational matters.

(b) That the Committee should consist of senior representatives of the Russian General Staff and the British and United States Chiefs of Staff.

RECOMMENDATION

8. We recommend that the Heads of the British and American Missions in Moscow be instructed to approach the Soviet General Staff with the proposal to establish a Combined Committee in Moscow.

J.C.S. Files

Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 12 September 1944.

C.C.S. 618/4

MACHINERY FOR COORDINATION OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET-BRITISH MILITARY EFFORT

In accordance with the instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the C.C.S. 172d Meeting,¹ the Secretaries propose that the British Chiefs of Staff and the United States Chiefs of Staff send the messages attached hereto as Enclosures "A" and "B" to Generals Burrows and Deane respectively.²

A. J. McFARLAND

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES

Combined Secretariat

Enclosure "A"

TOP SECRET

MESSAGE FROM THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF TO GENERAL BURROWS

[The text of this message was the same, *mutatis mutandis*, as that of the message proposed to be sent to Deane in enclosure "B", below.]

Enclosure "B"

TOP SECRET

MESSAGE FROM THE UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF TO GENERAL DEANE

1. It is desired that you propose to the Soviet General Staff that a tripartite Military Committee be set up in Moscow consisting of senior representatives of the Russian General Staff, of the United States

¹ See *ante*, p. 308.

² At their 173d Meeting, September 13, 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to the dispatch of the enclosed messages to Burrows and Deane. See *ante*, p. 320.

Chiefs of Staff, and of the British Chiefs of Staff. The idea of the United States Chiefs of Staff is that this Committee would deal with strategical and operational matters, but you should make it clear:—

a. That it will be purely consultative and advisory and will have no power to make decisions without reference to the respective Chiefs of Staff and the Russian General Staff.

b. It must not impinge upon the work that is at present being done by the European Advisory Commission, such as civil affairs, etc.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff consider that formation of this Committee should assist in eliminating the delays now existent in dealings between the Russians and the U.S. and British Military Missions. A cardinal point in the proposal, however, is that the Russian representative on the Committee should be a senior member of the Russian General Staff. On the U.S. and British sides the Heads of the present Missions would represent the United States and British Chiefs of Staff respectively, each being responsible to his own Chiefs of Staff.

3. In view of the approach of the Russian, U.S. and British forces toward each other, you should initiate action at once with the Soviet General Staff in order that the Committee may begin to function in the near future.

Department of the Army Files : Telegram

The Chief of the Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane) to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 13 September 1944.

To AGWar for General Marshall information to General Eisenhower and General Spaatz from Deane TopSec MX 20947. Copy sent direct to Eisenhower.

Simultaneously with the receipt of your OCTAGON 10 dated 12 September¹ I received information from USSTAF that the project was scheduled for today, September 13. The British and American Ambassadors and I saw Mr. Molotov who arranged for approval to be given by the Red Army General Staff. General Spaatz was informed of approval and as a result the mission is now scheduled for September 14.² I shall await word from General Spaatz as to whether this one mission completes the project or if he proposes to send representatives to Moscow to work out a plan for continued support. I do not believe it is necessary for representatives to come here since all details of plan should be worked out in London. Really, all that

¹ *Ante*, p. 397.

² The mission was later postponed until September 18 because of bad weather. See *post*, p. 491.

is necessary here is Soviet approval which the British and American missions can attempt to secure here once they have been informed of the plan.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President and the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

Moscow, [September 13, 1944.]

PRIORITY

Top secret for the President and the Secretary from Harriman.

Cable Nr 122231 WH 63 from Mr. Hull² regarding aid to the insurgents in Warsaw reached me only late tonight. On the basis of an earlier message received by the Military Mission from General Spaatz³ I spoke to Molotov last night regarding an operation by our Air Force which Molotov approved after telephoning to Red Army General Staff. Today General Deane talked to an officer of Red Army General Staff inquiring what the Soviets intended to do on their own account. He replied that the Red Army had nothing planned.⁴ General Deane and head of British Military Mission will jointly approach Red Army General Staff tomorrow to press for the carrying out by the Red Army of the promise of the Soviet Government to render assistance itself. I will see Molotov if a satisfactory answer is not obtained.

¹ Sent to Washington by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt as telegram No. MR-out-401, September 14, 1944.

² *Ante*, p. 398.

³ Not printed.

⁴ A Soviet drop of supplies on Warsaw was executed, however, on September 13. See Craven and Cate, pp. 316-317.

Department of the Army Files: Telegram

The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the Chief of the Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane)

TOP SECRET

OCTAGON, 14 September 1944.

URGENT

OCTAGON 26 TopSec sent to Deane from Marshall information to Spaatz and AGWar.

If arrangements, satisfactory to Spaatz, reference your MX 20947 of 13 September¹ and further reference our OCTAGON 10,² Russians and

¹ *Ante*, p. 404.

² *Ante*, p. 397.

yourself, can be completed without representatives from London proceeding to Moscow it is satisfactory here. You and Spaatz complete the arrangements and carry out the project as the two of you see fit.

Department of the Army Files : Telegram

*The Chief of the Military Mission in the Soviet Union (Deane) to the Commanding General, Strategic Air Forces in Europe (Spaatz)*¹

TOP SECRET

Moscow, 15 September 1944.

PRIORITY

MX 20970. To USSTAF for General Spaatz information copies to AGWar for General Arnold and Escom for General Walsh from Deane. Copy sent direct to Walsh.

Soviet Government informed British Government that they were prepared to cooperate with British and Americans in organizing aid to Warsaw provided this aid is rendered in accordance with a pre-arranged plan.

General Marshall has directed me and the President has directed Mr. Harriman to assist in working out a plan with the Russians and British. Burrows and I informed the Red Army General Staff that we wish to meet with them at once to work out a plan in which all three countries participate. So far there has been no Soviet reply. With the Red Army in Praga, the battle for Warsaw is reaching its critical and conclusive stages. In all probability American participation in relief of Polish insurgents will be limited to FRANTIC 7; however, both the Ambassador and I feel that it would be a great mistake to start reduction of Escom bases until the Warsaw situation has been clarified. It may develop that an additional American dropping mission will be a critical necessity and if so the facilities in Russia should remain available. The Ambassador feels that politically we would be in a most disadvantageous position if we had made additional missions impossible before the battle for Warsaw is decided or if we even gave the Russians the impression that we had abandoned the insurgents in Warsaw by initiating preparations to reduce Escom such as ordering trains.

In view of the above recommend that no firm date be set at this time for Escom reduction.

¹The text of this message was relayed to Arnold and Marshall at Quebec in telegram No. 30928 from the War Department, and was received at Quebec as telegram No. OCTAGON-IN-156.

740.0011 EW/9-1644 : Telegram

*The Chargé Near the Polish Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the
Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

LONDON, September 16, 1944.

US URGENT

POLES 102. Premier Mikołajczyk has requested me to transmit the following appeal of the Council of National Unity in Warsaw addressed to the President, Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin, dated September 15th and received in London today:

"On the forty-fifth day of the struggle of the people of Warsaw for the freedom of the capital and of Poland, witnessing the first signs of effective assistance in the form of air cover and dropping of arms and food, the Council of National Unity affirm that this has brought great relief to Warsaw."²

The Council of National Unity stress the inflexible will of the people of Warsaw and of Poland to fight the Germans unto the end for the freedom and independence of Poland. To carry on this fight it is indispensable to supply the soldiers of the home army. The Council of National Unity therefore fervently appeal for continuous dropping of arms, ammunition and food, for permanent air cover to be organized and for the bombing of German concentrations and military objectives. The enemy is attacking the city with continuously reinforced formations. The lack of quick and effective succor may cause a catastrophe."

Mr. Mikołajczyk indicated that he was conscious that the arrangements made for lending assistance to Warsaw through the American shuttle service and through British planes from Italy had been impeded by weather conditions recently but felt he must underline the continued urgency of assistance as reflected in the foregoing message.³

¹ Sent over the signature of Winant.

² The reference is to a drop of supplies to Warsaw carried out by Soviet planes on September 13, 1944. See Craven and Cate, pp. 316-317.

³ For a message from Winant dated September 18, 1944, announcing that 107 American planes had dropped supplies over Warsaw on that date, see *post*, p. 491.

D. ITALY

Roosevelt Papers

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposals of British Chiefs of Staff for Disposition of Italian Overseas Territories

I refer to your memorandum of April 28² in regard to certain proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff for the future disposition of Italian overseas territories.³

In accordance with your request, I am enclosing a memorandum on the subject which embodies the comments and recommendations of the experts in the Department charged with these matters. While the conclusions drawn are in no sense final, they represent long and careful study.

I may add that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed the view that from the limited viewpoint of our national security, there are no direct objections to the British proposals for the disposition of Italian overseas territories since United States postwar military interests are not directly affected.⁴ From the broader view of national and world-

¹ Sent by pouch to Quebec, where Roosevelt made the paper available to Churchill and approved the making of a copy for the British authorities. See *post*, p. 418, including fn. 2. The Department of State record copy of this memorandum is on file 865.014/4-2844.

² Not printed (865.014/4-2844).

³ These proposals, as summarized by Hull in a memorandum to Roosevelt dated April 26, 1944, on the basis of information received from the United States Mission at Algiers, were as follows:

"1. Eritrea would be dismembered with the western highlands going to the Sudan and the highlands and Danakil coastal plain to Ethiopia. It is assumed that the United Nations would not request a base at Massawa. A greater new Somaliland would be created including Italian Somaliland, the northern frontier district of Kenya and British and Ethiopian Ogaden Somaliland, the whole preferably under British trusteeship.

"2. Cyrenaica would be an autonomous principality under Egyptian suzerainty with adequate safeguards for United Nations military requirements, including facilities for air and naval bases in the Benghazi area. The offer of suzerainty to Egypt is considered a useful bargaining counter.

"3. Tripolitania would be restored to Italy subject to guarantees of demilitarization and retention by the British of the right to use Castel Benito Airfield as a staging point.

"4. There would be frontier readjustments with the French except in the Fezzan area.

"5. The Oweinat and Sarra triangle would be returned to the Sudan.

"6. Castelrosso would go to Turkey and the remainder of the Dodecanese to Greece, subject to the right of Great Britain to use bases in Crete and other facilities for bases in the islands, particularly Rhodes. Such facilities might be provided under some United Nations scheme.

"7. Pantelleria and the Pelagians would be under effective British control either directly or through some general security scheme." (865.014/210)

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 107, fn. 4.

wide security, however, the Chiefs of Staff have expressed the opinion that the United States should not support any such British proposals prior to ascertaining Russian views.

In my memorandum of May 6⁵ I mentioned that according to our information the proposals in question had not been considered by the British War Cabinet and in no way represented the policy of the British Government. I have, therefore, not discussed the subject with the British nor has any indication been given that we are aware of these particular proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Enclosure]

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 3, 1944.

MEMORANDUM

[Subject:] Comment on British Proposals for Disposition of Italian Overseas Territories

1. The preferred solution to the problem of Eritrea is for all of this territory to be assimilated to Ethiopia under an arrangement whereby the Ethiopian Government would assume certain obligations by agreement with the International Organization. Among these obligations would be an undertaking by Ethiopia, in the event of a threat to the security of the Red Sea or Northeast African areas, to open all ports, airfields and means of communication in Eritrea to the forces of the United Nations. Such obligations would also include the employment, in both Eritrea and Ethiopia, of technical personnel for the operation of ports, railways and roads, and of technical experts and advisers in the central and provincial government and administration.

This arrangement would satisfy the claims of Ethiopia for the return of Eritrea and for an outlet to the sea at Massawa, under safeguards for proper administration and with due regard for the security interests of the United Nations. However, if the British should insist, for overriding strategic reasons, on the dismemberment of Eritrea, so that a portion of the territory would be ceded to the Sudan, no objections are perceived strong enough to justify the opposition of this Government, provided that the area ceded lies north and west of Asmara and Massawa.

The *Greater New Somaliland* as proposed by the British would include Italian and British Somaliland and the Ogaden district of Ethiopia. Since the Ogaden is an integral part of the territory of an

⁵ Not printed (885.014/212b).

independent sovereign state and ally, a change in its status should not be considered. On the other hand, economic, administrative and cultural considerations support the view that Italian Somaliland, together with the British and French Somalilands, might advantageously be placed under International Trusteeship and directly administered as a single unit by an authority appointed by and responsible to the International Organization. Such an authority should be composed of experts or of representatives of the interested powers. If it should prove impossible to obtain French acceptance of this plan, it would still appear desirable to place Italian and British Somalilands under International Trusteeship, with special arrangements for a genuinely free port at Djibouti and the possible purchase of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway by Ethiopia.

No objection is perceived to the fusion of the northern frontier district of Kenya with a greater Somaliland, as mentioned in the British proposals.

2. *Libya*. The preferred disposition of Libya would be to place this entire area (Cyrenaica and Tripolitania) under International Trusteeship to be administered by a commission of experts responsible to the International Organization. This would not preclude the establishment of an autonomous Amirate of the Senussi, whom the British have declared shall never again come under Italian rule.⁶ However, if it should prove difficult to obtain British agreement to this over-all solution, a feasible though less desirable arrangement would be to establish Cyrenaica as an autonomous Senussi Amirate under Egyptian (or possibly British) trusteeship, along the lines of the British proposal, and to place Tripolitania under an International Trusteeship to be exercised by Italy.

3. It would be taken for granted that United Nations air and naval requirements would be satisfied in the Benghazi area. Likewise, should Great Britain wish to use the Castel Benito airfield for security purposes, there would be no objection, provided that no exclusive commercial rights or privileges were involved.

4. Limited frontier rectifications in the Fezzan area favoring the French would not appear objectionable, but any outright cession of territory in violation of the Atlantic Charter would be undesirable.

5. No compelling reasons are perceived for the return of the Uweinat oasis or the Sarra triangle to the Sudan, particularly in view of the possible violation of the Atlantic Charter thereby.

6. The Department is in accord with the British suggestion that some United Nations security scheme might provide for bases in Crete—possibly administered by the British—and for similar facilities

⁶ Eden had made a statement to this effect in the House of Commons on January 8, 1942. See *Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons Official Report*, 5th series, vol. 377, col. 78.

in the Islands of the Dodecanese, particularly Rhodes. It is agreed that with the exception of Castelrosso, which would be given to Turkey, sovereignty over the Dodecanese should be transferred to Greece.

7. Pantelleria and the *Isole Pelagie* should be retained by Italy but completely demilitarized.

865.48/9-1144 : Telegram

*The President's Personal Representative at Vatican City (Taylor)
to the President and the Secretary of State*

RESTRICTED

VATICAN CITY, September 11, 1944.

URGENT

313. For the President and the Secretary.

My greatest present concern is that with the completion of Italian National Committee for the Distribution of Italian Relief the material accumulated in America will not be available in Italy through failure to ship according to schedule. First shipment should now have arrived. If not delivered reaction damaging to prestige we have built up will be very unfortunate. Reported statements from America indicate intention of substantial and adequate relief for Italy is the policy of our government. While we in America understand the shipping difficulties, the people in distress do not. Would it be possible to allocate one or two ships for strictly relief voyages with standard cargoes of staples and essentials and keep them constantly en route bringing relief to stricken populations? It seems to me with such vessels loaded at a given port in America and destined for convenient ports in Italy, a minimum of time would be lost in loading and unloading and the delays and complications resulting from mixed cargoes, munitions and other vital products would be avoided. A simple plan of this character would seem deserving of careful study.

TAYLOR

865.48/9-1244 : Telegram

*The Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy (Kirk) to the
Secretary of State*

SECRET

CASERTA, September 12, 1944.

362. General Wilson has received word from London that the War Cabinet has requested British Service of Supplies to submit data on existing arrangements for administration of relief in Italy, expenditures thereon up to present time and has inquired as to what steps are being taken to get agricultural and industrial production restarted in Italy. This message adds that General O'Dwyer has apparently taken

a full report to Washington ¹ which will undoubtedly become available to British in due course but that the War Office would be grateful if General Wilson in the meantime could transmit a copy of this report with his comments urgently so that it might be available to the War Cabinet. War Office also requested any additional pertinent information on this subject.

KIRK

¹ See *ante*, p. 210.

Hopkins Papers

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President ¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 13, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have had several talks with General O'Dwyer, Crowley and the State Department relative to the Italian business. The attached memo supplements the statement which you have with you on Italy.²

It seems to me that there are great advantages to be accrued to us if you can take the initiative and get Churchill's approval to a course of action which you would announce publicly.

The machinery for getting quick action relative to immediate relief and the purchase of material for economic rehabilitation is available. The Italians can pay for all of the goods to be bought in this country, other than emergency relief supplies, out of funds which would accrue to them from our soldiers' pay.

The Prisoner of War business, I think, should be cleared up just as soon as possible and, of equal importance, is the obvious necessity of amending the Armistice terms.

H[ARRY] L. H[OPKINS]

[Attachment]

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State ³

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

[Undated.]

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS, THE WHITE HOUSE

I refer to Mr. Jones' conversation with you Monday morning, September 11.

¹ Sent to Quebec by pouch.

² *Ante*, p. 207.

³ Neither the copy of this memorandum in the Hopkins Papers nor the Department of State record copy (863.50/9-1344) indicates who initialed this paper for transmittal to Hopkins. It was drafted on September 13, 1944, by J. Wesley Jones of the Division of Southern European Affairs.

American policy toward Italy is based upon our desire to see that nation return to political and economic independence and stability as quickly as possible. We do not believe that Italy will contribute to an orderly and peaceful Europe if it is subject to any one of its more powerful neighbors. This Government has specifically assured the Italian people the right to choose the form of government they may desire when they are in a position to exercise that right. Political independence for Italy, free from foreign domination, would seem to be implicit in this pledge.

The economic well-being of a country is the prime factor in its internal stability and its peaceful relations with other states. The economic dependence of one state upon another is not conducive to such well-being and may ultimately have undesirable political implications. Furthermore, since the United States is bearing the major share of the civilian supply quota for Italy, it is sound American policy to help Italy again become self-supporting and to regain a measure of economic independence at an early date.

In the immediate future increased civilian supplies, principally foodstuffs, are essential to prevent further deterioration in Italian public health and morale in the ever-increasing portions of liberated Italy. The three principal problems to be solved are :

- (1) Available shipping to carry supplies from this country.
- (2) Internal transportation to distribute it to the various populated centers.
- (3) Method of payment.

A specific and sufficient allocation of shipping for civilian supplies should be obtained from the War Department or other United States agency.

Two thousand trucks are needed for the distribution of supplies for civilians in the present liberated area. Army trucks within the theater should be made available to the extent possible (not convenient) by the Supreme Allied Command. Once hostilities have ceased, a sufficient number of United States Army trucks and tractors in the theater could be made available for this purpose until the internal transportation system can be rehabilitated at least in a basic sense.

When the dollar equivalent of American troop pay spent in Italy, plus immigrant remittances and Italian exports to this country, is made available to the Italian Government, almost all the foreign exchange required for the purchase of civilian supplies in this country will be provided. (It is believed that this proposal is at present on the President's desk, having received British concurrence, and could be put into effect immediately if approved.) Limited UNRRA participation in the medical field and in assistance to displaced persons of Italian nationality up to \$50,000,000 is essential to supplement the civilian supply

program mentioned above. Every effort therefore should be made to assure that agreement to this proposal is given at the UNRRA conference in Montreal this month.

As to the second phase of Italy's economic problems, we should now make possible the primary rehabilitation of its agriculture and essential industries in order that the Italian nation can begin to be self-supporting again. Hence the Italian supply program should not be limited, as it has been so far, to consumers' goods but should make available fertilizer, seeds, spare parts and essential raw materials to permit the resumption of Italian production for the nation's basic consumers' needs. This will require not only a sufficient shipping allocation but sufficient funds to finance such a program even on a limited scale. The United States' funds to be made available to the Italian Government from troop pay, immigration remittances, et cetera, will probably not cover such an undertaking in addition to the consumers' goods which must be purchased over the next year for immediate consumption by the population. The following additional methods of financing might prove feasible.

(1) The War Department could continue its present practice of certifying Lend-Lease funds, on the basis of military necessity, to finance a civilian supply program of minimum subsistence. This would provide for the principal portion of the importation of consumers' goods, and the foreign exchange available to the Italian Government from troop pay, et cetera, would then be sufficient to finance a basic rehabilitation program for Italian agriculture and industry.

(2) Private Italian assets in this country, estimated roughly at \$74,000,000, could be taken over by the Italian Government and used as security for an Italian Government loan from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for the purchase of basic rehabilitation supplies.

On the political side it is desirable to clarify our relations with Italy, which has been a co-belligerent with the United Nations in the war against Germany for almost a year. During that time the Italian Government—Armed Forces and people—have cooperated sincerely and to the best of their limited resources in the common fight. They have “worked their passage” to a considerable extent. The United States and Great Britain could revise Italian Armistice terms which have been rendered largely obsolete by the course of events, or we could conclude a preliminary peace treaty with Italy, terminating the state of war existing between it and the United Nations, postponing for future settlement the more complicated issues of territorial dispositions and reparations.

Specific steps should meanwhile be undertaken immediately to support the representative and liberal Italian Government and to encourage the various democratic groups in Italy who are working for the regeneration of their country. These might include:

(1) The removal from prisoner-of-war status of Italian soldiers in the British Empire, North Africa, Italy and this country and their return to regular military status under Italian Command with ultimate authority for their disposition and use resting in the Allied Theater Commander or respective British and American military authorities. It is an anomalous situation, to say the least, that while Italian divisions are fighting with the United Nations on the Italian front and Italian resources are being employed to the fullest extent in the common struggle against Germany, we continue to hold Italian prisoners of war not only abroad but in Italy itself. The non-combat services which they are now performing in these areas could be performed as effectively if they had the status of Italian soldiers under Italian command. A solution of this problem would be a concrete and important gesture of support to the present Italian Government.

(2) The acceptance of Italian technical representatives by the various United Nations to handle financial and economic problems and to resume the protection of Italian interests in the various United Nations which is still being performed by third powers.

(3) Italian participation in the various international organizations, such as the ILO, UNRRA, Food and Agricultural Organization, Financial and Monetary Conference, et cetera. Italy also desires to subscribe to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, this without reference to membership in the United Nations.

(4) Resumption of United States' participation in the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome until such time as it is superseded or absorbed by the proposed Food and Agricultural Organization.

A copy of a memorandum which was prepared in this office for the President's use in Quebec⁴ is attached for your information.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 207.

J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Wilson)
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

CASERTA, 13 September 1944.

PRIORITY

FX 24540 to AGWar for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated to UK Base Section for British Chiefs of Staff, HQ Com Zone Main and SHAEF for information signed Wilson cite RHCOS. This is NAF 778.

Subject is guidance on economic policy for Italy.

1. As battle line in Italy moves north and the operational phase in large portions of occupied territory is terminated, I feel that approach to problems of civilian supply and economic rehabilitation must be re-examined. While purely military considerations remain pre-

¹ Sent to the War Department at Washington; relayed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Quebec.

dominant in the forward areas, problems associated with civil administration, particularly of an economic character, raise general questions on which I, in my capacity as President of the Allied Control Commission, require guidance.

2. During the active operational phase, activities of an economic character conducted by the Allied Control Commission and other agencies in Italy under my command of necessity have been directly related to support of military operations. Supplies have been imported and distributed to the civilian population in order to minimize disease and prevent unrest, and efforts toward economic rehabilitation have had the primary, if not the exclusive, purpose of utilizing Italy's resources for the war effort and producing in Italy goods which would otherwise have had to be imported.

3. In the light of the changed operational situation the limited directives which have governed seem no longer to be adequate. The Armistice agreement, under which the Allied Control Commission operates, contains no commitment to the Italian people as to any measure of material assistance. However, there has arisen in Italy the expectation, if not the assumption, presumably by reason of the known humanitarian policies of the two governments, that an additional measure of assistance and relief to the civil population would be forthcoming. Public utterances in both countries have tended to support this view. Moreover, if the two governments continue at this stage to consider only what is required in the interest of the war effort, they may lose the opportunity of ensuring one of their own long term interests, i.e., the establishment of a reasonably prosperous and contented Italy after the war. Notwithstanding this fact the standard of military necessity still obtains and in the provision of supply is being strictly adhered to. For example, a clothing programme was submitted in June (LAC airgram 32²) based on the estimated essential needs of the population this winter, but also having regard to the anti-inflationary effects of an increased supply of consumer goods. I am now asked, however, (CAL 738²) to certify that this clothing is the minimum requirement to prevent disease and unrest which would prejudice military operations. As another example, not of great importance in itself but indicating the type of question which is now arising, in response to a requisition of paper essential for proper keeping of Italian tax records, it is asked (CAL 566²) whether the paper is necessary "to control and manage the civil population."

4. For the foregoing reasons I request that directives which govern the provision of civilian supply and economic rehabilitation be re-examined and that, if the policy of the governments is to furnish aid to Italy beyond that required by strict military necessity of the Allied

² Not printed.

Forces, the standards applicable to that aid be revised. In particular I request that I be informed :

a. To what extent, if any, I may take into account factors tending toward inflation, and to what degree I am responsible for measures to counter these tendencies.

b. To what extent, if any, is it desired that industrial rehabilitation in Italy be carried out and if any rehabilitation is intended what industries should be given precedence?

c. Within the limitations of available shipping, to what extent, if any, are exports to be stimulated and machinery to handle export trade developed?

5. If my revised directive gives me responsibilities in the economic field broader than those now existing, I may require additional personnel of suitable technical training and experience, presumably drawn more from civil than military ranks. I am, as I have already indicated, prepared to accept qualified civilian experts in major proportion in the Allied Control Commission as soon as they are available.

Roosevelt Papers

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

TOP SECRET

QUEBEC, September 14, 1944.

MY DEAR FRIEND, The office of Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission, formerly held by General MacFarlane, is vacant. This is a British appointment. In order to have more political knowledge and experience in this post, so full of economic and political issues and so important for the welfare of the Italian people, I propose to appoint Mr. Harold Macmillan.¹ The Supreme Allied Commander is ex officio President of the Allied Control Commission. He would in practice delegate his functions to Mr. Macmillan.

I propose to leave Mr. Macmillan his present duties as British Resident Minister at A.F.H.Q., and British Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander. This is a simplification and reduction of British Staff.

It is proposed also that the day to day management of the Control Commission, apart from general political guidance (Macmillan), should be in the hands of the Deputy Chief Commissioner of the Commission, the United States representative, Mr. Stone, in whom we have great confidence. He would, if necessary, have a Lieutenant-General under him to assist in the administration and in carrying out effectively the policy. This would widen his scope and power.

I hope that these arrangements will be agreeable to you, as I should not like to make an appointment, even where it falls to me to do so,

¹ Cf. Churchill's letter to Roosevelt dated September 12, 1944, *ante*, p. 42.

that does not work into the scheme of our close Anglo-American cooperation.²

I should like to discuss with Anthony³ a suggestion that came up yesterday, namely, that Mayor La Guardia should pay a visit to Italy as your representative, and that while there he should be invited to attend the meetings of the Allied Control Commission.⁴ Thus he would have a chance to see that the machinery was working in the manner most beneficial to the Italians. I have a series of other proposals helpful to the Italians, on which I hope we shall be in full agreement. I would run through these with you, perhaps to-morrow, when Anthony will be here.

It is urgent to appoint Macmillan, because the post of Chief Commissioner has been vacant for two months, and I am becoming blameworthy in the matter, especially if any food shortage or needless unemployment should arise.

Yours always,

W[INSTON S. CHURCHILL]

² No reply by Roosevelt has been found, but a telegram from Churchill to the President dated October 22, 1944, referred to the agreement reached at Quebec that Macmillan would be appointed Acting President of the Allied Commission (see telegram No. 339 to Kirk at Rome, October 27, 1944; 740.00119 Control (Italy)/9-2944). The fact that Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed on the Macmillan appointment was released to the press on November 10, 1944. See Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XI, November 12, 1944, p. 583.

³ Eden.

⁴ The suggested La Guardia mission had also been mentioned earlier, as it is referred to in a letter from Churchill to Roosevelt, at Quebec, dated September 12, 1944. See *ante*, p. 42.

Roosevelt Papers

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

TOP SECRET

QUEBEC, [September 16, 1944.]

MR. PRESIDENT. I return the Memorandum you gave me about Italian Colonies.¹

The Foreign Office would like to treat this as an official communication if you would allow us to keep a copy of it.²

It seems that the usual broad and substantial measure of agreement exists between us, but we should like to look into the details more closely.

W[INSTON] S C[HURCHILL]
16.9.44.

¹ The paper attached to this communication is the ribbon copy of Hull's memorandum to Roosevelt of September 11, 1944. *ante*, p. 408.

² Attached to this memorandum in the Roosevelt Papers is the following handwritten note: "The President told the P.M. OK to keep copies of attached & he also said he wanted an answer from the British on it. D[OROTHY] J B[RADY]."

E. LEND-LEASE FOR FRANCE

Roosevelt Papers

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

[Subject:] French Lend Lease Agreement

We need instruction from you on one important phase of this proposed agreement;² i.e., how to deal with Monnet's request, which I understand he mentioned to you, for industrial items to get French production going again for the maintenance of the civil population.

We have been working under the memorandum of July 15, 1944,³ which you approved. This provides that

(a) The French get under straight lend lease what you approve as *necessary military aid* for their forces and for short-life supplies for war production. When you determine the aid to be no longer necessary, they will accept and pay for on credit terms the undelivered, non-munitions items you have authorized.

(b) They pay currently in cash for food, clothing, and other items consumed by the civil population.

(c) [Here is the trouble.⁴] Long-life industrial articles and other industrial articles would be furnished to them on credit only if necessary to the prosecution of the war in Europe or to the maintenance of Allied forces in the period immediately following an armistice in Europe.

Viewed as of the present date and position of the war, the memorandum of July 15th means, in effect, a rejection of Monnet's program and would require the French to pay cash currently for all items not required as necessary military aid. I do not think you intended, nor would I recommend, so flat a position. On the other hand, you would not wish to approve at this stage the French program, amounting as it does to something over a billion dollars of industrial items to be paid for on credit terms. I do not think that there is any formula which describes what you may wish to approve and what you may not wish to approve. What seems to me necessary is to leave in your hands complete discretion to do what you may think necessary from time to time in the light of French behavior.

Therefore, I recommend that you authorize us to provide that such long-life articles and such other articles as may be included from time

¹ Sent to Hopkins for transmittal to Roosevelt. See Hopkins' memorandum of September 12, 1944, *infra*. Concerning the discussion of lend-lease for France at the Second Quebec Conference, see *ante*, p. 295.

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, pp. 748 ff.

³ Not printed (851.24/7-1544), but see *ibid.*, p. 757, for the memorandum presented to the Delegation of the French Committee of National Liberation on July 20, 1944, following Roosevelt's approval of Hull's memorandum of July 15.

⁴ This sentence appears in brackets in the source text.

to time in a list to be attached to the agreement, and which are contracted for or purchased before you determine that aid under the Act ⁵ is no longer necessary for the prosecution of the war, we shall deliver (subject to your right of cancellation in the national interest) and the French shall accept and pay for on credit terms. I recommend also that you instruct the Foreign Economic Administration to submit to you proposed French programs under this provision before they are included in the list. Such a disposition of the matter will give authority to go ahead, with flexible control in your hands to do as much or as little as you determine to be desirable at any time.

The Foreign Economic Administration agrees with this proposal.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

⁵ i.e., the Act of March 11, 1941 (55 Stat. 31), as amended.

Roosevelt Papers

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President ¹

WASHINGTON, September 12, 1944.

MR. PRESIDENT: I think this ² is O.K.—it gives the final decision to you and in the present situation, that I think is essential.

If you will initial this, the matter will be handled that way.³

HARRY

¹ This entire memorandum is in Hopkins' handwriting. It was sent to Roosevelt at Quebec by pouch, together with Hull's memorandum of September 11, 1944, *supra*.

² i.e., Hull's memorandum of September 11, *supra*.

³ Roosevelt, instead of approving Hull's memorandum of September 11, *supra*, referred it to Morgenthau under cover of the following memorandum dated at Quebec, September 14, 1944: "Will you handle this with Harry Hopkins and Cordell Hull? F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]. P.S. Please return original to us." (Roosevelt Papers)

Roosevelt also asked Morgenthau, at Quebec, to discuss lend-lease to the Soviet Union with Hull and Stimson. See *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, 1945, p. 138. No indication has been found that lend-lease to the Soviet Union was discussed internationally at the Second Quebec Conference.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of the Treasury (Bell) to the Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) ¹

[WASHINGTON,] 14 September 1944.

Status of French lend lease negotiations on September 14.

1. The French have been told that the basic question of the scope and time limit of the Lend Lease Agreement has been placed before the President for decision.

¹ Sent to the White House Map Room, which transmitted it to Morgenthau at Quebec as telegram No. MR-out-404. Morgenthau had telephoned Bell from Quebec to ask for a report on this subject. See *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, 1945, p. 139.

2. The State Department and FEA have agreed on a draft (6th draft, dated September 11) ² of a lend lease agreement which *permits*

(a) Long life industrial reconstruction goods to go to the French under long term credits (Section 3c of the Lend Lease Act). This provision permits requisitions to be accepted by FEA until at least the *end of the war with Japan* and provides that the requisitions once accepted would be filled regardless of the end of the war with Japan. This would obviously enable a large scale program of reconstruction for France. (Monnet has a program ready of \$2 billion for which he proposes to have requisitions placed immediately.)

(b) The agreement permits giving the French on a straight Lend Lease basis, short-lived industrial goods and materials purportedly for French war production until at least the end of the war with Japan.

3. Secretary Hull has sent a memorandum to the President ³ through Harry Hopkins pointing out

(a) This draft lend lease agreement goes beyond the July 15 memorandum which the President approved.⁴

(b) This memorandum proposes that the possibility of excessive leniency in the administration be controlled by requiring FEA to submit to someone in the White House all programs and proposals for lend lease assistance before requisitions are accepted by FEA.

This memorandum to the President is now before the President at Quebec for his approval. State Department has not given us a copy of this memorandum although the State Department promised to clear this memorandum with us before it went to the President.

4. As you know the original memorandum which went to the President during the French negotiations on July 15 was designed to limit lend lease to France to the end of hostilities in Europe. Mr. McCloy and General Hildring of the War Department have definitely stated that French industrial production will be of no help in fighting the war in Europe and that the help which a reconstructed French industry will give to us in fighting the war with Japan can be "put in your right eye".

The importance of the phrase which will limit the scope of the program to the end of the war is that the *immediate* set of requisitions for aid will be much greater in volume under the prospect of a long war against Japan than it would be under the certainty of a short war in Europe.

5. The argument used to justify broadening the scope of the Lend Lease Agreement is that we should give the fullest discretion possible

² Not printed.

³ *Ante*, p. 419.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 419, fn. 3.

to the President. This argument has no basis in fact. The President already has all the discretion he needs under the Lend Lease Act. If after the war in Europe comes to an end, the President feels that France is making a contribution to the war in the Pacific or should for other reasons be entitled to reconstruction under Lend Lease, he can enter into a new agreement at that time. The only additional "discretion" gained by signing the agreement, as recommended by State and FEA, and immediately making large supply commitments thereunder, is to present Congress and the public with a *fait accompli* when the war in Europe is over. If the Congress should cut off Lend Lease following the end of hostilities in Europe, any attempt to rely on large requisitions placed under a previously existing agreement with the French (having no relation to the war in Europe) as permitting the reconstruction of France would be politically impossible and highly undesirable.

6. As we see it, the broadened scope of the memorandum will have the following effects:

(a) Since the French have already been presented with a memorandum limiting the scope of lend lease to hostilities in Europe, the change to permit lend lease at least until the end of the war with Japan will obviously lead the French to believe that the President has agreed to a reconstruction program for France. This is particularly true in the light of informal commitments which have been made to the French by various people in FEA and State to this effect. It follows that this will be construed by the French as being a major political victory arising from their strategy of playing one department of the United States Government against another on financial questions.

(b) Although the program being presented to the President provides for approval by the White House of the implementation of this agreement, it is obvious that the White House is not and should not be placed in a position to police detailed supply programs. The door will be wide open for reconstructing France under the Lend Lease Act without understandings as to the role of France in the future of Europe and of the world, and particularly of French participation in the war against Japan.

7. In conclusion, quite contrary to the avowed purpose of the proposal to give discretion to the President, its practical effect will be to tie his hands with respect to our dealings with the French at the termination of the war in Europe much more than would otherwise be the case.

DAN BELL

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President's Secretary (Tully)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 15, 1944.

MR-OUT-412. Personal and secret to Miss Grace Tully from Harry Hopkins.

I sent to the President memorandum entitled French Lend Lease Agreement and dated September 11th from the State Department.¹ FEA and State Department are anxious to know whether the President has initialed it.

Could you help me get an answer on this tomorrow?

HARRY HOPKINS

¹ *Ante*, p. 419.

Roosevelt Papers

The Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) to the President

[QUEBEC,] September 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In regard to proposal for Lend Lease to France, my recommendation is that for the time being we postpone taking any action.¹

H[ENRY] M[ORGENTHAU,] JR.

Approved: F[RANKLIN] D R[OSEVELT]

¹ Morgenthau telephoned Hopkins to tell him of this recommendation (Morgenthau Diary, vol. 772). Cf. *ante*, p. 371.

F. SHIPMENT OF ARMS TO ETHIOPIA

Editorial Note

On September 13, 1944, Hull sent to Roosevelt a memorandum on shipment of arms to Ethiopia so that the President would be prepared if Churchill raised the question at the forthcoming Quebec Conference. For the text of Hull's memorandum, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. V, pp. 73-74. No indication has been found that the subject of the memorandum was actually discussed by Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec.

G. VOTING FORMULA IN THE UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt[Translation ¹]

SECRET

Secret and personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to President F. D. Roosevelt.

I have received your message regarding the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks.²

I also hope that these important discussions may end successfully. This may be of serious significance for the further strengthening of cooperation of our countries and for the whole cause of future peace and security.

I must say that for the success of the activities of the International Security Organization, of great significance will be the order of voting in the Council, having in mind the importance that the Council work on the basis of the principle of coordination and unanimity of the four leading powers on all questions, including those which directly relate to one of these nations. The initial American proposal that there should be established a special procedure of voting in case of a dispute in which one or several members of the Council, who have the statute [*status?*] of permanent members, are directly involved, seems to me correct. Otherwise will be brought to naught the agreement achieved among us at the Teheran Conference which is proceeding from the principle of provision, first of all, *the unanimity of agreement of four powers* necessary for the struggle against aggression in the future.

Such a unanimity proposes [*presupposes?*], of course, that among these powers there is no room for mutual suspicions. As to the Soviet Union, it cannot also ignore the presence of certain absurd prejudices which *often* hinder an actually objective attitude toward the U.S.S.R.

¹ This translation accompanied the Russian-language original when the message was delivered in Washington by the Soviet Embassy. The translation was forwarded to Roosevelt at Quebec by the White House Map Room in telegram No. MR-OUT-407, September 15, 1944. By direction of the President (telegram No. MR-IN-153), a copy was sent to Stettinius.

² Roosevelt had instructed Harriman on September 8, 1944, to deliver a message asking Stalin to instruct the Soviet delegation to the Dumbarton Oaks conversations on the proposed world organization, then in progress in Washington, to agree to the position of the British and United States delegations that members of the Council of the proposed organization should not vote in disputes to which they were parties, this rule to apply even to permanent members of the Council (who could otherwise exercise a veto). For the text of Roosevelt's message, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. 1, pp. 788-789.

And the other nations also should weigh the consequences which the lack of unanimity among the leading powers may bring about.

I hope that you will understand the seriousness of the considerations expressed here and that we shall find a harmonious solution of this question as well.

[Moscow,] September 14, 1944.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 14, 1944.

For immediate personal attention of the President.

1. Yesterday Ambassador Gromyko notified me and Cadogan that he had received his instructions on the question of voting in the council. He said that his Government maintained its insistence upon the inviolability of the principle of the unanimity of the four great powers. He said that he had made a number of other concessions but that there was no possibility of his being authorized to give in on this point.

2. Yesterday afternoon and evening we worked hard with the British and Russians devising a compromise formula which would provide that in all procedures concerning pacific settlement of disputes, the votes of all members of the council parties to such disputes should not be counted but that in procedures concerned with enforcement action decisions by the council must be on the basis of the concurrence of members having permanent seats on the council, including parties to the dispute.

3. Gromyko is tentatively sounding out his government on this new formula. Mr. Hull is considering the matter carefully. May we have your views as promptly as possible?

4. All other developments have been reported to you in my daily progress reports.²

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]
Under Secretary of State

¹ Delivered to the White House Map Room; forwarded to Roosevelt at Quebec as telegram No. MR-OUT-403.

² For Stettinius' progress report to Hull dated September 14, 1944, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 807-809.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1944.

Supplementing yesterday's wire on voting procedure,² it may be helpful for you to have before you the exact text of the formula which is now being studied by the three governments as a possible solution. You will note the size of the majority vote is left blank. The Russians want 51 percent and the British want two-thirds.

"C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions with respect to the following matters should be taken by blank majority vote including the concurring votes of the permanent members of the Security Council :

- a.* All decisions coming under section VIII-B, entitled 'Determination of Threats to the Peace, Acts of Aggression, or any Breaches of the Peace, and Action with Respect Thereto', and under Section VIII-C, entitled 'Regional Arrangements'.

- b.* All matters relating to [disarmament]³ and regulation of armaments.

- c.* Recommendations to the General Assembly with regard to admission of new members, suspension and restoration of rights of membership, and expulsion of members.

- d.* Establishment by the Security Council of its subsidiary bodies or agencies.

3. Decisions under Section VIII-A, entitled 'Pacific Settlement of Disputes', should be taken by blank majority including the concurring votes of the permanent members of the council, but excluding the votes of that member or members of the council as are parties to the dispute.

4. All other decisions should be taken by blank majority vote."

The result of adopting this procedure would be that consideration and recommendations with regard to pacific settlement of disputes referred to in numbered paragraph three above would be taken without the vote of the party to the dispute even if that party happens to be a permanent member of the council and that consideration and decisions as to enforcement action of any kind would require the unanimous consent of all the permanent members of the council, whether or not one of them is involved.

¹ Delivered to the White House Map Room ; forwarded to Roosevelt at Quebec as telegram No. MR-OUT-410. Roosevelt discussed the subject matter of this telegram with Churchill on two different occasions on September 15. See *ante*, p. 362.

² *Supra*.

³ Brackets appear in the source text.

In view of the fact that this, if accepted, would represent a substantial concession to the Soviet point of view, we feel that we would be justified in trying to obtain their consent to the two-thirds majority vote.

Could we have your views as soon as convenient, both as regards the formula in the text and the size of majority vote?

E[DWARD] S[ETTINIUS] ⁴
Under Secretary of State

⁴ This telegram was initialed on Stettinius' behalf by G. Hayden Raynor.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)*¹

[QUEBEC,] 15 September 1944.

Memorandum from the President for the Under Secretary of State.

Neither the Prime Minister nor I are inclined to approve the proposed amendment.²

My thought has been that this amendment or a general reference to the subject should be mentioned in the agreement as having been discussed but without reaching any agreement or decision, thus leaving it up to the meeting of the United Nations.

Mr. Churchill, on the other hand, is afraid that this procedure will be unacceptable to the Russians, as they would know that they would be overwhelmingly defeated in a United Nations' meeting and that they would get sore and try to take it out on all of us on some other point.

That is about the only information I can give you. Cadogan will return Monday, I think, and he can give you any further news.³

I think we should keep on trying but if we cannot agree on this or any other point, I am inclined to favor either not mentioning disagreement or putting disagreements under a general statement that certain points have not been agreed on. I am still greatly in favor of a reference to the United Nations for discussion as soon as possible.

¹ Received as telegram No. MR-IN-154 at the White House Map Room, which forwarded the message to Stettinius.

² Quoted in Stettinius' telegram of September 15, 1944, *supra*.

³ When Cadogan returned from Quebec to Washington, he stated that he had been instructed to inform Stettinius and Gromyko officially that the British Government could not endorse the compromise voting formula which Stettinius had sent to Roosevelt at Quebec. See *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. I, p. 815, fn. 96. Stettinius later learned from Gromyko that he had also received official instructions that the formula was unacceptable. See *ibid.*, p. 816.

H. THE WAR IN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*TOP SECRET
C.C.S. 674/1

[QUEBEC,] 12 September 1944.

ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND OF "DRAGOON" FORCES BY SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the following message be sent to SCAEF and SACMed at once:¹

"Effective 15 September SCAEF will assume command of DRAGOON forces according to plan recommended in SCAF 77."²

¹ The dispatch of the message quoted below was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 172d Meeting, September 12, 1944. See *ante*, p. 306. The message was sent as telegram No. FACS 76.

² *Ante*, p. 232.

J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Eisenhower)*¹TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

[QUEBEC,] 12 September 1944.

OCTAGON 16. TopSec to SHAEF France for Eisenhower, FACS 78 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the proposals set out in SCAF 78.²

2. In transmitting this approval, the Combined Chiefs of Staff draw your attention:—

a. To the advantages of the northern line of approach into Germany, as opposed to the southern. They note with satisfaction that you appear to be of the same mind.

b. To the necessity for opening up the northwest ports, and particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam, before the bad weather sets in.

¹ This message was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 172d Meeting, September 12, 1944. See *ante*, p. 302.

² *Ante*, p. 234.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 12 September 1944.

C.C.S. 677

FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The views of the United States Chiefs of Staff with regard to General Wilson's progress report as submitted in NAF 774² and MEDCOS 181³ are as follows:

Part or all of the Fifth Army should be transferred to France, if it can be used effectively in the attack on Germany. The timing of the transfer and the route, whether overland or by sea, is dependent on the progress and outcome of the present offensive in Italy.

If General Eisenhower indicates that he does not require a part or all of the U.S. forces now in Italy, they should then be utilized to clear the Germans from Italy and to assist British forces in operations to the northeastward toward Vienna.

The transfer of part or all of the Twelfth Air Force to France should be dependent on the progress and outcome of the present offensive in Italy, and more particularly on the disposition of the Fifth Army. The Fifteenth Air Force can best perform its mission by remaining at its Foggia bases.

¹ For the consideration of this paper by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 172d Meeting, September 12, 1944, see *ante*, p. 302.

² *Ante*, p. 230.

³ *Ante*, p. 224.

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 13 September 1944.

C.C.S. 677/1

FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Reference: CCS 172d Meeting, Item 5c.¹

The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered the draft message to General Wilson proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff (Enclosure "A") in connection with item 5c, C.C.S. 172d Meeting, and recommend

¹ See *ante*, p. 305.

that the Combined Chiefs of Staff dispatch the message attached as Enclosure "B" to SACMed in lieu of Enclosure "A."²

Enclosure "A"

DRAFT TELEGRAM TO GENERAL WILSON PROPOSED BY THE BRITISH
CHIEFS OF STAFF PURSUANT TO ITEM 5c, C.C.S. 172D MEETING

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note of your NAF 774 this morning.

2. The following decisions are sent for your information and guidance in future planning:

(a) There will be no withdrawals from the Fifth U.S. Army, at any rate until the success of General Alexander's operations is ensured.

(b) For the capture of the Istrian Peninsula you may count on having the amphibious lift now in the Mediterranean. You should prepare plans for carrying out this operation as soon as possible. You should submit this plan to Combined Chiefs of Staff at the earliest date, and, in any event, not later than 15th October.

Enclosure "B"

DRAFT TELEGRAM TO GENERAL WILSON PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES
CHIEFS OF STAFF IN CONNECTION WITH ITEM 5c, C.C.S. 172D MEETING

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note of your NAF 774 this morning.

2. The following decisions are sent for your information and guidance in future planning:

(a) There will be no withdrawals of major units from the Fifth U.S. Army until the outcome of the present Italian offensive is known.

(b) For planning the capture of the Istrian Peninsula you may count on having the amphibious lift now in the Mediterranean. You should submit this plan to Combined Chiefs of Staff at the earliest date, and, in any event, not later than 10th October.

² At their 173d Meeting, September 13, 1944, the Combined Chiefs approved the dispatch to Wilson of the message printed as enclosure "B", below. See *ante*, p. 322. The message was sent as telegram No. FAN 415.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 13 September 1944.

C.C.S. 520/4 (OCTAGON)

CONTROL OF STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCES IN EUROPE FOLLOWING THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF ALLIED FORCES ON THE CONTINENT

References: a. C.C.S. 150th Mtg.,² Item 5
b. C.C.S. 520 Series³
c. C.C.S. 304/13⁴
d. C.C.S. 172d Mtg., Item 10⁵

1. While not accepting all points in C.C.S. 520/3, the United States Chiefs of Staff agree in principle with the establishment of control of the Strategic Bomber Forces in Europe by the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, RAF⁶ and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe,⁷ acting jointly for the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF⁸ and the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces,⁹ the latter acting as agents of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. In the opinion of the United States Chiefs of Staff, the directive proposed in the Annex to C.C.S. 520/3 is in several respects inadequate, and therefore they recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve and dispatch a revised directive as set forth in the Enclosure.¹⁰

¹ For the consideration of this paper by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 173d and 174th Meetings, September 13 and 14, 1944, see *ante*, pp. 320, 331.

² Held at Washington, March 17, 1944; minutes not printed.

³ Earlier papers in this series are not printed. With respect to C.C.S. 520/3, see *ante*, p. 309, fn. 8.

⁴ "Forces Available to the Supreme Allied Commander for Operation OVERLORD", March 14, 1944; not printed.

⁵ See *ante*, p. 309.

⁶ Air Marshal Sir Norman Bottomley.

⁷ Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz.

⁸ Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal.

⁹ General Henry H. Arnold.

¹⁰ The enclosed draft directive is not printed as such, but it can be reconstructed from the enclosure to C.C.S. 520/6, *post*, p. 432, and the footnotes thereto.

J.C.S. Files

Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 14 September 1944.

C.C.S. 520/6

CONTROL OF STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCES IN EUROPE FOLLOWING THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF ALLIED FORCES ON THE CONTINENT

References: CCS 172d Meeting, Item 10¹
 CCS 173d Meeting, Item 2²
 CCS 174th Meeting, Item 2³
 CCS 680/2, Paragraph 7⁴

The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 174th Meeting approved the directive in C.C.S. 520/4⁵ as amended by C.C.S. 520/5,⁶ and the directive as approved (Enclosure) was dispatched to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, RAF, and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, by the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF, and the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces, for action and furnished to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, for information.

A. J. McFARLAND

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES

Combined Secretariat

Enclosure

TOP SECRET

CONTROL OF STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCES IN EUROPE—DIRECTIVE⁷

Subject: Control of the Strategic Bomber Forces in Europe

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have decided that executive responsibility for the control of the strategic bomber forces in Europe

¹ See *ante*, p. 309.² See *ante*, p. 320.³ See *ante*, p. 331.⁴ *Post*, p. 471. This reference was probably changed or added later, as C.C.S. 680/2 postdated C.C.S. 520/6.⁵ *Supra*.⁶ "Control of Strategic Bomber Forces in Europe Following the Establishment of Allied Forces on the Continent", September 14, 1944. In this memorandum the British Chiefs of Staff accepted the enclosure to C.C.S. 520/4 subject to the inclusion of two new subparagraphs on important industrial areas and attacks in support of the Russian armies. These two proposed amendments were acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff and the language proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff became subparagraphs 5 *c* and 5 *e* in the directive as approved and printed here.⁷ The approved directive is substantively identical with the enclosure to C.C.S. 520/4 except for (a) the inclusion of the two new subparagraphs mentioned in fn. 6, above, and (b) the consequent relettering of subparagraphs 5 *c* and 5 *d* of the enclosure to C.C.S. 520/4 to become subparagraphs 5 *d* and 5 *f* in the final directive.

shall be vested in the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces, jointly.

2. The Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, are designated as representatives of the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces, respectively, for the purpose of providing control and local coordination through consultation.

3. The over-all mission of the strategic air forces is the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic systems and the direct support of land and naval forces.

4. Under this general mission you are to direct your attacks, subject to the exigencies of weather and tactical feasibility, against the systems of objectives and in the order of priority now established by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. When you decide that changes in objectives or priorities are necessary, you will issue the necessary directives and inform the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces.

5. Objectives other than those covered in paragraph 4 above will be attacked in accordance with the following:

a. Counter air force action. As the result of air action against the production, maintenance and operation facilities of the German Air Forces (G.A.F.), its fighting effectiveness has now been substantially reduced. At the same time our combined air strength has been vastly increased. In these circumstances we are no longer justified in regarding the G.A.F. and its supporting industry as a primary objective for attack. Our major effort must now be focused directly upon the vital sources of Germany's war economy. To this end policing attacks against the G.A.F. are to be adjusted so as to maintain tactical conditions which will permit of the maximum impact upon the primary objectives. No fixed priority is, therefore, assigned to policing attacks against the G.A.F. The intensity of such attacks will be regulated by the tactical situation existing.

b. Direct support. The direct support of land and naval operations remains a continuing commitment upon your forces. Upon call from the supreme commanders concerned either for assistance in the battle or to take advantage of related opportunities, you will meet their requirements promptly.

c. Important industrial areas. When weather or tactical conditions are unsuitable for operations against specific primary objectives attacks should be delivered upon important industrial areas by both Bomber Command RAF and USSTAF (using blind bombing technique as necessary).

d. S.O.E. operations. All SOE/OSS operations undertaken by units of RAF Bomber Command and United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe will be in accordance with the requirements of the Supreme Allied Commanders, who will issue the requisite orders from time to time, under existing procedure.

e. Attacks in support of the Russian armies. Attacks in support of operations by the Russian armies should be delivered as prescribed from time to time by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

f. Fleeting targets. There may be certain other targets of great but fleeting importance for the attack of which all necessary plans and preparations should be made. Of these an example would be the important units of the German Fleet in harbor or at sea.

6. You are responsible that the operations of the strategic air forces are coordinated with the operations of the tactical air forces in the theaters.

J.C.S. Files

*Draft Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC, September 14, 1944.]

Enclosure to C.C.S. 680

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER OF THE AGREED
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF
STAFF AT THE "OCTAGON" CONFERENCE

1. The agreed summary of the conclusions reached at OCTAGON Conference is submitted herewith:—

I. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE

2. In conjunction with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

II. OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

3. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

¹ Submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff under cover of a note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 680, "Report to the President and Prime Minister", September 14, 1944). Concerning the discussion of this draft report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 175th Meeting, September 15, 1944, see *ante*, p. 355. For the text of the final report submitted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Roosevelt and Churchill at the conclusion of the Second Quebec Conference, see *post*, p. 469.

5. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the over-all strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation:

a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication.

d. Continue the disruption of Axis sea communications.

e. Continue the offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia to include coordinating the action of forces.

g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

h. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers. Within the limits of our available resources, to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able effectively to employ this assistance against the Axis Powers in the present war.

i. Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as a matter of highest priority having regard to other agreed and/or inescapable commitments as soon as the German situation allows.

j. Continue operations leading to the earliest practicable invasion of Japan.

IV. EXECUTION OF THE OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Defeat of the Axis in Europe

Control of Strategic Bomber Forces in Europe

7. Prior to the launching of OVERLORD an air plan was developed by the Supreme Commander in preparation for and in support of OVERLORD, and in April, 1944, control of the air operations out of England of all the Air Forces involved including the Strategic Air Force and the R.A.F. Bomber Command passed to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. We have now decided that the special conditions which made it desirable that the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, should control all forces operating out of the United Kingdom no longer carry their original force. We have therefore agreed that the control of the Strategic Bomber Force in

Europe shall be exercised by the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe acting jointly for the Chief of the Air Staff, R.A.F. and the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces, the latter acting as agents of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. A Directive (C.C.S. — ²) has accordingly been issued to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, R.A.F. and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe (FACS —).

Operations in North West Europe

8. The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, has reported (SCAF 78 ³) on the course of operations in France and the Low Countries and has given us a review of his future intentions.

9. The Supreme Commander's broad intention is to press on with all speed to destroy the German armed forces and occupy the heart of Germany. He considers his best opportunity of defeating the enemy in the west lies in striking at the Ruhr and Saar since he is convinced that the enemy will concentrate the remainder of his available forces in the defense of these essential areas. The Supreme Commander's first operation will be one to break the Siegfried Line and seize crossings over the Rhine. In doing this his main effort will be on the left. He will then prepare logistically and otherwise for a deep thrust into Germany.

10. We have approved General Eisenhower's proposals and drawn his attention (FACS 78 ⁴) :

a. to the advantages of the northern line of approach into Germany, as opposed to the southern, and

b. to the necessity for the opening up of the northwest ports, particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam, before bad weather sets in.

Operations in Italy

11. We have examined a report by General Wilson (NAF 774 ⁵) on operations within his theatre. In so far as the battle in Italy is concerned he considers that operations will develop in one of two ways :

a. Either Kesselring's forces will be routed, in which case it should be possible to undertake a rapid regrouping and a pursuit towards the Ljubljana Gap (and across the Alps through the Brenner Pass) leaving a small force to clear up northwest Italy, or

b. Kesselring's Army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal, in which event it does not seem possible that we can do more than clear the Lombardy Plains this year. Difficult terrain and severe weather in the Alps during winter would prevent another major offensive until spring of 1945.

² The blanks in this paragraph appear in the source text. The directive referred to was the enclosure to C.C.S. 520/6, *supra*.

³ *Ante*, p. 234.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 428.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 230.

12. We have agreed:

a. that no forces should be withdrawn from Italy until the outcome of General Alexander's present offensive is known.

b. that the desirability of withdrawing formations of the United States Fifth Army should be reconsidered in the light of the results of General Alexander's present offensive and of a German withdrawal in northern Italy and in the light of the views of General Eisenhower.

c. to inform General Wilson that if he wishes to retain for use in the Istrian Peninsula the amphibious lift at present in the Mediterranean he should submit his plan therefor to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible, and not later than 10th October. We have instructed the Supreme Allied Commander accordingly (FAN 415 *).

Operations in the Balkans

13. General Wilson considers that a situation can be anticipated in which the bulk of the German forces south of a line Trieste-Ljubljana-Zagreb and the Danube will be immobilized and will so remain until their supplies are exhausted, in which case they would be ready to surrender to us or will be liquidated by Partisans or the Russian forces. We have noted that as long as the battle in Italy continues there will be no forces available in the Mediterranean to employ in the Balkans except:

a. the small force of two British brigades from Egypt which is being held ready to occupy the Athens area and so pave the way for the commencement of relief and establishment of law and order and the Greek Government.

b. the small Adriatic land forces which are being actively used primarily for commando type operations.

Command of "DRAGOON" Forces

14. Command of the DRAGOON forces operating in Southern France has been transferred as from the 15th September to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (FACS 76 †).

15. Initial adjustments to the command of the air forces operating in support of DRAGOON forces have been made. Further adjustments, on which the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff will be required, are dependent on the development of the campaign in Italy.

16. Logistic support for the DRAGOON forces will for the present continue to be supplied from the Mediterranean area.

Machinery for Coordination of United States-Soviet-British Military Effort

17. Some two months ago Marshal Stalin in conversation with the U.S. Ambassador to Moscow ‡ suggested that improvement should be

* See *ante*, p. 430, fn. 2.

† See *ante*, p. 428, fn. 1.

‡ W. Averell Harriman.

made in the system of military coordination between the U.S.S.R., U.S. and the United Kingdom.

18. We have examined the possibility of improving the coordination with the U.S.S.R. and have instructed the heads of the U.S. and British Military Missions in Moscow⁹ to initiate action at once with the Soviet General Staff with a view to the setting up in Moscow of a Military Committee consisting of Senior Representatives of the Russian General Staff, of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and of the British Chiefs of Staff.¹⁰

19. We have instructed them to make it clear that this Committee will be purely consultative and advisory, with no power to make decisions without reference to the respective Chiefs of Staff and the Russian General Staff and further, that it must not impinge upon the work at present being done by the European Advisory Commission such as civil affairs, et cetera.

20. In our instructions we have stressed that to eliminate the delays now existent in dealings between the Russians and the U.S. and British Military Missions, it is essential that the Russian representative on the Committee should be a senior member of the Russian General Staff. On the U.S. and British sides the heads of the present missions would represent the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff respectively, each being responsible to his own Chiefs of Staff.¹¹

⁹ Major General John R. Deane and Lieutenant General Montagu Brocas Burrows, respectively.

¹⁰ See *ante*, p. 403.

¹¹ For the remaining paragraphs of this draft report, which dealt with the war in the Pacific, see *post*, p. 454.

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET
C.C.S. 684

[QUEBEC,] 15 September 1944.

"RANKIN" PLANNING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER

1. We have noted the request from General Wilson in his telegram (MEDCOS 181)¹ for a firm directive on his responsibilities for RANKIN in the Mediterranean.

2. We ask that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree to the immediate dispatch of the enclosed message to General Wilson.²

¹ *Ante*, p. 224.

² At their 176th Meeting, September 16, 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the message contained in the enclosure. See *ante*, p. 375. The message was sent as telegram No. FAN 418.

Enclosure

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean Theater (Wilson)*

TOP SECRET

Following for General Wilson from Chiefs of Staff.

Reference MEDCOS 153³ and 181.

1. Your planning for RANKIN in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations should proceed on the following basis.

Areas of Occupation

2. You should plan to seize immediate control of countries in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations as follows:—

(a) Austria with four divisions and small tactical air force. Instructions have already been issued in FAN 410 and FAN 411.⁴

(b) Greece with approximately a division of British troops and small air forces. Instructions have already been issued in FAN 409.³

(c) The Dodecanese with approximately 2,400 men.

(d) Venezia Giulia with approximately one division.

3. It is not intended that you should station forces in Yugoslavia or Albania beyond guards which may be required in connection with distribution of supplies. No immediate action by you will be required in Hungary or Roumania.

4. It is not the present intention to send any British troops to Bulgaria.

5. It is intended in due course to offer British naval assistance in the administration of the Danube and in particular in the clearance of mines. On no account however will any British naval forces enter the Danube except after prior agreement with the Russians.

Availability of Forces

6. In estimating what forces are available for the above operations, you should bear the following considerations in mind:

(a) As stated in COSMED 127,³ United States forces will be withdrawn as soon as practicable after the cessation of hostilities.

(b) It will probably be the policy to withdraw Dominion forces as early as possible after the defeat of Germany for repatriation at an early date. Pending repatriation they should not be employed on occupational duties in Austria, Greece or Dodecanese or for internal security duties in Middle East until after discussion with Dominion Governments, which is being initiated forthwith.

³ Not printed.

⁴ Neither printed.

(c) The four British Indian divisions in your command will be withdrawn as early as possible and should not be used for RANKIN operations.

(d) French and Italian divisions will not be used.

(e) The internal security commitment in the Middle East after the defeat of Germany will require three divisions from forces at present in the Mediterranean and Middle East.

7. After making allowance for the above considerations, we calculate that you should have sufficient forces to meet the commitments in paragraph 2 above and still retain a small reserve for contingencies.

8. All the above applies to RANKIN only, i.e., the immediate seizure of control in enemy and enemy occupied territories. Direction upon the final occupation of Europe after the establishment of control will be issued later.

I. THE WAR IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

J.C.S. Files

Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 11 September 1944.

C.C.S. 417/9

OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

The Combined Chiefs of Staff, by informal action, have accepted the following restatement of the over-all objective in the war against Japan (in substitution for that contained in paragraph 3 of C.C.S. 417/2), subject to the agreements recorded in C.C.S. 417/5 as to the assurances requested by the British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 417/4:¹

"To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:

(1) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.

(2) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan."

A. J. McFARLAND

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES

Combined Secretariat

¹ Concerning the three papers cited in this paragraph, see *ante*, p. 265, fn. 2.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 11 September 1944.

C.C.S. 452/26

BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

1. We have seen the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 452/25² concerning British participation in the Pacific in the war against Japan, and we note that no mention is made of the employment of the British Fleet in the main operations against Japan, for which we expressed a preference in C.C.S. 452/18.³

2. In view of the important political considerations involved, we request a formal expression of the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on our first preference—namely, the employment of the Fleet in the main operations against Japan.

¹ For the discussion of this paper by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 174th Meeting, September 14, 1944, see *ante*, p. 331.

² *Ante*, p. 257.

³ *Ante*, p. 244.

J.C.S. Files

Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 12 September 1944.

C.C.S. 654/8

BASIC POLICIES FOR THE "OCTAGON" CONFERENCE

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed¹ on all the basic policies for inclusion in the final OCTAGON report to the President and the Prime Minister, with one exception.

2. This exception is as follows:

a. The British Chiefs of Staff have proposed the following as paragraph 6(i) of C.C.S. 654:²

"Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as a matter of highest priority, *having regard to other inescapable commitments*, as soon as the German situation allows."

b. The United States Chiefs of Staff have proposed that this paragraph should read as follows:

"Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East, as a matter of highest priority, *having regard to other agreed commitments*, as soon as the German situation allows."

¹ By action taken informally and in their final meeting at Washington before the Second Quebec Conference.

² *Ante*, p. 219.

3. The decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this wording is requested.³

A. J. McFARLAND
A. T. CORNWALL-JONES
Combined Secretariat

³ For the wording agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 173d Meeting, September 13, 1944, see *ante*, p. 322.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET
C.C.S. 675

[QUEBEC,] 12 September 1944.

PRIORITIES FOR PERSONNEL SHIPPING SUBSEQUENT TO TERMINATION OF
HOSTILITIES IN EUROPE

1. It is clear that the global personnel movement problems which will arise immediately before and following on the termination of hostilities in Europe will be of considerable magnitude and complexity, and that decisions will be necessary as to the priorities to be afforded to the various movements involved.

2. In order that consideration may be given to this matter, it is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff instruct the representatives of the United States Service Departments and the British Service Departments to undertake immediately, in conjunction with the appropriate shipping authorities, an examination of the scope of the movement problems involved and of the availability of shipping resources with which to meet the requirements.

¹ For the discussion of the subject of this paper by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 172d Meeting, September 12, 1944, see *ante*, p. 301.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET
C.C.S. 676

[QUEBEC,] 12 September 1944.

GENERAL PROGRESS REPORT ON RECENT OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC

The enclosure, compiled from reports of the area commanders in the Pacific, is presented for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

¹ Noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 173d Meeting, September 13, 1944. See *ante*, p. 321.

Enclosure

TOP SECRET

PROGRESS OF PACIFIC AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC OPERATIONS,
15 NOVEMBER 1943-15 SEPTEMBER 1944*North Pacific*

1. Operations in the North Pacific have been limited to periodic air raids and surface ship bombardment of Paramushiru and Shimushu and other islands in the northern Kuriles. Concurrently the establishment of bases to support future operations in the North Pacific is being carried to completion.

Central Pacific

2. In furtherance of the approved strategic concept of the war against Japan, the amphibious forces of the Pacific Ocean Areas, supported tactically and strategically by combatant units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, have successively occupied principal objectives in the Gilbert, Marshall and Marianas Islands.

3. The Gilbert Islands operations were initiated on 17 November 1943, and resulted in the occupation of Tarawa, Makin, and Apamama. Tarawa was well defended. In particular the beach defenses were extensive and difficult to overcome.

4. The Marshall Islands operations were initiated the 31st of January and resulted in the occupation of Kwajalein and Majuro Atolls. This was followed by the occupation in mid-February of Eniwetok.

5. Operations for the seizure of Saipan were initiated on the 15th of June. This was followed by the occupation of Tinian and Guam in late July.

6. The next operation scheduled in this area is the occupation of the Palaus. The target date is 15 September 1944.

7. From bases established in the Marshalls and Gilberts continuous air raids have been conducted against isolated Japanese held islands. Particular attention has been given to neutralization of Truk. These operations have been coordinated with similar operations conducted from bases in the Southwest Pacific.

8. During the operations for the occupation of the Marianas strong units of the Japanese Fleet were engaged by air action from our carriers in the Philippine Seas. Severe damage was inflicted on the Japanese in this engagement.

9. The submarine campaign in the Western Pacific has been prosecuted with vigor and the results attained have been most gratifying. Heavy toll has been taken of Japanese shipping as well as of escorting forces.

10. The occupation of the Marianas has presented the opportunity for development of bases for VLR bombers for operations against

Japan Proper. Preparations for conducting these operations are under-way with all speed.

South Pacific

11. Operations in the South Pacific have been principally harassing operations against the isolated Japanese garrisons by air forces. The Royal New Zealand Air Force participated in combat missions with U.S. Army and Navy air units from bases in the South Pacific. The South Pacific area is being progressively "rolled-up." Bases developed in that area are currently being used for rehabilitation of troops for further operations in the Western Pacific. The naval base at Espiritu Santo has proved very useful in repairing battle damage. Repairs have been successfully accomplished on all classes of ships.

12. On 15 February, the 3rd New Zealand Division (less one brigade) seized Green Island.

Southwest Pacific

13. A U.S. task force landed in the Arawe area of New Britain on 15 December 1943 and terminated organized enemy resistance on 16 January 1944.

14. One U.S. marine division, supported by Allied air and naval forces, landed in the Gloucester area on 26 December 1943 and succeeded in capturing the airfields by 30 December. Japanese killed were 3,686 as against our losses of 326. As a result of the Arawe and Cape Gloucester operations, western New Britain was secured by the middle of March.

15. Preceded by heavy naval and air bombardment, a successful, unopposed landing was made near Saidor on 2 January 1944. The airstrip was captured and ready for landing of transport aircraft by 7 January. Commencing 16 January, the remainder of the U.S. division employed reinforced the original landing. In expanding the beachhead, only weak resistance was encountered.

16. One U.S. cavalry division, supported by naval and air force units, made initial landings in the Admiralty Islands on 29 February 1944. The landing was made in Hayne Harbor, Los Negros Island, against little resistance and Momote airdrome was seized on D-day. Several enemy counterattacks were repulsed resulting in large Japanese casualties and by 23 March enemy forces on Los Negros were completely surrounded. Adjacent islands in the group were reduced and occupied and by the middle of April complete control of the Admiralty Islands had been obtained.

17. Two independent task forces, under the command of the Sixth Army, made simultaneous landings at Aitape and Hollandia on 22

April 1944. Landings were preceded by heavy naval bombardment and air strafing attacks.

a. The Hollandia Task Force made landings in the Humboldt Bay and Tanahmerah Bay areas respectively and formed a pincers movement in attacking the three airstrips. Only slight enemy resistance was encountered and by 1 May control of the area had been definitely established.

b. The Aitape Task Force established landings against practically no opposition and the airdrome was reported operational by 25 April.

c. The element of surprise played an important part in the success of both operations resulting in an estimated 54,000 troops to the eastward being cut off.

18. A U.S. task force, supported by air and naval forces, made unopposed landings on Wakde Island and near Arara on 17 May 1944. All enemy resistance on Wakde was overcome by 18 May. The Arara perimeter was extended between the Tementoe River and the Tor River on 17 May with increasing enemy resistance west of the Tor River. Strong enemy attacks failed to penetrate the perimeter and were repulsed. The task force perimeter was extended and by 3 July included the Maffin airdrome. Casualties suffered by the Japanese are 3,650 killed and 70 prisoners. Active patrolling is continuing.

19. On 27 May 1944 one U.S. infantry division, with the support of air and naval forces, made landings in the Biak Island areas and encountered little opposition initially. Enemy strength developed on 5 June and the Mokmer airstrip was crossed on 7 June under artillery, mortar and machine gun fire. Artillery fire prevented work on the Mokmer airdrome until 11 June and the enemy launched several unsuccessful counterattacks in an effort to regain the field. Boroke, Sorido and Mokmer dromes were entirely cleared of enemy artillery and small arms fire by 22 June. General patrolling and mopping up operations continue.

20. One U.S. regimental combat team, closely supported by air and naval forces, landed unopposed near the Kamiri drome on Noemfoor Island on 2 July 1944. On 3 July and 4 July three U.S. parachute battalions were dropped on the Kamiri strip, assisting the infantry. By 6 July enemy resistance had been overcome and the Kamiri, Koransoren and Namber dromes were firmly held.

21. A U.S. infantry task force made an unopposed landing near Cape Opmarai in the Cape Sansapor area on 30 July 1944. No opposition other than patrol skirmishes has been encountered and active patrolling continues. Japanese dead for the period 30 July to 10 August numbered 92.

22. Air operations conducted in the Southwest Pacific Area have been especially effective in neutralizing Japanese forces and enabling

the Allies to conduct further offensive actions aimed at gaining complete control. In all advances, their mission in each case called for securing airfields and other bases from which to conduct further operations. Air supremacy has been achieved to such an extent that only in isolated instances are the Japanese offering any determined air resistance.

23. Australian land force activity in the Southwest Pacific Area consisted primarily of participation in the Finschhafen and Kaiapit-Dumpu operations and the occupation of the Madang-Sepik River coast line. The 9th Australian Division captured Finschhafen on 2 October 1943 and drove the remaining Jap troops to Satelberg. Satelberg fell on 29 November. Elements of the 9th Australian Division, utilizing armor to great advantage, then advanced up Huon Peninsula coast line to contact U.S. Saidor Task Force at Yaut River, southeast of Saidor, to complete occupation of Huon Peninsula on 10 February.

Simultaneously, the 7th Australian Division was deployed into the Ramu Valley to reinforce independent Australian units and to stop the threatened Jap drive overland through the Ramu-Markham Valley from Madang. The 11th Australian Division relieved the 7th Australian Division 8 January and continued the Australian advance to a final juncture with U.S. troops near Yalua on 13 April. Subsequently, U.S. troops were withdrawn and the Australian units continued pressure on the Jap forces which withdrew up the New Guinea coast toward Wewak. By 6 June Australian troops had reached Hansa Bay and are now in contact along the Sepik River.

During this period, the RAAF carried on continued attacks from the Darwin area. Australian fighter units attached to U.S. task forces were used in each of the landings along the New Guinea coast as the initial occupation forces with their light P-40's.

They operated in the advance airdromes before the airdromes were suitable for the operation of U.S. units equipped with heavier aircraft.

The Netherlands East Indies Air Forces operating in the Southwest Pacific Area consist of the 18th Medium Bomber Squadron and the 120th Fighter Squadron. Elements of these forces participated in daily bombing and strafing strikes against enemy shipping and installations in the Aroe-Tanimbar-Kai and Timor areas.

24. Future operations in this area will advance our forces into the southern and central Philippines via Morotai, Talaud, Sarangani and the Leyte-Samar area, with a target date of 20 December for Leyte-Samar.²

² A map which accompanied this paper is not reproduced.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 13 September 1944.

C.C.S. 452/27

BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff would welcome a British naval task force in the Pacific to participate in the main operations against Japan. They consider that the initial use of such a force should be on the western flank of the advance in the Southwest Pacific. They assume that such a force would be balanced and self-supporting.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff repeat their acceptance² of the British proposal to form a British Empire task force in the Southwest Pacific. It is realized that the time of formation of such a force depends to a considerable extent on the end of the war in Europe as well as on DRACULA and on the requirements of projected operations in the Southwest Pacific.

¹ For the discussion of this paper by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 174th Meeting, September 14, 1944, see *ante*, p. 331.

² See *ante*, p. 257.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 13 September 1944.

C.C.S. 452/28 (OCTAGON)

DIRECTIVE TO SACSEA

We recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should now despatch the following directive to Admiral Mountbatten.

DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, SOUTH EAST ASIA COMMAND

1. Your primary² object is the recapture of all Burma at the earliest date. Operations to achieve this object must not, however, prejudice the security of the existing air supply route to China, including the air

¹ The draft directive contained in this paper was discussed and amended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff during their 174th Meeting, September 14, 1944 (see *ante*, p. 335). The amendments made during that meeting are described in fns. 2-4, below, and the directive, as changed, was circulated as the enclosure to C.C.S. 425/30 (OCTAGON), "Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command", September 14, 1944 (not printed). The directive was further amended during the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill on September 16, 1944 (see *ante*, p. 381), and the text finally approved was included as an annex to C.C.S. 680/2 (*post*, p. 476) and was also circulated separately as the enclosure to C.C.S. 452/31, "Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command", September 22, 1944 (not printed in this form).

² The word "primary" was deleted in C.C.S. 452/30.

staging post at Myitkyina, adequate protection of which is essential throughout.³

2. The following are approved operations:—

- (a) The stages of Operation CAPITAL necessary to the security of the air route;⁴
- (b) Operation DRACULA.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff attach the greatest importance to the vigorous prosecution of Operation CAPITAL and to the execution of Operation DRACULA before the monsoon in 1945, with a target date of 15th March.

3. If DRACULA has to be postponed until after the monsoon of 1945, you will continue to exploit Operation CAPITAL as far as may be possible without prejudice to preparations for the execution of Operation DRACULA in November 1945.

³ In C.C.S. 452/30 the words "and the opening of overland communications" were substituted for the last seven words of this paragraph.

⁴ The words "and the attainment of overland communications with China" were added to this subparagraph in C.C.S. 452/30.

J.C.S. Files

Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 13 September 1944.

C.C.S. 675/1

A. COMBINED MEMORANDUM ON TROOP MOVEMENTS, COVERING THE PERIOD OCTOBER 1944 TO MARCH 1945

The Representatives of United States and British military services in conjunction with appropriate shipping authorities submit the attached report of the examination of troop shipping requirements suggested by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 172d Meeting of 12 September.¹

A. J. McFARLAND

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES

Combined Secretariat

[Enclosure]

TOP SECRET

COMBINED MEMORANDUM ON TROOP MOVEMENTS COVERING THE PERIOD OCTOBER 1944 TO MARCH 1945

A. ASSUMPTIONS

1. The state of war in Europe is such that the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree:

¹ See *ante*, p. 301.

a. That it is feasible to release British troops from Europe for Operation DRACULA.

b. No further U.S. troops need be transported to European theaters.

2. If the decision with regard to the two conditions in 1 above is not made by 1 October the necessary transfer of British forces to India cannot be accomplished in time to execute the operation before the monsoon.

B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. The problem therefore is to determine the effect of employment of troop shipping for DRACULA on U.S. and British deployments subsequent to the defeat of Germany.

C. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The build-up of a British task force in India for DRACULA involves the movement of six British divisions or 370,000 personnel from Europe to India prior to 1 March 1945.

2. It is estimated that this movement will during its peak period involve virtually the entire British troopship lift.

3. This requirement will limit British assistance to the United States in the Atlantic to a troopship lift of about 25,000 per month from November 1944 to April 1945 by leaving only the two *Queens*² on this run. However in the event of any unforeseen difficulties in meeting the DRACULA program it might prove necessary to withdraw one or both of the *Queens* from the Atlantic service.

4. A further effect will be the withdrawal of all British ocean-going troopships now employed in cross-Channel movements. This amounts to a capacity of 25-30,000 troop spaces for combined cross-Channel troop movements. It is estimated that British cross-Channel troop movements can be accomplished in other type vessels. The scale of U.S. cross-Channel troop movements cannot be determined but should be relatively light in proportion to total U.S. withdrawals from the Continent. To the extent required such movement must be accomplished in U.S. shipping.

5. The DRACULA movement of British troops absorbs the full capacity of Indian ports with the exception of such U.S. troops as can be received through the port of Calcutta. India has stated that they can disembark two "General" class ships off Calcutta simultaneously by the use of Indian Ocean shipping.

² i.e., the *Queen Elizabeth* and the *Queen Mary*.

D. DISCUSSION

1. *Effect on British movement up to approximately mid-March 1945.*

a. After 30 September it will not be possible to carry out any normal trooping from the United Kingdom to theaters abroad other than any replacements included in the DRACULA program. Allowance has been made for 4,500 a month between Canada and the United Kingdom.

b. No non-operational movement can take place except those which might be capable of being effected in ships returning empty from operational voyages.

c. No troop ships could be spared for conversion to other tasks, viz: fleet train, hospital ships, etc.

d. It will only be possible to carry out movement already planned between theaters abroad, mainly reinforcements from West and East Africa to India and New Zealanders to Italy which are small in relation to the total fleet and for which shipping is being positioned. Internal movement in the Mediterranean will be reduced to a local lift of some 15,000.

2. *Effect on U.S. movements up to approximately end of March 1945.*

a. U.S. shipping schedules for redeployment have included the movement of 70,000 U.S. troops per month from Europe to the United States in British ships. Under this assumption the strength of U.S. forces in Europe will be:

1 Oct 44	2,760,000
1 Apr 45	1,535,000
	<hr/>
6 months withdrawals from Europe	1,225,000

b. The reduction of British assistance in the Atlantic to 25,000 troops monthly would result in the following European position:

1 Oct 44	2,760,000
1 Apr 45	1,805,000
	<hr/>
6 months withdrawals from Europe	955,000

In other words a reduction in the rate of return of U.S. troops from the European Theater will be required amounting to 270,000 in six months.

c. Troop movements to Pacific theaters in accordance with redeployment plans tentatively set up, but now under review, would be possible.

E. CONCLUSION

1. Until the strategic requirements for the furtherance of the war against Japan subsequent to the defeat of Germany have been determined and until shipping priorities have been established as between operational and non-operational moves, it is not possible to present

more detailed shipping implications during and after the period 1 October 1944 to 1 April 1945.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 13 September 1944.

C.C.S. 678

PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

1. The British Chiefs of Staff feel that it is important that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree and promulgate a planning date for the end of the war against Japan. The following planning must be related to an estimated date for the end of the war against Japan:—

- a. The redeployment of forces against Japan.
- b. The planning of production.
- c. The allocation of manpower.

2. The British Chiefs of Staff recommend that, in order to make due allowance for contingencies, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should accept as a planning date two years after the defeat of Germany.

¹ For the discussion of this paper by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 174th Meeting, September 14, 1944, see *ante*, p. 339.

740.0011 P.W./9-1344 : Telegram

The Chargé Near the Netherlands Government in Exile (Schoenfeld)
*to the Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

LONDON, September 13, 1944.

US URGENT NIACT

NETER 17. From Schoenfeld.

Foreign Minister van Kleffens requests following message be sent to the President. He has asked this mission to serve as channel of transmission since Netherlands Government has no direct code communication with Quebec.²

“On learning that Pacific strategy will be discussed at Quebec conference Netherlands Government request in view of their vital interest in that question that following statement with regard to operations in Japanese occupied territory be transmitted to the President. Same statement is being sent to Mr. Churchill through British Foreign Office. Minister for Colonies van Mook and Vice Admiral Helfrich are proceeding [to] America. Netherlands Govern-

¹ Sent over the signature of Winant.

² Hull forwarded the Netherlands message to Roosevelt as an enclosure to a memorandum dated September 15, 1944 (740.0011 P.W./9-1344).

ment trust President and Prime Minister will find it possible to give them an opportunity to elucidate Netherlands point of view. (*Statement begins*)

“Success of main strategy against Japan in severing communications between Japan and occupied area covering Burma, Malaya, Philippines, British Borneo and NEI will cut off Japanese forces in that area from arms and munitions but will not compel them to surrender or to withdraw supposing this to be possible. Area as a whole has sufficient food and other materials and facilities for maintenance and it may be assumed that Japanese forces have sufficient stocks of arms and munitions. Experience points to probability that Japanese stay on for irregular warfare even after defeat or surrender Japan. Facts in recovered territory in the area show that isolated Japanese forces become more ferocious and destructive as isolation becomes more irremediable. If liberation occupied areas is delayed suffering and destruction of large populations will increase beyond all measure and prisoners of war and internees can be considered lost. Since voluntary evacuation of the area by Japanese forces cannot be expected active liberation as soon as possible seems urgent both from this point of view and with regard to future rehabilitation. This action should primarily be directed towards most important territories with most civilized and numerous population and greatest economic value. Among these Java seems to offer best base for further operations because of central situation, sufficient food production and accommodation, ample skilled and unskilled labour, well developed system of roads and harbours, good air-bases and healthy mountain regions for rehabilitation. Even in case of widespread destruction repairs for Allied operational purposes are easiest to effect in Java. The occupation of Java would deprive the Japanese of their main regional source of supplies and labour.”

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 14 September 1944.

C.C.S. 452/29

ALLOCATION OF THE TWO REMAINING COMBAT CARGO GROUPS AND THE
TWO REMAINING AIR COMMANDO GROUPS

The United States Chiefs of Staff have agreed to allocate one combat cargo group and one air commando group to the China-Burma-

¹ For the discussion of this paper by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 174th Meeting, September 14, 1944, see *ante*, p. 335.

India Theater in order to assure adequate resources for Admiral Mountbatten to clear and secure the land line to China. The remaining combat cargo group and air commando group have been allocated to the Southwest Pacific in an effort to fill at least part of the deficiency in resources for operations in that area.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 14 September 1944.

C.C.S. 679

REDEPLOYMENT OF FORCES AFTER THE END OF THE WAR IN EUROPE

Reference: CCS 675 Series²

1. We consider that the whole redeployment problem, including repatriation, after the end of the war in Europe needs combined study which cannot be completed at this conference. This study appears to be required in order to assure the optimum use of the resources involved including personnel and cargo shipping and to make certain that forces required for operations against Japan will reach the theater of war at the earliest date.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff have prepared tentative plans for redeployment which are available to the United States members of the combined agencies concerned. Presumably the British members of these agencies have similar information available.

3. The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Administrative Committee in collaboration with the Combined Military Transportation Committee, Combined Shipping Authorities and Combined Staff Planners study and report on the problem. Questions requiring decision before completion of the study will be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

¹ As amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 175th Meeting, September 15, 1944. See *ante*, p. 356. The amendment, made at Brooke's suggestion, consisted of the addition of the words "Combined Shipping Authorities" in paragraph 3.

² For C.C.S. 675 and 675/1, see *ante*, pp. 442 and 448, respectively.

J.C.S. Files

*Draft Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC, September 14, 1944.]

Enclosure to C.C.S. 680

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER OF THE AGREED SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AT THE "OCTAGON" CONFERENCE

[IV. EXECUTION OF THE OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT]²

The War Against Japan

Over-All Objective in the War Against Japan

21. We have agreed that the over-all objective in the war against Japan should be expressed as follows:

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:

a. Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.

b. Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.

Operations in the Pacific Area

22. We believe that operations must be devised to accomplish the defeat of Japan at the earliest possible date and to that end our plans should retain flexibility, and provision should be made to take full advantage of possible developments in the strategic situation which may permit taking all manner of short cuts. We propose to exploit to the fullest the Allied superiority of naval and air power and to avoid, wherever possible, commitment to costly land campaigns. Unremitting submarine warfare against the enemy ships will be continued. Very long range bomber operations against Japan proper will be continued from China bases and will be instituted from bases being established in the Marianas and from those to be seized in the future. The air forces in China will continue to support operations of the Chinese ground forces and will also provide the maximum practical support for the campaign in the Pacific.

¹ Submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff under cover of a note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 680, "Report to the President and Prime Minister", September 14, 1944). Concerning the discussion of this draft report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 175th Meeting, September 15, 1944, see *ante*, p. 355. For the text of the final report submitted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Roosevelt and Churchill at the conclusion of the Second Quebec Conference, see *post*, p. 469.

² For the first 20 paragraphs of this draft report, which related to global strategy and objectives and to the war in Europe and the Mediterranean, see *ante*, p. 434.

23. Pursuant to the above, we have accepted, as a basis for planning, a course of action comprising the following schedule of major operations:—

<i>Target date</i>	<i>Objective</i>
15 October 1944	Talaud
15 November 1944	Sarangani Bay
20 December 1944	Leyte-Surigao Area
1 March 1945	Formosa-Amoy Area
	or
20 February 1945	Luzon

If the Formosa operation is undertaken, the following operations have been approved for planning purposes:

April 1945	Bonins
May 1945	Ryukyus
March to June 1945	China coast (Foochow-Wenchow Area)
October 1945	Southern Kyushu
December 1945	Tokyo Plain

A course of action to follow the Luzon operation, if undertaken, is under study.

24. In connection with the above planning, we have noted that British operations against Japan, not yet approved, will require the allocation of resources. In planning production these requirements will be borne in mind.

British Participation in the Pacific

25. We have agreed that the British Fleet should participate in the main operations against Japan in the Pacific, with the understanding that this Fleet will be balanced and self-supporting. The method of the employment of the British Fleet in these main operations in the Pacific will be decided from time to time in accordance with the prevailing circumstances.

26. We have invited the British Chief of the Air Staff^a to put forward, as a basis for planning, an estimate in general terms of the contribution the Royal Air Force will be prepared to make in the main operations against Japan.

Operations in Southeast Asia

27. We have agreed that our object in Southeast Asia is the recapture of all Burma at the earliest date, it being understood that operations to achieve this object must not prejudice the security of the existing supply route to China, including the air staging base at Myitkyina, and the opening of overland communications.

^a Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal.

28. We have approved the following operations:—

- a. Stages of Operation CAPITAL necessary to the security of the air route and the attainment of overland communications with China;
- b. Operation DRACULA.

We attach the greatest importance to the vigorous prosecution of Operation CAPITAL and to the execution of Operation DRACULA before the monsoon in 1945 and with a target date of 15 March. If DRACULA has to be postponed until after the monsoon of 1945, it is our intention to exploit Operation CAPITAL as far as may be possible without prejudice to preparations for the execution of Operation DRACULA in November, 1945.

Redeployment After the End of the War in Europe

29. We consider that the whole problem of the redeployment of forces after the end of the war in Europe, including repatriation, needs combined study in order to assure the optimum use of the resources involved, including personnel and cargo shipping, and to make certain that the forces required for operations against Japan will reach the theatre of war at the earliest date. We have accordingly instructed the combined staffs in consultation with the combined shipping authorities to study and report on this problem, submitting to the Combined Chiefs of Staff such questions as may require decision before completion of the study.

(NOTE: The above paragraph is dependent upon the decision on C.C.S. 679.⁴)

Duration of the War Against Japan

30. We feel that it is important to agree and promulgate a planning date for the end of the war against Japan. This date is necessary for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower.

31. We recommend that the planning date for the end of the war against Japan should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany; this date to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.

⁴ *Supra*.

Roosevelt Papers

*Prime Minister Churchill's Chief of Staff (Ismay) to President
Roosevelt's Chief of Staff (Leahy)*

ADMIRAL LEAHY I send you herewith a draft which I suggest we might send to the President and Prime Minister on the idea that General Marshall put forward at the Combined Chiefs of Staff Meeting this morning.¹

¹ See *ante*, p. 358.

2. Will you let me know if you approve and I will send a copy to the Prime Minister at once: but naturally I should be grateful for any amendments or improvements that you think necessary.²

H. L. ISMAY

[QUEBEC,] 15th September, 1944.

[Enclosure]

DRAFT MINUTE TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

The Combined Chiefs of Staff desire to place on record that the main difficulty with which the Quebec Conference has been confronted has been to find room and opportunity for the deployment against Japan of the massive forces which each and all of the nations concerned are ardent to engage against the enemy. In colloquial language, it was a case of "standing room only", even before the curtain rang up on the Conference.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have not included any recommendation on this subject in their Final Report, but they submit that it would have an excellent effect on world opinion in general, and a correspondingly depressing effect on Japan, if the above ideas, clothed in your own language, were included in a communiqué about the Conference (if one is issued), and, also, at the Press Conference which will be held on its conclusion.

[QUEBEC,] 15.9.44.

² No reply by Leahy has been found. Filed with this memorandum in the Roosevelt Papers, however, is a paper headed "Draft Communiqué to the Press" the body of which is identical to the Communiqué actually issued at the conclusion of the Second Quebec Conference. For text of the Communiqué, see *post*, p. 477.

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the Commanding General, Army Service Forces (Somervell) and the British Minister of War Transport (Leathers) ¹

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 15 September 1944.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 675/2

MEMORANDUM BY THE U.S. TRANSPORTATION, BRITISH MOVEMENT, AND
COMBINED SHIPPING AUTHORITIES

1. The attached Appendix "A" indicates the magnitude of the combined personnel movements which may be required during the first

¹ Circulated as the enclosure to the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 675/2, "Combined Personnel Movement Problem During the First Year After the Defeat of Germany", September 15, 1944): "The enclosure has been presented by Lord Leathers and General Somervell." This paper was noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 175th Meeting, September 15, 1944. See *ante*, p. 356.

year after the defeat of Germany (assumed at 1 Oct. 1944) on the basis of tentative redeployment plans.

2. The attached Appendix "B" indicates the probable combined resources estimated to be available during the period under consideration.

3. Owing to changes in plans under way and in prospect a precise analysis of this problem cannot be made until the entire matter has been studied by combined agencies based on decisions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on strategy and priorities.

4. It is therefore recommended that the Combined Administrative Committee, in collaboration with the Combined Staff Planners, the Combined Military Transportation Committee, and the combined shipping authorities, study and report on this problem in the light of decisions to be made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Appendix "A"

ANALYSIS OF THE COMBINED PERSONNEL MOVEMENT PROBLEM

Subsequent to a 1 October Defeat of Germany and for 1 Year
Thereafter

	<i>British</i>	<i>U.S.</i>
1. Operational Requirements		
a. Replacements (reinforcements) for forces already engaged in the war against Japan on 1 October.	*	693, 000
b. Build-up from U.S. for war against Japan.	—	826, 000
c. Redeployment for war against Japan.	1, 052, 000	804, 000
d. Additional replacements (reinforcements) to support increased strength due to <i>b</i> and/or <i>c</i> .	385, 000	213, 000
e. Replacements or readjustments in garrisons, of non-operational areas.	265, 000	10, 000
f. Rotational programs for forces engaged in the war against Japan.	150, 000	280, 000
g. Intra-Area movement accomplished by retained ships.	250, 000	768, 000
Subtotal	2, 102, 000	3, 594, 000
2. Demobilization and Repatriation Without Replacement		
a. British and U.S. Forces.	678, 000	1, 720, 000†

*This figure is included under other headings in item 1. [Footnote in the source text.]

†To the extent that the defeat of Germany is delayed beyond 1 October 1944 this figure will be increased. [Footnote in the source text.]

	<i>British</i>	<i>U.S.</i>
<i>b.</i> Dominion, Colonial and other personnel.	251, 000	28, 000
Subtotal	929, 000	1, 748, 000
3. Prisoners of War		
<i>a.</i> Allied prisoners of war.	53, 000	102, 000
<i>b.</i> Enemy prisoners of war.	466, 000	243, 000
Subtotal	519, 000	345, 000
4. Total Requirements for the Services‡	3, 550, 000	5, 687, 000

Appendix "B"

TOTAL AVAILABILITY OF PERSONNEL SHIPPING BY CATEGORIES
(as of 1 Oct 1944)

<i>Categories</i>	<i>British</i>		<i>U.S.</i>	
	<i>No. of Ships</i>	<i>Capacity</i>	<i>No. of Ships</i>	<i>Capacity</i>
1. Ocean Going	84	302, 000	220	492, 000
2. Limited Capability				
(<i>a</i>) Indian Ocean type	31	48, 000	—	—
(<i>b</i>) Miscellaneous	6	6, 000	45	35, 000
Subtotal	37	54, 000	45	35, 000
Total Troopship Lift	121	356, 000	265	527, 000

NOTES:

*British**U.S.*

1. Estimated lift on 1 October 1945, after allowing for additions and losses based on current C.C.S. rates

376, 000

708, 000

2. Additional trooplift may be realized by use of cargo ships temporarily fitted to carry a few hundred troops each.

3. An indeterminable lift may be obtained from captured enemy vessels.

4. Lift of LSI's and APA's is not included in above inventories but advantage will be taken of their lift whenever operational schedules permit.

5. Lift in U.S. Navy vessels as estimated and included in the above table for normal troop movement is subject to wide variation dependent upon possible utilization of Navy troopships for operational requirements.

6. No British cross-Channel type of shipping is included nor has any allowance been made for possible conversions for the naval fleet train or hospital ships.

‡To this requirement must be added an unknown number for essential civilian movements. [Footnote in the source text.]

J.C.S. Files

*Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 15 September 1944.

C.C.S. 681/1 (OCTAGON)

MESSAGE TO GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK ON THE RESULTS OF
"OCTAGON"

The two enclosed draft messages, differing in the degree of detail included, are circulated for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

A. J. McFARLAND

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES

Combined Secretariat

Enclosure "A"

TOP SECRET

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER TO
GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK²

From Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President.

My immediately following message is top secret and should be seen only by General Stilwell, a decoder appointed by him, and the Ambassador³ who is then to deliver it to the British Ambassador⁴ upon receipt. If possible it should be delivered by the two Ambassadors at the same time to the Generalissimo. Message should be carefully but closely paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery.

From Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President.

Top secret and personal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.

We have just concluded our conference in Quebec during which we discussed ways and means to bring about the earliest possible defeat of Germany so that we can reorient the entire weight of our forces and resources against Japan. We hasten to inform you of plans for our mutual effort, particularly in Southeast Asia.

First: We are determined fully to employ all available resources toward the earliest practicable invasion of the Japanese homeland. To

¹ For the discussion of this paper by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 175th Meeting, September 15, 1944, see *ante*, p. 355. For the message actually dispatched to Chiang at the conclusion of the Second Quebec Conference, see *post*, p. 479.

² The draft message itself and the preceding message concerning its delivery were both indicated for transmission via the War Department to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in China-Burma-India, Forward Echelon, Chungking.

³ Clarence E. Gauss.

⁴ Sir Horace Seymour.

this end we have devised courses of action and are taking vigorous steps to expedite the redeployment of forces to the war against Japan following the defeat of Germany.

Second: To continue and extend present operations under Admiral Mountbatten in North Burma to provide additional security for intermediate air ferry bases in the Myitkyina area, and at the beginning of favorable weather to launch a determined campaign to open overland communications between India and China. These operations will require continued effective cooperation of the Chinese troops who have already so distinguished themselves in Burma, as well as of your armies that are now engaged west of the Salween. The detailed operations will involve overland and airborne advances by the British from Imphal to seize Kalewa, thence the Yeu-Monywa area with exploitation toward Mandalay. At the same time, the Chinese, British and American forces now in the Myitkyina area will push on to Indaw-Katha-Bhamo, thence toward Mongmit-Mogok. Concurrently, your Chinese armies now engaged west of the Salween should drive vigorously toward Hsenwi and Lashio. All these operations will be fully supported by our preponderant air strength, and by adequate air supply. Small-scale amphibious operations on the Arakan coast, and activities by long range penetration groups will contribute to our success. We feel that the vigorous prosecution of these operations should result in securing an area by next spring which will permit the extension of the Ledo Road with accompanying pipelines in order to support the heroic effort of your forces.

Third: Without prejudice to the North Burma operations to protect the air ferry line and establish overland communications, Admiral Mountbatten has been further directed to continue planning and preparations for a large scale amphibious and airborne operation in South Burma to be undertaken as soon as developments in the European Theater will allow the necessary resources to be made available.

Enclosure "B"

*Draft Message From President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill to Generalissimo Chiang*⁵

TOP SECRET

SEPTEMBER 1944.

From Naval Aide to the President.⁶

My immediately following message is top secret and should be seen only by ALUSNA, a decoder appointed by him and the Ambassador who

⁵ The draft message itself and the preceding message concerning its delivery were both indicated for transmission via Navy channels to the United States Naval Attaché, Chungking.

⁶ Rear Admiral Wilson Brown.

is then to deliver it to the British Ambassador upon receipt. If possible it should be delivered by the two Ambassadors at the same time to the Generalissimo. Message should be carefully paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery.

Top Secret and Personal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.

1. We have just concluded a short conference at Quebec and hasten to inform you of the broad conclusions we have reached.

2. We have agreed that operations must be devised to accomplish the defeat of Japan at the earliest possible moment, and that to achieve this ultimately we may well have to invade Japan itself.

3. We have agreed that in the west our object should be the recapture of Burma at the earliest date. We attach the greatest importance to the vigorous prosecution of operations in Upper Burma in order to secure the air supply route, including the air staging posts at Myitkyina, and to open overland communications with you. It is therefore intended to pursue with the utmost vigor the present operations in Upper Burma. Reinforcements, including airborne forces, are being dispatched.

4. In addition, we are planning a major amphibious operation to take place in the Bay of Bengal next year. The date when it can be carried out will depend on the time when we find it possible to release the necessary resources from the European Theater.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*¹

TOP SECRET
C.C.S. 682

[QUEBEC,] 15 September 1944.

OPERATION "HIGHBALL"

The American Chiefs of Staff are asked to take note that Operation HIGHBALL will be available in the Eastern Theatre at the end of November, 1944.

¹ Noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 175th Meeting, September 15, 1944. See *ante*, p. 357.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 16th September 1944.

NOTE BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE, DATED 16TH
SEPTEMBER 1944

1. His Majesty's Government are in full accord with the directive to Admiral Mountbatten² which makes him responsible for executing the stages of Operation CAPITAL necessary to the security of the air route and the attainment of overland communications with China. Having regard however to the immense losses by sickness (288,000 in six months) which have attended the Burma campaign this year, they are most anxious to limit this class of operation, the burden of which falls almost wholly upon the Imperial armies, to the minimum necessary to achieve the aforesaid indispensable object. For this purpose they are resolved to strain every nerve to bring on the Operation DRACULA by March 15, as by cutting the Japanese communications the enemy will be forced to divide their forces. Decisive results may be obtained in a battle north of Rangoon, and the pursuit by light forces from the north may be continued without serious cost.

2. It is essential to provide five or six divisions for DRACULA. The 6th Airborne Division from England and a British-Indian division from Italy will start at the earliest moment irrespective of the state of the European war. It will not however be possible to withdraw any further forces from Europe before the end of organized and coherent German resistance. Admiral Mountbatten hopes by certain adjustments of his reserve divisions to withdraw two or even three divisions from the forces now facing the Japanese on the Burma front, for use in DRACULA. It would be of very great assistance to His Majesty's Government if the United States could place at their disposal for Operation DRACULA two United States light or ordinary divisions. Whether these divisions should come into action on the northern Burma front or whether they should go straight to the Operation DRACULA is a matter for study in time and logistics, observing that we have six months in hand before DRACULA D-day.

3. If such a provision were made, we should feel certain of being able to achieve DRACULA in time to limit the wastage to the British Imperial armies in the north and to clean up the Burma situation before the next monsoon. The destruction of the Japanese in Burma would liberate a considerable army, which could immediately attack Japanese objectives across the Bay of Bengal at whatever point or points may be considered to be most beneficial to the common cause

¹ Annex 1 to the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, September 16, 1944. See *ante*, p. 380.

² *Post*, p. 476.

and most likely to lead to the rapid wearing-down of Japanese troops and above all air forces.

4. If on the other hand we are not able to carry out Operation DRACULA, His Majesty's Government would feel they had been exposed to unnecessary sacrifices through persisting in operations ravaged by disease, and also their whole further deployment from India and Burma against the Japanese in the Malay Peninsula, et cetera, will be set back until 1946. Thus the averting of a double disaster depends upon the certainty that we can execute DRACULA by March 15 and, having regard to the very heavy losses we have sustained and are liable to sustain, we feel fully entitled to ask for a measure of United States assistance.

J.C.S. Files

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 16 September 1944.

C.C.S. 687

RELEASE OF AMPHIBIOUS CRAFT FROM "OVERLORD" TO OTHER THEATERS

The United States Chiefs of Staff propose the dispatch of the following message to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force:¹

Accelerated operations in the Pacific and prospective plans for SEAC require earliest practicable withdrawal of amphibious craft especially LST's from European Theater. Having due regard for your requirements for build-up until adequate port facilities become available and considering limitation on the use of these craft in the near future due to weather, Combined Chiefs of Staff desire you review the situation carefully with the object of early release of amphibious craft from OVERLORD. Early report in this matter is desired.

¹ The dispatch to Eisenhower of the message which follows was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 176th Meeting, September 16, 1944. See *ante*, p. 375. The message was sent as telegram No. FACS 81.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Generalissimo Chiang*¹

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 16 September 1944.

PRIORITY

WH Number 64, from the President for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

¹ Sent to the White House Map Room at Washington, where it was received as telegram No. MR-IN-158; forwarded to the American Military Mission, Chungking, via Army channels. This message was noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 176th Meeting, September 16, 1944 (see *ante*, p. 376), and was mentioned in the meeting later the same day of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill (see *ante*, p. 381). Concerning the delivery of this message to Chiang, see Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 441-446; Stilwell, p. 333.

After reading the last reports on the situation in China² my Chiefs of Staff and I are convinced that you are faced in the near future with the disaster I have feared. The men of your "Y" forces crossing the Salween have fought with great courage and rendered invaluable assistance to the campaign in North Burma. But we feel that unless they are reinforced and supported with your every capacity you cannot expect to reap any fruits from their sacrifices, which will be valueless unless they go on to assist in opening the Burma Road. Furthermore, any pause in your attack across the Salween or suggestion of withdrawal is exactly what the Jap has been striving to cause you to do by his operations in Eastern China. He knows that if you continue to attack, cooperating with Mountbatten's coming offensive, the land line to China will be opened in early 1945 and the continued resistance of China and maintenance of your control will be assured. On the other hand, if you do not provide manpower for your Divisions in North Burma and, if you fail to send reinforcements to the Salween forces and withdraw these armies, we will lose all chance of opening land communications with China and immediately jeopardize the air route over the hump. For this you must yourself be prepared to accept the consequences and assume the personal responsibility.

I have urged time and again in recent months that you take drastic action to resist the disaster which has been moving closer to China and to you. Now, when you have not yet placed General Stilwell in command of all forces in China, we are faced with the loss of a critical area in East China with possible catastrophic consequences. The Japanese capture of Kweilin will place the Kunming air terminal under the menace of constant air attack, reducing the hump tonnage and possibly severing the air route.

Even though we are rolling the enemy back in defeat all over the world this will not help the situation in China for a considerable time. The advance of our forces across the Pacific is swift. But this advance will be too late for China unless you act now and vigorously. Only drastic and immediate action on your part alone can be in time to preserve the fruits of your long years of struggle and the efforts we have been able to make to support you. Otherwise political and military considerations alike are going to be swallowed in military disaster.

The Prime Minister and I have just decided at Quebec to press vigorously the operations to open the land line to China on the assumption that you would continue an unremitting attack from the Salween side. I am certain that the only thing you can now do in an attempt to prevent the Jap from achieving his objectives in China is to reinforce your Salween armies immediately and press their offensive, while at once placing General Stilwell in unrestricted command of all your

² For the text of the report referred to, see Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 435-436.

forces. The action I am asking you to take will fortify us in our decision and in the continued efforts the United States proposes to take to maintain and increase our aid to you. This we are doing when we are fighting two other great campaigns in Europe and across the Pacific. I trust that your far-sighted vision, which has guided and inspired your people in this war, will realize the necessity for immediate action. In this message I have expressed my thoughts with complete frankness because it appears plainly evident to all of us here that all your and our efforts to save China are to be lost by further delays.

ROOSEVELT

J.C.S. Files

Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 19 September 1944.

C.C.S. 678/1

PLANNING DATE FOR THE END OF THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

The President and Prime Minister approved ¹ the recommendation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the date for the end of the war against Japan, for planning production and for allocation of manpower, should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany; this date to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.

A. J. McFARLAND

A. T. CORNWALL-JONES

Combined Secretariat

¹ By the approval of C.C.S. 680/2. See *post*, p. 475.

J. FINAL DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE

(1) TREATMENT OF GERMANY

Roosevelt Papers

Memorandum Initialed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill ¹

At a conference between the President and the Prime Minister upon the best measures to prevent renewed rearmament by Germany, it was felt that an essential feature was the future disposition of the Ruhr and the Saar.

¹ See *ante*, p. 361. Roosevelt telegraphed the text of this memorandum to Hull on September 15, 1944. See *ante*, p. 391.

The ease with which the metallurgical, chemical and electric industries in Germany can be converted from peace to war has already been impressed upon us by bitter experience. It must also be remembered that the Germans have devastated a large portion of the industries of Russia and of other neighbouring Allies, and it is only in accordance with justice that these injured countries should be entitled to remove the machinery they require in order to repair the losses they have suffered. The industries referred to in the Ruhr and in the Saar would therefore be necessarily put out of action and closed down. It was felt that the two districts should be put under some body under the world organization which ² would supervise the dismantling of these industries and make sure that they were not started up again by some subterfuge.

This programme for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character.

The Prime Minister and the President were in agreement upon this programme.

OK F[RANKLIN] D R[OOSEVELT]
W[INSTON] S C[CHURCHILL]
15.9 ³

[QUEBEC,] September 15, 1944.

² As typed, this passage read "put under somebody under the world organization who". The changes on the source text to "some body" and "which" were made in an unidentified handwriting.

³ The "OK" on the source text and Roosevelt's initials are in the President's handwriting. Churchill's initials and the date "15.9" are in the Prime Minister's handwriting.

Roosevelt Papers

Minute by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill ¹

The President and Prime Minister have agreed to put to Marshal Stalin Lord Simon's proposals for dealing with the major war criminals,² and to concert with him a list of names.

OK F[RANKLIN] D R[OOSEVELT] ³

[QUEBEC,] 15th September, 1944.

¹ In the Roosevelt Papers this document and the minute relating to the French Committee of National Liberation (*post*, p. 469) are attached to the following memorandum of September 16, 1944, from Churchill's Assistant Private Secretary to the President's Naval Aide: "ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN: I am sending for your records copies of minutes about the Agreement reached by the President and the Prime Minister yesterday on two points, namely, Treatment of War Criminals and the status of the French Committee of National Liberation. J. R. COLVILLE." Roosevelt forwarded copies of the two minutes to Hull for his information on September 21, 1944.

² For the Simon proposals referred to, see *ante*, p. 91. Cf. a draft of a telegram to Stalin dated September 17, 1944, *post*, p. 489.

³ On the source text "OK FDR" appears in Roosevelt's handwriting. No indication is given that the minute was initialed by Churchill.

(2) LEND-LEASE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

Roosevelt Papers

*Memorandum Initialed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*¹

1. We have discussed the question of the scope and scale of mutual Lend/Lease aid between the United States and the British Empire after the defeat of Germany and during the war with Japan. We have agreed that a Joint Committee shall be set up to consider this question with the following membership:—

Chairman: [blank]

American Members:

Secretary Morgenthau

Under-Secretary Stettinius

Mr. Leo Crowley

British Members:

[blank]

2. The Committee will agree and recommend to the Heads of their respective Governments the amount of Mutual Aid in munitions, non-munitions and services which is to be provided for the most effective prosecution of the war. The Committee is instructed to obtain from the various branches of the Governments whatever pertinent information is necessary for the preparation of their recommendations.

3. Pending the recommendations of the Committee to the Heads of the respective Governments, the appropriate departments of each Government shall be instructed not to make any major decision with respect to the programmes of Lend/Lease Aid for the period referred to above without the approval of the Committee.

4. In reaching its conclusions the Committee will be guided by the conversation between the President and Prime Minister on September 14th, 1944.²

OK

F[RANKLIN] D R[OOSEVELT]

W[INSTON] S C[HURCHILL]

15.9³QUEBEC, September 14th, 1944.⁴

¹ See *ante*, p. 363. Roosevelt telegraphed the text of this memorandum to Hull on September 15, 1944, with the request that Hull inform Stimson and Winant concerning it.

² See *ante*, p. 344.

³ The "OK" on the source text and Roosevelt's initials are in the President's handwriting. Churchill's initials and the date "15.9" are in the Prime Minister's handwriting.

⁴ This typed date appears on the source text, but the memorandum was not actually initialed until the following day, as indicated by the handwritten date "15.9" added by Churchill.

(3) RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

Roosevelt Papers

*Minute by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*¹

It was agreed between the President and the Prime Minister today that the time had not yet come to recognise formally the F.C.N.L. as the Provisional Government of France, but the matter should be kept constantly under review.

W[INSTON] S. C[HURCHILL]
16.9

F[RANKLIN] D R[OOSEVELT]²

[QUEBEC,] 15th September, 1944.

¹ In the Roosevelt Papers this document and the minute on war criminals (*ante*, p. 467) are attached to the following memorandum of September 16, 1944, from Churchill's Assistant Private Secretary to the President's Naval Aide: "ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN: I am sending for your records copies of minutes about the Agreement reached by the President and the Prime Minister yesterday on two points, namely, Treatment of War Criminals and the status of the French Committee of National Liberation. J. R. COLVILLE." Roosevelt forwarded copies of the two minutes to Hull for his information on September 21, 1944.

² On the source text, Churchill's initials and the date "16.9" are typed, whereas Roosevelt's initials are in his handwriting. As Colville's memorandum quoted in fn. 1, above, refers to the agreement reached "yesterday", September 15 appears to be the correct date for this paper.

(4) MILITARY CONCLUSIONS OF THE CONFERENCE

J.C.S. Files

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC, September 16, 1944.]

Enclosure to C.C.S. 680/2

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER OF THE AGREED SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AT THE "OCTAGON" CONFERENCE

1. The agreed summary of the conclusions reached at OCTAGON Conference is submitted herewith:—

I. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE

2. In conjunction with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan.²

¹ At their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on September 16, 1944 (see *ante*, p. 377), Roosevelt and Churchill had before them a draft of this report (C.C.S. 680/1 (OCTAGON)), "Report to the President and Prime Minister", September 15, 1944). This draft is not printed as such, but the changes which Roosevelt and Churchill made in it are described in the footnotes below.

² C.C.S. 680/1 read "the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers".

II. OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

3. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany.³

4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

5. Upon the defeat of Germany,⁴ in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and with Russia,⁵ to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the over-all strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation :

a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication.

d. Continue the disruption of enemy sea communications.⁶

e. Continue the offensive against Germany.⁷

f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia to include coordinating the action of forces.

g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

h. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against Germany and/or Japan.⁸ Within the limits of our available resources, to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able effectively to employ this assistance against the enemy Powers⁹ in the present war.

i. Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as a matter of highest priority having regard to other agreed and/or inescapable commitments as soon as the German situation allows.

j. Continue operations leading to the earliest practicable invasion of Japan.

³ C.C.S. 680/1 read "the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe".

⁴ C.C.S. 680/1 read "defeat of the Axis in Europe".

⁵ C.C.S. 680/1 read "and, if possible, with Russia".

⁶ C.C.S. 680/1 read "Axis sea communications".

⁷ C.C.S. 680/1 read "against the Axis Powers in Europe".

⁸ C.C.S. 680/1 read "against the Axis Powers".

⁹ C.C.S. 680/1 read "Axis Powers".

IV. EXECUTION OF THE OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Defeat of Germany¹⁰*Control of Strategic Bomber Forces in Europe*

7. Prior to the launching of OVERLORD an air plan was developed by the Supreme Commander in preparation for and in support of OVERLORD, and in April 1944, control of the air operations out of England of all the air forces involved, including the Strategic Air Force and the RAF Bomber Command, passed to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.¹¹ We have now decided that the special conditions which made it desirable that the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force should control all forces operating out of the United Kingdom no longer carry their original force. We have therefore agreed that the control of the Strategic Bomber Force in Europe shall be exercised by the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force¹² and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe¹³ acting jointly for the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF¹⁴ and the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces,¹⁵ the latter acting as agents of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. A directive (C.C.S. 520/6)¹⁶ has accordingly been issued to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe.

Operations in Northwest Europe

8. The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force has reported (SCAF 78¹⁷) on the course of operations in France and the Low Countries and has given us a review of his future intentions.

9. The Supreme Commander's broad intention is to press on with all speed to destroy the German armed forces and occupy the heart of Germany. He considers his best opportunity of defeating the enemy in the West lies in striking at the Ruhr and Saar since he is convinced that the enemy will concentrate the remainder of his available forces in the defense of these essential areas. The Supreme Commander's first operation will be¹⁸ to break the Siegfried Line and seize crossings over the Rhine. In doing this his main effort will be on the left. He will then prepare logistically and otherwise for a deep thrust into Germany.

¹⁰ C.C.S. 680/1 read "Defeat of the Axis in Europe".

¹¹ General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

¹² Air Marshal Sir Norman Bottomley.

¹³ Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz.

¹⁴ Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal.

¹⁵ General Henry H. Arnold.

¹⁶ *Ante*, p. 432.

¹⁷ *Ante*, p. 234.

¹⁸ The additional word "one" appears at this point in C.C.S. 680/1.

10. We have approved General Eisenhower's proposals and drawn his attention (FACS 78¹⁹) :

a. To the advantages of the northern line of approach into Germany, as opposed to the southern, and,

b. To the necessity for the opening up of the northwest ports, particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam, before bad weather sets in.

Operations in Italy

11. We have examined a report by General Wilson (NAF 774²⁰) on operations within his theater. In so far as the battle in Italy is concerned he considers that operations will develop in one of two ways :

a. Either Kesselring's forces will be routed, in which case it should be possible to undertake a rapid regrouping and a pursuit towards the Ljubljana Gap (and across the Alps through the Brenner Pass) leaving a small force to clear up northwest Italy, or,

b. Kesselring's Army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal; in which event it does not seem possible that we can do more than clear the Lombardy Plains this year. Difficult terrain and severe weather in the Alps during winter would prevent another major offensive until spring of 1945.

12. We have agreed :

a. That no major units should be withdrawn from Italy until the outcome of General Alexander's present offensive is known;

b. That the desirability of withdrawing formations of the United States Fifth Army should be reconsidered in the light of the results of General Alexander's present offensive and of a German withdrawal in northern Italy and in the light of the views of General Eisenhower.

c. To inform General Wilson that if he wishes to retain for use in the Istrian Peninsula the amphibious lift at present in the Mediterranean he should submit his plan therefor to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible, and not later than 10th October. We have instructed the Supreme Allied Commander accordingly (FAN 415²¹).

Operations in the Balkans

13. General Wilson considers that a situation can be anticipated in which the bulk of the German forces south of a line, Trieste-Ljubljana-Zagreb and the Danube, will be immobilized and will so remain until their supplies are exhausted, in which case they would be ready to surrender to us or will be liquidated by Partisans or the Russian forces. We have noted that as long as the battle in Italy continues there will be no forces available in the Mediterranean to employ in the Balkans except :

a. The small force of two British brigades from Egypt which is being held ready to occupy the Athens area and so pave the way for the commencement of relief and establishment of law and order and the Greek Government.

¹⁹ *Ante*, p. 428.

²⁰ *Ante*, p. 230.

²¹ See *ante*, p. 430, fn. 2.

b. The small land forces in the ²² Adriatic which are being actively used primarily for commando type operations.

Command of "DRAGOON" Forces

14. Command of the DRAGOON forces operating from southern France has been transferred as from the 15th September to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Facs 76 ²³).

15. Adjustments of the ground and air forces on which the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff will be required are dependent on the development of the campaign in Italy.

16. Logistic support for the DRAGOON forces will for the present continue to be supplied from the Mediterranean area.

Machinery for Coordination of United States-Soviet-British Military Effort

17. Some two months ago Marshal Stalin in conversation with the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow ²⁴ suggested that improvement should be made in the system of military coordination between the U.S.S.R., U.S. and the United Kingdom.

18. We have examined the possibility of improving the coordination with the U.S.S.R. and have instructed the heads of the U.S. and British Military Missions in Moscow ²⁵ to initiate action at once with the Soviet General Staff with a view to the setting up in Moscow of a Tripartite Military Committee consisting of senior representatives of the Russian General Staff, of the United States Chiefs of Staff and of the British Chiefs of Staff. ²⁶

19. We have instructed them to make it clear that this Committee will be purely consultative and advisory, with no power to make decisions without reference to the respective Chiefs of Staff and the Russian General Staff and further, that it must be military in its character and ²⁷ not impinge upon the work at present being done by the European Advisory Commission such as civil affairs, et cetera.

20. In our instructions we have stressed that to eliminate the delays now existent in dealings between the Russians and the United States and British Military Missions, it is essential that the Russian representative on the Committee should be a senior member of the Russian General Staff. On the United States and British sides the heads of the present missions would represent the United States and British Chiefs of Staff respectively, each being responsible to his own Chiefs of Staff.

²² The words "in the" did not appear in C.C.S. 680/1.

²³ See *ante*, p. 428, fn. 1.

²⁴ W. Averell Harriman.

²⁵ Major General John R. Deane and Lieutenant General Montagu Brocas Burrows, respectively.

²⁶ See *ante*, p. 403.

²⁷ The words "be military in its character and" did not appear in C.C.S. 680/1.

The War Against Japan

Over-All Objective in the War Against Japan

21. We have agreed that the over-all objective in the war against Japan should be expressed as follows:

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:

a. Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.

b. Ultimately²⁸ invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.

Operations in the Pacific Area

22. We believe that operations must be devised to accomplish the defeat of Japan at the earliest possible date and to that end our plans should retain flexibility, and provision should be made to take full advantage of possible developments in the strategic situation which may permit taking all manner of short cuts. We propose to exploit to the fullest the Allied superiority of naval and air power and to avoid, wherever possible, commitment to costly land campaigns. Unremitting submarine warfare against the enemy ships will be continued. Very long range bomber operations against Japan Proper will be continued from China bases and will be instituted from bases being established in the Marianas and from those to be seized in the future. The air forces in China will continue to support operations of the Chinese ground forces and will also provide the maximum practical support for the campaign in the Pacific.

23. Pursuant to the above, the operations in the Pacific Theater are being conducted to effect the reconquest of the Philippines and the opening of a seaway to China.

24. We have noted that British operations against Japan, not yet approved, will require the allocation of resources. In planning production these requirements will be borne in mind.

*British Empire Participation in the Pacific*²⁹

25. We have agreed that the British Fleet should participate in the main operations against Japan in the Pacific, with the understanding that this Fleet will be balanced and self-supporting. The method of the employment of the British Fleet in these main operations in the Pacific will be decided from time to time in accordance with the prevailing circumstances.

26. We have invited the British Chiefs of Staff to put forward, as a basis for planning, an estimate in general terms of the contribution

²⁸ The word "ultimately" did not appear in C.C.S. 680/1.

²⁹ C.C.S. 680/1 read "British Participation in the Pacific".

the Royal Air Force will be prepared to make in the main operations against Japan.

27. Canadian participation is accepted in principle.³⁰

Operations in Southeast Asia

28. We have agreed that our object in Southeast Asia is the recapture of all Burma at the earliest date, it being understood that operations to achieve this object must not prejudice the security of the existing air supply route to China, including the air staging base at Myitkyina, and the opening of overland communications.

29. We have approved the following operations:—

a. Stages of Operation CAPITAL necessary to the security of the air route and the attainment of overland communications with China;

b. Operation DRACULA.

We attach the greatest importance to the discharge of the task under paragraph 29a³¹ and to the execution of Operation DRACULA before the monsoon in 1945 and with a target date of 15 March. If DRACULA has to be postponed until after the monsoon of 1945, it is our intention to exploit Operation CAPITAL as far as may be possible without prejudice to preparations for the execution of Operation DRACULA in November, 1945. Our directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia is attached. (See Annex)

Redeployment After the End of the War in Europe

30. We consider that the whole problem of the redeployment of forces after the end of the war in Europe, including repatriation, needs combined study in order to assure the optimum use of the resources involved, including personnel and cargo shipping, and to make certain that the forces required for operations against Japan will reach the theater of war at the earliest date. We have accordingly instructed the combined staffs in consultation with the combined shipping authorities to study and report on this problem, submitting to the Combined Chiefs of Staff such questions as may require decision before completion of the study.

Duration of the War Against Japan

31. We feel that it is important to agree and promulgate a planning date for the end of the war against Japan. This date is necessary for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower.

32. We recommend that the planning date for the end of the war against Japan should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany;

³⁰ This paragraph did not appear in C.C.S. 680/1. Its introduction in C.C.S. 680/2 necessitated the renumbering of all the following paragraphs of C.C.S. 680/1. Concerning acceptance of Canadian participation in the Pacific war, see *ante*, pp. 349, 364, 379.

³¹ C.C.S. 680/1 read "We attach the greatest importance to the vigorous prosecution of Operation CAPITAL".

this date to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.

ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY ³²

33. Upon the collapse of organized resistance by the German Army the following subdivision of that part of Germany not allocated to the Soviet Government for disarmament, policing, and the preservation of order is acceptable from a military point of view by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

34. For disarmament, policing and preservation of order:

a. The British forces under a British Commander will occupy Germany west of the Rhine and east of the Rhine north of the line from Koblenz following the northern border of Hessen and Nassau to the border of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.

b. The forces of the United States under a United States Commander will occupy Germany east of the Rhine, south of the line Koblenz-northern border of Hessen-Nassau and west of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.

c. Control of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, and the necessary staging areas in that immediate vicinity will be vested in the Commander of the American Zone.³³

d. American area to have in addition access through the western and northwestern seaports and passage through the British controlled area.

e. Accurate delineation of the above outlined British and American areas of control can be made at a later date.

F[RANKLIN] D R[OOSEVELT]
W[INSTON] S C[HURCHILL] ³⁴

Annex

DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

1. Your object is the destruction or expulsion of all Japanese forces in Burma at the earliest date.³⁵ Operations to achieve this object must

³² This final section did not appear in C.C.S. 680/1. Concerning the decision at Quebec by Roosevelt and Churchill with respect to allocation of the zones of occupation in Germany and the conversion of that decision to documentary form through the machinery of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, see *ante*, pp. 365, 373, 375, 391-392.

³³ The map facing this page was prepared in Washington, shortly after the Quebec Conference, to reflect the lines described here and was annexed to C.C.S. 320/27. See *ante*, p. 392.

³⁴ According to Leahy, p. 264, Roosevelt and Churchill affixed their signatures to the final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as amended and approved, at Hyde Park on September 18, 1944. On that date the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff circulated a new cover page for the final report (C.C.S. 680/2, "Report to the President and Prime Minister", September 16, 1944) which read as follows: "The Final Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the OCTAGON Conference, as approved by the President and Prime Minister, is enclosed."

³⁵ The annex to C.C.S. 680/1 read "Your object is the recapture of all Burma at the earliest date."

U.S. CONTROL OF BREMEN
AND BREMERHAVEN





not, however, prejudice the security of the existing air supply route to China, including the air staging post at Myitkyina, and the opening of overland communications.

2. The following are approved operations:—

a. The stages of Operation CAPITAL necessary to the security of the air route, and the attainment of overland communications with China.

b. Operation DRACULA.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff attach the greatest importance to the effective discharge of the task under paragraph 2 a³⁶ and to the execution of Operation DRACULA before the monsoon in 1945, with a target date of 15th March.

3. If DRACULA has to be postponed until after the monsoon of 1945, you will continue to exploit Operation CAPITAL as far as may be possible without prejudice to preparations for the execution of Operation DRACULA in November 1945.

³⁶ The annex to C.C.S. 680/1 read "attach the greatest importance to the vigorous prosecution of Operation CAPITAL".

J.C.S. Files

*Communiqué*¹

[QUEBEC, September 16, 1944.]

COMMUNIQUÉ TO THE PRESS

The President and the Prime Minister, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff held a series of meetings during which they discussed all aspects of the war against Germany and Japan. In a very short space of time they reached decisions on all points both with regard to the completion of the war in Europe, now approaching its final stages, and the destruction of the barbarians of the Pacific.

The most serious difficulty with which the Quebec Conference has been confronted has been to find room and opportunity for marshalling against Japan the massive forces which each and all of the nations concerned are ardent to engage against the enemy.

¹ Annex II to the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, September 16, 1944. With reference to the origin of the text of the Communiqué, see Marshall's remarks to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on September 15, *ante*, p. 358, and Ismay's memorandum to Leahy of the same date, *ante*, p. 456.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin*¹

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

[QUEBEC, September 16, 1944.]

Number 66, top secret and personal to Marshal Stalin from the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

1. In our Conference at Quebec just concluded we have arrived at the following decisions as to military operations.

Operations in North West Europe

2. It is our intention to press on with all speed to destroy the German armed forces and penetrate into the heart of Germany. The best opportunity to defeat the enemy in the west lies in striking at the Ruhr and Saar since it is there that the enemy will concentrate the remainder of his available forces in the defence of these essential areas. The northern line of approach clearly has advantages over the southern and it is essential that we should open up the northwest ports, particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam, before bad weather sets in. Our main effort will therefore be on the left.

Operations in Italy

3. As a result of our present operations in Italy

(a) Either Kesselring's forces will be routed, in which case it should be possible to undertake a rapid regrouping and a pursuit towards the Ljubljana gap; or

(b) Kesselring's army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal, in which event we may have to be content with clearing the Lombardy Plains this year.

¹ Sent to the White House Map Room at Washington, which transmitted it on September 18, 1944, to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. It was preceded by the following telegram of instructions from the President's Naval Aide (Brown) to the Naval Attaché: "My immediately following message is top secret. It should be seen only by ALUSNA, a decoder appointed by him and the Ambassador [Harriman] who is then requested to deliver it to the British Ambassador [Clark Kerr]. If possible it should then be delivered by the British and American Ambassadors jointly to Marshal Stalin. Message should be carefully paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery." (J.C.S. Files) Harriman reported in telegram No. 3664, September 25, 1944, that he and Clark Kerr had jointly delivered the message to Stalin on September 23. (740.0011 EW/9-2544)

A first draft of the message to Stalin had been prepared by the Combined Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs and circulated as the enclosure to C.C.S. 681, "Message to Marshal Stalin To Be Sent at the Conclusion of Octagon", September 14, 1944 (not printed). For the discussion and amendment of the message by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 175th Meeting, September 15, 1944, see *ante*, p. 355. The revised message was then incorporated into enclosure A to C.C.S. 681/2, "Communication of the Results of 'Octagon' Conference to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek", September 15, 1944 (not printed), and was approved by Roosevelt and Churchill during their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on September 16 (see *ante*, p. 382).

Our future action depends on the progress of the battle. Plans are being prepared for an amphibious operation on the Istrian Peninsula to be carried out if the situation so demands.

Operations in the Balkans

4. Operations of our air forces and Commando type operations will continue.

Operations Against Japan

5. We have agreed on further operations to intensify the offensive against the Japanese in all theaters, with the ultimate objective of invading the Japanese homeland.

6. Plans for the prompt transfer of power to the Pacific theater after the collapse of Germany were agreed upon.

ROOSEVELT
CHURCHILL

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Generalissimo Chiang*¹

TOP SECRET

[QUEBEC, September 16, 1944.]

PRIORITY

Number 68, from Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President. Top secret and personal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.

We have just concluded our conference in Quebec during which we discussed ways and means to bring about the earliest possible defeat of Germany so that we can reorient the entire weight of our forces and resources against Japan. We hasten to inform you of plans for our mutual effort, particularly in Southeast Asia.

First: We are determined fully to employ all available resources toward the earliest practicable invasion of the Japanese homeland. To this end we have devised courses of action and are taking vigorous steps to expedite the redeployment of forces to the war against Japan following the defeat of Germany.

¹ Sent to the White House Map Room at Washington, which transmitted it on September 18, 1944, to Stilwell at Chungking, via Army channels. It was preceded by a message of instructions as to its delivery which was identical to the draft message of instructions printed *ante*, p. 460, in enclosure A to C.C.S. 681/1.

For two alternative drafts of this message circulated on September 15, 1944, as enclosures to C.C.S. 681/1, see *ante*, pp. 460, 462. For the discussion of these drafts by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 175th Meeting, September 15, 1944, see *ante*, p. 355. The message agreed upon at that meeting was incorporated into enclosure B to C.C.S. 681/2, "Communication of the Results of 'Octagon' Conference to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek", September 15, 1944 (not printed), and was approved by Roosevelt and Churchill during their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on September 16 (see *ante*, p. 382).

Second: To continue and extend present operations under Admiral Mountbatten in north Burma to provide additional security for intermediate air ferry bases in the Myitkyina area, and at the beginning of favorable weather to launch a determined campaign to open overland communications between India and China. These operations will require continued effective cooperation of the Chinese troops who have already so distinguished themselves in Burma, as well as of your armies that are now engaged west of the Salween. All these operations will be fully supported by our preponderant air strength, and by adequate air supply. Small-scale amphibious operations on the Arakan coast, and activities by long range penetration groups will contribute to our success. We feel that the vigorous prosecution of these operations should result in securing an area by next spring which will permit the extension of the Ledo Road with accompanying pipelines in order to support the heroic effort of your forces.

Third: Admiral Mountbatten has been further directed to prepare a large scale amphibious operation in the Bay of Bengal to be undertaken as soon as developments in the European Theater will allow the necessary resources to be made available.

Fourth: We have agreed on further operations to intensify the offensive against the Japanese in the Pacific Theater, including the opening of a seaway into China.

ROOSEVELT
CHURCHILL

6. POST-CONFERENCE CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK

Editorial Note

Roosevelt arrived at Hyde Park, following the Second Quebec Conference, about 9:30 a.m. on September 17, 1944, accompanied by Leahy, Lieutenant Commander Bruenn, Miss Tully, and Mrs. Brady (see the Log, *ante*, p. 294). Mrs. Roosevelt was already at Hyde Park, having left Quebec on September 14 (see the Log, *ante*, p. 291). Hassett flew from Washington to meet Roosevelt at Hyde Park on September 17 (see Hassett, p. 271), and Hopkins arrived at noon on September 18 (see Leahy, p. 263).

Churchill traveled to Hyde Park from Quebec a day after the President, arriving there at 11 a.m. on September 18, accompanied by Mrs. Churchill, the Churchills' daughter Mary, Leathers, Ismay, Moran, Martin, and Thompson (see Hassett, p. 271, Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 160, and Pawle, pp. 323-324). The Churchill party left Hyde Park at 10:30 p.m., September 19, traveling by train to New York, where they boarded the *Queen Mary* for the trip back to England (see Leahy, p. 266).

Other guests who were present during Churchill's visit included the Duke of Windsor, who came to luncheon on September 18 (see Leahy, pp. 263-264); Morgenthau and Mr. and Mrs. Lytle Hull, who came to dinner on that date (see Morgenthau Diary, vol. 772, and Leahy Diary); three Roosevelt cousins—Mrs. Dowd, Miss Delano, and Miss Suckley—who were at luncheon with Mrs. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Leahy on September 19 (see Leahy Diary); and the President's son-in-law, Major John Boettiger (see Leahy, p. 264). Except for Morgenthau and Boettiger (see below), no indication has been found that any of these guests participated in the substantive work of the Roosevelt-Churchill meetings at Hyde Park.

Since Churchill was a guest in the Roosevelts' home, there took place a number of informal and unscheduled conversations between him and Roosevelt, and the President (as was his custom) prepared no minutes or memoranda of conversation on them. The documents which follow constitute the only official papers which the editors have found which were prepared for or relate to the Hyde Park discussions.

Leahy, pp. 264-265, makes brief mention of (1) a discussion of "political questions involving Italy, Yugoslavia, and Russia" before

dinner on September 18; (2) signature of the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on OCTAGON; (3) the drafting of a statement on Italy in which Leahy, Hopkins, and Boettiger took part—possibly the draft printed *post*, p. 493; (4) a luncheon on September 19 at which Mrs. Roosevelt and Churchill discussed means of preserving international peace; and (5) a Roosevelt-Churchill discussion of military and industrial uses of atomic energy, which led to the initialing of an *aide-mémoire* on this subject (see *post*, p. 492).

Morgenthau reported to a group of colleagues at the Treasury Department on September 19 that he had learned at dinner the preceding night at Hyde Park—apparently from Churchill or Martin—that the British Government would name the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir John Anderson) to serve on the committee on lend-lease problems which had been agreed to at Quebec, but that he would probably be represented on the committee by Lord Keynes. Morgenthau further reported that he had said that this would be quite acceptable. (Morgenthau Diary, vol. 772)

It appears from Woodward, pp. 295–296, that Churchill intended to speak to Roosevelt at Hyde Park about armistice terms for Bulgaria and spheres of influence in the Balkans, but no evidence has been found to show that Churchill did in fact raise these questions with the President.

Churchill's Hyde Park visit is mentioned also in Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 160–161, in Hassett, pp. 271–272, and in Pawle, p. 324, but these sources add no information on the substance of the Roosevelt-Churchill conversations.

Roosevelt Papers

*The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President*¹

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Since the meeting with you on September 9th attended by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Hopkins, and myself,² I have had an opportunity to read the latest papers submitted to you by the Secretary of the Treasury on the treatment of Germany.³ There is no need to make any extended or detailed reply to these papers. My views have already been submitted to you in other

¹ Concerning the preparation of this memorandum, see Stimson and Bundy, p. 578. Although the paper was prepared during the course of the Second Quebec Conference, it apparently did not reach Roosevelt until the latter had gone to Hyde Park for further conversations with Churchill. See *ibid.*, p. 580.

² See *ante*, p. 144.

³ *Ante*, p. 128.

memoranda.⁴ I merely wish to reiterate briefly that I still feel that the course proposed by the Treasury would in the long run certainly defeat what we hope to attain by a complete military victory,—this is, the peace of the world, and the assurance of social, economic and political stability in the world.

The point of difference is not one of objective,—continued world peace—it is one of means. When we discuss means, the difference is not whether we should be soft or tough on the German people, but rather whether the course proposed will in fact best attain our agreed objective, continued peace.

If I thought that the Treasury proposals would accomplish that objective, I would not persist in my objections. But I cannot believe that they will make for a lasting peace. In spirit and in emphasis they are punitive, not, in my judgment, corrective or constructive. They will tend through bitterness and suffering to breed another war, not to make another war undesired by the Germans nor impossible in fact. It is not within the realm of possibility that a whole nation of seventy million people, who have been outstanding for many years in the arts and the sciences and who through their efficiency and energy have attained one of the highest industrial levels in Europe, can by force be required to abandon all their previous methods of life, be reduced to a peasant level with virtually complete control of industry and science left to other peoples.

The question is not whether we want Germans to suffer for their sins. Many of us would like to see them suffer the tortures they have inflicted on others. The only question is whether over the years a group of seventy million educated, efficient and imaginative people can be kept within bounds on such a low level of subsistence as the Treasury proposals contemplate. I do not believe that is humanly possible. A subordinate question is whether even if you could do this it is good for the rest of the world either economically or spiritually. Sound thinking teaches that prosperity in one part of the world helps to create prosperity in other parts of the world. It also teaches that poverty in one part of the world usually induces poverty in other parts. Enforced poverty is even worse, for it destroys the spirit not only of the victim but debases the victor. It would be just such a crime as the Germans themselves hoped to perpetrate upon their victims—it would be a crime against civilization itself.

This country since its very beginning has maintained the fundamental belief that all men, in the long run, have the right to be free human beings and to live in the pursuit of happiness. Under the

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 123, 127.

Atlantic Charter victors and vanquished alike are entitled to freedom from economic want. But the proposed treatment of Germany would, if successful, deliberately deprive many millions of people of the right to freedom from want and freedom from fear. Other peoples all over the world would suspect the validity of our spiritual tenets and question the long range effectiveness of our economic and political principles as applied to the vanquished.

The proposals would mean a forcible revolution in all of the basic methods of life of a vast section of the population as well as a disruption of many accustomed geographical associations and communications. Such an operation would naturally and necessarily involve a chaotic upheaval in the people's lives which would inevitably be productive of the deepest resentment and bitterness towards the authorities which had imposed such revolutionary changes upon them. Physically, considering the fact that their present enlarged population has been developed and supported under an entirely different geography and economy, it would doubtless cause tremendous suffering involving virtual starvation and death for many, and migrations and changes for others. It would be very difficult, if not impossible, for them to understand any purpose or cause for such revolutionary changes other than mere vengeance of their enemies and this alone would strongly tend towards the most bitter reactions.

I am prepared to accede to the argument that even if German resources were wiped off the map, the European economy would somehow readjust itself, perhaps with the help of Great Britain and this country. And the world would go on. The benefit to England by the suppression of German competition is greatly stressed in the Treasury memorandum. But this is an argument addressed to a shortsighted cupidity of the victors and the negation of all that Secretary Hull has been trying to accomplish since 1933. I am aware of England's need, but I do not and cannot believe that she wishes this kind of remedy. I feel certain that in her own interest she could not afford to follow this path. The total elimination of a competitor (who is always also a potential purchaser) is rarely a satisfactory solution of a commercial problem.

The sum total of the drastic political and economic steps proposed by the Treasury is an open confession of the bankruptcy of hope for a reasonable economic and political settlement of the causes of war.

I plead for no "soft" treatment of Germany. I urge only that we take steps which in the light of history are reasonably adapted to our purpose, namely, the prevention of future wars. The Carthaginian aspect of the proposed plan would, in my judgment, provoke a reaction on the part of the people in this country and in the rest of the world which would operate not only against the measures advocated but in its

violence would sweep away the proper and reasonable restrictive measures that we could justifiably impose.

I have already indicated in my memorandum of September 9, 1944,⁵ the lines along which I would recommend that we should go pending further light on other questions which can only be obtained after we have acquired greater knowledge of conditions and trends within Germany as well as of the views and intentions of our Allies.

HENRY L STIMSON
Secretary of War

⁵ *Ante*, p. 123.

Roosevelt Papers

*The Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)
to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*¹

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HARRY HOPKINS

With reference to our recent memorandum² concerning current problems with Italy, we would like to submit the following considerations to the President during his conversations with the British Prime Minister.

Certain areas of Italy's northeastern frontier will probably be in dispute after hostilities. In order that the final disposition of these disputed areas would not be prejudiced by occupation by the armed forces of claimant states, it is suggested that Allied Military Government be extended to all Italian metropolitan territory within its 1939 frontiers. In the South Tyrol and the Istrian Peninsula (Venezia Tridentina and Venezia Giulia), Allied Military Government should be maintained and these areas not restored to Italian administration (as is the present practice with respect to liberated areas in southern Italy). Allied Military Government would thus be maintained until the disputed areas are finally disposed of by peace treaty or other settlement. Any other course, such as letting the Tito forces occupy the Peninsula or Free Austrian forces occupy the South Tyrol prior to final disposition at the peace settlement, would undoubtedly prejudice the final disposition of these territories, cause deep resentment

¹ Hopkins presumably took this memorandum with him to Hyde Park when he went there to participate in the Roosevelt-Churchill conversations of September 18-19, 1944. The source text bears the following manuscript notation at the bottom of the page, made at Hyde Park: "18 Sept. President approves. W[ILLIAM] D. L[EAHY]."

² For the memorandum referred to and the enclosure thereto, see *ante*, pp. 412 and 207, respectively.

on the part of the Italian people, and result in the loss of considerable prestige by the Allies in Italy.

The British have already suggested a plan along these lines and would, it is believed, be willing to maintain Allied Military Government in frontier areas likely to be in dispute for the required period. It is reported that this is also the plan of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater,³ at least with respect to the Istrian Peninsula. On our part, it would mean keeping a certain number of American Military Government officers and soldiers in Northeastern Italy.

H F[REEMAN] M[ATTHEWS]

³ General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.

840.50/9-1744

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 17, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I note from your record of conversation with the Prime Minister on September 14, 1944² that lend-lease aid during the war with Japan will exceed, in food, shipping, et cetera, the strategic needs of Great Britain in carrying on that war and will, to that extent, be devoted to maintaining British economy. Would it not be well to make clear to the Prime Minister at this time that one of the primary considerations of the Committee,³ in determining the extent to which lend-lease might exceed direct strategic needs, would be the soundness of the course adopted by the British Government with a view to restoring its own economy, particularly with regard to measures taken to restore the flow of international trade? My thought on this, which applies to financial assistance through lend-lease or in other forms, is developed in the last enclosure, of which a copy is attached, to my memorandum to you of September 8, 1944.⁴

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]⁵

¹ A copy of this memorandum was sent to Hopkins and is filed in the Hopkins Papers. It is possible that Hopkins took the ribbon copy to Hyde Park with him for delivery to Roosevelt.

² *Ante*, p. 344.

³ i.e., the committee on lend-lease questions the creation of which was agreed to by Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec. See *ante*, pp. 346, 468.

⁴ The attachment was a copy of annex 10 to Hull's memorandum of September 6, 1944, which had been sent to Roosevelt on September 8 under cover of a further memorandum. For the text of annex 10, see *ante*, p. 172.

⁵ The source text bears the following manuscript endorsement: "Approved . . . by telephone by the Secretary, who authorized us to initial the original for him. T[HEODORE] C A[CHILLES]."

Hopkins Papers

*The Secretary of State to the President*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 17, 1944.

Subject: Considerations With Respect to Possible Recognition by Principal Allied Governments of a Provisional Government of France.

In my opinion the time has come to give serious consideration to the question of announcing this Government's recognition of the *de facto* French authority as the Provisional Government of France. Of course, the word "provisional" would not be dropped until after general elections are held in France.

I believe that this step is not inconsistent with the policy which we have carefully followed, namely, to refrain from any action which might have the effect of impairing the opportunity of the French people freely to exercise their will in the choice of their leaders.

The following factors suggest the advisability of taking this step at this time.

(1) There is every indication that General de Gaulle has been accepted for the initial period as the national leader in liberated France. This is fully corroborated by reports from our military authorities, who have been in touch with the local population in many parts of France. It likewise does away with the possibility of this

¹ The date of this memorandum suggests that it was prepared with a view to its use in the Roosevelt-Churchill conversations at Hyde Park. It is clear from the covering memorandum quoted below that it was written in ignorance of the existence of the Roosevelt-Churchill minute of September 15, 1944, on the subject of recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation (see *ante*, p. 469). Hull's memorandum was not transmitted directly to Roosevelt at Hyde Park, but was sent to Hopkins under cover of the following memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews):

"DEAR HARRY: I took this up personally with the Secretary and he is in full agreement with the policy recommended in the memorandum. The Secretary has approved its immediate transmission to the President. I leave to your judgment whether to present it to the President now in view of the speed with which events are developing, or whether you think it better for the Secretary to take it up personally with the President upon his return. Without knowing whether the question came up at Quebec, I am inclined to feel the sooner we get moving on this the better. . . . Very sincerely, Doc." (Hopkins Papers)

This covering memorandum was dated September 18, 1944, and as Hopkins arrived at Hyde Park at noon on that day (see Leahy, p. 263), Hull's memorandum could not have reached Hopkins before the latter left Washington for Hyde Park. The presence of the ribbon copy of Hull's memorandum in the Hopkins Papers and a note of September 23, 1944, by Hopkins establish that the Hull memorandum of September 17 did not reach Roosevelt before Churchill's departure from Hyde Park. Hopkins' memorandum of September 23 stated: "I talked to Matthews about this. He tells me that the Secretary sent a further note to the President on this same subject and that this memo [Hull's memorandum of September 17], therefore, need not be delivered." (Hopkins Papers) For the text of the "further note" referred to, which was dated September 21, and with which Hull enclosed a copy of the memorandum of September 17, see *Foreign Relations*, 1944, vol. III, pp. 737-738.

Government ever being charged with imposing General de Gaulle on the French people.

(2) There are increasing indications that the resistance groups and others in France have no intention of permitting the establishment of a personal dictatorship under General de Gaulle. The base of the governing authority has already been broadened by the inclusion of numerous representatives of metropolitan resistance. General de Gaulle's desire to maintain the thread of legal continuity and to work with democratic elements is likewise shown by the appointment of M. Jeanneney, President of the Senate.

(3) The Political Advisor on General Eisenhower's staff (Reber) reports that the Committee, with possible occasional changes of individual Commissioners, should be able to maintain control in France until such time as elections can be held.

(4) It will probably be many months before elections can take place owing to the absence of over a million prisoners-of-war and deportees in Germany.

(5) Lack of recognition will make it more difficult for the Committee to maintain the internal stability necessary for the prosecution of the war and orderly rehabilitation of the country.

(6) Our present popularity in France is high. It will suffer if we delay recognition unduly. Many Frenchmen undoubtedly understand and sympathize with our refusal to recognize the Committee when it was established in Algiers, but they will not understand this refusal now that France is largely liberated.

(7) General Eisenhower's headquarters agree that there is no reason to delay a further degree of recognition from a military point of view.

(8) Recognition would greatly simplify the solution of a number of practical problems of an economic and financial nature.

(9) A number of Governments have already extended recognition to the Committee as the Provisional Government of France and there are indications that the British and Canadians may shortly take this action even if we do not. American prestige would suffer severely if we were to be the only major power withholding recognition.

If you agree to the desirability of taking this step, either of the following two possibilities would present a suitable occasion for the extension of recognition, after consultation and agreement with Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

(1) The passage of a vote of confidence in General de Gaulle, and the *de facto* French authority as presently constituted, by the Provisional Consultative Assembly, established in Paris and broadened to include at least fifty percent of resistance membership.

(2) The setting up, with the approval of the Supreme Allied Commander, of zones of the interior, thereby emphasizing the change from a strictly military to a predominantly civilian administration.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

Roosevelt Papers

*Draft by Prime Minister Churchill*¹DRAFT OF A SUGGESTED TELEGRAM TO BE SENT BY THE PRESIDENT AND
THE PRIME MINISTER TO MARSHAL STALIN²

1. In the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers before Teheran, the Prime Minister of Great Britain submitted a draft proposing the local punishment of war criminals in the countries and, if possible, at the scenes where their atrocities had been committed.³ With some small amendments⁴ this document was approved and has been published to the world with general acceptance and approval.⁵ This document however did not attempt to deal with the cases of the major war criminals "whose offences have no particular geographical localization". This matter was touched on in conversation at Teheran without any definite conclusion being reached.⁶ It has now become important for us to reach agreement about the treatment of these major criminals. Would you consider whether a list could not be prepared of say 50 to 100 persons whose responsibilities for directing or impelling the whole process of crime and atrocity is established by the fact of their holding certain high offices? Such a list would not of course be exhaustive. New names could be added at any time. It is proposed that these persons should be declared, on the authority of the United Nations, to be world outlaws and that upon any of them falling into Allied hands the Allies will "decide how they are to be disposed of and the execution of this decision will be carried out immediately". Or alternatively, "the nearest General Officer will convene a Court for the sole purpose of establishing their identity, and when this has been done will have them shot within one hour without reference to higher authority".

2. It would seem that the method of trial, conviction and judicial sentence is quite inappropriate for notorious ringleaders such as Hitler, Himmler, Goering, Goebbels and Ribbentrop. Apart from the formidable difficulties of constituting the Court, formulating the charge and assembling the evidence, the question of their fate is a political and not a judicial one. It could not rest with judges however eminent or learned to decide finally a matter like this which is of the

¹ Cf. the agreed minute on war criminals which Roosevelt had initialed at Quebec on September 15, 1944, *ante*, p. 467, and a memorandum on this subject by Lord Simon dated September 4, 1944, *ante*, p. 91.

² This message was never sent to Stalin. On October 22, 1944, following conferences which Churchill had had with Stalin at Moscow, Churchill informed Roosevelt: ". . . I do not wish to press the memo I gave you which you said you would have examined by the State Department. Kindly therefore treat it as withdrawn." See *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, 1945, p. 400.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 556-557.

⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 768, fn. 21.

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 768-769.

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran*, 1943, p. 554.

widest and most vital public policy. The decision must be "the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies". This in fact was expressed in the Moscow Declaration.

3. There would seem to be advantages in publishing a list of names. At the present time, Hitler and his leading associates know that their fate will be sealed when the German Army and people cease to resist. It therefore costs them nothing to go on giving orders to fight to the last man, die in the last ditch, etc. As long as they can persuade the German people to do this, they continue to live on the fat of the land and have exalted employments. They represent themselves and the German people as sharing the same rights and fate. Once however their names are published and they are isolated, the mass of the German people will infer rightly that there is a difference between these major criminals and themselves. A divergence of interests between the notorious leaders and their dupes will become apparent. This may lead to undermining the authority of the doomed leaders and to setting their own people against them, and thus may help the break up of Germany.

4. We should be very glad to have your views upon this proposal at your earliest convenience. It is of course without prejudice to the great mass of German war criminals who will be handed over for the judgment of the countries where their crimes have been committed.

17.9.44.⁷

⁷ This draft was typed on the Prime Minister's stationery, bearing the address "10, Downing Street, Whitehall", in preparation for Churchill's conversations with Roosevelt at Hyde Park.

PR 10 Foreign Relations of U.S./8-20-71: Telegram

Prime Minister Churchill to the British Foreign Secretary (Eden) ¹

PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET

Following for Foreign Secretary from Prime Minister.

My immediately preceding telegram.²

Following is text of message for Marshal Stalin.³

¹ This message was typed on the Prime Minister's stationery, bearing the address "10, Downing Street, Whitehall", and the source text indicates that it was dispatched to London in the GUNFIRE series.

² Not available in United States files.

³ According to a minute of September 10, 1944, by Churchill's Principal Private Secretary (Martin), this message to Stalin was "a draft provisionally agreed between the President and the Prime Minister during their discussions at Hyde Park on September 18. After further consideration however they decided not to send a message of this character to Marshal Stalin at present." (PR 10 Foreign Relations of U.S./8-20-71)

1. We are sending a full account of the conclusions which we have reached in our Conference here.⁴ We both much regretted that circumstances which we well understood made it impossible for you to be present with us and thus to repeat the historic precedent of Teheran.

2. In sending you our account of this essentially military conference we feel that we should be less than frank if we did not also express to you certain anxieties which are much in our minds about political developments in Europe. With the defeat of the enemy's armies, political problems will arise in all parts of Europe. It is essential that we should work together to solve these. We mention in particular the situation in Yugoslavia and Greece, in both of which countries there has been, and in the former of which there still is, the danger of civil war. There is also the position in Poland, which causes us much anxiety. We were all much encouraged by the success of the visit of Monsieur Mikołajczyk, the Polish Prime Minister, to Moscow, and we hope that the conversations which were there opened can be carried to a successful conclusion with your help. It would be gravely embarrassing to the smooth working of our affairs if events should so fall out that we were left recognizing Monsieur Mikołajczyk and his Government while you supported some other authority in Poland.

3. These and all other matters which affect our relations towards other powers we are at all times ready to discuss with you, in order to seek agreement through the diplomatic channel or by any other means. As you know we think it extremely important that we should meet on this and other important topics as soon as the war situation allows.

W[INSTON] S C[HURCHILL]

[HYDE PARK,] September 18, 1944.

⁴ i.e., at Quebec. For the account referred to, see *ante*, p. 478.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President*¹

SECRET

LONDON, 18 September 1944.

To the President from Winant.

Immediately following your directive that a mission to drop supplies on Warsaw was authorized² clearance was obtained from Moscow and the project organized. Bad weather has delayed the mission. I thought you would like to know that I just received a message which was flashed back stating that one hundred and seven ships today in clear weather had dropped supplies over Warsaw.³

¹ Sent to the White House Map Room at Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded to Roosevelt, at Hyde Park, as telegram No. MR-OUT-420, September 18, 1944.

² See *ante*, p. 397.

³ This mission of B-17's of the Eighth Air Force, using shuttle-bombing bases in the Soviet Union at the end of the flight, dropped 1,284 containers of arms, food, and medical supplies intended for the Warsaw insurgents. Of the supplies dropped, not more than 288 containers (and perhaps as few as 130) reached Polish hands. A second proposed mission was not cleared by the Soviet authorities. See Craven and Cate, pp. 316-317.

Roosevelt Papers

*Aide-Mémoire Initialed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*¹

TOP SECRET

[HYDE PARK, September 19, 1944.]

TUBE ALLOYS

AIDE-MÉMOIRE OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER AT HYDE PARK, SEPTEMBER 18, 1944²

1. The suggestion that the world should be informed regarding TUBE ALLOYS, with a view to an international agreement regarding its control and use, is not accepted. The matter should continue to be regarded as of the utmost secrecy; but when a "bomb" is finally available, it might perhaps, after mature consideration, be used against the Japanese, who should be warned that this bombardment will be repeated until they surrender.

¹ Some of the background for the inclusion of the third paragraph in this *aide-mémoire* appears from a memorandum of September 22, 1944, by the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush) concerning a conference with Roosevelt which Bush had attended on that date at which Leahy and Cherwell were also present. Bush recorded:

"The President stated that Mr. Justice Frankfurter had visited him a few weeks ago and expressed himself as very much worried about the future handling in the post-war period of matters pertaining to the secret project. The President apparently professed ignorance of what Frankfurter was talking about, although I do not know how far this went, and I certainly gained the impression that the President did not tell Frankfurter any more than he knew when he came. Frankfurter insisted that Bohr should see the President, as he and Bohr had discussed the future state of the world from this standpoint and Bohr had some very striking ideas. This was apparently arranged and the President had seen Bohr for a short time and listened to him. The President, however, was very much disturbed in regard to security and wished to know how far Bohr had been taken into the matter, whether he was trusted, and also how Mr. Frankfurter happened to know anything about the subject whatever. Lord Cherwell traced the history of Bohr's escape from Denmark, his introduction to this country, and so on. He stated that Bohr had similarly seen the Prime Minister after having insisted on doing so in Britain and had told him his ideas about future handling of this subject. These ideas, I believe, revolve about immediate disclosure of the subject, its use as a threat against Germany, and similar matters, and also a control by the British and Americans of the subject after the war, and I judge the maintenance of a peace by the Anglo-Americans on this basis. I then traced the way Bohr had been introduced into this country and in particular the care that had been taken to be sure that he was handled in such a manner that we became sure of his discretion before introducing him to parts of the project. Both Cherwell and I brought out the fact that he was a very important physicist who had been able to contribute and also that he had given us some ideas as to what was going on in Germany that were quite valuable. It also appeared in this discussion that Bohr had been invited by the Russians to visit Russia but had declined." (A.E.C. Files, Historical Document No. 185)

For further information on Bohr's views and the manner in which they were brought to Roosevelt's attention through Frankfurter, see Liva Baker, *Felix Frankfurter* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1969), pp. 271-278.

² This *aide-mémoire* was initialed in duplicate. On the copy kept by the British Government there is the following marginal manuscript notation at this point by Churchill's Principal Private Secretary: "actually 19th J[OHN] M[ILLER] M[ARTIN]." Concerning the circumstances in which Churchill sent Stimson a photocopy of the British original of the *aide-mémoire* on July 18, 1945, see *Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945*, vol. II, p. 1370.

2. Full collaboration between the United States and the British Government in developing TUBE ALLOYS for military and commercial purposes should continue after the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement.

3. Enquiries should be made regarding the activities of Professor Bohr and steps taken to ensure that he is responsible for no leakage of information, particularly to the Russians.

F[RANKLIN] D R[OOSEVELT] W[INSTON] S C[HURCHILL]
18.9

Roosevelt Papers

The President to the Secretary of State

[HYDE PARK,] September 19, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I have had lengthy talks with the Prime Minister in regard to recognition of the Provisional Government in France. He and I are both very much opposed to it at this time. The Provisional Government has no direct authority from the people. It is best to let things go along as they are for the moment.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

Roosevelt Papers

*Draft of a Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*¹

[Undated.]

The Italian people, freed of their Fascist and Nazi overlordship, have in these last twelve months demonstrated their will to be free, to fight on the side of the democracies, and to take a place among the United Nations devoted to principles of peace and justice.

We believe we should give encouragement to those Italians who are standing for a political rebirth in Italy, and are completing the destruction of the evil Fascist system. We wish to afford the Italians a greater opportunity to aid in the defeat of our enemies.

Italy has made real progress these last twelve months.² We believe the United States and Great Britain should give her³ greater political

¹ Attached to this draft in the Roosevelt Papers is the following typewritten notation: "This was not sent. It was one of many drafts. F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]. (Quebec Conference File)".

² This sentence has been crossed out by hand on the source text.

³ The word "her" has been changed to "Italy" by hand on the source text. The manuscript changes described in this footnote and in those which follow are all in Boettiger's handwriting.

recognition, and we propose to invite the Italian government to send its own direct representatives to Washington and London, and on our part we will give our representatives at Rome the status of ambassadors.

First and immediate considerations in Italy are the relief of hunger and sickness and fear. To this end we have instructed our representatives at the pending conference of UNRRA to declare for the sending of food and clothing and medical aids⁴ to Italy.

Along with this is the need for first steps to be taken⁵ toward the reconstruction of an Italian economy—an economy wrecked⁶ under the years of the misrule of Mussolini, and ravished by the German policy of vengeful destruction.

These steps should be taken primarily as military aims to put the full resources of Italy and the Italian people into the struggle to defeat Germany and Japan. We should assist the Italians in the restoration of their power systems, their railways, motor transport, roads and other communications, and send our engineers, technicians and industrial experts into Italy to speed the work of rehabilitation.

The Italian prisoners of war should be given opportunity to volunteer their full efforts in the fight against the enemy, to carry the flag of Italy into battle against Germany and Japan.

We should all look toward that day⁷ when the last vestiges of Fascism in Italy will have been wiped out, when the last German will have left Italian soil, and when there will be no need of any Allied troops to remain—the day when free elections can be held throughout Italy.⁸

⁴ The words "and other essential supplies" have been inserted by hand at this point.

⁵ This passage has been changed by hand to read: "At the same time, first steps should be taken".

⁶ The word "wrecked" has been changed by hand to "laid low".

⁷ This passage has been changed by hand to read: "We all wish to speed the day".

⁸ The following clause has been added by hand at the end of this sentence: "and when Italy can begin to take her own high place in the great family of democratic nations."

Roosevelt Papers

*Draft of a Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*¹

The President and the Prime Minister held further discussions Monday and Tuesday at Hyde Park, on subjects dealing with post-war

¹ This paper bears the notation "Original Draft" in Leahy's handwriting, and was the text tentatively approved by Roosevelt and Churchill at Hyde Park on September 19, 1944, subject to possible amendments to be worked out after it had been reviewed by Eden, who had returned to London from Quebec and to whom Churchill telegraphed the text. Concerning British suggestions for amendments, see the editorial note, *infra*.

policies in Europe. The result of these discussions cannot be disclosed at this time for strategic military reasons, and pending their consideration by our other Allies.

The present problems in Italy also came under discussion, and on this subject the President and the Prime Minister issued the following statement:

"The Italian people, freed of their Fascist and Nazi overlordship, have in these last twelve months demonstrated their will to be free, to fight on the side of the democracies, and to take a place among the United Nations devoted to principles of peace and justice.

"We believe we should give encouragement to those Italians who are standing for a political rebirth in Italy, and are completing the destruction of the evil Fascist system. We wish to afford the Italians a greater opportunity to aid in the defeat of our common enemies.²

"An increasing measure of control will be gradually handed over to the Italian Administration, subject of course to that Administration proving that it can maintain law and order and the regular administration of justice. To mark this change the Allied Control Commission will be renamed 'The Allied Commission'.

"The British High Commissioner in Italy³ will assume the additional title of Ambassador. The United States representative in Rome⁴ already holds that rank. The Italian Government will be invited to appoint direct representatives to Washington and London.

"Our governments are also willing to consider a revision of the present long terms of the Italian armistice,⁵ to bring them more in line with the present realistic situation.⁶

"First and immediate considerations in Italy are the relief of hunger and sickness and fear. To this end we have instructed our representatives at the pending conference of UNRRA to declare for the sending of food and clothing,⁷ medical aids and other essential supplies to Italy.

"At the same time, first steps should be taken toward the reconstruction of an Italian economy—an economy laid low under the years of the misrule of Mussolini, and ravished by the German policy of vengeful destruction.

"These steps should be taken primarily as military aims to put the full resources of Italy and the Italian people into the struggle to defeat

² An earlier, undated draft in the Roosevelt Papers has the following additional paragraph at this point:

"The American and British people are of course horrified by the recent mob action in Rome [the lynching on September 18, 1944, of Donato Carretta, former vice director of the Regina Coeli Prison], but feel that a greater responsibility placed on the Italian people and on their own government will most readily prevent a recurrence of such acts."

³ Sir Noel Charles.

⁴ Alexander C. Kirk.

⁵ Signed at Malta, September 29, 1943; amended by a protocol signed at Brindisi, November 9, 1943. For texts, see Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604*; Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949*, vol. 3, pp. 775, 854; 61 Stat. (2) 2742, 2761.

⁶ This paragraph does not appear in the draft referred to in fn. 2, above.

⁷ The words "food and clothing" do not appear in the draft referred to in fn. 2, above.

Germany and Japan. For military reasons we should assist the Italians in the restoration of such power systems, their railways, motor transport, roads and other communications as enter into the war situation, and for a short time send engineers, technicians and industrial experts into Italy to help them in their own rehabilitation.

"The application to Italy of the Trading with the Enemy Acts should be modified so as to enable business contacts between Italy and the outside world to be resumed on the basis of exchange of goods.

"We all wish to speed the day when the last vestiges of Fascism in Italy will have been wiped out, when the last German will have left Italian soil, and when there will be no need of any Allied troops to remain—the day when free elections can be held throughout Italy, and when Italy can earn her proper place in the great family of free nations."

[HYDE PARK,] September 19, 1944.

Editorial Note

The issuance of the proposed Roosevelt-Churchill statement with regard to Italy was postponed at Eden's request. Eden's comments on the draft statement, transmitted to the Department of State as an annex to a memorandum from the British Embassy at Washington dated September 22, 1944, were as follows:

"1. I much hope the President will agree to leave out paragraph referring to a revision of long armistice terms. We did not include this in our original list of concessions because (i) to do so opens the whole of our position in relation to Italian surrender and would enable Italy to call in question all its provisions including fleet, colonies, etc., (ii) We could not do this without prior consultation with Russia who is also a party to armistice terms. To omit such consultation would cause great offence. Dominions who have also approved armistice terms would certainly expect consultation before any announcement was made. It should also be remembered that long armistice terms have never been made public and that military authorities have hitherto been unwilling to do so. Parliament would certainly press to see terms if their revision is announced.

"2. As regards paragraph dealing with relief of hunger and sickness, as we understand it UNRRA's help will be solely in medical side, supplies for child welfare and displaced persons. Therefore it seems unwise to mention specifically foodstuffs and clothing which would certainly make more difficult the task of our representatives at UNRRA in obtaining agreement. I suggest therefore that these words 'foodstuffs and clothing' should be left out.

"3. Paragraph dealing with trading with the enemy as at present worded with its reference to exchange of goods would give Italy privileged position over all our allies and ourselves and would undermine United States-United Kingdom supply machinery. To avoid this danger I suggest that in this paragraph we should therefore omit last words: 'on basis of exchange of goods'."

Eden also suggested that the other members of the Advisory Council for Italy be informed before the statement was issued, and recommended a further postponement of ten to fourteen days. (865.01/9-2244)

Following a telegraphic exchange (not printed) between Roosevelt and Churchill, the British Embassy informed the White House on September 26, 1944, that the British War Cabinet had approved the release of the statement, as amended, for the morning papers of the following day. The Embassy also suggested a further amendment to bring up to date the paragraph relating to the session of the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration which was then meeting at Montreal. This amendment was accepted and the statement was released to the press in Washington late on September 26, 1944, for the morning papers of September 27. For final text, see *infra*.

Roosevelt Papers

*White House Press Release*¹

[WASHINGTON,] September 26, 1944.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL

The President and the Prime Minister held further discussions Monday and Tuesday, September 18 and 19, at Hyde Park, on subjects dealing with post-war policies in Europe. The result of these discussions cannot be disclosed at this time for strategic military reasons, and pending their consideration by our other Allies.

The present problems in Italy also came under discussion, and on this subject the President and the Prime Minister issued the following statement:

"The Italian people, freed of their Fascist and Nazi overlordship, have in these last twelve months demonstrated their will to be free, to fight on the side of the democracies, and to take a place among the United Nations devoted to principles of peace and justice.

"We believe we should give encouragement to those Italians who are standing for a political rebirth in Italy, and are completing the destruction of the evil Fascist system. We wish to afford the Italians a greater opportunity to aid in the defeat of our common enemies.

"The American and the British people are of course horrified by the recent mob action in Rome, but feel that a greater responsibility placed on the Italian people and on their own government will most readily prevent a recurrence of such acts.

"An increasing measure of control will be gradually handed over to the Italian Administration, subject of course to that Administra-

¹ Printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. XI, October 1, 1944, p. 338.

tion's proving that it can maintain law and order and the regular administration of justice. To mark this change the Allied Control Commission will be renamed 'The Allied Commission.'

"The British High Commissioner in Italy will assume the additional title of Ambassador. The United States representative in Rome already holds that rank. The Italian Government will be invited to appoint direct representatives to Washington and London.

"First and immediate considerations in Italy are the relief of hunger and sickness and fear. To this end we instructed our representatives at the UNRRA Conference to declare for the sending of medical aids and other essential supplies to Italy. We are happy to know that this view commended itself to other members of the UNRRA Council.


"At the same time, first steps should be taken toward the reconstruction of an Italian economy—an economy laid low under the years of the misrule of Mussolini, and ravished by the German policy of vengeful destruction.

"These steps should be taken primarily as military aims to put the full resources of Italy and the Italian people into the struggle to defeat Germany and Japan. For military reasons we should assist the Italians in the restoration of such power systems, their railways, motor transport, roads and other communications as enter into the war situation, and for a short time send engineers, technicians and industrial experts into Italy to help them in their own rehabilitation.

"The application to Italy of the Trading with the Enemy Acts should be modified so as to enable business contacts between Italy and the outside world to be resumed for the benefit of the Italian people.

"We all wish to speed the day when the last vestiges of Fascism in Italy will have been wiped out, and when the last German will have left Italian soil, and when there will be no need of any Allied troops to remain—the day when free elections can be held throughout Italy, and when Italy can earn her proper place in the great family of free nations."

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